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THE TEST;
OR,
PARTIES TRIED BY THEIR ACTS.

BY JUNIUS.

Author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and other Tracts of 1840.

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THE TWENTY-SEVENTH (WHIG) CONGRESS.

Its position.

It was a singular one in history—perfectly so in the annals of this country. The Government had been for a long time in the hands of their political opponents, till a once prosperous nation had been reduced to an extremity of misfortune, and rose at last to demand a change in public policy. With a majority unparalleled, the Whigs came into power, and a suffering people looked to them for relief. It was ~~for~~ they should, for it had been promised, though the expectations of immediate result were doubtless unreasonable.

The first inauspicious blow.

None can deny that the death of their Chieftain was an astounding event. It was striking the sun from the political heaven.

The second blow.

The constitutional successor was little known, altogether untried, and was never expected to be called to that place. Diffidence towards him was the first state of feeling; concern the next; which ended in utter and hopeless disappointment. All know how that turned out; and we need not dwell on the painful history.

An unforeseen result.

In the constitution of our Government, the Executive occupies a commanding position in relation to the other branches. It seems never to have been anticipated, that he could be opposed to the legislature appointed by the same constituency, nor would such an event occur, if good faith in these high relations could at all times be relied on. It is manifest, however, that an Executive, not acting in harmony with the legislative branch of the Government, but opposing it, is a derangement of the machinery as to its intended operation. His power is sufficient to paralyze legislation, and to nullify any system of policy aimed to be established by legislative functions.

A thing to be considered.

Since it has been discovered, that the second on the Presidential ticket of 1840, who succeeded as principal by the death of the Chief, is *not* the man he was taken for, but utterly opposed to the great and leading principles of the party that raised him to power—if he has any principles at all—it *must be considered*, that the legislative branch of the Government, the majority of whom were *true* to those principles, were rendered *powerless* as to that system of policy that was designed to be established by the political revolution of 1840.

The question to be tried.

It will follow, therefore, that the 27th Congress cannot fairly be put on trial for not having done impossibilities, but only for what they *could* do and *have* done, under the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed, to redeem the pledges by which they were bound.

The difficulties of the Whig Congress.

In the grave of General Harrison was buried the Whig administration. Could any one expect, that the effects of many years misrule could be repaired in *thirty* days? There was not time to begin to do it, before the adverse winds of Executive power were blowing strong against the tide of reform. Treason was hatched, and began to peep and strut abroad, before the successor of the Fallen had been in his seat ten days.

Another difficulty.

The expectations of the nation were great, and the people demanded relief speedily, earlier than in any case it could possibly be obtained. A country which for an eighth of a century had been operated upon by causes of ruin, till it was prostrate, could not be raised again suddenly.

Another.

Nor was it possible for Congress alone to do the work, against a plotting, sub-

verting, thwarting, and opposing Executive. They were paralyzed, and their power of restoring public prosperity was stricken down. Even their investigating committees, whose functions were designed to ferret out corruption, were met at the threshold of their undertaking by the agents and abettors of corruption, who held in their hands the keys of the knowledge that was sought for, and whom the Executive still retained in their places, thus refusing to furnish the necessary facilities of reform. Deep and large as the fountains of corruption that have been laid open, are, it is believed that most of them, by this cause, yet lie concealed.

The difficulties encountered on the currency question.

All know that this was the question on which the country had been wrecked: that it was the *great* question. And all know with what patience, self-torture, and self-immolation, the Whigs of the 27th Congress waded through the Extra Session, struggling with ceaseless though useless endeavour, to save the party and the country from such unexampled perfidy. Giving up half, or more than half, and trying in every possible way to surmount the doom that was cast in their face, *once, twice*, were their large concessions baffled by the arbitrary interposition of the veto power. What they could, they *attempted*; what they could, they *did*.

"Who does the best his circumstance allows,
Does well, acts nobly, angels could no more."

The Exchequer.

And why did not the Whigs of the 27th Congress adopt that? Can it have been forgotten, with what argument and eloquence the vices and tendencies of the Subtreasury, political and other, were denounced by the Whigs in the campaign of 1840, and how their reasons prevailed with the people? Is it not in equally vivid remembrance, that the Subtreasury was repealed by popular demand and acclamation, as conceded by its friends and advocates? But the Whigs believe, and have demonstrated, in the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, contemporaneous with the vote of 193 to 18, which sealed the doom of the Exchequer—in that document they have *demonstrated*, that it has all the vices of the Subtreasury, and many more to boot; that it is the most hideous government bank scheme that could well be conceived; that, if carried into effect, it would enhance Executive power to an extent hazardous to liberty; and that, in the hands of an unprincipled, aspiring Executive, of strong and influential character, it might be seized upon for the overthrow of all liberty, and for the establishment of despotism. It is futile to rely on the power of repeal, when the whole history of our Government shows, that the Executive will can defeat any movement in the form of legislation. The people cannot contend against this "fixed Constitutional fact," except by a revolution; and the only safe way is to keep out of its power.

The Whigs, with good reason and sound argument, had denounced the Subtreasury as a Government Bank in embryo, while it was in the process of incubation, and opposed it as such when it was hatched, and *because* it was such—*because*, confessedly, it provided a good currency for office-holders, *but for them only*, and left a bad currency for the people. How, then, could they, in the face of such facts, and in fealty to the principles avowed by them in 1840—principles so often and so widely promulgated, and still maintained—how could they adopt the *same* institution—*identically* the same, except that it was presented in a perfect stage of maturity, and therefore in its most objectionable form?

But what is a Government Bank?

It is Government stepping aside from its appropriate functions, and setting up in trade; for banking is nothing more or less than trading in money. It is, so far, laying aside the proper uses of Government, and usurping the rights of citizens—commercial rights. A Government managing banking concerns, is a Commercial Factory. No Government ever went into trade, in money or any thing else, without injury to the rights of citizens; or with gain to itself, except in the augmentation of its power, which is always its object. It is sure to sacrifice the commercial capital invested.

The insurmountable objection.

It is a very important point of difference, that a Government Bank has no Master,

because it is a part of Government, and an arm of its power; whereas all other banks have a Master in the Government. A national Government Bank, to answer the purposes of such an institution, aims to regulate and control the currency of the country, and in doing that, it—that is, the Government—brings within its power, to deal with at pleasure, every possible commercial or trading interest of the country, from that of banking in general, down to the vocation of a grinder of knives or a retailer of brickdust. It would be a supreme commercial power, in the hands of the supreme political power, controlled by none, but controlling all, itself master in trade, and master of the authorities under which all trade is carried on. This is the sort of thing which the 27th Congress rejected—*spurned*, as in duty bound, if they would respect themselves, and have the respect of the American people.

THE EXTRAVAGANCE AND CORRUPTION OF THE LATE ADMINISTRATION.

We begin with Congress, where reform in Government must first begin, if it begins at all. The people will doubtless be astonished at the extravagancies of this body for a few years past, in the administration of its own internal economy, and at the corruption practised and tolerated in its own bosom. Could a body, practising such things, and conniving at such things, be expected to institute reform for other departments of the government?

Cost of the printing, binding, engraving, and lithographing of Congress.

This is, in any case, a large item of expense. The subject had been under investigation for two or three years, having been started by the Whigs while in the minority, and in 1842 much information appeared in the form of Congressional reports, to which we are indebted for the following results:

It was found upon investigation, that the average annual expenses, under the above general head, were \$261,459, and that the average annual saving under the new system, proposed and recommended by the Committees, would be \$132,761; and consequently, that the average annual unnecessary expense, or *waste* in this item, is equal to this saving, viz. \$132,761. (See Senate Doc. No. 332, 2d Sess. 27th Congress.) In other words, the waste is 50 per cent. on the cost. That is to say, the Government not only permitted such extravagance to grow up in its own domicile, not only tolerated it for a long succession of years, but sanctioned it by solemn acts of legislation, to provide for it.

Contingent expenses of Congress.

This is an atrocious item in the history of the past, and shows how little dependence could be placed in a national legislature for general economy and purity, that would be guilty of such a lack of both these useful qualities in the management of their own household.

The custom of supplying members of Congress with stationery, &c., or the custom of members voting themselves a supply out of the people's money, on a *reasonable* scale, might not be very objectionable. It would be thought mean to oppose it, though when well paid, they might as well afford to provide for themselves as the people do in their own case. But the extent of wasteful prodigality to which this custom at last arrived, will no doubt awaken some surprise in the minds of the people who paid for it all, and whose private habits of economy in such matters, are somewhat different.

For stationery used by the 25th Congress, the first under Mr. Van Buren, we find such items as the following in the report of one of the Committees on retrenchment (by Mr. Summers), 2d Session, 27th Congress, House Doc. No. 30:

| | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| For 3,079 reams envelope paper, | \$12,503 25 | For wafers, | \$1,332 01 |
| “ 3,610 do. quarto post, | 21,059 25 | “ ink, 15 barrels, | 528 50 |
| “ 2,316 do. foolscap, | 9,951 25 | “ inkstands, | 921 00 |
| “ 172 do. note, | 1,559 50 | “ seals, | 1,080 00 |
| “ 493 gross of steel pens, | 4,569 39 | “ pencils, | 562 00 |
| “ 83,700 quills, | 3,953 12 | “ folders, | 615 00 |
| “ making of pens, | 448 00 | “ twine, | 312 72 |
| “ sealing-wax, | 3,931 62 | “ 1,197 memorandum books, | 746 87 |
| “ tape, | 2,739 30 | | |
| “ 106 doz. penknives, | 2,602 00 | | |
| | | Total, | \$69,514 78 |

Which, divided among 242 members of the House, shows, that the cost for stationery, for each member of the 25th Congress, for a period usually about nine months, was \$287.25.

How much is the average annual cost to professional men, lawyers, for example, for the above-named articles of stationery? The writer of this Tract thinks his occasions for these may perhaps be equal to those of a member of Congress, and he believes they do not cost him over \$20 a year—for nine months \$15—which leaves \$272.25 for each member of the House of Representatives, in the 25th Congress, unaccounted for to the people—in all \$65,884.78—a pretty round sum of waste for one branch of the national legislature, on the above-named articles.

How many penknives did they use severally? Divide 166 dozen, or 1272, by 242, and we have the answer thus— $5\frac{6}{106}$. The average price of these penknives, it will be seen, was \$2.04 and a fraction each, which, of course, makes a bill of a little less than \$12, to supply each member of the 25th Congress in penknives for nine months. His sealing-wax cost somewhat over \$16; his quarto post paper, \$80 and some cents; and so on.—We leave the rest with the curious.

We suppose the excessive price of these articles results in the same way, by which the Clerk of the House of Representatives of the same Congress, Mr. Garland, contracted with a favorite of the President, Editor of "The Democratic Review," to furnish stationery to the amount of \$25,000, whereon the said favorite cleared a profit of \$7,000 to himself, *over and above a fair profit* in trade, as was proved and reported to the 27th Congress. In this way, of course, a penknife, which, in a fair market, costs \$1.50, would cost the people over \$2; and so with all the other articles. But when there happen to be two intermediate agents, each to make an *extra* profit of 33½ per cent. on the same articles, that helps to run up a bill fast. It would be difficult to account for these bills, except in such ways.

It appears from Mr. Summers' Report, before referred to, that the whole contingent expenses of the House of Representatives rose from \$106,000, in the 18th Congress, till they attained a maximum in the 25th Congress, of \$595,000, increasing nearly 6 to 1 in sixteen years.

It also appears, that the contingent expenses of the Senate for the year 1838, under Mr. Van Buren, were *greater*, by the sum of \$86,000, than for 1828, under Mr. J. Q. Adams; and *greater*, by \$24,000, than for the whole *four years*, under Mr. Adams. A like result turns up in comparing the contingent expenses of the House for the same periods; viz. that the *aggregate*, during Mr. Adams's *four years*, was *less*, by \$89,000, than the same item for the *one year*, 1838, under Mr. Van Buren. (Compare No. 17, House Doc. 1st Sess. 26th Congress, with No. 39, House Doc. 1st Sess. 24th Congress.)

FINANCIAL PRODIGALITIES OF THE FLORIDA WAR.

The profuse and wasteful expenditures of public money, as partially disclosed under this head, and one or two others, might *alone* account for the startling expenses of Government during the two administrations preceding the one now current, as compared with our former financial history and the level of public expenditures as reduced by the 27th Congress. We have room only for a few quotations from the volumes of public documents on this and other kindred topics, which may serve as a clue to the rest.

Extravagant hire of steamboats and other vessels.

From the beginning of 1836 to 1841, the number of steamboats and sail craft employed in the transportation service for the Florida war, was 737, for which a very extravagant hire was generally paid. About *fifty* of these are named in House Document No. 458, 2d Session 27th Congress, and their rates of hire specified. We give the following as specimens:—The steamboat, John Crowell, estimated to be worth \$15,000, was hired at \$300 a day, provided for and insured, till the compensation amounted to \$82,555. The Reindeer, 42 days, at \$175 a day—being \$7,350. The Georgianna, 32 days, at \$200 a day—\$6,400. The Charleston, 10 months, at \$4,400 a month—\$44,000. The Mobile was paid \$11,625 for 25 days. The Minerva, 73 days, at \$300 a day—\$21,900. The Merchant, 85 days, at \$450 a day—\$38,250.

Many other vessels were hired for short periods, at rates, which, on settlement,

quadrupled the price at which they might have been purchased in the outset, so that much money would have been saved, if they had been bought and manned, and then burnt in the end.

The cost of a wagon.

Grant's concentric wheel wagon cost the Government \$2,363.50, of which Mr. Grant was paid \$654.50 for superintending the construction of it, and \$15 was paid for engraving plates on the wheels, to travel in the sands of Florida. *Ibid.*

Cost of 206 oxen.

The purchase and delivery of 206 oxen was made to cost \$12,187.20—for the oxen, \$9,170.00; to the agent, \$1,980.00; and for expenses in the transaction, \$1,037.20. *Ibid.*

Cost of house-rent and saddles.

A house at Picolata was rented at \$3,000 a year. For 30 saddles, \$50 each was paid. For 12 do. \$87.50 each. *Ibid.*

At Pilatka, in 1840, when the end of the war was every day expected, more than \$100,000 was expended in public buildings, *on private lands*, when there was government land hard by. It is of course sacrificed.

Probable collusion in fraud on the public.

The foregoing items of extravagance are hastily selected from heaps of evidence of the same class brought before the 27th Congress, by which it is proved, that the Florida war was generally carried on, in whole and in particular, at a rate of most astounding prodigality. All the public agents in these transactions, from the Treasury Department at Washington, down to the last recipient of the public money, were perfectly familiar with this daily round of facts, for a course of years. Can it be imagined, that in any state of society, however corrupt, such extravagance and waste would be tolerated, under the eyes of so many agents, if there was no *collusion* among them, and if they did not *all* profit more or less by it? Do not these facts reasonably account for the protracted period of that war, when so much money was to be made out of it by all engaged?

Great frauds in the removal of Indians.

The removal of 16,533 Creek Indians was made to cost the Government \$590,448.58. It is proved pretty fairly, by the Committee on Public Expenditures, that these 16,533 Indians *might* have been removed for \$186,530, thus making a clear saving, in this single transaction, *honestly done*, of \$303,909.42—nearly two thirds of the actual cost. (Doc. No. 458.)

It is proved in House Document No. 454, 2d Sess. 27th Congress, that Captain Buckner was paid \$37,749 for *doing nothing*; after having been paid a very exorbitant price for what he *did* do, in removing Indians;—and the most remarkable part of the disclosure is, that a high public functionary received \$18,000 of this as a loan from Capt. Buckner, *apparently* for his company and presence at the Treasury Department when the requisition was being made out. Whether such company *silenced* the scruples of the Auditor, this deponent cannot say. The evidence before the Committee standeth thus: Witness (Capt. Buckner) asked—"What he could do for him?" Ans. "Witness could loan him some money. Whereupon witness agreed to loan him. \$18,000."

All these accounts were allowed at the Treasury Department!

It is also proved that Captain Collins was entrusted with large sums of money, as disbursing agent, to the aggregate of \$582,290, *after* he had proved himself a defaulter to one-third of this amount, and that the Government lost by him in the end the sum of \$215,369. If settlements had been insisted on according to law, it would have been impossible, in any case of the most wilful fraud, to lose more than a small fraction of this amount.—(See No. 453, House Doc., 2d Sess., 27th Congress.)

Remarks on these facts.

Speaking *moderately*, it may be presumed, from the volumes of evidence of this description that have been filed by the 27th Congress, that by an honest and prudent administration of these affairs, the Florida war might have been brought to a close, and the Indian tribes all removed, *at one half the actual cost to the country*. Moreover, from what has transpired, there is also a reasonable presumption that the *period* of the Florida war might have been abridged by several years.

Can any one suppose there was *no collusion, no connivance* among those who had the responsibility in these great concerns, for the advantage, pecuniary or political, that might accrue to them personally? With some the profit was pecuniary, with others political.

Defalcation and frauds under the Subtreasury system.

We mean the system of entrusting the public funds in the hands of individuals, instead of keeping them in banks. It is not easy to collect an exact account of this, but from the reports of Mr. Secretary Woodbury—a reluctant witness—of 1834, 1838, and 1839, on this subject, we obtain the following result from his somewhat mystified statements, in connexion with other facts that have transpired, viz:—that the Government, since its foundation, had lost by *banks*, \$857,890.85; and by *individuals*, in the various forms of trust, about \$15,000,000.

It is now ascertained, that the loss by individuals in Mr. Van Buren's four years, as the result of his system of Subtreasury, was about \$5,000,000, if we include what has since been developed under the operation of that system, and through his appointees; whereas, the first *Whig* defalcator in public trust, for two years, is yet to be found out. The annual aggregate of frauds, therefore, of Mr. Van Buren's Subtreasury system, may be put down at \$1,250,000. The annual aggregate of like frauds by the Whigs, so far as has transpired—0.

It is somewhat remarkable, that the account between the Government and the United States Bank, as to loss and profit in all transactions for forty years, stands thus:—Loss to Government—0; profit to Government—\$1,100,000, for premium on stocks, besides dividends, and the gratuitous functions of the bank as fiscal agent of the Government for the said forty years.

A recollection.

All must remember the disclosures forced from Mr. Secretary Woodbury, under the late administration, regarding the frequency, character, and great amount of defalcations under the Subtreasury, and the concurrent proofs brought before the public of Executive indulgence towards the offenders, in continuing them in office after their defalcations were proved—all for *partisan, political objects*.

Frauds in the New York Custom House.

The enormities that have been practised in this "Seat of Customs," are prodigious. The defalcations of Swartwout, Hoyt, & Co.—amounting to about *one million and a half*, seem to have veiled the minor frauds. In three years, 1838, '39, and '40, George A. Wasson received \$94,430.92 for cartage and labor—nearly half for cartage—effected chiefly by charging for each package, 31½ to 50 cents, which was the price for a *load*—in that way making a load run up to *five or ten dollars*, according to the number of packages. The Stationery and printing, under Mr. Hoyt, for 1838, '39, '40, and 1st quarter of 1841, cost \$51,703.22—averaging \$275.76 a year to each person employed, being nearly *double* the average cost of stationery for each member of the House of Representatives in the 25th Congress, that being \$287 for 2 years. It was by allowing \$22 a gross for steel pens, when they could be bought for \$1.50; \$3.50 a peck for sand, the fair price being 12½ cents; \$80 a ream for paper, worth \$15; \$12 for 1 card of Perryan pens, or \$1.50 for each pen; &c. &c. &c. No difficulty in making it up in that way.

The revenue collected in the first year of Jonathan Thompson, 1825, was \$15,754,827; employed 142 men, at a cost of \$211,471; or at the rate of 1 34-100 per cent. The revenue collected by Mr. Hoyt, in 1840, was \$7,591,760; men employed 470, at a cost of \$563,829; or at the rate of 7 42-100 per cent.

In addition to the Collector's Salary, Mr. Hoyt, in violation of law, as alleged by the Committee on Public Expenditures, took to himself, in all, \$29,883.36 for *storage* of Merchandise in buildings rented on his *private account*, while the Government is charged \$29,294.24 for salaries of storekeeper, clerks, and inspectors, and for stationery, employed and used in said buildings.

Mr. Hoyt was reported to Congress by the Secretary of the Treasury, as a defaulter for \$226,295.31. But Mr. Hoyt, anticipating this, charged the Government (with his own hand, his clerk refusing) \$201,580, that is, 1 per cent, on \$20,158,000 paid over by him to the orders of the Secretary of the Treasury—that is, 1 per cent. for the banking part of the Collector's functions.

In two years and four months, Mr. Butler, District Attorney, was paid by Mr. Hoyt, Collector, for services, \$62,690.50. Mr. Hoyt's gleanings, it would seem, were somewhat less than a *quarter of a million* for about three years service. (House Docs. Nos. 202 & 669, 2d Sess. 27th Cong.)

We are sorry to observe, that the present Executive has in nowise abated the extravagancies of the New York Custom House.

Public buildings.

In 1836 Congress authorized the erection of a new Patent Office, the expense of which should not exceed \$100,000. It is now expected it will cost, when finished, between \$500,000 and \$700,000. The Custom House at Boston was begun under a provision not to cost over \$50,000.

It has already cost \$695,000, and will require \$155,000 more to finish it. The New York Custom House was begun with an appropriation of \$200,900, and has cost over \$1,100,000. [For more of the kind, see No. 460, House Doc. 2d Sess. 27th Congress.]

The Branch Mints.

Those were designed, especially the one at New Orleans, *to make Gold flow up the Mississippi. It seems they have rather tended to make it flow out into the Sea.* That at New Orleans cost \$554,470. The three branches cost \$822,457. They were established in 1838, and previous to 1842 had coined \$2,884,708. The Philadelphia Mint cost \$209,230, and in 1836 alone coined \$7,764,900. The cost of coining at the branch mints has been 28 cents and 3 mills for each dollar. The cost of coining at Philadelphia 13 cents and 9 mills for one hundred dollars.

Items expended on the New Orleans Mint:—\$8,099 for 4 bath-houses, flagging yard, and paving side-walk; \$3,846 for paving yard; \$1,700 for 7 baths and 1 water closet; \$818 for finishing water closets; &c. &c. The voucher list of expenditures, numbering 272, is a curiosity—especially edifying to those who pay for it. [House Doc. No. 462, 2d Sess. 27th Congress.]

Frauds in contracts for mail bags, blanks, &c.

From House Doc. No. 989, 2d Session, 27th Congress, it appears, that the cost of mail bags, from 1831 to 1841, was \$335,000; that Mr. Jewett, Ohio, contractor, was paid \$58,124.13 for 4,782 bags; that, in November, 1840, there were on his (Jewett's) hands 4,020 bags, not wanted, which cost \$65,000; that a large overplus was in the hands of other contractors; that bags could be got at 50 per cent. less than was paid in those years; that, for blanks, \$300,000 was paid between 1829 and 1841, generally at about 50 per cent. more than fair price, leaving a supply on hand for twenty years to come; that storage for these surplus articles was charged and allowed; that, by these and other frauds, the expenditures of the Post Office Department were made to exceed its revenue, one year, by \$386,759.19, and another year by \$220,000, thus requiring special appropriations out of the revenue from Customs and public lands, and rolling a heavy burden on the 27th (Whig) Congress; that Cyrus Barton, Concord, N. H., for blanks, from 1836 to 1841, received \$13,927.14; Beals & Green, Boston, Mass., from 1829 to 1832, for do., received \$51,732.76; Paine & Clark, New York, from 1836 to 1841, for do. do. \$18,883.81; S. Penn, Jr. Louisville, Ky., for do. do. from 1830 to 1841, \$26,942.58; S. Medary, Columbus, Ohio, in 1836, for do. do. \$17,546.34; &c. &c. &c.

All these, and other like favors, "*for being always at their post, actively engaged*"—"stopping at no sacrifice that would insure success"—"*in promoting the interests of the noble cause*"—"which heartily entitled them to Executive favor"—&c., as stated in letters to the President. See Doc. 989, as above.

The same Committee (on Public Expenditures) speak of the establishment of many new mail routes and post offices, not required, at great expense, for the benefit of partisan favorites, and of the "*deep, dark, and unfathomable sinks*," out of which these facts were fished, where many more of the same kind yet abide, which could not be hooked up.

Sundries of a like kind.

From Document No. 756 of the House 2d Session, 27th Congress, it appears, that the Commissioning of Ships, and the increase of officers in the Navy, have been at the discretion of the Executive; that the expenses of the Navy had been doubled in 10 years; that naval officers had been multiplied beyond former example, without sufficient cause; that the number in 1835 was 1,051 and in 1842 was 1512, when 365, with an aggregate pay of \$350,000, were "absent on leave, or waiting orders," that is, *doing nothing*; that many had been thus unemployed for ten twelve, or fourteen years, receiving pay, and being promoted.

*It also appears:—*That from 1834 to 1841, seventy-two naval officers, at different times, had been detailed into the "Coast Survey" service, and while thus occupied, received double pay; that the Revenue Cutter service, being at the discretion of the Executive, rose from an annual cost of \$163,755 in 1830, to \$274,803 in 1837, while the revenue collected had decreased about one third; that the expenses of the Land Office rose in one year from \$23,500 to \$103,750, and remained in 1841 at \$98,500, when the land revenue was only \$1,400,000; and that the expenses of the army had risen from \$2,100,935 in 1829, to \$4,197,023 in 1841.

Extra Allowances.

The above instance of 72 naval officers detailed into the "Coast Survey" service, with extra pay, is an example. This license, unwarranted by law, had pervaded the army and navy, and crept into other branches of the public service, to such an extent, as to amount, in the aggregate, to scarcely, if at all less than a million a year. It was a germ of corruption, of alarming growth, corresponding with the plurality system under the British Government, which the reformers of that nation are fast breaking down, and which has always been allowed to be one of the greatest enormities in the British empire.

Expenditures without authority of law.

Liberties of this kind, to a great extent, were taken, in the progress of the two administrations that preceded the present. A very licentious practice of voting large contingent funds, for the different departments of Government, had obtained, which presented temptations, and opened a floodgate of corruption, to the higher and lower public functionaries. Many hundred thousand dollars had in this way been put at the discretion of the existing Administration, no small portion

of which was squandered for most unsuitable partisan or private ends. The sacred deposits of trust funds of various descriptions, were invaded and exhausted, without sanction of law.

The new practice of having large outstanding appropriations, lying over from one year to another, which often amounted to many millions, enough in some cases for the annual expenditures of the Government, was introduced and carried on in the last two administrations, and has often been abused by applying such appropriations to objects not designated by law, at the discretion of the Administration. In this way, there was never any want of funds, when a partisan object required it, or a private whim was to be gratified, or favorites wanted patronage.

Secret and partisan emissaries were by this means sent out, under the guise of Government Agents, for this, that, or the other object, the chief errand being confidential. It was only necessary to have a *nominal* Government design, though unauthorized by law, to find an apology for drawing on contingent or trust funds, or on dormant outstanding appropriations. *Special Agents*, almost without number, were, from time to time, put in commission for home or foreign missions, on the basis of this practice.

Mr. George Plitt was sent abroad, as Post Office Agent, under Amos Kendall, at \$16 a day, till the expenses ran up to 9,666.64, the payment of which was sanctioned by Mr. Van Buren, as President, *without authority of law*. In the same manner three young men were sent out in 1839, by Mr. Poinsett, Secretary of War, to the Cavalry School, at Saumur, in France, and three more in 1840—all *without authority of law*. Americans sent to Europe to learn to ride and manage a horse, at the public expense, at the whim of a public functionary, and *without legislative sanction!*

An Administration partisan press also experienced the benefits of contingent and disposable funds in the hands of the Executive and his agents. In the two years of 1838 and 1839, Mr. Kendall, Post Master General, contrived to run up bills for advertising and printing in one Newspaper office, the Statesman, Columbus, Ohio, to the amount of \$9,848.21. (Blue Book.) And so it was done all over the Union, by the different Executive Departments at Washington.

Remark.

It should be observed, that the quotations we have made, showing extravagance and corruption in the Government, are only a few selections, extracted from voluminous and authentic public documents, furnished principally by that laborious and indefatigable Committee on Public Expenditures, whose toils in the last Congress have brought so much of hitherto concealed frauds to the light of day. The number and extent of them are hardly credible, and we regret that we have not space for more copious extracts. What we give is merely as a *peep* into the great mass, the entire of which will readily account for the extraordinary and otherwise unaccountable expenditures of the last two Administrations, *from whose books our facts and figures come.*

Comparative expenses of our Government at different periods.

The expenses of our Government down to the end of Mr. Jefferson's administration, appear to have been frugal and exemplary. The cost of Washington's administration, comprehending eight years, was only - - - \$15,892,188

Of John Adams's four years, - - - - - 21,450,351

Of Jefferson's eight do., - - - - - 41,300,788

As the war with Great Britain came under Mr. Madison's terms of office, eight years, the expenses were of course extraordinary, and mounted up to \$144,684,939

Monroe's eight years, - - - - - 104,463,400

J. Q. Adams's four do. - - - - - 50,501,914

It may be thought that the expenses of Mr. Monroe's and Mr J. Q. Adams's administrations, were disproportionately large, as compared with the earlier days of the republic. But the growth of the country may account for a part of it, and the grander projects of the nation, suggested by the experience of the war, for the other part.

But it is somewhat startling to find the expenses of General Jackson's administration of eight years mounting up to - - - \$145,792,735, being greater than the cost of Mr. Madison's eight years, which had the war with Great Britain on hand. But yet more startling is the announcement of the fact, that Mr. Van Buren's administration of only four years, cost the nation \$140,585,821. In eight years, at this rate, it would have been 281,170,642.

There are no apparent reasons, aside from the facts disclosed by the investigating Committees of the 27th Congress—nor are these *very satisfactory*—for this rapid and amazing increase of national expenditures. Besides, that the Florida war was unnecessarily protracted and unnecessarily expensive, as has been shown, by the corruption and frauds involved in it, that, even as it was, will not account for but a small fraction of this great excess of expenditures above all former example. And what else extraordinary was there?

Appropriations of the 27th Congress—great reduction of expenditures.

Appropriations are generally in excess of the expenditures, with a view of grant-

ing a liberal supply. The appropriations of the 27th Congress for 1842, being the last half of one fiscal year and the first half of another, falling in 1842, were \$21,609,754.58.

It should be observed, however, that the charges of the Post Office Department, *about four million and a half*, are a part of this appropriation, which should be deducted for a fair comparison, as the revenues and disbursements of that Department have heretofore been kept by themselves, and not reckoned with those of the Government. Nor was the debt of the District of Columbia, *one million and a half* (assumed), or the two per cent. land fund and land distribution appropriations, falling in this account, properly chargeable to this administration—all of which deducted, would reduce the appropriations for 1842 to less than *sixteen millions*.

The appropriations for the six months, between January 1, and June 30, 1843, were \$8,166,418.00; and for the fiscal year, ending June 30, 1844, they were \$16,332,837.00.

A comparison.

Compare the appropriations of the 27th Congress with the annual expenditures of Mr. Van Buren's administration, as reported by the Treasury Department, July 2d, 1841:—

| | |
|---------------------|------------------|
| Expenditure of 1837 | \$37,265,037 15 |
| " 1838 | 39,455,438 35 |
| " 1839 | 37,614,936 15 |
| " 1840 | 27,249,909 51 |
| Total | \$140,585,321 16 |

The annual average of the expenditure of Mr. Van Buren's administration would be 35,146,330 29

Compare this average with the appropriations of the 27th Congress for the year ending June 30, 1844, which may fairly be taken as the level to which a Whig Congress has brought the expenses of Government, viz. \$16,332,837, which is *less*, by \$2,580,656.19, than *half* the annual average of the expenses of Mr. Van Buren's Administration; or less by \$18,813,493.29, than the entire average; or less by \$23,122,601.35 than the highest annual expenditure of Mr. Van Buren.

Remarks.

A RESULT AND FACT of the kind above demonstrated, needs no comment. It will fall a CHARM upon a Government-ridden, long abused, and oppressed nation, and open their eyes to the past and the future. They will see—for it is *proved*—that the charges brought by the Whigs in 1840, against the then existing and former Administrations, of profligacy, corruption, and prodigality, are sustained; and that the expenses of Government for many years were nearly *double*, at least *one third* greater than what was necessary.

Bad Stewardship.

Mr. Van Buren came into power with *six millions of dollars* in the Treasury; he took for the *uses* of Government the *eight millions* of United States Bank Stock that was owned by the Government; he also took the fourth instalment due to the States by the Deposit Act of 1836, which was *nine millions*; the Treasury Notes outstanding on the 4th of March, 1841, when he retired to give place to General Harrison, were somewhat over *six millions and a half*; the whole amounting to about *thirty millions*, which is the amount he expended, during his four years, in *excess* of the revenues of the Government.

In addition to this, the outstanding appropriations on the 4th of March, 1841, were about *twenty-nine millions*. These, of course, were so many liabilities of the Treasury, and consequently so much additional burden or debt on the incoming Administration—swelling the whole account to nearly *sixty millions*, in excess of the revenues of the period of his Administration. It is fair, however, to credit Mr. Van Buren the *nine millions* of outstanding appropriations that were imposed upon him, when he came into power, March 4, 1837. We have, then, this result, that the expenditures of Mr. Van Buren's Administration, including his appropriations thrown upon the succeeding Administration, were *fifty millions in excess* of the revenues of his term of office.

Further than this:—The conditions of the Compromise Act of 1832 were about to strike off *five millions* of revenue in 1841, and *five millions* more in 1842. Yet the Government, in full view of the excessive expenditures of the past, and of this diminishing revenue for the future, had made no provision for this extraordinary and overwhelming state of things, brought about by its own profligacy and improvidence.

It is manifest, that no Government could long maintain itself under such a stewardship; and that in our case, from the moment Mr. Van Buren took charge of our public affairs, till he resigned them, we were descending straight and rapidly into a deep gulf of debt and ruin. Indeed, our momentum downward was so great, when he gave up the reins, that it was impossible to *hold up*—and here we are in consequence. We should, however, have done better, if treason had not prevented.

An illustration.

A steward is put in charge of a large estate for a given time, with plenty of money, with a regular income from the tenants equal to all expenditures, with no incumbrances on the property, but large sums due to it and at interest, and is bound so to manage it, as to deliver it up at the end of his time, in as good a condition as it was in when he took it.

But the first thing he does, is to spend all the money left in his hands; then he calls in the debts, which were intended to remain on interest, and spends that; by want of foresight, bad management, and prodigality, the income from the farms and other property gradually falls off, and there is not enough to keep the estate in order; by the same cause this state of things wears worse and worse, and the estate is running in debt; all his employees he indulges in the same habits of extravagance and profligacy, whose influence, coming in aid of his, helps on the general ruin; he is compelled largely to anticipate his income, and draw on the future; till at last, when the time of his stewardship has expired, the estate is deeply involved, is greatly injured by bad husbandry, the morals of the tenants are very much altered for the worse; and take it all in all, the next steward that comes, finds a hard enough task of it, to save the estate from complete ruin.

The story we have told is that of the last Administration of our national affairs.

Retrenchment and Reform.

THE GRAND RESULT of reducing the appropriations to a little over sixteen millions a year, is sufficient evidence of what the 27th Congress achieved, in the way of *retrenchment and reform*. They found every department of the Government more or less ill organized, inefficient, extravagant, and corrupt, exerting a most pernicious influence on the morals of the people, and squandering the public funds by tens of thousands, and by millions. The expenditures of the Government, by such means, had been *tripled* since the administration of Mr. J. Q. Adams; but the 27th Congress, by applying the axe of retrenchment, with a salutary vengeance, brought the expenditures back again—*fully back*, if we take into consideration the growth of the country. Boldly did they take the axe in hand, right lustily did they wield it, with coats and hats off, and the result is announced to the world. They spared not the estimates sent in by the Executive Departments, but cut them down by millions.

The cases to which the knife of excision, or the grubbing tools of eradication, have been applied, are too numerous for specification in our limits. We can only speak of them generally.

Some millions were lopped off from the expenses of the army, by an Act which reorganized and reduced it largely, and abolished numerous sinecures, and the corrupt custom of *extra allowances*, which sometimes exceeded regular pay, and which, as a whole, were enormous. The abuses that had crept into the army, augmenting expenditures, were flagrant and startling. They were boldly taken in hand, and provided against for the future.

There was the Board of Navy Commissioners in their easy chairs at Washington, deteriorating the Navy every day, and wasting money in vast sums by their decisions. It was abolished; and the whole Navy Department was reorganized by an Act of Congress, introducing a new system of economy and efficiency, as well in the machinery of the Department itself, as in the various branches of the naval service—thereby retrenching from *one to two millions* in the general service, and saving *many millions* from waste.

An Act was passed amending the organization of the Civil Departments, suppressing the system of contingent and general appropriations; cutting off the power of pensioning a partisan press, by ordering the public printing to be done on contract with fair dealers, in open market; ordering purchases and other Government jobbings, on the same principle; reducing and limiting allowances of various kinds—all a *saving of millions*.

The vast speculations and frauds in the Indian Department, Land Offices, and Custom Houses, were hunted out and reformed—an *immense saving*. The contingent expenses of Congress were cut down to an honest level, and former abuses corrected. All branches of the public service were thoroughly overhauled, examined, retrenched, and reformed—to the *saving of many millions*, as the appropriations demonstrate.

An instructive fact.

If the estimates of the Executive Departments, as sent into Congress, had been taken as the rule of legislation in the appropriations, we should have been but little, if at all, better off than before. The 27th Congress thought it their duty to cut them down *by many millions*. All this will serve to convince the people how little sympathy there is in the Executive for their burdens, and that they must look to Congress, if they have a good one, for retrenchment and reform. The Executive has no interest in such operations, but the contrary. From that quarter come all abuses in the way of extravagance and corruption. At that very moment, and all the while that the 27th Congress were doing this great work for the people, the Executive and his pensioned press were waging a fierce and savage war against them, and denouncing them as the *enemies* of the people.

Private Justice.

It is the highest praise of a Government, that it respects *private Justice*. A large national debt had been hanging over us for many years, in the form of *private claims*, which Congress after Congress had warded off, and refused to hear, lest they should have money to pay. That *appears* to have been the reason that had filled the hearts of widows, orphans, and decrepid old men, with despair for a nation's injustice. It is certain, that former Congresses found enough other ways for their money.

But the 27th Congress marched straight into these long arrears, examined the files, heard about a *thousand* cases, and granted relief in a little less than *three hundred*, which added so much to the demands on the Treasury. But it was *Just*. The appropriations for *private claims* at the last session were a little less than *one thirtieth* of the whole amount for a single year. We have not the means of exact comparison, but we think the private claims *acted upon* by the last Congress, were *six*, if not *ten* to one of the average of the preceding *six Congresses*—all which were left a debt by the preceding Administrations on the present.

The time occupied in the Sessions of the 27th Congress.

It was 450 days, about sixteen months—the longest time any other American Congress ever sat, by about three months. This has been made a subject of accusation without considering, 1. That they had the *Apportionment* on a new census to fix, a work the materials of which are ten years accumulating, for which it would be no more than fair to allow *one month*. 2. That they had the *Tariff* to readjust, another accumulation of ten years, which may fairly be put down for *three months*, on account of the greatness and difficulties of the task, in the peculiar circumstances of the case. There were between *six and seven hundred* articles to legislate upon, each of which was enough for a separate bill. *Six* plans of *Tariff* were got up, *four* passed, and *two* were vetoed. 3. *The currency question*, which, including all the hindrances and embarrassments occasioned by the Vetoes, and the new projects in the form of Exchequer plans, probably did not consume less than *three months*. 4. For the labors in retrenchment and reform, it is proper to allow *another month*.

All these will probably be allowed to be *extraordinary*, not usually claiming the attention of Congress; and they amount altogether to *eight months*—which is half the time occupied by the three Sessions.

When, therefore, these facts are considered, in connexion with the grand total of their labors, that the aggregate of the Reports made in both Houses, was 1849; of joint resolutions and bills acted on, 1328; and of laws finally passed, 514; the laws averaging as much *more than one a day*, as 514 exceeds 450, a far greater proportion than any other Congress ever did in a given time; when all this is considered, the accusation falls to the ground, and the 27th Congress stands forth, not only vindicated, but entitled to the highest praise, in this particular. Certainly, it can never be said, that, by their protracted Sessions, they have *increased* the expenses of Government, when it is proved, that they have *reduced* them *one half*.

The discipline of the 27th Congress.

Notwithstanding all the clamor about gag-laws, suppression of the freedom of debate, &c., it is now generally conceded, even by the opposition in the late Congress, certainly it is felt by the country, that the one hour rule, and the assumption in the House of Representatives of the right to limit debate in Committee of the Whole, are among the best and most important regulations ever adopted by a deliberative body. It is a great reform, and it was by this, and by this only, that the 27th Congress were enabled to accomplish such a vast amount of business so greatly in excess of all preceding Congresses, in a given time.

The custom that had grown up, of allowing one speech to be spun out two, sometimes three whole days, was an outrage, that should be scouted from the nation, with the indignant voice of popular reprobation.

Land Distribution.

Although, like the action of Congress on the currency question, this also was a failure by the interposition of the veto power, it was nevertheless a prominent and important feature in the history of the 27th Congress.

The terms of the cession were, that these "lands shall be a *common fund* for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or *shall* become members of the Confederacy, according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure," after the objects of cession shall have been answered. General Jackson, in his message of 1832, says, "as the lands may now be considered as *released from the pledge*, the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished, it is in the discretion of Congress to dispose of them," &c.

Besides the equity and consequent obligations of the case, there are *four* cogent political and eminently practical reasons, which urge distribution in *some* form. 1. The States are but integral parts of a whole—the Union. If the parts are weak, the whole is weak; and if the parts are strong, the whole is strong. The interests of the parts cannot be disjoined from those of the whole. 2. In the Federal Constitution, the States have relinquished the right of collecting revenue from imposts, and it is vested in the United States. This will naturally be regarded as conferring some obligations on the United States to be at least *considerate* and *kind* towards the States in their needs, when in danger of being driven to direct taxation for want of this power, and to help them if they can without violating the Constitution. 3. It will always be felt, and we think with truth and justice, and felt more and more, that it was the action of the Federal Government, which brought the indebted States and other parties, and the country generally, into these difficulties. Hence arises the obligation to render assistance, when it can be done in a proper and Constitutional way. 4. The importance of rescuing the tariff system from the fluctuating influence of an ever shifting land revenue, and the practical evils resulting from this connexion, would seem sufficient to make it better to *give away* the public lands, than to have such a disturbing cause for ever acting on the *Tariff* policy. Once dispose of this agitating question, and let the General Government depend on a *Tariff* for support, we may then hope for a permanent and uniform system of revenue and finance.

Funding the public debt.

This was a part of the doings of the 27th Congress. It will have been seen in a former part of this Tract, in what an embarrassed condition Mr. Van Buren left the Treasury and the public finances; that he *came in* with *six millions* in the Treasury, afterwards took the *eight millions* of United States bank stock, and the *nine millions* instalment due the States—in all, with their fractions and interest, about *twenty-four millions over and above the revenue*—and that he *went out*, leaving the Treasury involved with *six millions and a half of debt*, in the form of Treasury notes, and other liabilities in the form of outstanding appropriations, amounting in all to nearly *thirty-five millions*. Add this *thirty-five millions* to the *twenty-four millions*, above referred to.

and deduct nine millions of outstanding appropriations left for Mr. Van Buren to provide for when he came into power, and we have the result of *fifty millions run up by Mr. Van Buren in his four years, over and above the public revenue.*

Beside all this, there was a constantly *descending* revenue, resulting from the conditions of the compromise act of 1832, and from the misfortunes of the country. *Five millions were to fall off by the first of these causes, in 1841, and five millions more in 1842.*

With this astounding state of things, inherited by the new administration, with *such* a debt, *such* liabilities of the Treasury, and *such* a revenue—what was to be done?

The Whigs of the 27th Congress, like all honest men, were compelled to *recognise the debt*; to call it by its right name; but what should they do with it, and how provide for the prospect before them? They took the bull by the horns at once, put a ring in his nose, and got him under control, instead of hanging on to his tail, and being dragged after him in his wild and furious career, as the previous administration had done. *They funded the debt*, or a small part of it, *twelve millions*, and undertook to manage the rest as well as they could, by Treasury notes and other expedients, till prosperity might return under the operation of the contemplated Tariff.

Providing for the extinction of the public debt.

When a man has got in debt, if not discouraged, he undertakes to get out by fresh enterprise and frugality. There was no other way for the 27th Congress to provide for the extinction of the public debt imposed upon them by the previous administration, but by restoring public prosperity by a Tariff. This they put in order, and by it the nation may gradually be relieved of all its burdens.

Who created this public debt?

In view of the facts we have presented, it might seem very superfluous to put this question, and yet the Locofoco press throughout the country is constantly iterating and reiterating the charge, that the Whigs made it.

We observe a *confession* from the Hon. Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, in circulation, of a debt of \$7,480,692.18, on the 4th of March, 1841, when Mr. Van Buren retired—which he (Mr. Johnson) professes to have got from the Treasury. Add to this the outstanding appropriations, not reckoned by him, of \$23,906,090.76, (House Doc. 281, 2d. Sess. 27th Con.), saddled on the incoming administration, and it makes the debt thus descending, or inherited, \$35,386,782.94. These being the liabilities of the Treasury on that occasion, constitute the true story of the debt.

The amount of these outstanding or undrawn appropriations, is remarkable. One fourth of this would be an egregious fault at any time. But the out-going administration on the 4th of March, 1841, had used up all funds, run down the revenue, got in debt, and found it *convenient* to saddle the burden on their successors, who had to provide for it all.

Mr. Van Buren's furtive mode of creating a public debt.

There is another cause of national debt which may be called *furtive*, growing out of the last administration, and *stealing* upon the present. It was neglecting to provide a revenue for the future, or permitting our only system of revenue to *run down or run out*. They *broke it down*. A Government is as much bound to provide for four years to come, as for next year; or is as responsible for breaking down the revenue for four coming years, as for one. By such means it *entails* a national debt. It is precisely the same as if it had left one.

It has been seen, that Mr. Van Buren used up *thirty millions* more than the revenue of his term of office; that he left more than *thirty millions* of a positive burden on the succeeding administration; and in addition to all this, he so managed our financial system, that it would not be possible to get more than *half* as much revenue in the next four years as he got in his term, without a new organization, the benefits of which could not be realized under two or three years—scarcely less than four. All these things considered, the burden entailed by Mr. Van Buren on the succeeding administration, could not be less than *fifty millions*—a sum nearly enough to support a prudent administration for a whole term of four years.

The worst thing of all.

It were a small matter, that the expenses of Government should have been raised *one half or one third* higher than was necessary, by fraud, peculation, defalcation, and extravagance, pervading all its departments, as has been proved in these pages, if the destruction of the currency and other ruinous disasters, brought upon the whole nation and all its parts, by a mistaken and fatal policy, had not rendered the burden so heavy—so intolerable; and if, moreover, the Government had not allowed the system of revenue itself to be broken down, thus leading to direct taxation of a people, who, by such causes, had been made so poor as to have nothing to pay it with. If they had left us the old state of things, our prosperity and our means, they might have run up the expenses of Government to *fifty*, or even a *hundred millions* a year—and we could have borne and carried it all easily.

Confession of Mr. Woodbury.

In December, 1840, Mr. Woodbury, then Secretary of the Treasury, said in his annual Report:—

"Thus the progressive reduction of the present Tariff, which has been going on since 1833, will, after December, 1841, take effect to a much larger extent than heretofore. Nearly two millions and a half will then be deducted at once.

"On the 1st of July afterwards, at least two millions and a half more of duties will be removed; making an aggregate in six months, of quite five millions. If the imports then should not differ much from those in 1833, this would leave an income from them not probably exceeding ten or eleven millions of dollars yearly. It will therefore be necessary to make corresponding reductions in the expenditures of 1842, or seasonably provide otherwise, in some permanent manner, to supply all wants likely to happen from this cause."

This is a confession to be noted, as coming from Mr. Woodbury, whose faculty of concealing such truths was pre-eminent. As a peep into the future from that position, however, and as usual for him, it does not disclose a thousandth part of the difficulties to be encountered, arising out of the improvidence and wastefulness of the Administration of which he was a part. There is, nevertheless, in this confession, a foreshadowing of a coming crisis. That Crisis, induced by the previous administration, the Whigs of the 27th Congress had to meet, and provide for. Mr. Van Buren and his friends, adhering to their principles, would have been overthrown by it. They could never have repaired the mischief they had done.

The Districting Law.

The Constitution, on this subject, reads thus:—"The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators."

Now, it happens, that the law of the 27th Congress, requiring each State to be divided into as many Congressional districts as there are Representatives, to the end that each member may represent his own district, still leaves the detail of these regulations, as to "times, places, and manner of holding the elections, to be prescribed by the State legislatures," as above directed by the Constitution, so that nothing of the power thus vested in the States, is taken away, notwithstanding the right of Congress to "alter such regulations by law at any time," is clearly given in the same sentence. There is therefore not the slightest invasion of the pretended claim of the States, by this law. They are only required to elect by Districts, instead of the general ticket.

The benefits of the district system are, 1. *Uniformity* in the mode of elections. Before, some, and most of the States, acted on the district system; others elected by general ticket. 2. *Fairness* to all political parties. It might happen, when the majority of the people of the United States were of one political party, that the adoption of the general ticket in two or three States, should give the opposite party the ascendancy in Congress—a very improper advantage. 3. The District system: is *more democratic*, and gives a chance to every district to elect a man whom the people know, to represent them and their interests; whereas the other system is controlled by the nominations of a few political demagogues, who thus control the people of a whole State, and the people of the Union. It is *anti-democratic*.

If Representatives elected by general ticket should be admitted into the next Congress, it will be against a law of the land—it will be nullification in the boldest form, the nullifiers standing up and acting in the capacity of the Supreme legislators.

The remedial Justice bill.

In the passage of this bill, the 27th Congress had to grapple with and settle one of the most delicate and most momentous questions involved in the relations of Federal and State Jurisdictions. All know, that the Constitution forbids the States to make war, or peace, or treaties with foreign powers; from which it might justly be inferred, that no State has a right so to exercise its independent authorities as to breed war. Yet it is manifest, that such was the tendency and hazard of the action of the New York authorities in the case of Alexander M'Leod.

The object attained by the Remedial Justice bill, is to bring all such questions, involving international relations, under the Federal Jurisdiction, and into the Courts of the United States, where they properly belong, so that it shall not be in the power of the authorities of a single State to involve the United States in war.

The Tariff.

This is a difficult subject, both in theory and practice. Facts only can decide the questions that rise.

Tariff axioms.

1. *Free trade means fair trade*, in popular phrase. 2. *Fair trade* requires, that if one nation has a tariff, its neighbor, trading with it, must have an equal one, for self-protection. 3. And consequently, the principles of free trade, require equal tariffs, or none at all. 4. Since other nations, with which we trade, have tariffs, we must have one too, to maintain our own rights, or unwisely suffer disadvantage and loss. 5. *Reciprocity* in tariffs is a principle of free trade—that is, the same practically.

Specimens of foreign tariffs.

The British Tariff on Louisiana sugar is 20 per cent.; on molasses, 400 do.; on American tobacco, 1200 do.; on our spirits from grain, 2700 do.; on our wheat, 60 do.; on our salt beef, 80 do.; on our pork, 68 do.; on our bacon, 85 do.; on our timber, 96 do.; on our staves, 110 do.; &c. &c. &c. British duties on our most important agricultural staples—cotton excepted—are intended to be prohibitory, and are so. The duties collected in Europe on American tobacco are thirty-five millions of dollars annually—equal to the average annual expenditure of Mr. Van Buren's Administration; and double of the annual appropriations of the 27th (Whig) Congress. Surely, it is no more than fair to get something back for all this which foreigners get out of us—at least half of what Europe gets on our tobacco, which would amply support our Government under a Whig Administration.

Objections to the Tariff of 1842.

It is said it is *too high*. The following is a comparative statement (direct from the Treasury Department) of the Tariffs of 1824, '28, '32-3, and '42, in regard to a list of some of the most important articles, by which it will be seen that there is no foundation for this objection:—

| Species of Merchandise. | Rates of duty under the Tariffs of | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 1824. | 1828. | 1832-3. | 1842. |
| Cloths and cassimeres | 36½ per ct. | 55 per ct. | 50 per ct. | 40 per ct. |
| Merino shawls of wool | 30½ " | 55 " | 50 " | 40 " |
| Blankets not above 75 cents each | 27½ " | 38½ " | 5 " | 15 " |
| " above 75 cents each | 27½ " | 38½ " | 25 " | 25 " |
| Woolen hosiery, gloves, mitts, &c. | 27½ " | 38½ " | 25 " | 20 " |
| Worsted stuffs | 27½ " | 27½ " | free | 30 " |
| Worsted yarn | 30½ " | 30½ " | 20 per ct. | 30 " |
| Woolen yarn | 36½ " | 36½ " | 50½ & 4 cts. | 30 " |
| Other manufactures of wool | 36½ " | 36½ " | 50 per ct. | 40 " |
| Wool unmanufactured not above 8 cts. per pound | 16½ " | 55½ & 4 cts. | free | 5 " |
| " above 8 cents per pound | 33 " | 55½ & 4 cts. | 40½ & 4 cts. | 30½ & 3 cts. |
| Flannels | 36½ " | 49½ per ct. | 16 cts. | 14 cts. |
| Baizes | 30½ " | 40½ " | 18 " | 14 " |
| Cotton bagging | 34 cts. | 5 cts. | 34 " | 4 " |
| Clothing ready made | 33 per ct. | 55 per ct. | 50 per ct. | 50 per ct. |
| Sugar, brown | 3 cts. | 3 cts. | 2½ cts. | 2½ cts. |
| " white clayed &c. | 4 " | 4 " | 3½ " | 4 " |
| " loaf | 12 " | 12 " | 12 " | 6 " |
| Cheese | 9 " | 9 " | 9 " | 9 " |
| Lard | 3 " | 3 " | 3 " | 3 " |
| Lead, pig, bar, &c. | 2 " | 3 " | 3 " | 3 " |
| Iron nails, cut | 5 " | 5 " | 5 " | 3 " |
| " wrought | 5 " | 5 " | 5 " | 4 " |
| spikes, | 4 " | 4 " | 4 " | 3 " |
| cables, chain, &c. | 3 " | 3 " | 3 " | 2½ " |
| Blacksmith's hammers and sledges | 27½ per ct. | 2½ " | 2½ " | 2½ " |
| castings, vessel o. | 1½ cts. | 1½ " | 1½ " | 1½ " |
| " other | 1 " | 1 " | 1 " | 1 " |
| round and Brazier's rods | 3 " | 3½ " | 3 " | 2½ " |
| nail and spike rods | 3 " | 3½ " | 3 " | 2½ " |
| sheet and hoop | 3 " | 3½ " | 3 " | 2½ " |
| bar manufactured by rolling | 150 cwt. | 125 cwt. | 150 cwt. | 125 cwt. |
| manufactured otherwise | 90 " | 1 ct.-lb. | 90 " | 85 " |
| Salt | 20 cts. | 20 cts. | 10 cts. | 8 cts. |
| Glass bottles, black, n by a 1 quart | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 |
| " n by a 2 quart | 350 | 350 | 250 | 400 |
| Window glass, n by a 8 by 10 inches | 300 | 300 | 300 | |
| " n by a 10 by 12 " | 350 | 350 | 350 | |
| " above 10 by 12 " | 400 | 400 | 400 | |
| Shoes and slippers, silk | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 |
| " prunelle, and other stuff | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| " leather | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| " children's | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Boots and booties | 150 | 150 | 150 | 125 |

It will be seen that the Tariff of 1828 is the highest of the four. It has been called "the bill of abominations." Yet Martin Van Buren, Richard M. Johnson, Thos. H. Benton, Mahlon Dickerson, Silas Wright, and James Buchanan—all voted for it. Messrs. Wright and Buchanan also voted for the Tariff of 1842, and twenty of the Loco focos of the House. Indeed, the credit of the bill of 1842 is claimed for these, because, it is said, *their vote carried it*.

It is also said, that the present Tariff will operate as *prohibitory, and diminish revenue*. It is a sufficient answer, to state the facts, that the highest Tariffs we have ever had, have produced the largest revenue, and that every quarter's return of the present Tariff, proves the same thing. These facts are indisputable.

It is moreover said, that a Tariff *enhances prices* of the goods on which it is imposed. Suppose it does, it is a voluntary tax, and in a Tariff like ours, it falls chiefly on the rich. But the thing is false, in application to a judicious Tariff, as the following statement, furnished by the Treasury Department, will show:—

| Description of articles. | 1816. | | 1825. | | 1829. | | 1832. | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------|------------|---------|------------|
| | Price. | Duty. | Price. | Duty. | Price. | Duty. | Price. | Duty. |
| Braces of 24 bits | s. d. 18 10 | per ct. 90 | s. d. 7 6 | per ct. 25 | s. d. 3 | per ct. 25 | s. d. 5 | per ct. 25 |
| Hammers, per doz. | 12 | 90 | 7 2 | 25 | 5 4 | 25 | 4 2 | 25 |
| Cupboard locks, per doz. | 4 8 | 20 | 2 7 | 25 | 1 10 | 25 | 1 3 | 25 |
| Steeleyards, per pair | 4 8 | 20 | 2 9 | 25 | 1 4 | 26 | 1 | 25 |
| Hinges, cast bits, per doz. | 3 2 | 20 | 2 3 | 25 | 1 2 | 25 | 1 4 | 25 |
| Compasses, rule joint, per doz. | 4 2 | 20 | 3 1 | 25 | 2 7 | 25 | 1 10 | 25 |
| Currycombs, per doz. | 3 10 | 20 | 2 | 25 | 1 4 | 25 | 11 | 25 |

The prices under 1816 show the rates before the Tariff of that year; those under 1825 show the effects of the Tariff of 1816; and so on. Like effects were produced by those Tariffs on nearly all kinds of goods subject to increased duty, cotton and woollen fabrics, &c. &c.

The Birmingham Factory of pins, in Connecticut, which, before the Tariff of 1842, was able to turn out a *million a day*, and *undersell* the imported pins, immediately *lowered* the prices *six cents per pack*, after the Tariff, which imposes a duty from 20 to 30 per cent. on this article.

The following are from the prices' current of domestic goods, at Lowell, Mass., immediately before and immediately after the Tariff of 1842:

| | | Cents. | Cents. |
|---------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Cotton drillings, - - - - | before the Tariff, | 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ | after, 7 |
| " shirtings, - - - - | do. | 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ | do. 5 |
| " " heavy, - - - - | do. | 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | do. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| " sheetings, - - - - | do. | 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ | do. 6 |
| " " wide, - - - - | do. | 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ | do. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Flannel, - - - - | do. | 10 | do. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ |

Woollens of different kinds fell from 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 20 per cent.

The Collector of the Customs of New York, Mr. Curtis, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, of Nov. 28, 1842, gives a long list of prices, before and after the Tariff, of articles on which an increased duty had been imposed, which proves, that the prices of such articles had in all cases fallen, except on the best brandies—and fallen largely, for the most part.

These facts prove, that a suitable protection of home industry and labor will enable domestic manufacturers to *sell lower*, and that home competition is quite sufficient to secure this end.

Any Tariff, therefore, that is necessary for an adequate revenue, supersedes the necessity of direct taxation, and is an unspeakable blessing to the labor and industry of the country, besides that it lowers the prices of manufactured articles, while the wages of labor, and the staple products of our own soil, everywhere rise. The farmer gets his goods cheaper, sells his products higher, and finds a ready market. By this means a foundation is laid for the re-establishment of a sound currency. It brings in the precious metals, and keeps them here. Accordingly we find, that since the Tariff of 1842, they are flowing in upon us with great increase.

The truth is, we can never have a sound and abundant currency, till the Tariff shall have had a fair and full experiment. For the want of it, our country had been drained of specie. It is now flowing back again.

Hence, the re-adjustment of our Tariff regulations, which, by the conditions of former legislation on the subject necessarily devolved on the 27th Congress, was, in fact, of greater importance than the re-establishment of the currency. It was a *sine qua non*—the former being indispensable as a basis of the latter.

The Tariff is necessarily the first step in our return to prosperity. Not an inch can be recovered, but all would be backward and downward still, without it. Hence the importance of the 27th, or Whig Congress, as the opposing party would never have granted this boon to the people, but would even now snatch it away, if they should dare.

What we have proved.

We submit whether the facts we have adduced do not prove, that there has been something *bad*—very bad in the administration of our Government for a length of years; and that the people in 1840 did not complain without reason, were not roused without cause.

To whom we are indebted.

To the Whigs of the 27th Congress, laboring under the greatest possible disadvantages by the defection of the Chief Magistrate—or rather by the betrayal of the insincerity of his pretensions—and contending with a powerful opposition that conspired with a treacherous Executive to thwart, undermine, and defeat them—to the Whigs of that Congress, placed in such circumstances, and warring with such difficulties, is the nation indebted for these discoveries and results. There is the GREAT FACT, the DOINGS of the 27th Congress, demonstrating what can be accomplished, even against such obstacles, in the way of retrenchment and reform, in bringing to light the hidden crimes of the past, and providing healing measures for the great misfortunes of the country.

What history will record of the 27th Congress.

It will say—That it was begotten of an injured people, in hope of redress; that it was the most talented ever assembled in the same place; that the majority of that body were men of honest political design, intent on great reform, so much demanded; that they were born to this great endeavor amid shoutings, lived under a cloud, and died grieving, if not lamented; that they had more important business coming before them, and did more, than any other Congress; that what they left undone, was not their fault; that they were placed in a position most anomalous, and had to contend with difficulties unparalleled, by the perfidious conduct of the Chief Magistrate: that they came in after a set of men, who, by many years of a ruinous policy and destructive measures, had broken down the currency, run down the revenue, run down the people, and run down the country; that they were required to build all up again in a day; that they performed miracles for the circumstances in which they were placed, introduced bold reform, and effected large retrenchments, in a Government for a long time not guilty of such works, but the contrary; that in fidelity of purpose and vigor of undertaking, they excelled all example of the kind; and that they began a great and good work, achieved much of it, and put down a stake in American history, which will be looked to and hung to in all future time, so long as men may hope for improvement.

The Future.

In 1840 the instincts of a nation in deep distress, were roused for self-preservation, and they triumphed. But *treason*—rank treason snatched victory from the victors. In 1844, the last great trial will come, and the weal or woe of this nation will then be settled. There is no escape. We have only to say to a disappointed, suffering, and half despairing people,—

Once more unto the breach, dear friends—ONCE MORE.

2

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No. II.

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Money.

MONEY is the *medium of trade*, or the means by which trade is carried on.

Currency.

Currency is that which *passes* for money, and, for the purposes of trade, is money.

Different kinds of Currency.

The classification might be more extended, but *four* divisions will answer our purpose.

1. *Gold and silver, weighed in the scales, and assayed by Chemistry.*—This is the currency of the world at large, or international currency, established from time immemorial. The stamp they bear is that of the Creator, and the tests applied to them are the Creator's laws. It is the only money recognized, as a common standard, in the commercial intercourse of nations. They constitute the *basis*, and are the *test* of all other currencies. All other currencies are sure to be *proved* by this, and none can stand in full credit, which are not convertible into this on demand.

2. *The legalized currencies of particular states and nations.*—With us they are the Federal coins, certain foreign coins adopted as a tender, and bank paper. These are all *credit* currencies. That is, the coins pass on the authority of law, and on the credit of the mint assays; and the bank notes pass on the faith of being convertible into specie on demand. Of the two, it will be found that the faith required for the use of coins, is greater than that exercised in the use of redeemable paper, first, because paper is tested every day by somebody at the bank; secondly, because coins are rarely tested; thirdly, because they are seldom found to be exactly equal to their credit value; fourthly, because, in the present state of the arts, they are more easily counterfeited than paper; fifthly, because they are inconvenient; and sixthly, because they occasion anxiety and hazard.

3. *All negotiable promissory notes, bills of exchange, letters of credit, drafts, checks, bonds, mortgages, and a great variety of evidences of debt*, are a valid and very common currency in the trading world. Some of the heaviest amounts of commercial transactions are done in one or more of these forms, at home, and with remote parts. These also are a *credit* currency.

4. *Parole currency, or currency of man's word.*—Among the yeomanry of our country population, more business is transacted by this, than in all other ways. It is the naked and most simple form of credit, and an honorable proof of sound morals. But it is an *actual* currency, and one of no less importance, than moral beauty. It is perhaps as sound, if not sounder, and as much to be relied on as any other. Certainly it is greatly used.

Remark.

These statements may serve to show the practical operation of the *great principle* of a credit currency, and the foundation on which it rests. They show, too, that society cannot exist, nor trade go on, without it.

What gives credit to a currency.

It is indispensable to the credit of a *common* currency, that it be always convertible into *specie on demand*. Otherwise its credit is instantly impaired, and it sinks just in proportion to the doubts cast over the prospects of redemption.

The reason of this.

It is because gold and silver, weighed in the scales, and assayed by common laws, are the *universal* test.

No legislation can force credit into a currency.

This truth is settled by experience. All governments have tried to legislate credit into their currencies, but without avail. France tried it in her assignats; Great Britain has tried it in various modes; we tried it in our Continental money; despots have tried it; but it always fails.

The reason.

Gold and silver, *weighed*, is the only *common* currency of the great commercial world. This test finds its way everywhere, into all countries, and to all currencies, in spite of legislation, or the will of despots, and says, *Pay me that thou owest in THIS money*, or in that which will command it. Trade is *voluntary*, as between two parties, and cannot be *forced*. It is regulated by the scales, with gold or silver in them. The moment legislation or a despotism says, *You shall take my currency for so much*, if it will not bear the *common* test, it is not *trade*, but *force*.

The conventional law of the great commercial world, *gold and silver in the scales*, is more potent than the legislation of states and nations, or the arm of despots. It cripples both, the moment they attempt to contend against it.

What constitutes the value of gold and silver.

It is not the fact that they are *money*, but the fact that they are in *demand* for a great variety of purposes of utility, art, and ornament, on account of their peculiar and excellent qualities. Money is only *one* of the innumerable uses to which they are applied, and it is because they are in demand for these *other* uses that they have such value in the shape of money. It is this demand alone that *sustains* the value of gold and silver coins, and of bullion employed as money.

What has given to gold and silver the office of money.

It is the demand above spoken of—a demand existing from time immemorial, and which is likely always to exist. If so, and *only* for that, gold and silver will always be the *money* of the world, as they always have been.

The proportion of the gold and silver used as money.

It is estimated, that trade requires about *one sixth* or *one seventh* of the gold and silver of the world for the uses of money; and the amount devoted to this function increases or diminishes, according to the activity and extent of trade. When trade requires more, more *appears* in the form of money; and when it requires less, the excess is absorbed by other demands, or lies in deposit, waiting for the more profitable uses of trade.

Scarcity of Money.

It is stagnation in trade that goes by this name. There is always money enough, and more than enough, for the demands of trade. When trade *invokes* money, it is sure to come, first, because gold and silver, used as money, are more profitable than in other applications; and secondly, because there are always traders who can command it, and who will be sure to do so when they can profit by it. It is not, therefore, the non-existence of money that produces what is called *scarcity*; but the want of profit in the use of it.

Where lies the responsibility of stagnation in trade.

Government can facilitate or embarrass, revive or destroy the trade of a nation. It is fair to hold the Government responsible in this matter. The maxim of Mr. Van Buren, "Let the people take care of themselves, and the Government take care of themselves," is as destructive as it is fallacious. It is subverting the design of Government. It destroys the legitimate relations between the two parties. It is monstrous. The appropriate function of Government is a parental care of the people and their interests; but this maxim destroys this relation entirely. No wonder at the result. If the Government would *let* the people take care of themselves, they would.

The Constitutional tender.

The Constitution of the United States has wisely ordered, that "no State shall make anything but gold and silver coins a tender in payment of debts." The effect, and doubtless the design of this rule, is to keep the way open for the only legitimate test for all currencies, viz., gold and silver *weighed in the scales*. The Constitution itself goes no farther than the test of *coins*, which is imperfect; but the aim of Government in the mint assays, is to keep the coins as near as possible to the test of the scales, which is near enough for all practical purposes, though seldom exact.

A false notion.

Some aver, that the Constitutional tender, gold and silver coins, is the only Constitutional currency. This cannot be maintained, first, because the rule itself grows out of the fact, and is based upon the fact of the existence and use of other currencies, and comes in to forbid that any other currency should be *forced* upon the public, by forcing it on creditors. So long as the creditor may lawfully *demand* gold and silver coins in payment of debts, his rights are sufficiently well secured. Secondly, to put an interpretation on the Constitution, which was contrary to the practice of the time, and which interferes with the necessities of society at all times, would be absurd. Thirdly, the rule, as we interpret it, is all-sufficient, as it leaves all currencies open to the test of gold and silver weighed.

The political effect of this rule.

The world is full of traders in money, or in the variety of currencies. The consequence,

under this law of the Constitution, is, that every variety of currency is every day and every hour brought to the fundamental standard, gold and silver. This is the practical effect of the law, which was doubtless its intention, and which is as good a protection of the public against false and spurious currencies, as society can conveniently furnish.

What the people will have.

In a free country, and with a trading, enterprising people, it is of no use to legislate against currencies, which the convenience of the public requires, and which the people will have, law or no law. They are the best judges of their wants and necessities. A State, for example, by an act of legislation, forbids the use of bank notes less than five dollars; but if the people want them, smaller notes rush in from other States, and the law is nullified. A State, it may be, thinks it best to try for an exclusive hard money currency by suppressing banks of issue and circulation. Immediately the country will be flooded with notes issued on the credit of private and irresponsible persons, "payable in goods at my store," at my price, and such like; or payable in notes of a foreign State, if five or ten dollars shall be presented at once, which is always inconvenient; and the chances are many to one, that, in the end, they will not be paid at all. Nevertheless, the people will use even such a currency, in spite of all law.

Congress refused to re-charter the Banks of the District of Columbia, and forbade the issue of notes less than five dollars, under severe penalties. The consequence was, that the depreciated paper of banks foreign to the District, rushed in; private persons set up banking without authority, and threw out notes payable in foreign paper, on conditions little better than not payable at all; shimplasters from unknown persons, of unknown value, and of all denominations, from sixpence upwards, were thick as leaves in autumn; and members of the Government, law makers and law administrators, were compelled to use them, in the face of their own penalties.

It is because the people will have a paper currency, however bad; or because they will use it, whoever utters it, or whatever be the terms of redemption. Such is the experience of the country.

An exclusive hard money currency impracticable.

As we have seen, coins are a *credit* currency; but some think we ought to have no other. A moment's reflection will show, that the present amount and activity of trade could not possibly be carried on by such a currency. If, for example, all the trade of the city of New York were forced into this mode, it would probably take all the dealers to count it, and all the porters and carters to deliver it; if all the trade of the United States were compelled to be carried on in this way, it might require all our navy to protect the many millions of specie that would be constantly afloat, and the army to guard the many millions more passing by land, besides all other expenses and hazards of transportation. The bare expense of an exclusive metallic currency, for the present amount of the trade of the world, would in a short time be equal to its entire value. Such a currency would, therefore, be perfectly impracticable. It would stop itself, and stop trade, except in the small way of barbarians. An exclusive hard money currency seems to have stopped at the line which separates barbarism from civilisation, freedom from despotism.

The best currency.

Except for small cash, in the way of change, and so long as the currency is so regulated as to be convertible into specie on demand, the best currency is that which combines convenience and the least intrinsic value; and that is paper, which costs almost nothing. Nothing is more convenient, and nothing costs less. Hence its use. All that the holders of paper money want to know, is, that it is good for its face, and will pass for that; in other words, that the bank will pay specie for it; and that makes it good. The less its intrinsic value, so much the better. When it is too much worn for use, the bank takes it, and nothing is lost; if it should be burnt, or sunk in the sea, or dropped by the way and never found, still nothing is lost, except to the owner; and he may be indemnified, if he can prove his loss, and specify the note or notes. In such a case, the bank is obliged to pay him, dollar for dollar.

It is apparent, therefore, that paper is the best currency in the world, so long as it is good for the amount in specie. It is most convenient, least expensive, and the safest. Among the inventions of trade, it is the *ne plus ultra* of modern civilisation.

The proper functions of gold and silver as money.

Except for small cash or change, trade requires but a very small fraction of the gold and silver employed in the office of money, to be in actual circulation; nor is it possible it should

be, in the present amount and activity of trade. It is more economical, as well as more convenient and more safe, it is absolutely necessary, that the great bulk of it should lie in deposit as the *basis* of the circulating medium. It does not require to be moved at all, except in such quantities as may be necessary to restore the balance of trade between commercial points, when one has become indebted to another, as New York to Boston, or Philadelphia, or Baltimore, or Cincinnati, or New Orleans, and *vice versa*. In such cases of the indebtedness of one place to another, which cannot be settled in the way of trade, specie travels to balance the account. In the same manner, present demands are settled between our own and foreign countries, on whichever side they may be. Except for this great function, the great bulk of specie lies still, and is represented in the trading world by more convenient and less expensive currencies. Such is and necessarily always will be the actual operation of the commercial world.

The American Banking System.

It is natural, certainly best, that the banking system of every country should be adapted to the genius and wants of the people. Hence, banking, as it grew up among us, had respect to the resources of the country, and the enterprise of our population. "Money makes the mare go." We had great resources, but wanted means to develop them, and thus to augment our wealth. To this end an augmentation of the circulating medium, over and above the specie basis, seemed to be required. How could this fairly and prudently be done?

Why thus:—Here is real estate worth at any time a *hundred thousand dollars*; and here are *ten thousand dollars* in gold and silver. Put these one hundred and ten thousand dollars together, under statute regulations, as a capital held liable for the debts of its trustees in their corporate capacity, and give them leave to issue on this basis not more than thirty thousand dollars of a paper currency, for which this capital is held exclusively liable. If the trust is honestly administered—and the penalties of fraud should be exemplary—the security is ample, and the public are safe. In case of suspension, the capital is three to one of the claims against it.

Now, although this case does not indicate all the usual functions of banking, nor in all cases its exact shapes, it is sufficient to characterize the *great principle* of our American system, to wit, to provide a circulating medium equal to the wants of the country, with a suitable regard to the safety of bill-holders and other creditors.

How such a system operates.

With the exuberance of our resources and enterprise, it affords the means of multiplying wealth in a manifold degree. Instead of one dollar to trade with, we have several, and they are all good, being convertible into specie on demand; or if, in an extraordinary crisis, the banks are forced to suspend for a season, the notes are still good, while the capital liable is two, three, or five to one of the demands.

The hazards of such a system.

When properly managed—and the law should secure this end—the only hazard is that of suspension in an extraordinary emergency of trade. Rightly understood, this need be no subject of alarm, as it is known by the conditions of the law, that the banks are allowed to issue more paper than they have specie in deposit; and consequently, if surprised by a run, or by a demand in excess of the deposits, that they are obliged to suspend. But the abundance of other capital held liable, is a sufficient security.

The benefits.

It augments the circulating medium, the soundness of which cannot be questioned, because it is proved every day at the banks, and thus gives scope to enterprise, and increased facilities to trade. It is to this system of a sound credit currency, that, as a nation, we owe our unrivalled march to prosperity and wealth. By the use of the *principle of credit*, thus modified and guarded, it has anticipated means, and produced incalculable wealth out of resources which otherwise must have lain dormant.

The Credit principle.

Credit is morality, and the exact measure of the soundness of the social state. To think of living without it, is turning the eye and footsteps back to a state of barbarism. Credit is the moral peculiarity of civilisation.

Origin of the war on the credit system of this country.

The President of the United States—that once *was*—having been used to command, and being little tolerant of opposition, proposed, without any right, a man whom he wished ap-

pointed president of one of the branches of the United States Bank; but the head and directors of that institution, very unwisely perhaps, declined the offer. Whereupon, the President of the United States flew into a passion, and swore the destruction of the bank. "Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth!" The said President of the United States, when he came into power, as much expected to sign a bill to re-charter the bank, as to do anything else. But this affair altered the case, and he had them in his power.

Stages of the conflict.

On the part of the President of the United States, 1. Veto of the bill to re-charter the bank. 2. Removal of Deposits. 3. Loaning the Deposits. 4. Specie circular. 5. Invoking the multiplication of State banks.

First effect.

The destruction of that part of our currency that was properly *national*, struck out of existence the *balance power*, the *regulator* of the currency of the country, in consequence of which an unsuitable and unsafe number of State banks, and a vast amount of merely nominal banking capital, sprung up, like Jonah's gourd, to die as quick.

It appears by the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, (House Doc. No. 111, second session, Twenty-sixth Congress) that the increase of banks from 1820 to 1830, was only 22, and the increase of bank capital, for the same period, only \$8,000,000. During this time the influence of the national *regulator* kept the unhealthy growth of State banks in check. But, behold the change! From the same document, *as above*, it appears that the increase of banks, from 1830 to 1840, was 392, (including branches, 571), and that the increase of banking capital for the same period, was \$213,000,000! It also appears, that this rapid increase did not begin till the fate of the national bank was sealed.

Another effect.

A large portion of these banks failed, and the capital vanished, as might have been expected. The United States Almanac, for 1843, (which we suppose is good authority), states the number of bank failures, as a consequence of the revulsion of 1837-42, at 116; the losses on bank circulation and deposits, \$54,000,000; and on bank capital, \$248,000,000. This is a heavy reckoning for the loss of a *regulator*. But the effect on the country, in all forms, is also to be considered.

Who are the bank gamblers?

In the increase of banks, from 1830 to 1840, *more than two thirds* of them were created by that political party that has taken the lead in denouncing banks; and well they might denounce them, for *more than half* of their own creation have *failed*, while *all but five* created by their opponents, during the same period, had resumed specie payments early in 1842, thus proving their soundness.

When a bank failure was rare.

During the existence of a national institution as a balance power, it was seldom the country witnessed such an event as a bank failure: but since this regulating influence was removed, the whole country has been devastated by bank explosions; and the United States bank itself, after it became a *State* institution, was swept away in the general vortex.

How the United States Bank became corrupt.

There is no evidence that this bank was unsound, while it was a *national* institution, but the contrary, if the proof of the pudding is in the eating. It always discharged its functions as fiscal agent of the Government with fidelity, without reward and without loss to the public; it yielded up the Government deposits on demand; the Government stock of six millions, and the dividends thereon, amounting to upwards of a million, were all realized; and it served the country equally well in the various functions of supply, regulator, and conservator of the currency. No man, or woman, or child, ever lost anything by it.

But, being driven off from its connection with the general Government, it was compelled, with its large capital, to take refuge under the wing of one of the States, where there was no room for it. It was like putting a seventy-four gun ship in a mill pond. Doomed to struggle against the continued and active hostility of the national Executive, it was tempted, for the employment of its capital, to go beyond the legitimate sphere of banking, into the field of commercial adventure, and commenced buying and selling cotton, &c., thus putting in jeopardy its capital and credit, till all was lost in the unanticipated revulsion of trade. Persecution furnished the plea of necessity; necessity led to crime; and crime ended in ruin—precisely as a man becomes a bandit, when society sets itself against him for a supposed offence,

and then lives on the spoils of his victims. It was the action of the general Government, after and because it became a State institution, that tempted it to crime, and the vengeance of Federal power that sealed its doom.

Some specific results of this contest.

First, the balance power of the currency was broken down. What followed that, we have seen. Next, the public funds, which the constitution had assigned to the custody of the legislative branch of the Government, got into wrong hands. Thirdly, they were used, in the way of their disposal, to carry on this feud. Fourthly, loaning the deposits was another stage of the same quarrel. Some forty millions, that had thus been forced out of constitutional custody, into ninety-six banks, were ordered to be loaned—equally unconstitutional. A cashier of one of the pet banks, in Wall street, said, (as stated by Mr. Webster in his speech on the currency, at New York, 1840), “he hardly knew what to do, for he was ordered to loan more of the public money than he could find security for.” The money was forced on speculators.

The effect of loaning the deposits.

It was a temptation, an enticement to general extravagance and wild speculation, and the whole country, individuals, corporations, and States, were seduced by the bait. Banks grew up like mushrooms, States launched out in internal improvements, and the whole community was infected with the madness of the time. The inflation of credit, produced by this cause, was unnatural, and doomed to burst. Ordinarily, trade, in its natural action, though in constant vibration, will regulate itself; but this unnatural impulse forced the pendulum to a fearful height, and its backward sweep put the whole machinery out of order.

A proof of this.

The history of the State debts shows, that from 1820 to 1825, the increase of State bonds was \$12,000,000; from 1825 to 1830, the increase was \$13,000,000; from 1830 to 1835, when this stimulant began to operate, the increase suddenly rose to \$40,000,000; and from 1835 to 1840, it was \$109,000,000, nearly the whole of which was issued in 1835 and 1836, before the destruction of general credit. The imports of 1836, tempted by the same seductive influences, were \$61,000,000 in excess of the exports; and the home speculations and adventures, prompted by this cause, were on the same scale of extravagance. *The people were unnaturally stimulated to excess by the action of the general Government.*

A Compact.

It cannot be denied, that there was a virtual compact in these encouragements to speculation held out by the general Government to the States and people of the Union. The investment of the surplus revenue in State bonds, was publicly talked of in Congress, and a Senator, regarded as an organ of the administration, said in his place, “that he was not afraid to recommend such an investment of the national funds, as the States would issue as many bonds as the Government might choose to buy.” That the seducer should afterwards turn round, and accuse and berate his victims for the crime of seduction, was not very kind.

The effects of the specie circular.

That was cruel. But it had now become necessary to break down all speculators, thus tempted into the field—individuals, banks, States, and all—in order to break down the prince of speculators at Philadelphia. The specie that was indispensable to sustain even tolerably the excess of credit occasioned by loaning the deposits, was suddenly withdrawn from under this stupendous superstructure, and sent to places where it was not wanted—and down came everything. Individuals went down in heaps, banks blew up in scores, States reeled on their foundations—and the whole country was prostrated.

Remarks.

The destruction of credit, and the great revulsion of trade in 1837–42, and the consequent calamities, public and private, have been ascribed to criminal overtrading, extravagant speculations, and excessive use of credit, not, perhaps, untruthfully. But all the blame has been cast on the people. It was the Government that brought this charge, to screen their own faults, while they were the cause of it all. Nobody ever knew trade or credit hurt itself, when left to itself, except in particular instances. A man, now and then, may commit suicide; but a whole community never killed themselves in a heap; nor did trade or credit, as the attribute of a people, ever commit suicide. It is too sagacious, too vigilant, and has too much interest at stake. It would be a paradox. Nothing but high and overruling causes, independent of itself and superior to itself, can disappoint trade, or destroy credit, through-

out the ranks of an entire community. But trade and credit, with all their sagacity, could never foresee such freaks as the Government of this country has played with them, or such folly and rashness as they have been doomed to encounter in the governing powers. The trade and credit of the country fell before the strong arm of Government arrayed against them in forms unanticipated, and till the facts occurred, inconceivable. It was impossible for the nation to stand up under such fitful and disastrous changes of public policy, on such momentous matters.

Result.

We had a good banking system, a good currency, a prosperous state of trade, and were doing well. *But—it was crushed.*

One error leads to a thousand.

It may ruin a world, and has done so. The removal of the deposits was an act of arbitrary power in a momentous concern—it was a violation of the Constitution. The great machinery of public finances, once out of order, there was no end to it. It is not rectified even yet.

The functions of a currency in the body politic.

It is as blood to the animal economy. Disturb it, or vitiate it, or impair it, or tie up its veins, or overcharge it, or drain it, or dam up its courses, or put clogs and trammels on its action, or in any way treat it rudely and unskilfully, the effect is precisely the same on the health and wealth of the nation, as is produced by a like treatment of the vital current, functions, and organs of the human body.

A Quack Doctor.

A certain doctor gave out that a certain great animal was too plethoric, and required bleeding; but the blood being precious, he proposed to infuse it by injection into the bodies of certain other animals of the same genus. But it only threw them into a fever. He then proposed to draw it off again, and infuse it into the veins of the people. But it gave the people a fever. Then he thought it would better suit the bodies of the backwoodsmen, and he gave it to them by a like process. But, unfortunately, all the bodies thus practised upon, rather grew worse, and showed symptoms of a fatal termination. The virus, once communicated, became a raging epidemic. States caught it, cities and villages caught it, all manner of corporations caught it, individuals caught it, the whole nation was seized of it, new and artificial beings started into mushroom life, to get a little of the blood, and, after a feverish existence, died. At last, the fever being spent, there was an universal collapse, and all remedies failed to bring the patients to.

Can this country do without a bank paper medium?

We have shown that it cannot do without a paper medium, nor does any sensible man dream that it can. The question, then, is, whether we shall use the paper of private and irresponsible persons, who are a law unto themselves, or whether we shall have a law-regulated currency, involving in it a proper responsibility to the public? Manifestly, there can be but one answer to this question. The people have decided in favor of a mixed currency, that they may always have a choice between gold, silver, and paper.

Question of a national paper medium.

The next question is, whether it is best for the States alone to furnish a paper currency, or whether we shall have a national paper medium also? If experience be of any weight, we all know that we have always had trouble, and infinite trouble, when the States alone have done this. It was so before we had a national paper medium; it was so from 1811 to 1816, when we were left to be supplied by the State Banks alone; and we again find it has been so ever since the national paper medium has been last withdrawn—*nothing but trouble and infinite loss*; whereas, during the twice twenty years of a national paper currency, all went well, and no nation ever had a better currency. Are not these facts worth something? Ought they not to be conclusive?

Which is the safest?

It is a notable fact that neither the government nor people have ever lost the first cent by a national bank, and that both and all have realized incalculable benefits. But all the cheating, all the bank frauds, and all the losses complained of, as falling on the public through the agency of banks, have come from *State institutions*. These, certainly, are pretty strong facts.

It is, undoubtedly, true that the power of the General Government over a national institution, to prevent fraud, is much more effective than that of the States over their institutions. The skill of legislation in the former case, is of a higher order, as combining the concentrated wisdom of the nation, and they are exempt from *log-rolling*. The vigilance of the nation is greater—a thousand eyes to one. It would be next to impossible for a national institution to cheat the public. Although accused of that propensity, if the charge be just, the fact that it has not been done, proves that it could not be. But the State Banks have been for ever cheating us, and never so much as in the absence and for want of a national institution. When the cat is away, the mice are bold.

But it is the moneyed power we have to fear.

As to that, the appeal comes too late, when we have seen a bank of a hundred million power crushed by the hand of a single man, and that without the least difficulty, in the mere wantonness of power. The power over banks is always in the hands of government, in other words, of the people, at whose bidding they rise, and stand, or fall.

Moreover, if it is moneyed power we have to fear, the putting out of the way of a national bank of *thirty-five millions* of capital to give place to some *four hundred* state banks, with more than *two hundred millions* of capital, was something like jumping out of the frying-pan into the fire. That we did jump into the fire, and got well singed, is, alas, too true.

An Allegory.

The head of a great family saw the big old Newfoundland family dog, in his path, and cried out unto his sons—"Mad Dog!" Whereupon the youngsters seized their rifles, gave chase, and shot him down. But it turned out that he was in no wise mad at all, and the loss was grievous. He had been especially useful in keeping the numerous pack of small dogs in order. The moment he was dead, the small dogs broke loose, many of them ran mad and bit numbers of the family. N. B.—One of the family took the carcase of the old Newfoundland, and undertook to galvanize it. He jumped a little, and then fell down, to jump no more.

The regulating power of a national paper medium.

In the absence of this, the State banks have always played the mischief with us; in its presence, no State bank of unsound capital has dared to make its appearance; or if so, its frauds were sure to be detected and exposed. Another most important office of a national paper medium, as we have seen, has been to repress the excessive increase of banks and bank capital.

The universal credit of a national paper medium.

This is indispensable to the domestic trade and the domestic commercial relations of the people of this country. A man starts on a journey with current money of the State banks, and at the end of the first stage, it becomes uncurrent. The further he goes, the worse it is; and the time has been, when a traveller might lose *fifty per cent.* on the money he set out with, before he gets to the end of his journey. It is the same in remittances. We have lost *forty-five per cent.* on money received as a remittance at the city of Washington, which was at par in the State where it came from. But between the remotest points of the Union, the discount on a national currency could not exceed *one cent and a half* on a hundred; generally it would be nothing; rarely over *half a cent*.

The credit of a national paper medium abroad.

It is as good at London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Constantinople or Canton, as at New York, Philadelphia, or New Orleans; whereas, our State bank paper is good for nothing abroad. Such credit of our national paper medium abroad is of incalculable importance to a great commercial nation like ours, and has been one of the proudest attributes of our national character.

Influence of a national paper medium on domestic exchanges.

It regulates, equalizes and facilitates them between the remotest points of the Union, so that all accounts of debt and credit at these distances, can be balanced at a most trifling rate of discount.

A national paper medium, indeed, is almost, if not quite as necessary, as the constitutional tender, and discharges nearly the same functions—exactly the same, so long as it is redeemable in specie.

A national paper medium insures a sound paper currency everywhere.

Nobody would tolerate an *unsound* national bank currency, nor have we ever had one;

nor would a national institution tolerate an unsound State bank currency. Consequently, in the co-existence of these two kinds, we are sure to have an *universally* sound currency. But whenever these have ceased to co-exist, we have had a bad currency.

A national paper currency indispensable to supply an adequate circulating medium.

Everybody feels, and it is apparent, that we have not an adequate circulating medium, now,—1843. It has been growing less and less, tighter and tighter, for a long time. In some parts of the interior of Pennsylvania, the people have been obliged to divide bank notes into halves, quarters, eighths, and so on, and agree from necessity to use them as money. In Ohio, with all her abundance, it has been hard to get money to pay taxes. The Sheriff of Muskingum County, as stated by the Guernsey Times, in the summer of 1842, sold at auction one four-horse waggon, at \$5 50; 10 hogs at 6½ cents each; two horses (said to be worth from \$50 to \$75 each) at \$2 each; two cows at \$1 each; a barrel of sugar for \$1 50; and a “store of goods” at that rate. In Pike County, Mo., as stated by the Hannibal Journal last winter, the Sheriff sold 3 horses at \$1 50 each; 1 large ox at 12½ cents; 5 cows, 2 steers, and 1 calf, the lot, at \$3 25; 20 sheep at 13½ cents each; 24 hogs, the lot, at 25 cents; 1 eight-day clock, at \$2 50; lot of tobacco, 7 or 8 hogsheds, at \$5; 3 stacks of hay, each, at 25 cents; and 1 stack of fodder, at 25 cents.

Thus has property been sacrificed in all parts of the country, because there was no money to buy it. But we need not prove what all know.

The amount of our circulating medium at different periods.

By a Congressional Document, before quoted, (No. 111, H. R. 2d Sess. 26th Congress), it appears, that the circulation of the banks; in 1830, was \$61,000,000; in 1835, \$103,000,000; in 1836, \$140,000,000; in 1837, \$149,000,000; in 1838, \$116,000,000; in 1839, \$135,000,000; in 1840, \$106,000,000; and the United States Almanac quotes it for 1841 at \$115,000,000, and for 1842, at \$63,800,000. It is now, in 1843, supposed to be about \$50,000,000—probably less. Some put it at \$40,000,000. The last we think is nearest the truth.

Some take it for granted, that the circulation of the years of excessive trade, 1835 and 1836, to the explosion of 1837, was much greater than usual, and greater than was necessary for a suitable amount of trade. That it was very much more active than usual, is doubtless true. But the excesses of that time did not necessarily require an excess of the circulating medium, nor is there evidence that it was materially swelled on that account. The excesses were committed chiefly by the abuse of *credit*, though doubtless the actual circulation was many times more active than usual; but it does not appear, that it was much, if at all greater in amount than the trade of the country, in a prosperous state, usually requires.

The circulating medium of England.

In 1836, it was \$280,000,000, while the aggregate of her imports and exports, for the same year, was \$480,000,000. Manifestly, other things being equal, England could do a given amount of business, connected with imports and exports, on a less amount of circulating medium than we can, as it is chiefly done at London and Liverpool, where the circulation is prodigiously active. Yet our circulating medium in 1836 was only \$140,000,000 for an aggregate of \$318,000,000 of imports and exports. An equal proportion of circulation for us would have been about \$190,000,000. These facts may serve to show, that as a commercial rival of England, we shall stand a poor chance, with a circulating medium of \$50,000,000, while she employs nearly six times that amount. Our field of trade is vastly wider, and our uninvoked resources immeasurably greater; but for want of an adequate circulating medium, we can neither cultivate the one, nor call out the other, as our interests claim. Relatively, we are at present in the retrograde movement.

Our imports of Specie.

From Senate Document, No. 290, 1st Session, 26th Congress, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, it appears that, from 1834 to 1838, the imports of specie were in our favor by an aggregate of nearly *fifty millions* in five years; but in 1839, the balance was against us, as compared with 1838, by about *twenty-five millions*, with a positive loss of *eight millions*. The drain of specie from us continued, till the Tariff of 1842 put a stop to it, and for the first six months of 1843, the return of specie upon us has been at the rate of nearly *thirty millions a year*. Never, in our history, have we had such a rapid acquisition of the basis of a circulating medium. And surely, it was wanted bad enough.

What occasions a general bank suspension.

It is the want of a suitable Tariff to keep money in the country. By buying of foreign

nations more than we sell to them, the balance of trade falls against us, which can only be settled by drafts on our specie. As most of this lies in bank vaults, the notes of our banks are bought up by the agents of foreign creditors, directly or indirectly, and presented for payment in specie for exportation, to satisfy these foreign demands. The only alternatives left, are for the banks to suspend, or the country be deprived of a circulating medium.

It is scarcely possible for a general bank suspension to occur under suitable Tariff regulations, uniformly maintained by our Government. It is true, indeed, that our foreign indebtedness, in the shape of state bonds, &c., might, in a given exigency, occasion the same result, on the same principle. But a suitable Tariff may be made to operate, in the manner of a sinking fund, to settle the whole of that account, and our country be amply supplied, in the meantime, with a circulating medium.

It cannot be objected to this, that the country is taxed to pay this foreign debt. It is not so, while domestic competition in the manufactures protected, makes the articles cheaper than they would be in open and free trade with foreign countries, and while the market for the products of our own soil is not injured, but rather improved, *as can be shown*. Consequently, all parties, and the country itself, are enriched, except that the profits of the import trade may be diminished. But what right have importers to demand an extent of trade in their line, that shall bring a balance against the country, as heretofore, and thus impoverish us all?

Trade a part of National jurisdiction.

We have a republic of *trade* to take care of, as well as a jurisdiction of soil, and the rights of both are equally sacred. The former is always more exposed to foreign influence than the latter. We may get into the hands of foreigners before we know it. Everybody knows that a producer will come to ruin, that buys more than he sells, and that he cannot get rich unless he sells more than he buys. It is precisely with a nation as with an individual. If the Government allows the traders with foreign parts to run the nation in debt, by bringing to the home market more than they carry to foreign markets, the nation must, sooner or later, stop payment, and a general bank suspension is the *mode*, or a ruinous contraction of the circulating medium. Traders between nations will make all they can out of both sides, though a nation be ruined. They would not injure the country wantonly, but they must get rich, and be "merchant princes." The responsibility lies with the Government that *permitted* it.

Banks in a state of suspension may yet be sound.

Their degree of soundness is daily proved by the discount at the money brokers, whose counters are the specie standard. There it is quickly found out, whether the discount is merely the usual penalty of suspension, or whether there is fear for the bank.

A duty of Government.

It is the duty of Government to provide, that there be no necessity or apology for a general bank suspension, by its care of the trade of the country. The necessity of a general suspension arises from our buying of foreign countries more than we sell to them—in other words, running in debt. A nation is an individual *among* nations, and, like any individual person, may be forced to stop payment. Nothing but the Government of a nation is competent to bar this result, by stepping in and saying to importers, Ye shall not bring goods here to run us in debt. In other words, by enacting a suitable Tariff.

Reason of this obligation.

Trade is a complicated machinery, of many parts, many chains, and many links, each trader occupying the place of a link, connected with others by the interest of the parties. It is the interest of the importer to buy and sell all he can, *tempting* his customers, till they are *involved in bankruptcy*. It is impossible for the public, the secondary parties, to know that bankruptcy is coming, till it *has* come. But the Government can know it, if they are fit to be governors, and ought to prevent it.

There can be no adequate basis of a currency without an adequate Tariff.

In the absence of a suitable Tariff, specie is withdrawn from the country, as was the case in the operation of the Compromise Act, in its last stages, by the fall of duties. It then becomes impossible to support an adequate circulating medium redeemable in specie. But the Tariff of 1812 is now restoring to us the basis of a sound currency, and if it should not be disturbed, there is every prospect that we shall, ere long, have an abundant and sound circulating medium. But nothing could be more unfortunate for the country, than to check this return of specie, by impairing the instrument that brings it back.

A contingent prospect.

'We have now a chance of being rescued from our great misfortunes, if we should be prudent enough to *let well alone*. Life is returning, vigor begins to reanimate the body politic, the nation, lately shorn of its locks, shows symptoms of reviving energy. By fostering the labor and stimulating the enterprise of our own population, and protecting our manufactures from a ruinous competition with the self labor of foreign despots, we are laying a sure foundation for a sound and adequate currency; but, undermine this structure, prostrate this agency, and we are *down again* as a nation.

The greatest good of the greatest number.

There may be a *few* who will make less money in consequence of the Tariff. The importing merchant, whose interest it is to buy as cheap as he can, sell as high as he can, and as quick as he can, might, doubtless, acquire more wealth, if trade were perfectly free to him all the world over. So, also, might it be with his carrier, till a foreign carrier shall underbid him, when free trade shall be open to that vocation. But the great mass of our population would suffer by it; for there is not a single article of our domestic manufactures which will not come cheaper by competition *under* protection than *without* it, and the products of our soil will have a better market. We produce certain things which foreign nations must have, and what they do not want they have already prohibited.

Political anatomy.

As a nation depletion had been practised upon us by the doctors till we were well nigh dead. But the specie that is now returning to the country, under the operation of the Tariff, is our life-blood. Nevertheless, it requires a *heart, arteries, and veins* for distribution. It is not enough for the human body that the blood be chiefly on one side, while the heart and the other side are nearly destitute. That is disease—paralysis. A *universal* distribution of the vital element is required for health. The great arteries must be filled, and the *heart*, by its vigorous functions, must regulate the pulsations of every part to the surface and to the extremities.

The specie that is now returning, as a basis of trade, cannot circulate in its own proper form commensurate with the demands of trade. It is a physical impossibility. It might do so for the small trade of barbarians, but the immense trade of this immense country cannot be carried on in this way. Banks, as *organs* of circulation, are indispensable. Hence—

The necessity of a re-organization of our currency system, or a return to the old one.

The specie that is now returning, for the most part, lies dead in the vaults of the Atlantic cities, with little service to the country at large. Our vast interior, that needs it most, scarcely feels it. It is because our currency system has been deranged and broken down. The blood is on one side, and beats but faintly at the heart. It is paralysis. The banks, where the specie is heing heaped up, dare not extend their circulation, not even equal to the demands of their own regions, for they do not know how the Government will treat them. A stage of returning prosperity is arrived at, but a platform for the next stage, for a consummation, is wanting.

Turn, and twist, and agonize as we may, it will be found impossible for this great work to be properly and well done, till the general Government shall have taken the business in charge, and set up an Agency that shall be able to lay its broad hand upon the nation, and reach every part of it with its fingers. All experience has proved, that the State banks, besides being unsafe, while operating alone in this field, are incompetent to the task. They have never done this duty well; *they cannot do it*.

The Constitutional question.

To debate the *right* of the general Government to authorize a national paper medium, after the Supreme Judiciary has repeatedly, and each time with unanimity, decided the question, and after all the Presidents of the United States, except one, and an *Acting* President, have concurred, would seem superfluous. The right of the *States* to do this, might, perhaps, be questioned, if usage had not sanctioned it. None will deny, that the *design* of the Constitution, in giving power to Congress "to coin money," and withholding that power from the States, was to secure a *uniform* currency; nor will it be denied, that the power to issue a paper medium, exists *somewhere*.

But, a paper medium being the chief currency of the country at all times, it is, in fact, more influential in maintaining or disturbing uniformity, than coins. Besides, a constitutional power given for a specific end, implies *the means* indispensable to that end, else it

is no power at all. And so says the Constitution itself:—"Congress shall have power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."

Consequently, as a paper medium always has been and is the chief currency of the country, the end of *uniformity* would be totally subverted, if this power be denied to the general Government. Better far, to have given the power of coining money to the States, and that of supplying the paper medium to the national authorities.

If, therefore, it is the right and duty of the general Government "to coin money," it is also their right and duty to furnish a paper currency, so long as it is used as a part of the circulating medium of the country.

Independence of the international currency.

By international currency, we mean gold and silver weighed in the scales, which is the only common currency of the whole world; and by its independence, we mean, that no national legislation, or despotic power, can control it, but it controls them. This secures a great, important, practical, public good:—viz. that no nation or state, no corporations or individuals, can, at any time or anywhere, put forth a currency that will not instantly be proved by this. This state of things results from the fact, that the whole civilized world has become a domestic scene, one trading family, all parts of which are governed by this one law. It is impossible that insurrection against it, though a conspiracy of nations should engage in it, should start up anywhere with hope of success. This great conventional law of the commercial world, which owes its origin to no human legislation, but to the provisions of nature, would put them all down, and has done it repeatedly and uniformly.

Inferences.

It will follow, that all legislation on banking and the currency must have respect to this controlling principle, else it will come to bad. It also follows, that the public are protected by these provisions of nature against the quackery of legislation, the power of despots, and the arts of smaller swindlers, so far as the recognition of true money is concerned.

A practical distinction.

The difference between international currency, gold and silver weighed, and the legalized currencies of states and nations, is of practical importance, chiefly political. It is impossible to apply the common test of the great commercial world, to wit, the scales, to the common currency of a nation, in its common uses. It is obliged to be built up on a credit foundation; but it is of supreme political importance to the state, to see, that there is no cheat in it, as it cannot escape the test of the scales.

The political vitality of an established national currency system.

Whatever may have been the currency system of a country, there is a political vitality in it that cannot be tampered or trifled with. If the Government invades it, it stabs itself, as well as the nation, to the heart. In every national currency, whether gold and silver coins alone, or mixed with paper, there is necessarily involved a credit system. To make war on this system, is striking, with murderous weapons, at the vitals of the body politic—for nothing can be more vital than the monetary system of a nation. The trade, in other words, the business of the people, in all its branches, the public finances, and the machinery of Government, all depend on this, and go by this, or else cannot go at all.

Disasters of change in a national currency system.

In a great commercial community like ours—so peculiarly and actively commercial—a great and radical change in the currency system cannot but be disastrous. Individual habits may be changed, at least gradually modified, though it is hard work; but to change the social and political habits of a nation, suddenly and radically, in so important a matter as their commercial economy or currency system, is like the march of a revolution.

A Government Bank.

It is only within a few years that much has been said on this subject, and it is not, perhaps, generally well understood. But it is important it should be understood, as efforts have recently been made to establish such an institution—or rather, to extend the Constitution of the United States, by enlarging the powers of Government; for such is its effect, and that, too, in a very important point of view.

Mr. Van Buren's *Treasury* was a Government bank in embryo, and Mr. Tyler's *Exchequer* was its consummation.

Banking is trading in money. It is one of the parts of society that is necessary to the other parts, and like all other parts should be regulated by law. It is not a part of Government, and can never lawfully be so. It is a *trade*, not a governing power. To introduce it into the Government, is adding to the Constitution; for Government to assume it, is usurpation. Such, in an incipient stage, was the Subtreasury; and such, in the maturest form, was the Exchequer.

Of all the agencies of society, banking requires the most rigid authority of law, and the most watchful care of Government. It should be aware that a *Master* in the Government ever stands by its side, and is ever looking into its concerns. But banking in the hands of Government, as a part of its functions, has no master, but is a sovereign power. Why, Sirs, it is frightful to think that banking should have had even a chance of gaining such a position in this free country! But such, *precisely*, is the thing that has been proposed! Nay, nay! We will have no such thing. Banking is a vocation to be governed, and well governed—not a power to govern.

What follows.

It does not necessarily follow, that we are to have an *old-fashioned United States Bank*, as the common phrase is—though it might be fair to ask what *hurt* it has done? It always did well as a *regulator* of the currency; it always secured a *good* currency; it facilitated and equalized exchanges, and was in universal credit at home and abroad; it discharged all the fiscal operations of Government forty years, without charge; it was a safe deposit of public funds; and in all its functions served the Government and people well. *These are facts.* But, nevertheless, it is not the *mode* of furnishing a national currency, that is of consequence; it is the *principle*:—*Separate it entirely from the Government, and govern it well.* It should be a *creature*, not a *part* of Government. Give it any improved form whatever, and throw around it additional guards. It is always in the power of laws, under care of Government, and in the hands of the people, as their servant and subject. Through their representatives, they make and take care of it, and it is obliged to do as they bid.

A word on the Subtreasury.

It is a heartless, cold, selfish thing. It provides for the Government by robbing the people And who are the Government? What claims have they for such special care? The insolence of the Subtreasury is astonishing, as if the Government were the nobility, and the people serfs; as if the former were to be provided for, whatever becomes of the latter. We really cannot see the use of Government, if it does not take care of us, but only makes us slaves, to take care of them. Better, as seems to us, to have no Government at all.

The authors of the Subtreasury, apparently conscious that, by breaking down the currency, and ruining the trade of the country, they had driven the people out of house and home, and deprived them of meat and clothing, seemed only anxious to provide a house for themselves, and get something to live on in it. But the people, seeing how it was, turned them out, and will doubtless take care that they do not get in again.

But the Exchequer plan went a little farther, and proposed to unite the supreme commercial power with the supreme political power, thereby putting it in the power of the President, as master of the banking trade, and master of the authorities by which all other trades are conducted, to control the trade of the country—to control everything.

The last effort for a false system of currency.

It is apparent, that the *principle* of a Government bank is not yet dead, and that another effort is likely to be made to revive it in a new form. The precise modification it may assume, will depend on the necessities to which the arts of designing men may impel them; but the *principle* will be *United States Treasury credit* hooked in, perhaps, or mixed up with State banks—another pet bank system. It will be an attempt to make Government *credit* answer the purpose of a *common* currency—a thing impossible, if a uniform and stable currency be required. Government credit can never be anything other than a *subject of trade*, to be dealt in by bankers and brokers. Six months previous to the writing of this article, it was below par; now it is above; and when this gets into the hands of readers there is no telling where it will be.

We ask the people one single question, which will bring the matter home to them: Are you accustomed to see United States Treasury notes as a *common* currency? Such a thing was never known, and cannot be. You may see them passing over the counters of bankers and brokers, *in the way of trade*, or in the hands of persons who want to keep money by them; but the moment they want to use it, they *sell* it at a premium, or are obliged to get it discounted, if it is below par.

Until we can get a national currency, a part of it as low as *ten and five dollar* notes,

always of uniform value by being payable in specie, it will never become common to accommodate the people.

What the abundance of money, and its low interest, teaches.

It is agreed, that now, in the middle of 1843, the best securities can get money at *four per cent.*, and it goes begging at that. This teaches, first, that the state of trade is very bad; for in a prosperous state of trade, the use of money commands a high price, and is difficult to be got. Secondly, it teaches that capital is abundant for the revival and re-organization of a suitable currency system. It would now be the easiest thing imaginable to re-establish an institution for a national paper medium, *provided* that capitalists could have a reasonable degree of confidence, that the policy of a Government, inviting such investment, would continue *uniform*. A national bank, established for twenty years, would be a most attractive investment of capital for these times.

Who are the democrats on the subject of banking.

The democrats, alias republicans, of 1816, (for the parties then were called *Republicans* and *Federalists*, and knew no other names), gave us a bank, by 80 votes to 71 in the House, and 22 to 12 in the Senate. Let it be remembered, that it was the *Republican* or *Democratic* party that gave us the United States bank, with James Madison, a democratic President. But a new political sect has since arisen, professing to stand and walk in the democratic shoes; but, in fact, they are Federalists of the worst stamp, uniting in their creed the most obnoxious principles of that obsolete school, such as admiration of the veto and other high Federal and monarchical powers, with the most radical and revolutionary doctrines. Taken together, it is the seed and type of absolute government, and had its origin (a fit paternity) in a blind devotion to the will of one man, who thus became the *father of Locofocoism*.

Who, then, are the democrats? The Whigs stand precisely in that position, not only on the subject of the currency, as those principles were avowed and settled in 1816, and re-asserted in 1832, though overcome by the veto of the Locofoco Primate; but the Whigs are also the true democrats as advocates of popular rights, and as reformers of Executive usurpations and corruption.

A great mistake.

We regret that the excessive *amiability* of the Whigs and the Whig press (shall we call it folly?) should allow the Locofocos the benefit of the name of democrats. It is one of the greatest mistakes a political party ever made. We know the practice is being dropped; nor can it be dropped too fast or too quick for the good of the country. The position which the word *Democracy* occupies in men's minds, as its etymology indicates, is, for the most part, the *opposite* of Monarchy—a *people* government. *As such*, it will rule the world, and ought to do so.

A false accusation.

The Whigs are accused of being the *bank-party*. If this means that they want a sound banking system, always paying specie on demand; that they want *few* banks, and the least amount of bank capital that will answer the necessities of the country, then the charge is true. They have made *few* banks, and with rare exceptions, *good* ones; whereas their opponents have covered the country with banks that have brought ruin upon us by their explosions.

Loss to the country by losses on exchanges in a bad currency.

We heard a distinguished Senator of the United States, whose accuracy of information is reliable, say, that the domestic trade of the country, requiring settlement by exchanges, may be estimated at about *four hundred millions a year*. If we suppose that the average of losses by exchanges in this trade, on account of bad currency, after the destruction of the national medium, was *five per cent.*, it amounts to *twenty millions annually*, about equal to the fair cost of the general Government.

But this is not all.

It is, indeed, one of the smallest items of loss to the country in such a state of things. The embarrassments of trade produced by it, cannot be estimated. It affects every man's business, interest, and fortune, and produces momentous results in the shifts of trade, forcing it into unaccustomed modes and channels, as regards the commercial connections of one section of the country with another, all to the detriment of public and individual wealth.

A common impression.

It is, doubtless, a very just impression, so commonly entertained and expressed, that the derangement of our currency system has been the chief cause of our national misfortunes.

The currency is so intimately allied to trade and credit, that it cannot be separated from them. If we have succeeded in determining where lies the responsibility of breaking down our currency system, we have also succeeded in determining where lies the responsibility of breaking down the trade and credit of the country.

The greatness of this ruin.

In the midst of the unhappiness of our public and private misfortunes, thus occasioned, few have thought of the extent of the evils. A just array of them by the power of figures would doubtless seem incredible. Nevertheless, let every individual calculate for himself what he, personally, has lost, what chances have been sacrificed by him, what he might have done, and what he might have been, if the prosperity of the country had not been arrested by these fatal measures; let him consider that he is only one of *seventeen millions* of people that have suffered in like manner, and he will then be prepared to appreciate the following estimates of losses to the country, arising out of the mal-administration of our public affairs for a series of years.

The United States Almanac states the losses occasioned by the *monetary* disasters of the country, growing out of the revulsion of 1837-42, thus:—

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|--------------|
| Losses on bank circulation and deposits, | - | - | - | - | \$54,000,000 |
| “ on bank capital failed and depreciated, | - | - | - | - | 248,000,000 |
| “ on State Stock depreciated, | - | - | - | - | 100,000,000 |
| “ on Company Stocks, | - | - | - | - | 80,000,000 |
| “ on Real Estate, | - | - | - | - | 300,000,000 |

Total of these items, - - - - - \$782,000,000

But these are only a few of the many items of our losses. We have carefully examined a statement in detail of the commercial statistics of the country, collected and arranged by an able hand, “*Concivis*,” in a series of letters addressed to the people of the United States, in 1840, by which the following results (apparently fairly deduced) in the depreciation of property and labor in the United States, for the four years previous to that date, are obtained:—

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------|
| Losses on wool, | - | - | - | - | - | \$20,000,000 |
| “ on cotton, | - | - | - | - | - | 130,000,000 |
| “ on grain, | - | - | - | - | - | 150,000,000 |
| “ on foreign merchandize, | - | - | - | - | - | 130,000,000 |
| “ on domestic do. | - | - | - | - | - | 400,000,000 |
| “ on capital vested in manufactures, | - | - | - | - | - | 50,000,000 |
| “ on capital vested in moneyed stocks, | - | - | - | - | - | 150,000,000 |
| “ on capital vested in slave labor, | - | - | - | - | - | 400,000,000 |
| “ on capital vested in lands, | - | - | - | - | - | 2,500,000,000 |
| “ on capital vested in real estate in cities, | - | - | - | - | - | 500,000,000 |
| “ on the price of labor, | - | - | - | - | - | 1,500,000,000 |

Total, - - - - - \$5,930,000,000

So much for the losses for the four years previous to 1840—the aggregate being greater than the national debt of Great Britain. But this is not all. These losses will have continued another four years before we shall begin to get out from under them, which will *double* the amount; and then it will be many years more, under the most favorable circumstances, before we can fully recover our prosperity, which will at least *treble* the amount—a reckoning of misfortune to a nation sufficiently astounding.

A sound from the West.

As an item of news, if we may be allowed to descend to this function; it appears, that now, in 1843, the whole of the Great West are moving, like the waters of a mighty ocean, for the revival of our national currency system; and already the deep-rolling swell of the sea, in its progress towards the rising sun, dashes over the lofty ridge of the Alleghanies, and begins to sprinkle the Eastern plains and valleys. *Look out for a deluge, to re-baptize the nation.*

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THE TARIFF.

The TARIFF is chiefly a question of facts and figures, and we hope to present it so that it can be understood.

The leading questions.

The chief topics in this debate are the effect of buying too much, and the effect of European capital and labor on American capital and labor.

Buying too much.

If we had space to explain and exemplify, we should start with the proposition, that a producer of anything whatever, who depends on the sale of his products, *will fail*, if he buys and *continues* to buy more than he sells, and that he can only prosper, *so far as trade is concerned*, by selling more than he buys. But it is enough for our purpose to say, what every body knows, that with nations as well as with individuals, there is such a thing as *buying too much*. This we shall endeavor to show, has been the *great fault* and *great misfortune* of this country, in its foreign trade.

The commerce of the United States, internal and external.

Most persons will probably be surprised to find, that about *nineteen twentieths* of our trade is *in* *nal*, in distinction from foreign or *external*. The last Census informs us, and the fact is announced by Senate Document, No. 340, 2d Session, 27th Congress, that the value of the annual products of the United States in the aggregate is \$2,000,000,000, [two thousand millions of dollars,] while our annual exports rarely exceeded *one hundred millions*. There are reasons to suppose that this result from the census is short of the fact by about *one fifth*, and that the annual products of the United States are not less than \$2,500,000,000. Our manufactories alone produce about *four hundred millions* a year by the following rule:—Capital invested \$300,000,000, and it is ascertained, that the annual products of manufactories are at least *one third* greater than the capital invested. It will be seen, therefore, that most of the trade of the country, is *internal*.

Free trade.

The meaning of this phrase in most men's minds, would probably be expressed thus—*let every man be free to trade as he can*. And this is precisely the law of the land, for the regulation of internal commerce. At least, we do not know anything to the contrary. But in *external* commerce, or trade between nations, those who engage in it are to some extent public agents, and hold in their hands political powers of vital importance to the nation they represent. They carry the national flag and national credentials. Hence the propriety and importance of the following clause in our Constitution: "Congress shall have power to *regulate* commerce with foreign nations." This, probably, will be deemed sufficient to show, that trade between nations can not be free, as the trader is an agent of the public, and bears a public commission. In other words, he is as much bound by his instructions as any other public agent, and it is equally important that he should be instructed.

But, if it be suitable and important to prescribe regulations for the government of our own citizens, in their foreign trade, who are accountable to us, much more is it important to have an eye on foreigners who trade with us, and who are not accountable to us, except not to violate our laws while they are here. They may have reasons and strong temptations to injure us, which would not so naturally, and could not so easily actuate our own citizens. They may even be in conspiracy with foreign powers against us, and invariably are so, acting as they do under the commercial systems of their respective governments, which are hostile to us, and which they, as traders, have an interest in supporting. They may defraud our revenue, and impair or break down the rights of American citizens guaranteed by law, and have done so to a vast extent.

The wealth of our public estate.

We speak of the nation. This wealth is partly physical, and partly moral, social, and political. Without the moral, social, and political, the physical would be of little value; but all together comprehend the elements or capabilities of the wealthiest nation on the globe.

The effect of our external or foreign trade on our national wealth.

It will be beneficial or injurious, according as we buy *just enough* or *too much* of foreign products. Our physical resources, and moral energies are so great, that we can bear a great deal of loss in the way of foreign trade, and yet thrive; but there is a point of disadvantage arising from this cause, beyond which we can not fail to break down. Let us review our history for the instruction it may afford in regard to this great and fundamental principle.

The period from the peace of 1783 to the adoption of the Constitution in 1789.

From the deficiency of our own public records, we are forced to resort to the books of the English Customhouse for the information we want, a copy of which, as far as our occasion requires, may be found in Pitkin's Statistical View, from which we learn, that our imports from Great Britain for the first year after the peace were *six to one* of our exports to that empire, and that the average proportion of our imports to our exports, from 1783 to 1790, was as *three* of the former to *one* of the latter. The balance against us for the first year was upwards of *twelve millions of dollars*, and for the whole period nearly *fifty millions*. Considering the infancy of our condition, and the poverty in which we came out of the war, this was a prodigious balance to be remitted in specie as the only mode of settlement.

The effect.

It drained the country of the little specie the war had left us, and entailed upon us a worthless paper currency. Neither the Confederation, nor the States, could pay the interest on their debts, and the nation was bankrupt. One State after another, in its separate action, tried to establish a protective system by duties on imports; but for want of harmony, it rather made the matter worse.

The result of necessity.

Virginia at last proposed a convention of the states, to debate the expediency of a reorganization of the general government, which resulted in the adoption of the Constitution. The history of the times, as any one may see, proves that the chief motive of this movement was to have a government with ample powers to regulate foreign commerce, and establish a protective system, as well as to raise revenue. Hence the language of the Constitution: "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States—to regulate commerce with foreign nations," &c.

The first general act of the first Congress.

"Whereas it is necessary for the support of government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and for the encouragement and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported—Be it enacted," &c. This subject was moved at the earliest opportunity by Mr. Madison, the father of the Constitution, and the act was signed by President Washington, the Fourth of July, 1789. This and other similar acts of legislation rescued and saved the country. But it was a terrible ordeal, and put in peril the existence of the republic, to have bought at such a time so much more than we sold.

The period from 1790 to 1807.

This was one of comparative prosperity, but not so great as we were entitled to. Our neutral position during the protracted war in Europe, made up in part for the defects of our commercial regulations, by opening to us in some degree the ports of the belligerent powers, and giving us a portion of their commerce and carrying trade. Nevertheless, it will be found (see House Doc., No. 3, 1st Session, 26th Congress), that in each of these years the balance of trade between us and foreign parts, was against us, and in some years it was very great. For the whole period it was \$229,998,061, or a trifle less than *two hundred and thirty millions of dollars*. (See same authority.) Some abatement from this balance ought doubtless to be made for the different modes of estimating the respective amounts of imports and exports; but after all due allowances on this account, the balance would still be against us to a startling amount.

We can not feel, that the profits of navigation employed in our export trade, or of the trade itself, ought to be subtracted from this balance, as the talent and enterprise engaged in it were the property of the country, and their legitimate product belongs to the same category with the wealth of all other productive labor of the nation. It was a relief, certainly, but not properly an item in this account. It is a part of the footing of the ledger-book of the nation in its domestic reckoning.

How we got along.

If it be asked, How could we prosper in such a trade? The answer is, that, having a very large and productive estate to cultivate at home, worked by enterprising and frugal laborers, we prospered in spite of it. This is, in fact, the true reason. It is inevitable, that a nation which buys more than it sells, will be injured, so long as 3 is greater than 2, and 4 greater than 3.

The period between 1807 and 1815.

With non-importation, non-intercourse, embargo, and war upon us, this period was of course disastrous, if foreign trade, under any circumstances, can be beneficial, as doubtless it is, properly regulated. The imports fell off from *one hundred and thirty-eight millions* in 1807, to

fifty-seven millions in 1808, and the exports from *one hundred and eight millions* in the former year to *twenty-two millions* in the latter, and both continued to dwindle, till the imports came down to about *thirteen millions*, and the exports to about *seven millions*, in 1814. The balance of trade, as usual, was against us, the aggregate for this period of seven years being \$91,220,330. (See same document as above.)

The period from 1815 to 1838 inclusive.

From the same authority as above, we find, that, in the last three quarters of the fiscal year, 1814-'15, to wit, the first three quarters after the peace, the imports exceeded the exports by more than *sixty millions of dollars*; that in the year 1815-'16, before the tariff of 1816 began to operate, the excess of imports over exports was about *sixty-one millions*; that in 1836, the excess was again *sixty-one millions*; and that the aggregate excess of imports over the aggregate of exports, from 1815 to 1838 inclusive, was \$415,353,608 (more than *four hundred and fifteen millions of dollars*).

Period from 1833 to 1840, inclusive.

This, it will be seen, is a partial *lap over* on the previous head. The balance of foreign trade against us for this period, being eight years, amounted to the enormous sum of \$172,770,000. (Upward of *one hundred and seventy-two millions of dollars*.) From 1835 to 1840, the balance against us was \$132,670,000 (*more than one hundred and thirty-two millions of dollars*), of which the *sil . . . one* which we bought amounted to *one hundred and six millions*. What a draft this on the money of the country!

Another item in this reckoning.

There is another fact of very material consequence to be considered: viz., that a large fraction of our exports has been of foreign origin. From the same authority, above cited, we find, that the aggregate exports from 1803 to 1838, inclusive, was \$2,775,406,407 (more than *two thousand seven hundred millions of dollars*), and that, of this amount, \$852,873,942, *nearly one third*, was of foreign origin. It will be seen, that all the profits of *producing*, and the profits of all the capital employed in producing, these exports of foreign origin, were realized by foreigners, and that we had nothing but the profits of the trade and navigation engaged in this commerce. Nay, a part of this was in the hands of foreigners. This great and comprehensive fact enhances the balance of foreign trade against us *immensely*.

The problem solved.

It has been asked, why should this country, so exuberant and inexhaustible in its resources, and tenanted by such an enterprising, working people, be so often involved in commercial distress, bank suspensions, want of money, bad state of the currency, &c., &c.? The answer is found in the facts we have disclosed, and the result is based on the principle, that a man who is constantly buying more than he sells, will get into trouble. It is precisely the same with a nation. Such a man's credit, if it had been good, may sustain him for a while; but, under such a system of bad economy, it can not last long. It is the same with a nation. By various commercial shifts of the people, and by temporary financial expedients of the Government, a nation that is constantly buying more than it sells, can patch up its credit for a season. A nation, under a system of bad economy, may stand it longer than a single man; but, when it does fall, great is the fall thereof.

Remark.

In the light of the facts we have set forth, all the commercial embarrassments and *up sets* of this nation, may be distinctly traced to the true cause. It is always the same, because in the nature of things, *with us, such as we are*, it is impossible there should be any other. Is it possible for a man to get into commercial difficulty, whose work or trade annually brings a balance in his favor? No more is it possible for a nation. It is equally impossible for a man or a nation to stand, that regularly creates an annual *adverse* balance of trade.

Review of our commercial and financial history.

All along we find it corresponding precisely with the doctrine we have announced. Was it not so from the peace of 1783, to the re-organization of the Government in 1789? Was it not so in 1815-'16? From 1819 to 1823? And how was it from 1837 to 1840? With the commercial embarrassments of the people, came also the financial embarrassments of the Government; for the former always begets the latter.

The effect of buying more than we sell on our currency.

Will not a man's money, who is always buying more than he sells, soon be gone, unless he has a great deal of it? It is precisely so with a nation that buys more than it sells—the money must *depart*. If the currency be a mixed one, the specie that constitutes its basis will be gone, and the banks suspend. Or, if it be a hard money currency, that, too, must still go.

Here is the secret of all our currency difficulties. The currency of a nation that was good to begin with, can not fail, nor become unsound, except by buying more than it sells. It is impossible. And the currency of an industrious and producing nation, that continues to sell more than it buys, will become good and abundant, even though it was bad and insufficient. And not only so, but it will continue good and abundant *uninterruptedly*; for nothing can change it, but a change in the character and habits of the nation. The case, and the truth of the case, stand thus:—If, as a nation, we do not run in debt, by our foreign trade, we have our money and a currency; but if foreign demands draw it off, we can not have a sufficient currency, that is good.

What would be a great blessing.

It can not be denied, that it would be a great blessing, if we had a currency which nothing could disturb, and credit which nothing could impair. This is sure to come if we would establish a commercial system, and stick to it, not to buy more than we sell. It is as practicable, as it is simple.

How this vice of buying too much came upon us.

It was by inexperience, temptation, and seduction—and seduction was the leading influence. When Great Britain failed to beat us in the field, she took to a system of commercial policy, by which she did beat us. It was said, and said with truth, for the first few years, that England profited more by the Revolutionary war than we did. We went into that war to get rid of a system of *direct* taxation and oppression, and came out of it to be subject to a more grievous system of *indirect* taxation and oppression; and the latter system, although we have partially shaken it off, we have not got rid of to this day.

The Seducer.

England set up to be the work-shop of the world, and the weaver's loom for every nation's back. Toward us she was first a tyrant, and commanded. Witness her prohibition of all exports from the American colonies, of anything like the productions of her own shop at home. But when she could no longer support her authority, she began to coax, and put on the airs of a seducer. "What excellent goods, these; fine wares; first rate merchandise; buy them." And we fell into the temptation, and had to pay for them.

"The work-shop of the world."

The power of machinery in Great Britain, as employed in her manufactures, is variously estimated by English authorities, from a *one hundred million* to a *one hundred and eighty million* man power. Take the lowest, *one hundred million*, which is equal to *one tenth* of the population of the globe, quite sufficient, probably, to do all the manufacturing which the wants of the world are likely to require. A population of *twenty-four millions* (the population of Great Britain), by the agency of *five hundred thousand* (that being the number of operatives employed to work this machinery), employs such a productive power for the wants of mankind! Well might Great Britain covet the market of the world for her manufactures; but the question is, whether it is best for us and the world to submit to it, when we can do it for ourselves with greater economy.

The policy of England.

England commenced her war on American manufactures in 1699, and continued it to the war on the Revolution. Lord Chatham said in Parliament, "He would not have the Americans make a *hob nail*." Another noble lord added, "nor a razor to shave their beards." Mr. Brougham, now Lord Brougham, said in the house of Commons, in 1816, "It was well worth while by this glut [excessive exports to America], to stifle in the cradle those rising manufactories in the United States, which the war had forced into existence." Mr. Robertson, another member, ridiculing the doctrine of free trade, confessed, that it "was nothing more nor less than for us [the English] to get a monopoly of *all markets* for our manufactures, and to prevent other nations, *one and all*, from engaging in them." The Edinburgh Review, referring to the Compromise Act, said, "We have no doubt, that it has given the *death-blow* to the American system."

The London Spectator, in 1843, says:—"More general considerations tend to show that the trade between the two countries most beneficial to both, must be what is commonly called a *Colonial* trade; the new-settled country importing the manufactures of the old, in exchange for its own raw produce. In all economical relations the United States *still stand* to England in the relation of *Colony to mother-country*."

Again, "Both England and the United States are suffering because the [economical] *Colonial* relation has been broken; because the surplus capital of England does not find its way to America along with the stragglers of its surplus population; and because the raw produce of America, through the influence of restrictive duties, and for want of that capital, can not find its way to England." It must be allowed, that this has a modest squinting *backward*.

Every true American will duly appreciate such an unblushing proposal to revive the old system of *Colonial* dependence. Such always has been and *still* is the plan of British commercial policy, and such will be its end, if *unopposed by an American system*. It is *their* policy to make and keep us *dependent on them*; it is *our* policy to be *independent of all the world*.

Mr. Jefferson's views.

Mr. Jefferson said in his report to Congress, as Secretary of State, in 1793, "Free commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions and vexations. It behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and navigation, by counter prohibitions, duties, and regulations;" and in a letter to Mr. Benjamin Austin, in 1816, he said, "To be independent for the comforts of life, we must fabricate them ourselves. We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist. Experience has taught me, that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort, and if they who quote me [referring to his notes on Virginia written in 1783], as of a different opinion, will keep pace with me in purchasing nothing foreign, when an equivalent of domestic fabric can be obtained, without any regard to difference of price, will not be our fault, if we do not have a supply equal to our demand, and wrest that weapon of distress from the hand that has so often violated it." Every President of the United States has recommended and sanctioned, and every Congress has legislated protection of American interests against foreign systems of commercial policy. Yet, as the facts quoted demonstrate we have never succeeded.

How foreign manufacturers manage to defraud and injure Americans.

They send their agents here, who, by their intimate relations and a secret understanding at home, are able to supplant American merchants, to defraud our revenue by false invoices, and thus to crush those very American interests which were designed to be protected by the laws they violate. See Senate Doc., No. 83, 2d Session, 27th Congress, for proof of fraud in the agents of one English house, to the amount of some hundreds of thousands of dollars. Also a voluntary fine of eighty-six thousand dollars, paid by seven agents of British houses, to Mr. Hoyt, Collector of New York, to compromise, and purchase exemption from the course of justice—and a variety of other evidence of the same kind—a mere index to the vast frauds that have been practised upon us with impunity. The proportion of foreigners engaged in the importing business of New York, is 74 to 26 Americans, and in the French and German trade, they are nearly a hundred to one. While enjoying the immunities of American citizens, besides disgorging their goods, wares, and merchandise, upon the country, which we do not want, and thereby running us in debt, they are committing the crimes of felony on the revenue and of robbery on the people.

No wonder then.

In view of the facts we have had occasion to notice, it is no longer a wonder that Great Britain obtained such signal vengeance upon us for the loss of her jurisdiction over us; no wonder that, since the general peace of the world, the nations of Europe, having left off fighting each other, and turned to fight us by their commercial systems, have brought them to bear upon us with such tremendous energy, as repeatedly to have made us reel and fall under them, we having no adequate defence.

The reason why we have been able to stand it even so well.

It is our internal commerce and reproductive wealth. A man of large estate, if it be well managed, can lose a great deal, and yet thrive, though the increase of his wealth will be checked by his losses. We have seen that our foreign trade is a trifle compared with our domestic. We produce two thousand or two thousand and five hundred millions a year, and not more than one twentieth of it goes into our exports. The remainder is used by ourselves, and most of that remainder is a subject of trade among ourselves, no small share of which is employed as a reproductive power, augmenting, always in some degree, much of it in a manifold degree, our substantial wealth. Witness the growth and improvements of the country. A man that improves his estate, adds to his wealth. It is the same with a nation. Hence we have been able to bear a losing business in our foreign trade, though it has many times crippled us, and several times broke us down for a season, by breaking down our currency in the withdrawal of our specie to an amount greater than we were able to bear.

A question put.

In the whole history of our government, from the establishment of our independence, we find only six years when as a nation we have sold as much as we have bought. Is it reasonable, that so trifling a part of the trade and business of this nation, as our foreign commerce, which is rarely more than one twentieth, should expose us to such hazards, and bring us into such difficulties?

A suggestion.

It may be surprising, but facts and figures give occasion for the suggestion, that, apart from the destruction of life and public morals, it might be better for us to be in a state of perpetual war with a maritime power that would chiefly drive our commerce from the great highway of nations, than to continue under that system which has, for the most part, characterized our commercial intercourse with foreign nations. War gives immense activity to business, and great profits in every branch of industry and trade; nor is it easy to show, that the expense of a war is greater than the commercial advantage, if the people who are benefited by it would consent to be taxed to prevent the government from running in debt. There is reason for saying, that, after both the wars we have had with Great Britain, her commercial system did us more injury than would have resulted from the continuance of war. In the

that was but a partial and slow one, but was greatly strengthened by the protracted war in Europe. In the second, the tariff of 1816 came in to help us, after the horse was stolen.

What is likely to come to pass.

Doubtless, the facts developed in our commercial history as it relates to foreign powers, such as have come under review in these pages, will yet claim and receive the grave deliberation of Congress, as to what can be done to arrest the career of buying of foreign nations more than we sell to them. It is impossible to prosper under such a system, and this whole nation, ere long, will rise with one voice to demand a remedy.

What the remedy is.

It is in substance, to enact such regulations for the government of our foreign trade, as will counteract and prevent this everlasting excess of imports over exports, and turn the tide of foreign commerce in our favor. In other words, it is the permanent establishment of a suitable protective tariff system. We say protective, because protection is the thing required—the *vinc qua non*—protection of American interests against the hostile machinations of foreign commercial systems.

The tariff a patriotic question.

Most unwisely and most unfortunately it has, to a great extent, been made a sectional question; but it is purely a patriotic one. No part of this nation can prosper without a protective tariff, for the simple reason that the nation, as a whole, can not prosper without it. Has any part failed to suffer disadvantage, and a corresponding equality of disadvantage, from the revulsion of 1837-40?

The cotton-growing interest.

As no other American interest has been more indebted to a tariff, or is more likely to be dependent upon it, we have never been able to see any good reason why it should be opposed to it. It started under a tariff of 3 cents a pound in its favor, has never had less, and one cent a pound would be as effectual a prohibition as three. It will, perhaps, say, it does not require a tariff. Any how, it is claimed, and does in fact exclude the foreign product.

The cotton-growing interest in the foreign market, as compared with other American interests.

Our average annual exports of domestic origin and home manufacture, from 1836 to 1840, inclusive, being five years, were \$102,588,892, of which the exports of cotton were \$64,238,225, leaving only \$33,350,367 as the annual average export for this period of all other American products. The average annual portion of these exports to Great Britain and her dependencies, was \$60,200,131, of which portion cotton made \$45,560,647, leaving only \$14,639,484 for all exports other than cotton. The average annual exports of all our agricultural products, other than cotton, for these years, including animal food and the products of animals, to all parts of the world, was only \$11,766,615, of which \$5,353,818 only was the annual export to Great Britain and her dependencies. To England, Scotland, and Ireland, our annual average exports of agricultural products for this period of five years, including animal food and animal products, were only \$1,474,719. The entire average of all our exports to England, Scotland, and Ireland, for these years, was \$53,295,933. But of this \$45,515,137 was cotton, and only \$7,780,796 of all exports other than cotton. These results are deduced from public and official documents, and will not be denied.

The effect of this foreign demand for raw American cotton, on our other agricultural and other American interests.

If the above quotations were not sufficient to show the effect, we have before us the obvious fact, as a part of British policy, that Great Britain is obliged to impose prohibitory restrictions on those American products which she does not want, and heavy duties on those of which she wants but little, that she may be able to admit, under a mere nominal duty, this American staple of raw cotton which she does want. And the worst of it all is, that a large portion of this same cotton comes back to us, under an advanced price, some of 500, some of 1,000, some of 1,500, and some of 2,000 per cent., to support British manufacturers and the British government, and pay the navigation, mercantile, and other charges, when we might save much or most of this by a suitable protection of our own manufactures.

No does this system and course of trade create a better market for American raw cotton.

Certainly, not in the long run, nor can we see that it does so temporarily. The world must have just so much of cotton fabrics, and of just such a quality, wherever they come from; and if the British should buy less, we should manufacture more to supply the deficiency. It

is impossible to injure the market of American raw cotton, so long as its quality and price give it a preference; and whenever this advantage fails, nothing can support the demand for it. It is morally certain, that Great Britain will continue to buy American raw cotton to just such an amount as may be necessary to support "the present colossal, mammoth-like, and almost unwieldy grandeur," as Blackwood calls it, of her manufacturing system; and not less certain that she will refuse to buy, whenever she can do without it. She is not likely, either to be coaxed or successfully implored by us, to trade for our advantage, if it be not for hers.

Another consideration.

The fact, that since the tariff of 1842, we have been able to export cotton goods to Great Britain herself—"carry coal to Newcastle," and sell it there—to the surprise and consternation of our excellent friends in that empire—is sufficient evidence, that, by a suitable protection of our home manufactures, we can not only create a home market for all our cotton that may not be wanted in England, and thus be independent, but also, that we can compete with England herself for the market of the world. *One third* of the cotton yarn spun at Paterson, N. J., is exported to China through a New York house. The American cotton-grower should have his eye upon these things, if he would be wise, not only for his own interest, but for considerations of patriotism.

Yet another class of facts.

We can not any longer be blind to the aim and efforts of Great Britain to supply herself with raw cotton from her own dominions in the East, or to the annual rapid increase of the culture of cotton in western Asia, Egypt, Africa, South America, and Texas, all favorable climates, with an inviting soil.

We learn from authentic sources, that the import of India cotton into Great Britain, for 1839, was 132,900 bales; 216,651 bales for 1840; and 273,637 for 1841. For the month of January, 1841, it was 17,200 bales; for the corresponding month in 1842, it was 49,380; and it has been reported, that the India crop for exportation for 1842, was likely to mount up to 600,000 bales. In 23 years from 1816, the increased consumption of India cotton in Great Britain was as *ten to one*, while the increase of the consumption of American cotton, for the same period in that country, was only as *four to one*. It is true, the American cotton-grower has taken encouragement from the intimation, that the *quality* of India cotton is against it. It should, however, be remembered, that the same channels of information which announce disappointment for this reason in one quarter, also announce that they are trying in another quarter, and that the production of indigo in India had to encounter the same difficulty, which was finally overcome, to the almost entire suppression of the American product. The chances are *many*, perhaps a *hundred*, it may be a *thousand to one*, that the British, ere long, will succeed in supplying themselves with raw cotton from India. Is it not, then, sound American policy, and the only permanent security of American cotton-growers; to be prepared for such an event, by rearing and protecting American manufactures, that we may be able in such an exigency, to vie with England for the market of the world in the supply of cotton fabrics? Our cotton manufactures date from 1816; in 1825 their annual consumption of raw cotton was 100,000 bales; and in 1842 the consumption was 300,000 bales, *threefold* greater than the ratio of increase of British cotton manufactures for the same period, notwithstanding the disadvantages which American establishments have labored under for want of adequate protection. In 1835, we exported of American cotton manufactures \$2,858,000; in 1840, \$3,549,000; and these exports may be carried to an indefinite extent. In every aspect of this great question, the finger of sound policy seems to point to the increase and protection of American manufactures, as well for the present as for the future, and not less for the interest of the American cotton-grower, than for the welfare of the American republic. The apparently impending rush of the several quarters of the world we have mentioned, into the culture of cotton, bids fair soon to require a high and vigorous protection of the American cotton-growing interest. Can it fairly ask it *then*, if it refuses *now* to join in the establishment of an American commercial system, for the defence of American interests that are common to us all? As we have seen, it can not be injured by a protective policy even now; for if, peradventure, the demand for the raw material should be less abroad, it will be in a corresponding degree greater at home, besides the immense saving and benefit to the country in doing this work ourselves.

Northern capital and Southern labor.

The fact, that it has been publicly said, by public men, that Northern capital invested in manufactures, is hostile to Southern labor, seems to require a notice. First, we have to remark, *that*, according to the interpretations given by Southern authorities to the laws and institutions of the South, that which is here called Southern labor, is *capital*. Next, Mr. Ex. Secretary Woodbury, in his report of 1836, on American cotton, estimates the whole amount of *capital—not labor*—employed in its culture, thus:—Capital in lands \$312,000,000; in slaves

\$408,000,000; in horses, cattle, &c. \$20,400,000; floating capital \$30,600,000; total \$771,000,000. The total of capital vested in American manufactures (making calculations for the increase since the taking of the last census, when it was \$267,726,579) is now estimated as equal to \$300,000,000. Consequently the capital vested in the production of American cotton, not to speak of sugar and rice, is nearly *three to one* of the capital vested in American manufactures of the entire Union. It would seem, therefore, from the facts before stated, in regard to the ascendancy of American cotton in the foreign market over all other American products, that Southern capital is rather hostile to Northern labor, than Northern capital to Southern labor, if either be true.

Benefit of our Cotton Manufactories to the country.

Annual cost of raw material, say, from seven to eight millions of dollars. This goes to the American planter. The value of this cotton, when manufactured, is ascertained to be *forty-six millions*; now we probably manufacture to the amount of more than *fifty millions* annually. This *fifty millions* goes to all the parties engaged in the production and manufacture of the cotton, and stays in the country, to circulate here, instead of going abroad to buy foreign manufactures of the same kind. The same remark applies to other domestic manufactures of every description—we save the cost to the country, and have the use of the money. The capital vested in American Cotton Factories, *fifty-one millions of dollars*, employs many times that amount of other American capital, of great variety, as will be seen under the following head.

American manufactories enhance the value of agricultural and other American capital to a great amount by giving it profitable employment.

It has been ascertained and well certified, that the Glenham Woollen Factory, at Fishkill, N. Y., with a capital of \$140,000, gives profitable employment to \$1,432,000 worth of other American capital, chiefly agricultural, in items as follows:—66,000 sheep, \$2 a head, \$132,000; 22,000 acres of pasture land to feed the sheep, in Dutchess county, supposed to be worth \$50 an acre, \$1,100,000; farms employed to the extent of 2,600 acres worth \$70 an acre, \$182,000; other capital to furnish teazles, firewood, coal, provender, &c., &c., \$8,000. Total \$1,432,000. Consequently, if \$140,000 of manufacturing capital employs \$1,432,000 of other capital, then the \$300,000,000 of manufacturing capital of the United States, at the same rate, would employ other capital of the country to the amount of \$3,068,571,428, or about *three thousand millions of dollars*. Not to assume this case as a rule to determine the exact general result, it is near enough to show, that American manufactories employ and sustain a vast amount of American capital, of great variety. The wool growing interest of the United States alone, is estimated by the Hon. Mr. Slade, of Vt., at *two hundred millions of dollars*. The farmers of the country—of which class more than a million are interested in growing wool—receive annually *forty millions of dollars* from this source; for subsistence of operatives in the Woollen and Iron Factories alone the farmers receive *twenty-six millions of dollars*—in all *sixty-six millions*, being nearly *nine times* as much as all the American flour, beef, and pork, absorbed by the entire foreign market of the world.

In the same manner every kind of American manufacture employs American capital, of kinds different from every other, and of great variety. Inasmuch, therefore, as the capital employed in manufactures is only as about *one to ten* of the capital employed by it, it will be seen, that American manufactories impart a most essential and most important value to the entire capital of the country, and directly or indirectly, not only give profitable employment to every American laborer, but enhance the price of his labor. No laborer could be found in the United States, who is not in these ways benefited, and that not in a trifling degree.

The national benefit.

This is immense, and embraces not only the negative good of preventing all this work and all this reward of work from going abroad, to be realized by other nations, which would make us so much poorer, but the positive good of having the work to do and the pay for it, which makes us so much richer. And this remark applies equally to every new manufacture, craft, or useful art, that is introduced and carried on among us.

A deduction.

It will be seen, therefore, that the objection sometimes made against domestic manufactures, viz., that they are for the benefit of the rich rather than of the poor, of the capitalist rather than of the laborer and the mechanic, is without foundation. It is the labor of the country that is first and chiefly benefited by the investment of capital, or the setting up of business, that employs labor. The proprietor can never get his dividend, or his profits, till the laborer is paid; and the profits of the latter are always greater than those of the former, in proportion to the capital employed. Investments in a large manufacturing establishment, existing in the shape of stocks, are not usually made so much for speculation, as for a reasonable and

steady income, an income that can never be had, till all the other capital and all the labor employed by it have realized their reward; nor is it possible for such establishments to make large dividends, without having first conferred more than a proportionate benefit on the numerous parties, by the instrumentality of whose labor these establishments are carried on. It is a well-known fact that a great proportion of the large manufacturing establishments of this country have changed owners. And why? Because it has been a losing business, and the original proprietors have retired from disappointment, not a few of whom have sunk large fortunes. But the laborers & the country have had all that has been thus sacrificed, and are all the richer by as much as these proprietors have been made poorer.

It is proved in "*Facts for a Laboring Man*," published in 1840, that a family of seven persons, whose entire wages in 1816, in a Cotton Factory, were only \$180 a year, could get in 1836, in consequence of the increase of wages, \$658 a year; while the prices of their products had fallen about *two thirds*.

Who are manufacturers.

The maker of brickdust and the house-carpenter, the mason and ship-builder, the tailor and shoe-maker, the hatter and milliner, the blacksmith and watch-maker, the iron-founder and the saddler, the author and his publisher, the soap-boiler and apothecary, the wheelwright and the locomotive-builder, the cabinet-maker and rope-maker, and all the various handy-craftsmen of civilization, are as much manufacturers as the makers of pins and buttons, of tin ware and cutlery, of cotton-shirting and broadcloths. The chief ground of difference is, that, while the capital of some of these crafts-men and crafts-women consists in their skill, or two hands and ten fingers, or brains and sinews, that of others consists in their money, which employs the skill, hands, fingers, brains, and sinews of their neighbors. If either of these more properly merits the name of manufacturer, it is he who does the work, and the *workers* are they to whom these crafts are most essential for a living, and as the foundation of wealth. To oppose manufactures, is therefore to oppose every man who depends on handy-craft for a livelihood—it is to oppose the march of civilization.

Effect of the multiplication of our producing classes.

First, it diminishes each class, and increases its chances of profit. Next, instead of paying a foreign producer, and thus losing the money to the country, the money remains, generating domestic wealth, as money in use always does. Every new class of producers, if the products are in demand, increases public wealth in a manifold degree; whereas the importation of these products subtracts from public wealth in an equal degree.

The more wants, if supplied at home, the more wealth.

This is true because the above is so, and for the same reasons. Wants make work, and work makes profit. This is the advantage of civilization over the natural state. It multiplies wants, sharpens invention, promotes industry, and thereby creates wealth. The multiplication of wants is another name for the augmentation of the interests of trade, and trade—*fair trade*—is mutual help for mutual benefit. Every one will see, that, from the primitive or natural state of man, before trade or mutual help commenced, the progress of society has been incalculable; nor is it possible to fix a limit to its future advancement by the same means.

The principle of protection.

It arises from the compact of society. Every interest of lawful trade being a benefit to society, is entitled to protection, and it must be adequate, or it is not protection.

It has been said, that agriculture is our natural calling, and that our best national policy is to foster that chiefly.

But what is agriculture good for, beyond the natural wants of the producer, without a market? If that were our only pursuit, we should have no market, either at home or abroad. Not at home, for every squaw can produce enough for her own wigwam; not abroad, for they do not want it. It is the multiplicity of industrial pursuits, that creates a market for the products of each; and the greater the number, the better the market.

A near market always better than a remote one, and a home market better than a foreign one.

Why are farms near New York worth from fifty to a hundred dollars an acre, while those in Illinois are not worth more than ten dollars? Because the former lie at the door of a market. A home market is better than a foreign one, first, because it is nearer; secondly, because it is more secure; thirdly, because it is more uniform; and, lastly, because the prices are better. It is the merchant only that profits by the increase of distance and the multiplication of stages between the producer and the consumer, and the consumer pays the tax. The average price of flour and wheat in the United States, from 1831 to 1840 (as ascertained by the prices current of those years, published in different parts of the country), was \$6 65 cts. a barrel,

and \$1 30 cts. a bushel; whereas, the average price of flour in Europe for the same period, was only \$4 93 cts. a barrel, and of wheat 98 cents a bushel (as ascertained by comparison of Customhouse books, and other authentic documents, in different parts of Europe). The Hon. Chas. Hudson, of Mass., presented proof in detail to the Committee of the House of the 27th Congress, that Massachusetts alone consumes annually of the agricultural products of other states of the Union, to the amount of *forty-two millions of dollars*, it being more than *half* of the annual average of our exports for the last ten years, exclusive of domestic manufactures. It is because of the extensive manufactures, and the multiplicity of mechanics and artisans in that state, creating demand. The fact, that we produce annually in the United States to the aggregate value of *two thousand millions of dollars*, and usually export less than *one twentieth*, often not more than *one thirtieth*, is decisive evidence that our home market is our chief reliance.

Home manufactures cheaper than foreign.

Since the manufacture of cotton goods commenced in this country in 1816, the prices have been reduced on an average about *two thirds*. Woollen goods, oil-cloths, refined sugar, nails, spikes, and the various articles of iron manufacture, leather, pins, &c., &c., have all fallen materially in price, the moment protection has been sufficient to raise domestic competition. It is scarcely possible to put one's finger on an article of home manufacture, encouraged by protection, which has not been cheapened; and this too in the midst of increased wages of labor, and higher prices of agricultural products.

What this proves.

All this shows that we have been paying an exorbitant price for British and other foreign manufactures, since they can still afford to compete with us, which is in part the cause of reduced prices. Before, it was all in their hands, and they set their own price, which was extortion in itself, and a yet greater injury to this nation by running us in debt to foreign parts. We can never know the fair value of an article of manufacture, and we are sure not to get it at a fair price, while we are dependent on foreigners for it. But when we make it ourselves, we not only save in price, but we have the profits of manufacture, and the yet secondary and larger advantage of the profitable employment which the home manufacture gives to other capital. The positive commercial loss, and the political disadvantage of dependence on foreigners for the supply of our wants, are incalculable.

What Captain Marryat says.

In his work on America, he states, that the supply of British goods of all kinds, is more abundant in the remotest frontier towns of the United States, where the stumps of the primitive forest are yet standing in the streets and cellars, than in the market-towns of England. This we know to be true, for we have personally observed it in both quarters.

By a recent report of a committee of the British House of Commons, it appears, that Prussia consumes annually of British manufactures to the amount of 7 cents for each individual of her population; Russia to the amount of 16 cents for each individual; Norway 17 cents; France 20 cents; and the United States to the amount of 402 cents for each individual of our population; and yet there is scarcely one of these articles which we could not produce, and generally at a lower price.

How this happens.

For want of proper restrictive regulations of our own, England brings her goods, offers credit, and we run in debt. England wants to sell them, and the sight of them captivates our eyes.

Facts.

During ten years, from 1820 to 1830, of a tolerable protective policy, we paid off *one hundred millions* of foreign debt. During the next ten years, from 1830 to 1840, of comparative *free trade*, we contracted a foreign debt of *two hundred millions*. During the first period our imports were \$798,500,000, and the amount retained for domestic consumption, was \$568,900,000. During the second period our imports were \$1,302,500,000, and the amount retained for domestic consumption was \$1,103,100,000; that is, our imports and consumption in the second period, were nearly *double* of the first. Here is the secret of the foreign debt contracted. (Report of Committee on Commerce, 27th Congress, by Hon. J. P. Kennedy.)

Reciprocity in trade between us and Europe—the facts.

The Hon. P. Triplett, of Ky., made a communication to the committee on manufactures, in the 27th Congress, from which we deduce the following facts:—that our products consumed in Europe, pay duties on entering there, equal to *half* of their entire value; whereas, European products consumed by us, pay duties here equal only to *one fifth* of their value.

From other authentic sources we learn that, in 1841, our imports were \$127,945,000, and

our exports \$91,000,000. The duties we got from these imports amounted to \$14,487,000, being about 11½ per cent.; whereas, the duties which foreign countries obtained from our exports of that year, amounted to \$113,500,000, or 124 per cent. ! The average of our exports of tobacco to Europe for 1839 and 1840, was \$9,225,000 for each year; and the average duties imposed for each year by European governments, was \$32,463,000 or 350 per cent. ! The duties on American tobacco in Europe have been as high as \$35,000,000 a year. Out of our toil and sweat they support their extravagances, and by the prohibitory effect of their excessive tariffs, they curtail our market abroad, while our comparatively free ports admit their products, not only to run us in debt to them, but to suppress American industry, and deprive American labor of a fair reward.

The commercial system of Russia.

In Blackwood's Magazine for June, 1843, is a good British scolding at Russia, because she is taking less and less of British manufactures, and supplying herself; in other words, because she is wise enough not to run in debt to Great Britain. It appears from the same source, that the Russian system brings annually and uniformly a handsome balance in favor of the empire, as the result of their regulations of foreign trade.

The Turkish system.

But poor Turkey has fallen very much into the hands of British policy, and Mr. McCulloch informs us, that, of 600 looms employed in Scutari in 1812, only 40 remained in 1831; and of 2,000 weaving establishments at Tournovo in 1812, only 200 remained in 1831. As a consequence, their hard-money currency is exported to England in large amounts for the supplies of goods they receive from "the workshop of the world," and the nation is greatly impoverished.

A plain and practical case.

Suppose a bushel of American wheat, in the farmer's hands, is equal to the cost of a yard of British cloth, apart from the exactions of the British government, direct and indirect, and that these exactions make this yard of cloth cost two bushels of wheat; in other words, the American farmer, in the purchase of this yard of British cloth, pays one bushel of wheat as a tax to the British crown. This is precisely the mode by which we are taxed for foreign manufactures. But suppose the British manufacturer comes over with his capital, and sets up business here; the American farmer then gets his yard of cloth for its fair value, one bushel of wheat; the manufacturer is equally well paid, and escaping the exactions of the British government in a thousand forms, his own fortunes are greatly mended, while his adopted country is enriched by the employment of his capital within itself. This is precisely the effect of the tariff of 1842. British manufacturers and capitalists are coming over, buying up, and putting in operation American manufacturing establishments, which had been shut up, and erecting new ones. Agents of Yorkshire (England) manufacturers have already set agoing several establishments in the vicinity of Philadelphia.

An illustration of the relative position of Europe and the United States, in regard to their respective commercial systems.

Here are two contiguous estates, one well and the other badly managed. Whenever the proprietor of the latter buys of the former, he insists on *less*, and when he sells, he claims *more* than a fair price, by which means the good husbandman is taxed to make up for the bad management of his neighbor. *Thus are we taxed to support the burdens of European governments.*

Or, suppose one of these United States should impose heavy duties on the products of a contiguous state--would not justice require corresponding regulations in the latter?

A farther view of this subject.

By submitting to foreign tariffs without adopting a countervailing one, we are not only taxed to support the vices of foreign governments, but we put ourselves still farther in their power by enabling them to impoverish and oppress us directly. Importers are one class of merchants, and exporters another, and the interest of each one of each class is to *push his business*, and make all the money he can, without any regard to its effect on the public. The consequence is, when we have no tariff to countervail foreign tariffs, that our exports find hard work to get into foreign markets, while our imports crowd in upon us in excess, and run us in debt.

A hard case.

A farmer in Illinois wrote a letter to his friend in the east, in 1842, complaining that he could get only 31 cts. a bushel for his wheat, 25 cts. for beans, 10 cts. for corn, 1½ cts. a pound for beef and pork, 2½ cts. a pound for tobacco, &c., stating that he had to pay *five dollars*, or which is the same thing, 16 bushels of wheat, or 20 bushels of beans, or 26 bushels

of corn, or 300 lbs. of pork or beef, or 200 lbs. of tobacco, *per yard* of British broadcloth to make him a coat! The cost of this yard of cloth at the manufactories in England, was probably about *three dollars*, or two bushels of wheat, as sold in the market there. That is, the producer in England received for the cloth *one eighth* of what was charged to the farmer in Illinois. Who got the difference? If the manufacturer had been in Illinois, or anywhere in this country, the farmer might have got his yard of cloth for *two* bushels of wheat, instead of *sixteen*, and the manufacturer would have made a market for the farmer's beans, corn, pork, beef, &c., at a good price.

Effects of the Tariff of 1842.

Every body, the whole nation, feels its reviving, renovating influence. It has put a stop to excessive importations, revived domestic trade, turned the balance of foreign trade in our favor, is fast restoring the prices of American products and labor, and in the first six months of 1843 brought back to this country nearly *thirty millions of dollars in specie*, thereby furnishing the basis of a sound circulating medium, which only requires a proper organization of our currency system, that we may reap the full benefit of it. (See our Tract on the Currency.)

The benefit of the tariff to the agricultural interest.

This is emphatically the great interest of the country, and therefore its claims are strongest for the benefit of legislation.

Mr. Everett, our minister to England, stated, in a speech at an agricultural meeting, at Derby, in July, 1843, Earl Spencer in the chair, that, although the commerce between Great Britain and the United States was twice as great as between England and any other country, yet the whole of the products, passing to and fro, was not worth so much as the *cats and beans* raised in Great Britain, as proved by their agricultural statistics, and that the entire value of the products employing British navigation all the world over, was not equal to the *grass* grown in Great Britain. Such is the importance of agriculture to every nation.

Over this vast American interest the Tariff of 1842 has thrown its shield, first in direct protection given to its products. For cotton, wool, hemp, beef and pork, hams and bacon, cheese, butter, lard, potatoes, flour and wheat, *eleven articles*, we find an average protection of 43 per cent., which is higher than the average protection given to manufactures. But, secondly, protection of manufactures is a protection of agriculture, inasmuch as our manufactures give employment to such a vast amount of agricultural capital and open such a market for agricultural products, as has been shown in another place. The importance of protection to agriculture will further appear from the fact, that the annual average of imports of the above-named agricultural products, for the *five years* preceding 1842, were \$2,341,600, and that the potatoes imported into Boston in *one year* amounted to \$41,000. It will be seen by a statement, page 7, that our imports of agricultural products for the above-named five years, were greater than our agricultural exports, other than cotton, to Great Britain.

Benefit of the Tariff to labor.

It has been estimated by political economists, that the industry of a country is equal to *one seventh or one eighth* of its entire wealth. It might be said, that *all* the essential wealth of a nation consists in its capacity for labor, as no nation could subsist without it. American labor, by the revulsion of 1837-'40, was seen to be sinking rapidly into the griping fist of European despotism, by the approximation of its prices to the European standard, till the tariff of 1842 rescued it, and is fast establishing it on the true American basis, with the prospect of a fair reward.

Effect of the Tariff in England.

From English papers of July, 1843, we learn, by a return made to Parliament, on motion of Mr. Thornly, that the exports of British goods to the United States for the previous year, were less in value by the sum of *twelve hundred thousand pounds* (nearly *six millions of dollars*), than in any other previous year since 1833 (when the Compromise Act was passed by our Congress); and that the English feared they would have to remit specie for American cotton, instead of paying for it in goods, with a balance in their favor, as in former years. The same document also shows that the imports into Great Britain from the United States have not diminished but increased. This proves, that the Tariff of 1842 is putting things to rights pretty fast.

Our imports for 1840 were \$107,141,519, of which only \$49,915,315 paid duties. In 1841 they were \$127,946,177, of which only \$61,926,446 paid duties. In 1842 the imports were \$99,357,329, of which \$69,400,633 paid duties, more than *two thirds* of the whole. Exports for 1842 \$104,117,969. The exports of 1840 were also somewhat largely, more than *twenty-four millions*, in excess (very unusual) of imports. It went to settle balances. This was the *sixth year* of an excess of exports since the establishment of our independence, and the other *five* were very trifling. But since the Tariff of 1842, our foreign trade is getting to be healthful, and bids fair to be safe. The revulsion of 1837-'40, by inducing a want of credit abroad and commercial distress at home, has operated as a tariff in our favor.

Commercial treaties.

But for the respectable source from which this project has recently been revived, we should have thought it unworthy of notice. The first and most serious objection to it, is, that it virtually *reconstitutes* our machinery of legislation, in a very important particular, and transfers a function to the Federal Executive, which the Constitution has jealously confined to the immediate representatives of the people in the lower house of Congress—to wit, the *origination of the revenue laws*—and farther nominates foreign powers as parties, with rights, to bring such legislation to maturity! Will the people of this country consent thus to chain themselves, and such momentous interests, first to the car of our Federal Executive, and next to the cars of foreign despots? A Treaty can not be reviewed, and amended, or repealed, like a law of Congress; but is binding and unalterable, whatever may be the result of experience—of which we already have a little, giving good advice, in the following particulars:—On the authority of the late Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, (See House Document, No. 163, 2d Session, 27th Congress,) it appears, that the result of our treaty of 1828, with the Hanseatic Towns, is, that *before* that treaty *five sevenths* of the vessels entering those ports from the United States, were *American*, and that in 1840 *four fifths* were Bremen, and only *one fifth* American. Like to this has been the result of our arrangement of 1830 with Great Britain, in regard to her American possessions, which appears from the fact, that since that time, the British tonnage, entering our ports, has increased 500 per cent., while our own tonnage, entering our ports, has increased only 50 per cent.; and from the further fact, that British vessels have monopolized almost the whole trade between the State of Maine and British American possessions. We have a similar arrangement with Sweden, in consequence of which, she has already entered upon our China trade, in the case of the Swedish ship *Albion*, and is likely to wrest it from our hands. Each of these arrangements is based on the *Free Trade principle*, allowing equal terms of trade to the vessels of the contracting parties. Such is the result of our commercial treaties *thus far*. They bind us to perpetual, irrevocable sacrifice. These cases may serve to show what would be the fate of our navigation interest, if the protection it now enjoys were withdrawn. It could not stand a competition with the cheapness of foreign capital and labor employed in navigation a single day, and foreign flags would monopolize even our coasting trade.

A new commercial treaty with Great Britain? Is she a fool, or we, to talk of that? Already the average of her tariff, as it bears on us, is 110 per cent. above ours as it bears on her, and would require an average abatement on her part of 60 per cent., and an average addition on ours of 50 per cent., to make a fair treaty. Will Great Britain consent to this? The absurdity of such a project is too obvious to be mentioned. Great Britain is not wont to be so disinterested and gracious.

The impracticability of such a scheme in relation to European powers generally.

Their debts and other burdens are too great, and the wits of their statesmen are continually tortured for the invention of tariffs adequate to their purposes. They are constantly straining them to a higher pitch, and the recent apparent and trifling abatement in the British tariff is in fact a *protective* measure, offered as a lure to the German League and to nations of the Continent to induce them to *halt*, that England may retain her trade with them. Holland owes a debt averaging \$266 67 for each one of her population; the debt of England averages \$222 24 for each individual; the debt of France is \$54 54 for each person; and so on, till having counted *twenty-five* States, the average of debt is still \$10 00 for each person. (See Hunt's Merchants' Magazine for May, 1843.) Is it likely, that, with the additional burden of their expensive governments, they will relax their tariffs to trade with us for our advantage? In charity we are bound not to imagine that this proposal is offered as a wedge to split the Constitution.

The effect of European capital and labor on American capital and labor.

The value of capital (money we mean) is determined by the interest it can obtain in the market; and by this rule the average value of capital in Europe is at least *one third* less than the average value of American capital, as settled by experience. The average price of European labor, as determined by the best authorities, is at least *two thirds*, and might perhaps be put down at *three fourths* less, than the average price of American labor. Say, *two thirds*. In other words, the value of American capital is as 3 to 2, and of American labor as 3 to 1 of European capital and labor. This may be assumed as settled.

How this difference arises.

It is the difference in this particular, between a *free* country and countries *not free*. It is not an *accident*—a transient result—but the *permanent effect of a permanent and immutable cause*. In our case, the value of capital and the price of labor are *not forced and fictitious*, but they are the *prerogative of freedom*. In the case of Europe, the laborers are *not a party in arranging the price of their task*. They have no choice. It is *forced*. Consequently, the capital that is thus *wrung* from involuntary service, *at such a price*, can be afforded at less

interest; and considering how it is acquired, the price of European capital is in fact higher than American capital, as compared with the price of labor there.

It will be seen, therefore, *other things being equal*, that the advantage which European capital and labor, as producing powers, have over American capital and labor, acting in the same capacity, in open and free trade, is equal to the difference in their relative values, which may be assumed as *two to one*, or 100 per cent., if labor be regarded an equal power with the capital that employs it. But other things are not equal, and the difference is in favor of Europeans. For example, laborers in Europe work from 12 to 18 hours a day, averaging say 15 hours, and American laborers never over 10 hours, making a difference in this particular of *one third*. There are other points of difference all on the same side; but this is enough to show that we have not rated the sum of difference too high, in allowing European capital and labor to be 100 per cent. more powerful, as producers, in opposition to American capital and labor. The point is this:—That American capital and labor, at a cost of 100 per cent., can not compete in the same market and on the same terms with European capital, at a cost of 67 per cent., and European labor, at a cost of 33 per cent.

The question.

The question then—the great, practical, momentous question—is, Shall European capital and labor, in a field of open and free trade, be permitted to bring American capital and labor, that is, American society, down to the same level? Or shall American society, by the American government, *protect* American capital and labor, and maintain the position to which the cost of American freedom has elevated them?

The great battle.

The great battle of the world is between freedom and despotism; and we take upon us to say, that, more than in anything or all things else, the *form* under which that contest is now carried on, is between European capital and labor on one side, and American capital and labor on the other. On this pivot, in our regard, turns the destiny of nations. SUSTAIN the position of American capital and labor, that every man may be secure of the fair reward of his exertions, however humble his birth and calling, and freedom will prevail all the world over. The American people, *united and resolved* in this great enterprise, can beat the world—the *whole world*—on this platform, and crumble into dust the bulwarks of despotie sway. BUT, let European capital and labor PREVAIL against us, and there is an end of freedom, till another cycle of ages, with its sad round of experience, shall burst the chains again, and they who succeed shall better appreciate their duty and their chances.

The battle for American freedom was only begun in the establishment of American independence. The commercial systems of Europe, as they act upon us through the agency of European capital and labor, are more to be feared than all the power of European arms. A perpetual war would be less expensive and less perilous than the effects of this occult, silent, insinuating, all-pervading power, if *unresisted by us*.

And is all this against commerce?

Certainly not. But the question is, *How we can make commerce most profitable?* Whether we shall put and keep this whole nation in the hands of a few importing merchants, that they may become "merchant princes," and into the hands of the agents of British and foreign manufactories, to be their *slaves?* or whether we shall yet be *free and independent?* We have shown that our home trade is some *twenty to one* more than our foreign trade, and that our foreign trade, unregulated, or nearly so, has been the cause of all our commercial and currency troubles, from time to time, in the progress of our history. The practical question, therefore, is, *How foreign trade can be regulated, so as not to destroy both domestic and foreign?* By a suitable protection of home industry, and American capital and labor, we can increase our trade in a manifold degree, without any risk, and with a certainty of an increase of national wealth: whereas, an extension of foreign trade at the expense of domestic, is sure to ruin all.

The importance of our domestic trade.

We have stated in our Tract on the Currency, from good authority, that the domestic exchanges of this country, required to be negotiated for the settlement of accounts in trade, amount to not less than *four hundred millions of dollars* annually. As this mode of business is comparatively rare, and is little employed, except in the larger and more formal transactions of commerce, the fact is a sufficient indication of the vast domestic trade of the country.

A question easily answered.

Viz., Who are the British allies in this country? *Ans.* The advocates of free trade.

How to pay our foreign debt.

It is allowed to be about *two hundred millions*. Regulate our foreign trade so as to bring a balance of *twenty millions* a year in our favor, and the account will all be settled in ten years, so far as the *nation* is concerned, and that without prejudice, and with great benefit to the interests of the country. In 1840 we actually settled *twenty-four millions* of this reckoning. (See page 13, last paragraph.) That such a policy of liquidation would be a tax upon none, and alike beneficial to all, will appear from the general argument of these pages.

Our leases of national prosperity.

Heretofore our national prosperity has been leased to us *at will* by the agents of foreign manufactories and importing merchants; and the usual run of a lease is not over ten years, more apt to be about five, and is liable to expire in two or three. It depends entirely on their success in tempting us into an excessive consumption of foreign products. Without a protective system, they would doubtless be able to bring us all to the ground, and lay us flat on our backs again, in *about three years*.

The leaning of great commercial cities, engaged in foreign commerce, towards free trade.

It would certainly be difficult to account for this on any principle of sound judgment or patriotism. No parts of the community can be more interested in a steady and healthful course of trade, than our large commercial towns; and no other equal portion of our country suffered so much as New York in the revulsion of 1837-40. Whenever the effects of excessive imports come, as come they must, with desolating power, these are the points that feel it first, and ultimately suffer most.

This leaning towards free trade, therefore, in these quarters, can only be accounted for from the probable fact, that they who talk so, being deeply in for it, hope to escape, or hope to get rich and retire before a revulsion comes. It is impossible they should be ignorant of the cause of these disasters.

How much richer we might have been.

On the last page of our Tract on the Currency, will be found a comprehensive summary of the losses to this country, as occasioned by the revulsion of 1837-40. In the present Tract is enough to show, that we have been suffering greatly ever since our existence as an independent nation, by the same cause, viz., *the want of a proper protective system*. It will follow, therefore, that we have suffered incalculable *putbacks*, from time to time, and that no one can tell how much richer we should have been as a nation, under such a system of government as our rights entitle us to. We can not help the past; but it will be our own fault, if we do not take care of the future.

Just what we want.

We want a system of foreign commerce that will secure the following results:—First, to afford adequate protection to American industry, invention, labor, and enterprise; and next, to afford adequate revenue for the support and objects of the government. With a proper discrimination in the imposition of duties on imports, these two ends may easily be accomplished.

Our country a world in itself.

We have almost every variety of climate and soil; our mineral resources are inexhaustibly rich in nearly all the known treasures of those regions; manufactures and the mechanic arts, in every variety, can be carried to the highest perfection here, as proved by experience; we can furnish their products cheaper than they can be imported; and there is scarcely any want of man, in the natural or social state, which we can not supply, equal or superior in quality, and on better terms than can be got elsewhere. Nature, in our wide domain, is all-bountiful, and society and the useful arts here are not surpassed in the civilized world. The enterprise of our population is unrivaled; and though young, we have come to a maturity in national importance, resources, and capabilities, that few nations can boast of. In this position, we will consent to trade with other nations on *fair terms*; but to be *dependent* first, and then to be *slaves*—this is what we will not consent to.

Our commercial domain.

Our commercial domain, and the rights appertaining thereunto, which extend over all public seas, penetrate all empires, and are co-extensive with the globe, limited and restricted only by the law of nations, are as important to be defended as the rights of our territorial domain. The latter, indeed, will prove to be of little value, unless the former can be maintained in all its integrity. Our independence is vulnerable chiefly, almost solely, through the channels of our foreign trade. It is through these easy loop-holes, spacious avenues, and open-mouthed ducts, that European capital and labor have poured in their products upon us, to suppress American industry, and bring down the price of American labor to the European standard.

Retrospective and prospective.

In our late commercial revulsion, labor among us stood like Laocoon and his offspring, writhing in the contortive folds of the serpent, which hissed in the ear of its victims the death that awaited them, till the tariff of 1842 came to its relief. On the basis of free trade in our foreign commerce, it is inevitable, that American capital and labor will together fall into the arms of European capital and labor, and expire in the grip; and the hopes of the world, based on American freedom, will die with it. For, it is not a problem yet to be solved, that the emasculating influence of European toil, meted out by despotism to the masses of mankind, unfits man either to assert, or acquire, or maintain freedom. Once reduce the price of American labor to a bare subsistence, and hardly that, which is the lot of European labor, and to which free trade in our foreign commerce inevitably tends, and down goes with it the value of American capital—and down for ever all the dear and precious rights of American freedom. "Have you any children?" asked a British government commissioner, of a respectable weaver. Ans. "No; I had two, but they are both dead, thanks be to God." "But, do you express satisfaction at the death of your children?" Ans. "I do. I thank God for it. I am relieved from the burden of maintaining them; and they, poor dear creatures, are relieved from the troubles of this mortal life." This is a pretty fair picture of the condition of European laborers, when death, in the shape of starvation and overwork, is so cruel as to spare them; and this is the condition to which the policy of free trade in our foreign commerce, would reduce every American laborer!

What we have proved.

It will probably be admitted, that the following things, among others, have been established:—

1. That the great bulk of the trade of this country is *domestic*.
2. That buying too much in our foreign trade, has been the cause of all our commercial and currency difficulties.
3. That it is impossible that such difficulties should arise from the action of domestic trade.
4. That this buying too much, draws the specie out of the country, and undermines the currency.
5. That the only way to prevent this buying too much, is to establish and maintain a restrictive and protective policy.
6. That the only parties benefited by this immense injury to the country, are foreign governments, foreign manufacturers, and a few importing merchants among ourselves.
7. That we can never have a foreign trade profitable to the country, or otherwise than injurious, till this practice of buying too much of foreign nations be suppressed.
8. That the importance of foreign trade is commonly overrated, and that American *self-dependence* is a more safe reliance.
9. That the products of manufactures are cheapened, and the wages of labor enhanced, by protective duties.
10. That both American labor and American capital are victims of European capital and labor, on the platform of free trade.
11. That American freedom and independence are put in jeopardy by our foreign trade, as heretofore conducted.
12. That the entire controversy is between the rights of American labor and the claims of European despotism.
13. That we are a world in ourselves, and have no need to desire or seek a commerce with foreign nations that will not render us equivalent for what we bestow.
14. That foreign trade, unregulated, is competent to destroy both itself and domestic trade, and that such is its tendency.
15. That domestic manufactures employ and put into active and profitable use a vast amount of American capital on which labor depends, and that the greater the number and extent of home manufactures, the better the chances of labor.
16. That the commercial systems of Europe are hostile to American interests, and require countervailing regulations.
17. That British policy contemplates the revival of colonial dependence on our part, and that such is the tendency of the actual system of trade between the two countries.
18. That a protective tariff is indispensable to our prosperity as a nation, and is a truly patriotic measure, equally important to all sections of the country, and all classes of American citizens, if we except a few importing merchants, leagued with agents of foreign and hostile interests, who are willing to make their fortunes on the ruins of a great country. And sundry other cognate results, for which see the text.

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LIFE OF HENRY CLAY.

● BY JUNIUS.

Author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and other Tracts of 1840.

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LIFE OF HENRY CLAY.

MR. CLAY was born the 12th of April, 1777, in Hanover county, Virginia. His father, a Baptist minister, who left his wife a widow in indigence, when Henry was in his fifth year, with seven young children, and two younger than Henry. Mr. Robert Hughes, a playfellow of Henry Clay in boyhood, said of his old friend, at a dinner on the Fourth of July, 1844, at Campbell Court House, Virginia: "He and I were born close to the slashes of old Hanover. He worked barefooted, and so did I. He went to mill, and so did I. He was good to mamma, and so was I. I know him like a book, and love him like a brother." The boy that works barefooted for his mother, will be very likely, when he comes to be a man, Providence opens the way, to serve his country well. The two spheres are kindred to each other.

Mr. Clay's first rudiments of education were acquired in a log schoolhouse. In the meantime, he had to work barefooted and go to mill. He is familiarly called in "old Hanover" the "MILL-BOY OF THE SLASHES,"—having been so often seen between his mother's house and Mrs. Darricott's grist-mill on the Pamunkey, mounted on a bag and a poney, guided by a rope-bridle. At the age of fourteen, he went to serve as clerk with Mr. Richard Denny, druggist, in Richmond, Va.; and the next year, 1792, went into the office of Peter Tinsley, Esq., clerk of the High Court of Chancery, where he attracted the notice, and received the kind regards of the venerable Chancellor Wythe, who afterward employed him as his amanuensis in recording his decisions, comments, &c. In these not unfavorable positions, spurred on by his ambition, and cherished by the Chancellor and others who had the sagacity to recognize the germe of his future eminence, he made rapid advances in legal and other studies. After spending his nineteenth year in the office of Robert Brooke, Esq., Attorney General for the State of Virginia, Mr. Clay obtained license for the practice of law from the Judges of the Court of Appeals in his native State.

Removal to Kentucky.

In 1792 Mr. Clay's mother had married Mr. Henry Watkins, and removed with her family to Woodford county, Kentucky. Attracted by his filial regard, Henry was induced to follow her; and in 1797 Mr. Clay, a youth of twenty, opened an attorney's office in Lexington, as he says in his speech of June 6, 1842, at that place, "without patrons, without the favor or countenance of the great or opulent, and without the means of paying my weekly board. I remember how comfortable I thought I should be, if I could make one hundred pounds, Virginia money, a year, and with what delight I received the first fifteen-shilling fee. My hopes were more than realized. I immediately rushed into a lucrative practice."

A pleasant story.

While Mr. Clay was yet a stranger at Lexington, he joined a debating club, but for some time declined taking any part in the discussions. After a while, however, it happened that a question was about to be put by the chairman for decision, when Mr. Clay, in a low voice, said to a fellow-member by his side, that he thought the question was not exhausted. Whereupon, glad of the chance, and without leave, Mr. Clay's friend suddenly rose, and said, "Mr. Chairman, Mr. Clay will speak on this question." Thus unexpectedly forced up, and abashed with that diffidence which gifted minds usually feel before they are used to collision with other minds, Mr. Clay began: "Gentlemen of the Jury," and perceiving his mistake, he stopped short. But through the politeness of the chairman and the club, who had wished to see him come out, he was encouraged to begin again: "Gentlemen of the Jury," said Mr. Clay, and there he stopped. At last, however, he got over the distressing balk, and gradually acquiring self-possession, he made an argument that excited the astonishment and admiration of all. The ice being thus broken, he walked straight into a reputation, that has never flagged, and never been stained.

The self-made man.

"Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them." The first certainly was not the lot of Henry Clay, nor was greatness thrust upon him. All the distinction he has acquired, was *achieved*—achieved by his single arm, by his own lofty aims. Such is the self-made man. He will ever be honored, who, by his own inherent vigor and high aspirations, has successfully contended against obstacles that would dispirit ordinary minds, and baffled in an honorable career the adverse winds and storms of unhopeful birth and fortune. In the blood and on the graves of our fathers, martyrs to freedom, was laid a platform for such endeavors, on which our youth, whatever their origin, may build high hopes, and earn an imperishable fame. The spectacle of the boy working "barefooted" for his mother, touches all hearts; and when that boy, in riper years, is seen toiling through a like career for his country, the mother of us all, he obeys the instincts, and fulfils the high destiny of his filial piety.

Mr. Clay at the bar.

It might be difficult to say, whether Mr. Clay was more able in the management of criminal or civil causes; but it is easy to decide in which he early acquired the highest reputation. His characteristic sympathy for the unfortunate, especially for persons in peril of life, awoke the profoundest feelings of his nature, and he never failed of success in his defence of persons accused of capital crime, though he had cases in hand which seemed to all others hopeless, as for example, those of Mrs. Phelps of the two Germans, father and son, and of Willis, all clearly cases of murder in an aggravated degree, but all successfully defended by this young advocate. The only capital case in which he appeared for plaintiffs, was against a slave, who had killed his master while undertaking to chastise him, which resulted in the slave's condemnation. With this exception, Mr. Clay has always been the defender of slaves, and often, never without success, volunteered his services in suits for their freedom, and in other cases. It has ever been a scrupulous rule with Mr. Clay, that no man, freeman or slave, should go without defence in law for want of money, when it was in his power to aid them.

Nor was Mr. Clay less successful in civil cases. Down to this time, he has been regarded as second to no counsellor in the Union. In one case, involving the land laws of Virginia and Kentucky, while yet a young man, he had, in a necessary absence, left it in the hands of an associate counsel, who was foiled by his opponents at all points, during a two-days contest; but just as the case was being submitted to the Court, who would doubtless have decided against him, Mr. Clay came in, had a moment's conversation with his colleague, addressed the Court for half an hour, in total ignorance of the evidence that had been adduced, and *gained the cause!*

Mr. Clay and emancipation.

When Mr. Clay arrived in Kentucky, he found the people of the State agitating the question of remodelling the Constitution, and a very respectable minority were in favor of introducing a clause for the gradual emancipation of the slaves, as had been done in some of the northern States, by freeing at a specific age those born after the adoption of the proposed Constitution, that ultimately all should be free. Mr. Clay enlisted in this project of emancipation with great zeal, and devoted all his energies, through the press, by personal influence, and in an active campaign, to accomplish this end. But he and his associates were unsuccessful. More than twenty years afterwards, when he proposed the compromise to settle the Missouri question, he declared, on the floor of Congress, that, if he were a citizen of Missouri, he would use all his influence to establish a system of gradual and ultimate emancipation, and he earnestly recommended it. In a speech at the anniversary of the American Colonization Society, in 1827, Mr. Clay said of slavery, "If I could only be instrumental in eradicating this deepest stain upon the character of our country, I would not exchange the proud satisfaction I should enjoy, for the honor of all the triumphs ever decreed to the most successful conqueror."

The alien and sedition laws.

These two laws were passed at the Session of 1798-'99. The first gave power to the President to banish an alien at his discretion, if he judged his presence here prejudicial to the interests of the country; and the second put a stopper on freedom of speech and of the press, in discussing the merits of public men. The second was certainly against the Constitution, and the first was no less a bold stride towards monarchical power. Kentucky was the first of the States that shook the dewdrops from her mane, and Henry Clay was the organ of her indignation. Then only twenty-two years of age, the thunders of his eloquence electrified the people. No other man was so prominent in the field, and none so effective in that influence, which raised Mr. Jefferson to power, as this young champion of democracy. A true democrat then, he is so still, and ever has been. Where can be found, in this broad land, a more vigilant sentinel of popular rights, or a more faithful denouncer of Executive usurpations, and the abuses of Executive power?

The saddle on the wrong horse.

In a reply to Mr. Calhoun, while the sub-treasury was under debate, Mr. Clay said: "All the former grounds of difference which distinguished that (the Federal) party, and were the subjects of contention between them and the Republicans, have ceased, from lapse of time and change of circumstance, *except one, and that is the maintenance and increase of Executive power.* This was the leading policy of the Federal party. A strong, powerful, and energetic Executive *was its favorite tenet.* I tell the gentleman, that he will find the *true old democratic party*, who were for resisting the encroachments of power, and limiting Executive patronage, *on this side of the Senate, and not with his new allies, who do not hold a solitary principle in common with the republican party of 1798.* IT IS THE OLD FEDERAL PARTY WITH WHOM HE IS NOW ACTING."

Mr. Clay's entrance into public life.

In 1803 Mr. Clay was elected from Fayette county to a seat in the lower house of the Kentucky legislature, and was immediately pitted against Mr. Felix Grundy in defending the

charter of the Lexington Insurance Company against a movement for its repeal, in which was successful by convincing the Senate, who listened to his argument in the Assembly, though he lost the vote of his own house. It was in this field that Mr. Clay's parliamentary powers were first presented to public gaze, and gave earnest of future and high promise. He was a leader there, as everywhere, and a favorite of the public. From this time to the war of 1812, we find him alternately in the legislature of his adopted State, and in the councils of the nation at Washington. In 1806 he was transferred to the Senate of the United States for one session, to fill out the unexpired term of the Hon. John Adair, resigned, where he immediately distinguished himself as one of the earliest movers—more properly, perhaps, the founder—of the internal improvement system. After having been again returned to the house of assembly in Kentucky, and made speaker, he was in 1809 sent back to the United States Senate for two years, to complete the term of the Hon. Buckner Thurston, who had resigned. It was in April, 1811, while a bill to provide munitions of war, &c., was under debate in the Senate, and during the pendency of an amendment giving preference to articles of American growth and manufacture, that Mr. Clay boldly and distinctly propounded and advocated his views on the policy of protection. The amendment prevailed. Mr. Madison found himself sustained by all the powers of Mr. Clay, in his proclamation to assert our jurisdiction to the line of the *Perdido* in Florida. Various and active were the exertions of Mr. Clay in the Senate, during this Congress; and among the rest, as is known, he was found in opposition to the recharter of the Bank of the United States.

Mr. Clay and Aaron Burr.

There was a time when the envious rivals of Mr. Clay, if such men could be his rivals, undertook to calumniate him for consenting to defend Colonel Burr on his first trial. Mr. Burr had written to Mr. Clay, and assured him, on the honor of a gentleman, that there was no foundation for the charges against him; whereupon Mr. Clay, with his characteristic generosity, undertook his defence, and succeeded; but afterward, having discovered the truth, treated him as he deserved. Even if Mr. Clay had had no such assurances from Col. Burr, it would be a slender compliment to our laws and institutions, which profess to guaranty an accused person a fair trial, to deny him counsel!

Mr. Clay elected to the House of Representatives of the United States.

In all the public stations, successively, which Mr. Clay occupied from 1803 to 1811, we find him always prominent; always looked up to, though a young man; always leading off on some stirring theme or in some important measure, riveting the attention and commanding the respect of the bodies of which he was a member, and rising in this western hemisphere a star of uncommon brilliancy. Having a choice of a seat in the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, in 1811, he did not hesitate to prefer the latter, for the stirring and eventful period that was then before the country, in a prospect of war with Great Britain. On the first ballot he was made Speaker, an honor never before or since conferred on a new member.

Mr. Clay and the war.

It is known that we went into the war with Great Britain in the midst of powerfully-conflicting opinions as to the necessity, propriety, or expediency of so momentous a step; that the administration and its friends were vigorously assailed from where they had need and some claims for encouragement and support; that the first stages of the war were disastrous, and, as such, gave eminent advantage to the opposition and to the enemy. But the brilliant achievements of its later stages, and the final result, put the whole matter in a new and different light. The lapse of nearly thirty years has served only to impart additional validity to a general conviction at first entertained, that we acquired by that struggle very important benefits and needful advantages.

The part borne by Mr. Clay, in that trying period of our history, adds not less to his claims on the gratitude of his country, than to the blaze of his reputation. At one time portraying, in many terms and with flashing indignation, the injuries and insults of the foe; at another, remonstrating with domestic opponents: then turning, with a true American heart, and laying his electrifying hand on the heart of the American people, he disarmed opposition, chased away the fears of the timid, imparted fresh courage to the strong, and stood by the Government, erect, prominent, and influential in its counsels, both in the origination and conduct of the war. He was as a general-in-chief over the intellectual power of the country, and the breath of his mouth moved over it as the wind of heaven sways the forests of an unbroken wilderness. His animating spirit, his stirring eloquence, his useful counsels, and his untiring agency, from the position he occupied, were everywhere felt, and equally beneficial in our army and navy, to excite them to noble and successful deeds, as in the presiding magistracy of the nation, to give it constancy and vigor. By his timely advice, and by the magic of his persuasions, the resources of the country started up from their places of repose, organized, disciplined, and in force; and the nation was victorious. He was the guiding

genius of the conflict, which ended, not less by his instrumentality, for the honor and enduring good of the republic. See the detail of his action as Speaker and Member of the House of Representatives, and read his speeches, as an illustration and in proof of this brief sketch.

Mr. Madison's estimate of Mr. Clay.

He invited him repeatedly into his Cabinet, and offered him the mission to Russia, then deemed very important. He even proposed to put Mr. Clay at the head of the army; and was only deterred from sending in his name to the Senate for the appointment of *General-in-Chief* by the advice that he could not be spared from the public councils.

Mr. Clay's services in the Treaty of Ghent.

When the offensive demands first put forward by the British Commissioners were chiefly waived, a difficulty arose in a want of harmony in our own Board, on a very important question, *to wit*, whether the right of navigation on the Mississippi should be conceded to the British? Messrs. Adams, Gallatin, and Bayard, were in favor of it, and Messrs. Clay and Russell opposed to it. The reasons for it were, first, that it was a former right: and, next, that if not granted, it was likely to disturb our fishing rights as before enjoyed. The reasons against it were, first, that when before conceded, the Mississippi was supposed to have its sources in the British dominions, in which case it is a usual right among nations; but it was since ascertained, that its sources lie within our jurisdiction. The British might as properly demand the right of navigating the Connecticut, the Hudson, the Potomac, or any or all of our rivers. Secondly, the instructions of our commissioners forbade treating on the navigation of rivers whose sources are in our bounds. Thirdly, in the then present and prospective condition of the great west, and in our relations with Indian tribes, the admission of the British into those waters must, necessarily, be prolific of incalculable evils, of endless controversy, and would endanger the peace of the two countries. Mr. Clay, therefore, being in the minority, felt himself constrained to say, *that he would put his signature to no treaty conceding the proposed right.* This brought Mr. Bayard over to his side, and the treaty was concluded without prejudice to our fishing interests. Who can tell what the country owes to Mr. Clay for his foresight and firmness on this occasion?

The respect and esteem he acquired with the British commissioners, the honors paid him at Paris and London after the conclusion of the treaty, and his reception at home, are a sufficient attestation of the high consideration he had won both in this country and abroad.

Mr. Clay's imputed change of opinion on the subject of a national bank.

After Mr. Clay's return from abroad, he was again sent to Congress, and again made Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was this Congress (the fourteenth) which rechartered the Bank of the United States, and Mr. Clay gave it his support. The change, however, was rather in the commercial and monetary condition of the country, making more evident what was "necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of Congress," specified in the Constitution, in regard to the currency, than in Mr. Clay. His opposition to a national bank in 1811 was based on the belief he then entertained, that it was not "necessary" in the sense of the Constitution, and therefore not "proper," and that the State banks were sufficient. But the sad experience of four years, without a national bank, had demonstrated to Mr. Clay's mind, and to all the world, that the State banks were *insufficient*, and that a national bank was "necessary," which brought such a measure within the constitutional powers of the General Government. *This was the change.* Mr. Clay's former opinion was founded on *one* set of facts, the latter on *another*; and though there is a *difference*, there is no *inconsistency*.

Anecdotes.

For having voted for Mr. Richard M. Johnson's "*Compensation Bill*," in 1816, an unpopular measure, and repealed at the next Congress, Mr. Clay had to make his defence to his constituents. Meeting an old hunter one day, who was against him on that account, Mr. Clay asked him: "Have you a good rifle, my friend?" "Yes." "Does it ever *flash*?" "It did *once*." "And did you throw it away?" "No: I picked the flint, tried it again, and brought down the game." "Have I ever *flashed*, except on the Compensation Bill?" "No!" "And will you throw me away?" "No! no!" cried the hunter, with tears in his eyes, and grasping Mr. Clay's hand,—"No! no! I will pick the flint, and try you again."

A barber in Lexington was also in the same state of feeling toward Mr. Clay, and about to vote against him. But meeting Mr. Clay one day in the street, he accosted him, and said, "I have wronged you, Mr. Clay." "How so?" "Why, my wife came to me, and said, 'Jerry, don't you remember when you were in jail, and Mr. Clay came and let you out? and will you vote against him?' 'No! no! Jinny,' I said, 'do you think I am such a beast?'"

Mr. Clay's efforts in Congress for the recognition of the independence of the South American States.

The name of Henry Clay, of North America, is better known, and excites more gratitude, in the republics and States of South America, than that of any other man, living or dead,

foreign to that quarter of the globe; and he is known there only as the early, disinterested, heroic advocate of their emancipation. If they have not yet done as well as we could have wished, it detracts not at all from the virtue which so magnanimously espoused their cause, and finally won for them such important advantages. In 1816 Mr. Clay began to plead for them in the American Congress; in 1818 he made a speech in those halls, which was read at the head of the armies of South America, while fighting for freedom, and electrified their hearts; and in 1822, after six years of struggle against opposition, he had the satisfaction of witnessing the consummation of his aims, in the recognition of their independence by our Government. In 1827 he had a letter of thanks from Bolivar, to which he replied, with his characteristic frankness, expressing his regrets that Bolivar had disappointed the hopes of mankind, and commending to him the example of the immortal Washington.

Mr. Clay on Internal Improvement.

On the Cumberland road is erected a monument, surmounted by the Genius of Liberty, and inscribed with the name of HENRY CLAY, in recognition and testimony of the fact, that this great national work, which has levelled the Alleghanies, and created a powerful bond for the perpetuity of the Union, owes its existence to him, as a part of that great and beneficent "American System," so called, of which he is the acknowledged father. Internal improvement, as a national policy, though sanctioned, as is believed, by the Constitution, and without doubt sanctioned by the opinion and wishes of the country, when freely and fairly expressed, has balked sadly all along by means of Executive scruples and one-man power. For a length of years Mr. Clay battled heroically for this sublime enterprise, and has stamped upon the public mind an impression not easily to be eradicated. He has sown seed in the field, which, under more genial suns, will yield their fruit. The question lies only for a while upon the shelf, where unworthy hands have put it, and will doubtless come down again to fructify the Union with its blessings. Nay, it is not on the shelf. The influence of the originator and stimulator of this magnificent scheme, has been felt by the States, and prompted the members of the great family, in their separate capacity, to assume the more appropriate functions of the unnatural parent, and, in no small extent, to make amends for her defect of duty. It *must* be done, and *will* be done. Then will the Union be bound by ties which nothing can break, and the great arteries of this life-giving influence will conduct the vital current to every part.

Mr. Clay and American labor.

It has been the lot, the good fortune, the peculiar talent, the high gift, we may say the *genius* of Henry Clay, not only in being endowed with sagacity to pry into the present, but with prophecy to look into the future. A wise system of national policy, in all its parts, would seem to have sprung forth in full maturity from *his* mind, before the seed had broken its shell in the general mind. Hence the tardiness with which the nation has been inducted into his views, and the facility with which they have been temporarily blinded. Winds and storms and the convulsions of nature may disturb the action of the tides; but these mighty movements of nature do not follow the sun and the moon more surely, than the public mind of this country moves forward in the path of its inspired and guiding genius. Mr. Clay has never propounded a great thought or a great measure, or made a public argument, which has not sunk into the mind of the American people, and gone to the bottom, where it is securely anchored. He has only to stand still, and the nation will come to him. It is coming now, has long been coming, it has come.

Take that part of his "American system," which throws its shield over American labor, industry, and enterprise, ~~which~~ was conceived by Mr. Clay when he first came into public life, and which has been toiled for by him from that day to this, and there is not a single article of it which the public mind of the country is not at this moment prepared to adopt. (See our Tract on the Tariff.) It is at last found out, that American labor, industry, enterprise, products, and interests, *must be protected*—that protection is not only necessary, but proper in the nature of things, and in the laws of human society; and that nothing is more preposterous, or more suicidal, than to put and leave ourselves in the power of foreign factors and foreign Governments, as, to a great extent, we have done heretofore.

What American labor—(we use this term in all its applications to manufactures, the mechanic arts, agriculture, and commerce, more especially the first two)—what American labor owes to Mr. Clay, is too well known to need repetition. It has been badly enough protected, at best. But all it has had of fair reward, all the manufactures that have sprung up in the country on which labor so extensively depends, the entire system indeed, are chiefly to be ascribed to the conceptions, zeal, and efforts of Henry Clay. Not to speak of the decided stand he took at an early period in his adopted State, or of his efforts of the same character in Congress, in 1816, when the proper effectiveness of the tariff of that year failed only by the loss of Mr. Clay's amendment, which he urged with so much eloquence and zeal, in 1820, when the specie was flowing out of the country like rivers into the sea, for want of

an adequate tariff, a new and great effort was made, with Mr. Clay at its head, which failed, notwithstanding all the agony of his patriotic endeavors. Foreseeing the fate of the measure, while under debate, Mr. Clay said:—"I frankly own, that I feel great solicitude for the success of this bill." And in his deep and thrilling tone, he added,—"But I will not despair. The cause, I verily believe, is the cause of the country. It may be postponed; it may be frustrated for the moment; but it finally *must* prevail." In 1821, it *did* prevail, and Mr. Justice Baldwin, of the Supreme Court, said of Mr. Clay on that occasion, that "he was General, corporal, and private," so multiform were his functions, so assiduous his efforts. It has been said, and facts attest its truth, that the seven years subsequent to the tariff of 1824, were the most prosperous in the history of the country. The tariff of 1828 was in some respects unequal and unfair, in consequence of an attempt of Martin Van Buren and Silas Wright to break down the system, by over-straining certain parts of it, in which, for the time, they failed.

The Compromise Act.

Mr. Clay has been blamed for this. And why? But for that, Mr. Verplanck's bill, reducing duties to a common level of 15 per cent., known to be an Administration measure, would have passed, and the whole system of manufactures, and all the capital vested in them, would have perished. In addition to this, nullification threatened to deluge the land in the blood of a civil war. Mr. Clay's object, therefore, in the Compromise, was, *first*, to appease nullification; *next*, to save the system of manufactures; and *last*, to give the nation, and all parties, time for reflection. He knew that nullification would cool down, that the policy of Mr. Verplanck's bill, at that moment in danger of being forced upon the country, would not bear sober reflection, and that it was competent for Congress at any time to reconsider its previous acts, and repeal or modify them. The Compromise Act, therefore, was a remedial, healing measure for an alarming crisis, and as such necessary and most beneficent. One thing more can be said of it: it was contingently a perfect scheme, and if the currency of the country had not been broken down, it would have sustained the manufacturing interests, and answered all the purposes of the country, till the time contemplated by its terms had arrived for revising and readjusting the tariff regulations. But, so long as the country was in the hands of the Destructive Dynasty, properly so called, the contingent prospects of the Compromise Act were of course unfavorable for an ultimate salutary result. Nothing could save the country in such hands.

The tariff of 1842.

For want of space, we beg leave to refer to our Tracts on the Currency and the Tariff, for what we should otherwise say here. As Mr. Clay was not in Congress at the passage of the Tariff of 1842, and has had little to say on public affairs since his retirement, his views of this measure can only be inferred from his known and published opinions. There may be details in it which he would wish to modify; but it was framed by those who thought it profitable, and no less an honor, to be instructed by him, and who desired to carry out his policy. Its salutary effect in reviving business and trade, and in restoring the prosperity of the country, is all the praise that need be bestowed upon it. We refer to our first Tract, *THE TEST*, for proofs of the other and important benefits to the country, in the way of retrenchment and reform, effected by the 27th (Whig) Congress, notwithstanding the foul treason against which they had to contend, and which defeated their general policy. The Tariff alone is a compensation for the struggle and revolution of 1840, though the country has been most perfidiously robbed of its just rights in the failure of other important measures. Doubtless, the people will avenge themselves in 1844.

The history of Mr. Clay's policy and efforts in regard to protection.

We do not propose to give this history, for we have no room, but only to say, it is one and the same from beginning to end. A true disciple of Jefferson in this particular, he moved while a member of the Kentucky legislature, that each member should clothe himself, from head to foot, in domestic fabrics; and if we take this fact as the germ and index of his policy, through life, we shall not greatly err. Mr. Clay was never an ultra, or a bigot; but he knew what the interests of the country required, and was willing to set an impressive example—not that he would exclude imports, injure the foreign trade of the country, and thereby impair the revenue; but he wished to see the country truly *independent*. "Our complete independence," he said in 1820, "will only be consummated after the policy of this bill shall be recognised and adopted." This bill, as we have seen, was lost.

A retrospect and prospect.

Hard, painful, perilous, and changeful, has been the conflict in this country against the Destructive Dynasty; but *something* has been gained. We have a system of manufactures, though imperfect, and a host of thriving mechanics and artisans, and they have done enough to show what can be done. The foundation is laid, though the edifice is incomplete. No power, we trust, can upset this beginning, since the people have discovered its importance, and feel it

more and more every day. On the Camberland Road stands a monument, announcing to the world and future generations, who battled successfully for Internal Improvement. Not one monument alone; but, tens, hundreds will be raised throughout the land, to tell the world and posterity, who was the father of the "American System"—who the successful Defender of the rights of American labor.

The Missouri question.

All know, that this was a stern trial of the republic. We propose to notice it only so far as it is connected with Mr. Clay, whose efforts and influence hushed the tempest, and carried the country safely through it. In consequence of professional occupation at home, Mr. Clay had resigned the Speaker's Chair by a letter at the opening of the Session of 1820-'21, and did not arrive at Washington till the 16th of January, when he found Congress in a blaze of excitement on the Missouri question. All eyes were turned to him. After sounding the state of feeling, he moved, on the 2d of February, and carried the appointment of a Committee of thirteen, upon this subject, and was himself made Chairman. On the 10th, he reported a Compromise, which was rejected by a small majority of the House, after repeated trials. He then moved for a joint Committee of both Houses, which was carried, and acceded to by the Senate, the result of which was a report in effect the same as that before made to the House, which was ratified by both branches, without farther controversy, and the question was settled, on condition of its being accepted by the State of Missouri, as was afterward done.

In this adjustment, if we mistake not, the principle was recognised, that in States, where slavery has existed since the organization of our Government, the question of its abolition or continuance, shall be left where the Federal Constitution has left it, viz. in the sovereignty of those States, and that this rule applied to Missouri, as having been received into the Union as a part of Louisiana. The compromise acceded to by Missouri, was, first, the suppression of an obnoxious provision in her Constitution, designed to exclude from her jurisdiction, free colored people of other States; and next, an admission to the freedom of the Union, in her limits, of all persons recognised as citizens of other States, it being understood, that free colored people are so recognised in some of the States.

Mr. Clay's views and feelings, as an emancipationist of the old school, what he said on the floor of Congress, and his advice to the State of Missouri, on this occasion, have been noticed in another place.

"The Great Pacificator."

In Kentucky Mr. Clay had early acquired the name of "*the Great Commoner*," the people's man. Protracted, and almost hopeless as this Missouri controversy had become, agitating the whole nation from the outmost verge to the centre, and threatening to rend in pieces the fair frame of this republic, Mr. Clay had scarcely been at the seat of Government over a month, before it was settled, and settled for ever. With unanimous voice, and simultaneously, the whole country hailed him as "*THE GREAT PACIFICATOR*." Twice, on like emergencies, when all hope of conciliation appeared to be abandoned, has he stepped in, and rescued the nation from an impending civil war. The attitude of South Carolina, in 1833, with the torch of nullification in her hand, was even more formidable than this firebrand of the West. For one such achievement, by words of peace and kindness, a loftier, though less noisy fame is earned, than by vanquishing the foes of the country in the battle plain. "Blessed are the peace-makers." He who, dispensing with brute force, marches straight into the hearts of men, to conquer them there, is a hero of the highest order. The Duke of Wellington has confessed, that the courage of the field is *physical*. This is moral and sublime. It demonstrates a tact in swaying men's minds for purposes of good, rarely possessed.

Mr. Clay in the Speaker's Chair.

Two or three days after Mr. Clay's elevation to the Speaker's Chair, for the fourth time, in 1823, the following lines appeared in the National Intelligencer:—

"As near the Potomac's broad stream, to other day,
Fair LIBERTY strolled, in solicitous mood,
Deep pondering the future—unheeding her way—
She met goddess NATURE beside a green wood.
'Good mother,' she cried, 'deign to help me at need!'
'I must make for my guardians a Speaker to-day;
'The first in the world I would give them.'—'Indeed!
When I made the first Speaker, I made him of CLAY!'"

The legislature of Kentucky, and the House of Representatives in Congress, seem always to have had this good advice before their eyes, while "*THE FIRST IN THE WORLD*" was among them. The captivating amenity, the commanding dignity, the exemplary impartiality, and the useful energy, with which Mr. Clay discharged the laborious and responsible duties of this station for so many years—twelve in Congress—are attested by all parties.

Mr. Clay's indifference to the allurements of place.

As under Mr. Madison, so also under Mr. Monroe, he was repeatedly called to the Cabinet, and offered a *carte blanche* for any one of the foreign missions. But he declined them all. It can not be denied, that the post he occupied in Congress, was vastly more important, and more influential, and no one can fail to commend his choice. Mr. Clay had his whole mind and heart bent on the great questions of the time, and it is no more than fair to allow, that he wanted to be where he could do most good to the country. In that place, he was near the people, was the people's man, and the whole country's man. With the mighty interests at stake in the war, with the questions of internal improvement and the Tariff pending, &c., &c., how could a man of his known temper and patriotism, be content with any post, however exalted or honorable, but that of legislation? He preferred usefulness to place.

Reception of Gen. La Fayette.

The re-visit of this early friend and self-sacrificing champion of the American people, who came from the old world to fight for and with them in the new, in a time that tried men's souls, was most grateful to the people of this country, and his reception in the Capitol of the Republic, the 10th of December, 1824, after an absence of nearly half a century, was one of peculiar and thrilling interest. It fell to the lot of Mr. Clay, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, to tender to this distinguished guest the unfeigned welcome of the nation, and to do the honors of the occasion. We need not say, that it was done as it should be. The feeling was intense, and the scene sublime. We are indebted to an allusion of the speaker on the occasion for the inimitable and just illustration, that it was not unlike the reunion of pure spirits in an after state of existence, to recount the worthy deeds of the former, in which they had mutual sufferings, toils, perils, triumphs—and in the end a glorious triumph.

Mr. Clay and General Jackson.

We are advised by Mr. Clay himself, in a speech in Senate, of 1838, that his first acquaintance with General Jackson, was in the fall of 1815 or 1816, and mutually agreeable. In 1819, Mr. Clay thought it his duty, in debate, to animadvert with freedom, and in terms of censure, on some parts of General Jackson's conduct in the Seminole campaign, relating to the execution of Ambrister and Arbuthnot, his hostile irruption into Florida in violation of instructions from the War Department, and his forcible seizure of the fortress of Pensacola, while in possession of a Spanish garrison. This was of course displeasing, and interrupted their friendship. At an early part of the session of Congress for 1824-5, they met at a dinner got up by the mutual friends of both, and General Jackson took Mr. Clay home in his carriage, after which they repeatedly met at dinner, till the election of Mr. Adams by the House of Representatives, which was the end of their social intercourse.

Mr. Clay a candidate for the Presidency in 1824—the result.

The votes of the Electoral Colleges stood thus:—For Andrew Jackson, 99; for John Quincy Adams, 84; for Wm. H. Crawford, 41; for Henry Clay, 37. Of course, by a rule of the Constitution, the three candidates having the largest number of votes, went into the House of Representatives, in Congress, for a choice, which resulted in the election of Mr. Adams.

Mr. Clay, who had a majority of the Legislature of Louisiana in his favor, was entitled to the Electoral vote of that State, and would have been carried over Mr. Crawford into the House, if the choice of Electors by that body had not been made in the absence of two or three of his friends. There was also a disgraceful intrigue in the control of the Electoral votes of New York, the detail of which is in evidence and fully substantiated, which violated an understanding among the friends of the respective candidates, and robbed Mr. Clay of a sufficient number of votes to have carried him into the House. So that, by unfair dealing, Mr. Clay failed of being returned to the House, from two independent sources, either of which, conducted in good faith, would have made him President of the United States in 1825; for it is admitted, that he would have been elected, if he had gone into the House of Representatives. The consequences to the country, made contingent on that event, have been truly momentous!

Plurality—majority.

Every one knows, that the 162 Electoral votes given for Messrs. Adams, Crawford, and Clay, were for either of these men, in preference to General Jackson, and consequently, that the majority over General Jackson's 99 votes, and *against* him, was 63. And yet, it was most *un-democratically* maintained at the time and afterward, that because General Jackson had a *plurality* of votes, he was entitled to be made President against the will of the *majority*!

The alleged bargain.

A most wicked and infamous attempt was made, while the election of President was pending in the House of Representatives, to force Mr. Clay into the support of General Jackson,

or to bar his freedom of action, by publishing a story, that Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay had made a *bargain*, in which Mr. Clay was to support Mr. Adams for the Presidency, and Mr. Adams was to make Mr. Clay Secretary of State. The absurdity of this calumny must instantly strike any one, who regards either of the following considerations:—1. That no office would be refused to Mr. Clay, whichever of the candidates might be President, whether we consider his merits, or the fact, that neither could be elected without his aid. 2. That Mr. Clay's rejection of all offices under Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe, was sufficient evidence, that he did not covet such honors, and would not take them, except to serve the country. 3. That Mr. Clay's known views of General Jackson's character and principles,—without disparaging his merits as a soldier—would of necessity oblige him to lend his influence in another direction. 4. That, having ascertained by a personal visit, that Mr. Crawford's state of health forbade all hope of fitness for the office of Chief Magistrate, Mr. Clay had no choice. And 5. That Mr. Clay had repeatedly, by letter and conversation, before the meeting of Congress and afterward, declared his purpose to support Mr. Adams. Was Mr. Clay a man to bargain for place—to solicit?

The investigation.

As was due to himself, Mr. Clay demanded of the House a Committee of investigation, and Mr. George Kremer, a member from Pennsylvania, was compelled to father the deed. But this precious morsel was too important to those who had got it up, and who were feeding the nation with it, to allow it so suddenly to be snatched from them, and Mr. Kremer is instructed to back out from the Committee, under the extraordinary pretext, that he did not choose to be forced into such a court, either as accuser or witness! A libeller, and not bound to prove it!

The after plot.

It was foreseen, that nothing was more probable, than that Mr. Clay should go for Mr. Adams, and nothing more probable than that Mr. Adams should desire Mr. Clay to be Secretary of State. "Well then," said these conspirators, "we have nothing to do but to promulgate it as a bargain to defeat General Jackson; and if it turns out so, as doubtless it will, we shall have him on that tack; or if, after such an assault, he has not courage enough to act the free man, we shall have gained our end by the shortest cut."

With that indignant scorn, with which conscious rectitude looks in the face of mean artifice and low cunning, Mr. Clay supported Mr. Adams, as he had declared he should, and then went into the State Department. All the world would have justified him, if he had done the latter for no other reason, than to vindicate his rights against a foul conspiracy.

But a little more than two years afterward, a letter, dated March 8, 1827, written, though not signed, by Carter Beverly, of Virginia, appeared in the newspapers, stating, on the authority of General Jackson, that Mr. Clay's friends in Congress had made proposals to General Jackson, to support him in the House of Representatives for President, if he (Gen. Jackson) would not continue Mr. Adams Secretary of State; in other words, *as understood*, if he would make Mr. Clay Secretary, which he (General Jackson) had indignantly rejected.

It was not till the 5th of June (time enough to hatch up the mode of future proceeding, and time enough to give this infamous calumny full scope of action on the public mind) that General Jackson could be induced, although solicited by Mr. Beverly, to confirm his (Mr. Beverly's) letter; and then he shifted the responsibility on "a distinguished member of Congress," the Hon. James Buchanan, as afterward appeared. But Mr. Buchanan, having some honesty in his heart, was forced to throw back all the responsibility on his master, entirely acquitting Mr. Clay and his friends, and got out of the scrape as well as he could. Mr. Beverly, foreseeing that he must die, and being troubled in his conscience on account of that letter, has since, in another document, made a public recantation, so that this deep-laid, foul conspiracy is now fully exposed. That the parties in it should first originate such calumnies, and then allow them to float so long, even for years, over the broad surface of the community, poisoning the public mind against a man, whose pure and disinterested patriotism, and whose unsullied honor, none knew better than the calumniators themselves, can only be accounted for by the fact, that such deep depravity was necessary to their ends.

The truth of the case.

The truth is, that the advances made in this case, were from the other side, and from Gen. Jackson himself, towards Mr. Clay, we mean not in unworthy proposals, but with a manifest anxiety to obtain Mr. Clay's support. Mr. Clay retired early from the dinner, of which we have spoken elsewhere, and was about to step into his own carriage, which was waiting at the door, when he was followed by General Jackson and Major Eaton, and pressed to take a seat with them, with which, by common civility, he was forced to comply. And this politeness was continued till the election in the House took place; and the worst of it all is, that it was continued while the plot against Mr. Clay was hatching, and a part of it (Mr. Kremer's) actually opening on the public.

The re-action.

It is the wise economy of Providence, that great offences shall have a great atonement, and that innocence under a cloud, shall come out under the blaze of noon. It was a cloud, indeed, and a dark one, which the enemies of Mr. Clay brought over his head; and although it has been slow in departing, the day will be so much brighter and longer. Shielded by uprightness, Mr. Clay has always been too lofty-minded to battle with calumny, or even to avail himself of disproof or confession, except as urged by duty to his friends and the public; and when reminded by a voice from the crowd, during his speech at Lexington, June 6, 1842, of Mr. Beverly's recantation, he replied—"I want no testimony,"—and laying his hand upon his heart, said—"here—HERE—HERE is the best witness of my innocence." Mr. Clay may be wrong in this, and ought, doubtless, to consent to a full exposure of the base slanders, by which he was once so fiercely assailed. The hearts of the people of this country have long been returning, and are still returning to him, so far as they have been alienated, like the ocean tide that rolls up on the bosom of the shore, with this difference:—there will be no ebbing of the waters.

Mr. Clay and Mr. Randolph.

All are acquainted with the eccentricities of John Randolph, and with the facts, that he had no great liking for Mr. Clay, and that he was wont to rebel against Mr. Clay's discipline, as Speaker of the House of Representatives. It is, however, recorded, to his credit, that in 1833, while passing through Washington to Philadelphia, where he died soon after, — he requested to be carried up to the Senate Chamber, although too weak to walk, or stand. He had not been there long, before Mr. Clay rose to speak in debate. "Help me up, help me up," said Mr. Randolph to a friend that stood by him—"I came here to hear that voice." When Mr. Clay had finished, he came and spoke with Mr. Randolph. They shook hands, and parted in a spirit of mutual good will. It was the last time they ever met.

Mr. Adams' Administration—Mr. Clay as Secretary of State.

The grounds of opposition to Mr. Adams' Administration, or rather the reasons alleged, which occasioned his defeat in 1828, have long since been exploded, though too late to save the country from a long and sad history of misfortune. The reasons were generally about as valid, as the calumnies against Mr. Clay. Never in our history have we had a better or more patriotic Administration, and never was the country equally prosperous. History will do it justice, and even the people are already inclined to do so. They now behold in Mr. Adams an American patriarch of transcendent virtue, and transcendent powers, rising in reputation and glory, as he descends to the place of his fathers. Like the trees of a tropical climate, he has blossomed and borne fruit twice, before his summer has ended.

The Administration of the State Department by Mr. Clay, was alike honorable to himself, and beneficial to the country. The Panama Mission was under his guidance, in which he was peculiarly at home as the advocate of the South American States; his attempt to gain the favorable interposition of Russia in behalf of those States, reflects not less honor on his heart, than his head; and more treaties were negotiated by him, than by all his predecessors from the foundation of the Government. The reputation of Mr. Clay in foreign parts, gave him eminent facilities in the management of our foreign affairs, and they were used with a true American spirit, as just as patriotic. It was a time of general peace, and therefore no great and stirring questions were then in agitation. "Who," said Mr. Adams, after his retirement, "could select a man, whom, for his pre-eminent talents, for his splendid services, for his ardent patriotism, for his all embracing public spirit, for his fervid eloquence in behalf of the rights and liberties of mankind, and for his long experience in the affairs of the Union, foreign and domestic, a President of the United States, intent only on the honor and welfare of his country, ought to have preferred to HENRY CLAY?"

Good humor.

On Mr. Clay's return to Kentucky, after the inauguration of General Jackson, in the spring of 1829, he found the roads extremely bad, and to avoid the thumps and knocks of the inside of the stage, he turned his back upon his fellow passengers, and took a seat with the driver on the box, when they were a few miles east of Uniontown, Pa. The citizens of that place, being on the look out for the arrival of the Ex-Secretary of State, stood in crowds to welcome him, as the stage drove up. "Gentlemen," said Mr. Clay, before he got down, "you see I am among the OUTS, but I can assure you, that the INS behind me have a far worse time of it."

Mr. Clay's good humor never forsakes him. It seems impossible for him to resist temptations for repartee, in which he is most skilful, or for original pleasantries of which he is most prolific, or for sallies of wit in which he is most happy. His buoyant, lofty, and ever-active mind, seems to be relieved by such playfulness. Or is this the mode by which superior and more vigorous intellects can more easily come down to a common level, and commune with

ordinary minds? We observe, that this propensity is usually allied to benevolence. Certainly, whether so or not, its effect is to relieve the tedium of the dull facts of life, and to promote the happiness of social intercourse.

¶ *Three thousand at one table.*

On the 16th of May, 1829, after Mr. Clay's retirement, he sat down to a public dinner, in Fowler's garden, Lexington, given in honor of him, with *three thousand* of his "old friends and neighbors"! It was then he said:—"When I felt as if I should sink beneath the storm of abuse and detraction, which was violently raging around me, I felt myself upheld and sustained by your encouraging voice and your approving smiles. I have doubtless committed many faults and indiscretions, over which you have thrown the broad mantle of your charity." Such communion with "old friends and neighbors" is not bought by kings; it is the free gift of a generous people to a faithful public servant—the reward of patriotic effort in the service of freemen—*himself one of them*. Never unmindful of this generous confidence, so early bestowed, and so unremittingly maintained for a long course of years, Mr. Clay could not overlook them in his farewell speech to the Senate, the last of March, 1842. After having endeavored to express his obligations to the Senate, to the country, to *all* his friends "throughout this continent," he added:—"What shall I say—what *can* I say at all commensurate with those feelings of gratitude which I owe to the State, whose humble representative and servant I have been in this chamber?" [Here Mr. Clay's voice faltered under the struggle of his emotions.] "In the darkest hour of calumny and detraction, when I seemed to be forsaken by all the rest of the world, she threw her broad and impenetrable shield around me, and bearing me up aloft in her courageous arms, repelled the poisoned shafts that were aimed at my destruction, and vindicated my good name against every false and unfounded assault."

"*Bearing me up aloft in her courageous arms*," said Mr. Clay, lifting and extending his own arms, and raising his voice, which trembled and broke with emotion, as he said it. We heard it. And he who heard it, will not soon forget the *manner*. —"*Repelled*," said Mr. Clay, with a corresponding expression of gesture, which told the triumphant vindication he experienced in that hour, from such defenders.

He met them again, face to face, in 1842, when the same scene was re-enacted, in the presence of tens of thousands, with additional interest, arising from the circumstances of the present, the history of the past, and the prospect of the future.

Mr. Clay's re-election to the Senate in 1831.

We are forced to go backward and forward, for the sake of putting like things under the same head, though far apart in time. Never were the services of Mr. Clay more required, in defence of American labor and enterprise, than on his return to the Senate in 1831, in which branch of Congress he had not had a seat since 1811. The faithlessness of the then existing Administration to the best interests of the country, and their insidious attempts to break down the tariff regulations of 1824 and 1828, were but too apparent. Mr. Clay was the only man equal to the crisis, and even he, as we have before noticed, was only able to save the tariff from immediate and entire demolition by a Compromise.

Mr. Clay's second nomination to the Presidency.

It was made by the National Republican Convention, at Baltimore, the 12th of December, 1831, and the Hon. John Sargeant was nominated for Vice President. Mr. John Floyd, of Virginia, and the Hon. Wm. Wirt were also in the field for 1832. But the action of those opposed to the Jackson dynasty, in this campaign, was rather to keep up the organization, than with any expectation of success. It was manifest that the people had not even begun to recover from the infatuation of the time, and from the poison that had been infused into their minds by the calumniators of Mr. Clay. Although Mr. Clay is ever a candidate for the Presidency in the hearts of his friends, he has never been put in nomination, and never been in the field, but *twice*, viz., in 1824, when he was cheated out of it, as we have shown, and for the campaign of 1832, when no one expected any other result than the success of General Jackson. In 1836 he declined a nomination, that was tendered.

"I would rather be right, than be President."

So said Mr. Clay to the Hon. Wm. C. Preston, in a private interview, as certified by the latter. If for many years, when truth and fairness could not prevail, such a resolution did him no good, it is nevertheless true, that, in the end, honesty is the best policy. Where, in the history of political society, has such *firmness in the right*, against such obstacles and such assailants, been maintained so long, so unswervingly, so heroically? Long time were the doctrines and policy advocated by Mr. Clay injurious to him politically; and he knew, and all knew, it would be so. But who ever saw him trim? Who ever accused him of a want of frankness?

The public domain.

We need not say how much the country owes to Mr. Clay for his course on this subject; though it may be proper to state, what is not generally thought of, that the public lands would have been for ever wrested from the rightful owners, but for him. It is also proper to notice the fact, that this question would have been finally and fairly settled in 1833, but for a fraud on the people, by subverting the operation of the Constitution. The bill passed by a majority of 24 to 20 in the Senate, and of 96 to 40 in the House. Such was the feeling in Congress on this subject, it was never doubted, that it would have passed by a vote of *two thirds* in both houses, and thus become a law, even under the veto, if it had been returned in season for action. To have had it thus returned, was undoubtedly the constitutional right of the legislative branch of the Government. But advantage was taken of the adjournment of Congress before the ten days after it was sent to the President had expired, and he kept it over to the next session, thus defeating the will of the nation.

Again, in 1836, a land distribution bill was carried through the Senate by Mr. Clay, in a vote of 25 to 20, and though approved of by a majority of the House, it was nevertheless defeated there by the influence of the Executive. In 1842 it was killed by a Veto of John Tyler. In all these ways, and for so long time, not only on this, but on sundry other momentarily important measures, has the will of the nation been thwarted by the One Man power. This great measure of Mr. Clay, by which he has stood so long and so constantly, has never failed to have with it a majority of the people.

So anxious was Mr. Clay that this bill should escape the veto power in 1833, and so self-sacrificing his spirit for what he conceived to be the good of the country, that in the fervor of his zeal in debate, he turned and said to his colleague, Mr. Grundy, the friend of the President, "Tell General Jackson, if he will sign this bill, I will pledge myself to retire from Congress, and never enter into public life again."

The United States Bank.

Although the fundamental and vital principle of democracy, the will of the people, as expressed by their representative organs, was violated by General Jackson's veto of the bank bill in 1832, nevertheless, as the act was authorized by the Constitution, it does not compare with the flagrant criminality of the removal of the deposits. The President himself, in a message to Congress, proposed to enlarge the powers of the Secretary of the Treasury, with a view to this object, thereby recognising the sound doctrine, that it could not otherwise be done, as the Constitution had made Congress the keeper and given that body the control of the public funds. The House of Representatives answered the message by a vote of 109 to 46 against the proposal, which was decisive so far as the authority of the Constitution could go. But, lo! General Jackson walks straight over this vote, and over the Constitution, and removes the deposits, in the face of both! It was impossible for Mr. Clay, as a public guardian of the Constitution and the rights of the people, to be silent on these occasions, so painful to the heart of the true patriot. Uniformly, therefore, and frequently has he stood up to denounce these abuses of the Veto power, and these infractions of the Constitution. The Resolutions of the Senate on the removal of the deposits, though "*Expunged*" by a subsequent resolution of the same body, are only made more conspicuous by the latter act, and will hand the true story down to posterity.

Mr. Clay's Policy in regard to a national bank.

All know that Mr. Clay is in favor of such an institution; but it is not without reference to the will of the people, that he would propose one. When the Sub-treasury was under debate, in 1836, he said in the Senate, "If a national bank should be established, its stability and utility will depend upon the general conviction that is felt for its necessity. And until such a conviction is deeply impressed upon the people, and clearly manifested by them, it would, in my judgment, be unwise even to propose a bank." When Senator Wright, the same year, in answer to petitions for a bank, offered a resolution, "that the prayer of the petitioners ought not to be granted," Mr. Clay moved the following substitute, "That it will be expedient to establish a bank of the United States, whenever it shall be manifest, that a clear majority of the people of the United States desire such an institution," which was negatived, and Mr. Wright's was adopted. That is, it was resolved, that a clear majority should not rule! In 1842, Mr. Clay put forward, in a letter to Mr. Jacob Stratton, Secretary of the National Clay Club, at Philadelphia, a summary of principles of public policy, as held by him, the first of which is, "A sound national currency, regulated by the will and authority of the people."

General Jackson's meditated war with France.

The first instalment of the indemnity of 25,000,000 of francs, nearly \$5,000,000, as negotiated in the treaty of 1831, for French spoliations on our commerce from 1800 to 1815, was not paid by reason of the refusal of the French Chambers to make an appropriation; but the King and his ministry desired to pay. As our Executive only had to do with the Executive

of France in this matter, there was no difference between them, and some courtesy was due to the King of the French in his inability. But General Jackson, in his message of December, 1834, recommended a law, authorizing *reprisals*, in case the French Chambers should not provide for the debt during the then approaching session. That this menacing attitude of the President of the United States should deeply wound the King of the French, and exasperate the French Chambers, and the nation, is not strange. Louis Philippe recalled his minister from Washington, tendered passports to our minister at Paris, and we were at once on the eve of war, when Mr. Clay brought in his celebrated "*French Report*," on the 6th of Jan. 1835, the result of which, in connexion with a corresponding resolution of the Senate, was the restoration of good feeling and the payment of the debt, while the honor of our country was maintained. This *third* time was the nation saved from the horrors and calamities of war by Henry Clay. So bent was General Jackson on a fight with France, that he stayed at the Capitol till 12 o'clock the last night of the Session, urging an appropriation that would put the business in his own hands.

Mr. Clay in the Twenty-seventh Congress.

What that Congress *did*, has been shown in our first tract, *THE TEST*; what they *could not do*, by reason of treachery, everybody knows already. The Chief that was set up by the people, had been stricken down by the hand of the Almighty, and in his place came one, second only, in the violations of trust, to him who sold his Lord and Master for thirty pieces of silver.

But Mr. Clay, schooled in the misfortunes of his country, and never despairing of the republic, stood erect in the common disappointment, and witnessed the complete redemption of the country *deferred* again by an inscrutable Providence. Shoulder to shoulder with his political associates, himself leader, he fought through the Extra-Session for the principles and measures he had contended for through life, and though he had wished and purpose^d to retire from the councils of the nation at an earlier date, he yielded to the claims of duty, in this unexpected exigency of public affairs, to attend the next Session. Failing of the measures which the country waited for, and had a right to expect, Mr. Clay embraced this last opportunity to propose some amendments in the Constitution of the United States, and to bring forward his views, in the form of sundry resolutions offered to the Senate, as to the policy and measures required in the present state of the country. Each of these resolutions, *eleven* in number, was discussed at large by him the 1st of March, 1842. They regarded chiefly the revenue and financial policy of the Government, the disposal of the public domain, retrenchment and reform in the different branches of the public service, and proposed to require of the Heads of the Departments detailed reports on these several modes of reform, preparatory to legislative action.

The amendments of the Constitution proposed, were: 1. To restrict and limit the Veto power. 2. To secure to Congress the control of the Treasury, by vesting in that body the appointment of the Secretary. And 3. To prohibit the President from appointing members of Congress to office, during the term for which they are elected.

Having at the Extra Session given his aid for the repeal of the Sub-treasury, and labored in vain to re-establish a sound national currency system, and having finally at the Session of 1841-2, propounded a system of national policy in the resolutions above referred to, together with the aforesaid amendments of the Constitution, he bade farewell to the Senate on the 31st of March, and retired to private life.

Mr. Clay's Speeches.

In the speeches of Mr. Clay will be recognised the intellectual and moral stamp of this great American Statesman. There will be found, in his own peculiar diction, (wanting, indeed, the charm of his *manner*,) his *American system*, with the facts and reasons, by which he so ably set it forth, and so triumphantly defended it; his general views of national policy, as well as his views of particular questions; and most of the things that have made him so eminent and surpassingly influential in human society. Hundreds of his speeches, and some of his most brilliant efforts, have been lost, for want of a hand to record them at the time of utterance.

[A cheap collection of his most important speeches, as they bear on the public interests of the country, well chosen, and well edited, from the most approved copies, in *two volumes*, with a memoir of his life prefixed, has been published by Greeley & McElrath, Tribune Office, New York, *price one dollar*, which, we are happy to observe, is in great demand from all parts of the Union, and going off by hundreds and thousands. It is an auspicious evidence of a growing appetite in the public mind for the food to be derived from such a source. It is, in fact, a library of the political history of our country, which every American citizen should have within his reach.]

Mr. Clay an American.

Although born in Virginia, and adopted by Kentucky, however proud of him they may be, he does not belong to them, be it known; but he is the property of the whole country, to which he has devoted the labors of his life. From the character of his mind, and the influence

of his position, it is morally impossible that he should be infected with sectional prejudice. His heart, his soul is *American—all American*—and he belongs to the Union. Can another individual be found among us so *entirely* the property of the American people?

Duelling—games at cards.

In early life, Mr. Clay was a plural number of times engaged in "affairs of honor," and twice came to an encounter, first with Mr. Hemphry Marshall, of Kentucky, growing out of Mr. Clay's motion for the members of the Kentucky legislature to clothe themselves in domestic fabrics—not a bad cause, though a bad result; and next, with Mr. Randolph. But Mr. Clay is now an *anti-duellist*, if we understand him. "I owe it to the community to say," he publicly observed in later years, "that no man holds in deeper abhorrence than I do, that pernicious practice. Its true corrective will be found, when all shall unite, as all ought to unite, in its unqualified proscription."

In 1819, when invited to a game of "*bragg*," he replied, "Excuse me, gentlemen. I have not played a game of hazard for more than twelve years, and I take this opportunity to warn you all to avoid a practice destructive of a good name, and drawing after it evil consequences of incalculable magnitude."

Mr. Clay's private fortune.

Sometime previous to 1820, Mr. Clay suffered deeply by suretyship, and was obliged to be absent from Congress two or three years, to get his affairs righted in the practice of his profession. No man has sacrificed more to his country in a pecuniary point of view, than Mr. Clay. As no lawyer ever had better chances, he might have acquired one of the largest fortunes in the Union, if, instead of devoting his life to the public, he had spent it in his profession. Mr. Clay is frugal in his habits, though not parsimonious. "Here is a *hundred dollars*," said Mr. Clay to a young man, handing it over to him, when he came to consult him for the recovery of an estate that belonged to him by rightful inheritance. "Take this," said Mr. Clay, "and when you want more, call on me." This is a fair specimen of the man. Notwithstanding this liberality of disposition, Mr. Clay has saved a comfortable and unembarrassed estate.

The person of Mr. Clay—his manners—eloquence.

Mr. Clay is tall, and slenderly, but tightly built, light-br eyed, and blue-eyed. He is accused by phrenologists of eagle-eyed perception. They aver, that he observes all, and sees through all, and is apt to hit game, when he fires. Some one has also suggested, that his mother a long time ago gave him a "mellow—mellow horn" to wind. Certain it is, if it was not naturally musical, and of surprising compass, he has made it so by practice. It has thundered deep tones, piped shrill notes, and performed all manner of musical functions between these extremes. Though it may be a little worse for wear, it is good yet, and preferred to all others.

Mr. Clay has grace, dignity, and command—the first to charm, the second to beget respect, and the third to excite awe. Mix them all together, and they make a very perfect man.

As to his eloquence, it must have been matchless in his youth, judging from its effects. The courts, juries, and legislature of Kentucky, popular assemblies there and elsewhere, and both houses of Congress, have successively, for nearly half a century, been swayed by him.

Mr. Clay the candidate of the people for the Presidency in 1844.

We have never yet seen the Whig man that could make up his mouth to say otherwise. The simultaneous rush of the Whig press, of Whig conventions, of Whig assemblies, formal and informal, of nineteen twentieths, if not ninety-nine hundredths of the Whig party throughout the Union, to put forward the name of Henry Clay for 1844, after the faithlessness of the Acting President was placed beyond question, is a most extraordinary fact; and the constantly augmenting power of this general feeling, is another remarkable fact. The suggestion, that it was unseasonable, can not well be sustained. It was an extraordinary, unparalleled position of the public mind. All confidence in the unfortunate choice that had been made of the *second* on the ticket of 1840, who, by a melancholy event of Providence, succeeded as principal, was lost. The great and victorious party of 1840, was without a chief, and temporarily doomed to a most vexatious overthrow of their hopes. If they could not rally without delay, and concentrate their affections somewhere, they would be scattered to the winds. So far from being unseasonable, it was a *necessity*. It was the irresistible action of the instincts of self-preservation. And where else *should* they—*could* they go? Wait they *must*, but not to know what they might hope for in the end, was like the agony of final dissolution—like the winding-sheet of despair.

Most fortunately, fortunate beyond all example in such a case, there *was* a man not unknown to fame—a man whom they *would* and *should* have had before—a tried and faithful man—a man equal to any and all emergencies, as proved by almost every variety of public service for forty years—who never faltered or made a mistake in the great exigencies of the

nation—who filled the eye of the great world, and for whom the world cherished a profound regard—a man equally respected at home and abroad—and whose high endowments and rare gifts seemed to have been made and modelled for the occasion. Upon him, without pause, and with unexampled unanimity, they fixed their eyes and their hopes. A more settled, or more determined purpose has rarely, if ever characterized a state of the public mind. As well might you turn back the rivers, or roll back the tides of the ocean, as to oppose these accumulating forces.

Gratitude—Ingratitude.

If there has been occasion for the saying, that “republics are ungrateful,” we do not yet consent that the libel describes the American people. It was gratitude that led the people of this country into one of the greatest mistakes they ever committed. General Jackson did us great, eminent, heroic service, as a soldier. Not to confess it, would indeed be ungrateful. And military achievements are always attractive, imposing, and captivating with a susceptible and generous people. But the very qualities which made Andrew Jackson a great general, unfitted him to guide the helm of State. That strong and unbending will, which is the best qualification to lead an army, is the worst possible to preside over a true democracy, where the will of all is to be consulted; that despotic authority which is necessary in the field, is most unsuitable in the Chief Magistrate of a free people; and that impetuosity which bears down a foe, in the onset of battle, will carry away the pillars of a republic. Here is the secret of the misfortunes of our country in having chosen for President such a man as Andrew Jackson. But it was *gratitude* that made him President.

While General Jackson was the military idol of the nation, Mr. Clay was borne down by the calumnies already noticed—calumnies which for a long period, poisoned the public mind, but which have since been driven and chiefly eradicated from the field they occupied. He now stands before the whole country a patriot as spotless as he is disinterested, having the advantage, not only of all his recognised merits, but of a man, who, emerging from a dark cloud of aspersion, justified by the certificate of his foes, and ennobled by the dignity of his bearing while suffering injustice, is received into the bosoms of a generous people with a thousand fold more enthusiasm, than would otherwise have been felt for him, with all his exalted gifts. “He is too good a man to be President,” was all that could be urged against his nomination at Harrisburg in 1839. We shall see whether such a libel on the American people will be proved, now they know what he is. Not till it is proved, will we consent to the charge of ingratitude on this republic towards such a man.

The Harrisburg Convention.

We may assume it as a principle, that a departure from democratic or republican practice, in the action of the representatives of the people, will result badly. All know that the Harrisburg Convention of 1839 disappointed the wishes of the great majority of their constituency, and that the murmurs of the Whig party were alarming, when the result was announced. Nothing but the peculiar and distressing state of the country, so imperatively demanding a change in the Government, could have united them on such a nomination for the campaign of 1840. Nay, if Mr. Clay had not himself gone forward as captain, taken the colors into his own hand, and dashed into the thickest of the foe, at the head of his own legions, saying, “it is for the country, and therefore for me, for us all,” the summons to the onset would have failed. “If,” said he, in a private letter read to the Convention, *after* the nomination was made, “if the deliberations of the Convention shall lead them to the choice of another,” (than himself), “as the candidate, *far from feeling any discontent, the nomination will have my best wishes, and RECEIVE MY CORDIAL SUPPORT.*” Such magnanimity is not common in the selfish squabbles of this world.

Such being the facts, the inference is fair, that the nomination generally desired by the people, would have been successful in a much greater degree. *Availability*, if anything other than the wishes of the people be brought into the question, is a dangerous doctrine to act upon in such a Convention, as it takes the question out of the people's hands, and is hostile to the true principles of democracy. Did not a few, a very few decide the nomination at Harrisburg, *against* the wishes of the people? The result has been immeasurably disastrous. Who ever thought of John Tyler for the Vice-Presidency, in the appointment of the members of that Convention? It was the *first* error which led to that fatality in the *second*. Once break loose from sound principles, and there is no knowing where we shall land. An impromptu nomination, made at the discretion, and on the sole responsibility of *representatives*, is a perilous one. We say not this for reproach or rebuke, but because we still have before us the selection of a *second* to him who is already pointed out by the acclamations of the people, and because the saddest experience of the nation has taught us, that *that* selection may be momentous.

A Contrast.

In 1829, at the end of Mr. Adams' Administration, it could be said, that Congress had been independent, and the dominant power in the republic, as the immediate representatives of the people ever ought to be. Then, our commerce, agriculture, and manufactures were in a most flourishing condition, never so much so: our currency system was sound, the best in the world; labor was sure of employment, and of a fair reward; there were few brokers, usurers, and money-lenders; work, and not speculation, was the business of the people; our habits were simple and democratic; and our national honor and commercial credit, without a stain. We were a prosperous, wealthy, thriving, happy people. Such was the state of the country when its government was conducted on the principles of Mr. Clay, and he a part of the Government.

But in 1829, democracy was superseded by ONE MAN POWER; Congress became a mere Executive tool; a train of devastation, social and commercial, moral and physical, such as no other country ever experienced in so short a time, from similar causes, followed; our manufactures were nearly prostrated; trade was paralyzed; agriculture was depressed; the currency was ruined; general morals were corrupted; our honor sullied and our credit gone; wild and ruinous speculations drove industry and economy from the field of enterprise; brokers and jobbers rode the nation out of breath and out of flesh; and the Government of the country, in all its branches and agencies, was put up at auction to the highest bidders in a system of utter political venality and crime.

“Look on this picture—then on *that*.”

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POLITICAL ABOLITION.

BY JUNIUS.

Author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and other Tracts of 1840.

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POLITICAL ABOLITION.

1. *The Author's position on the subject of slavery.*

It is that of a Northern man, born and educated in a free State, always opposed to slavery, still opposed to it, judging it to be wrong, and desiring to see it abolished, as well in this country, as in all others. This he assumes to be the general feeling of the people in the free States, as he has rarely found an instance to the contrary. We, therefore, of the free States, (we speak for the great body of the people,) do not yield to the Abolitionists a whit in our *opposition* to slavery; we differ from them only as to the *mode* of getting rid of the evil. We claim to be the *true* friends of the slave, while we believe them to be pursuing a course hostile to his best interests, and unfavorable to his emancipation.

2. *The origin of slavery in the United States.*

It is enough to say, that it was *imposed* upon the Colonies, by the British Government, for the augmentation of its revenue and the profit of its favorites, *against* the anxious protests of the Colonists themselves, and that while the Colonies were subject to the British Crown, it had grown to an extent not easy to be eradicated. *Thus far*, the responsibility of its introduction and growth, is settled. When the Colonies became independent, and were about to set up the Government of the United States, those members of the Confederation, which had slavery as a part of their state of society, foreseeing the evils of interference with this subject from other quarters, refused to come into the Union under the Constitution, without an express stipulation to secure their exclusive control of the slave question within their respective limits, which condition was acceded to. Such, briefly, is the origin of slavery in the United States.

3. *The more remote origin of Occidental or American slavery of the African race.*

It began in a proposal of Las Casas, a Roman Catholic priest, to the Spanish Government, for authority to introduce Africans by importation into the West Indies, to save the natives, who were being exterminated by hard service and severe treatment under the Spaniards. His object was benevolent. From that germe, African slavery spread over this Western world. Its still *more* remote origin, however, lay in the previous debased condition and barbarous customs of the African tribes, which *invited* the Asiatics on the East and Europeans on the North, to trade in the bodies and souls of men, whom portions of their own race, by prowess of arms, had first made captive, and then exposed for sale—a custom of the African tribes, or hordes, practised from time immemorial. We mention it not as an apology for the more civilized portions of the world, for engaging in this inhuman traffic, but as an historical fact to account for the *origin* of African slavery. It originated in the barbarous passions and habits of the race.

4. *How the subject of slavery should be approached.*

For all that the United States are concerned in it, it is manifest, that the present Government and people of this country, are in no wise responsible for its origin. It was entailed as a calamity, and its being on the hands of any of the States, when we acquired our independence, can not be charged as a crime. They are only responsible for the manner in which they treat it, and for the disposition that shall be ultimately made of it. They who believe in that Providence, with whom "one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day," will look forward for some grand and beneficent result to grow out of that *providential* treatment, which has marked the history of this race for centuries, past. It is a great wheel moving round, and notwithstanding all the clouds and darkness that have overhung it, some rays of light have dawned on its progress. Miracles of relief are not to be expected; but relief will come at last.

5. *Definition.*

By *political* abolition, as used in this Tract, we mean that well-known movement, got up in the free States, to accomplish this object, by resorting to the ballot-box, in its bearings on the National Administration. It can not be denied, that the ballot-box is a primary and fundamental political power. All other political powers above it, are only its instruments and agents. Whatever may result from this primary function of the body politic, these primary actors are responsible for. It is this power which directs and controls the offices of legislation, the functions of magistracy, and the sword of war. It is the original and effective agency of political society, in a popular government like ours.

6. *The formation of our Government.*

It has been justly called a Government of *compromise*, on account of the variety of conflicting interests which had to be consulted before its consummation. The achievement of Independence was but half the work. We were a spectacle to the whole world as to what we

should come to. The friends of liberty were anxious, its enemies still hoped for our failure, while we had to encounter appalling difficulties. The Confederation proved miserably deficient, and nothing could exceed the concern of our most eminent patriots, till the Constitution was finally adopted. It was entirely a new kind of government, composed of wheels within a wheel, of inferior sovereignties allied to one superior and general. In the construction of this machinery, it was necessary exactly to define the powers of the General Government, so as not to interfere with those of the States. This being done, the powers of the States, called *State Rights*, are determined by the following Article, the Tenth of the Amendments:—"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." From this article is derived the exclusive power of the slave States over slavery within their respective limits, it being one of the powers "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States." In all such powers, the States are as sovereign as any independent nations.

7. *The political compact of the Union—political rights resulting therefrom.*

While we are one nation, we are many States, and the States are not provinces, recognising in all things the supremacy of the national authorities; nor municipal corporations, acting in the capacity of counties and towns, under a commonwealth; but they are original, independent, and sovereign powers in all things "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States;" and these delegated and prohibited powers were not imposed by authority, but surrendered by compact, while the States were acting in the capacity of original and independent sovereignties. It was of the nature of a treaty between nations, as a political transaction, though more intimate and more solemn, having in view a different and more comprehensive object—viz: a supreme and supervising authority as to the powers "delegated." But the political rights "reserved," are as independent and sovereign, as those of two nations are, under compact of a treaty, in all things not belonging to the treaty. This view, which we believe to be correct, is important to our present purpose.

8. *The importance and solemnity of the Union as a compromise between the parties.*

But for this compromise, the struggle and cost of the American Revolution would in all probability have been wasted. It was indispensably necessary to save and secure the freedom and independence we had acquired. The parties to this compact had diverse interests to protect, and diverse difficulties to encounter. The arrangement, as finally adjusted and ratified, was regarded by our fathers as one of great solemnity and of unspeakable importance. It was viewed with a kind of religious awe, and with conscientious respect. The man that would lift his hand to impair or disturb it, would have been scathed by the reprobation of a universal public sentiment—a feeling that has been cherished from that time to this, and ever ought to be cherished.

9. *Where lies the responsibility of slavery under this compact.*

Do we, the people of the United States, hold ourselves responsible for any of the laws and institutions of Great Britain, of France, or of any other foreign and independent power, because we happen to be under a treaty with them? It is true, indeed, that the treaty or compact of this Union, is not precisely of the same character with our treaty stipulations with foreign nations, as it bears on the question before us, in that it goes farther, and is more particular in its specifications. We never promise, that we will not meddle with the domestic regulations of foreign powers, when we make treaties with them; for it is not deemed necessary. But we have promised, and solemnly engaged, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are" (of course, shall be) "reserved to the States respectively." But, the political compact of a treaty with a foreign power, so far as it goes, is precisely of the same political character with the political compact of this Union. How, then, can the free States, or the people of those States, be responsible for slavery in other States, which, as high contracting political parties, they have solemnly engaged never to meddle with? This power is "reserved" to those States. If the free States, or the people of those States, ever had anything to do in originating slavery, they have atoned for it by abolishing it. The slave States never surrendered the care, nor transferred the responsibility of slavery, either to the General Government, or to the free States, or to any parties whatever. How, then, can the General Government, or the free States, or any of their parts or agencies, be responsible for that which they not only never had in charge, but expressly stipulated not to assume? The responsibility of this engagement may be brought home with great force from the other side, nor is it possible to escape from it. More than this:—There is an oath of allegiance, always implied in the use of a political power in the State, and in many States actually administered to voters and public officers, to support the Constitution of the United States. Put these obligations together, and they present a formidable obstacle to the conscience of a man, who thinks of stepping over or tries to get round them. If, as American citizens, we have no responsibility in the serfdom of Russia, of

Austria, or of Turkey, and if it would be improper for us to interfere with it *politically*, much more as parties to the public and solemn compact of this Union, are we bound to respect its federative engagements.

10. *The proper ground of abolition.*

As an enterprise of humanity and benevolence, employing *moral* means only, in distinction from political agencies, abolition is a proper mission *from any quarter to any quarter*. Such has ever been the high ground taken by the Society of Friends *as a body*. They have protested against slavery before the world, and done what they could, by precept and example, by speech and the press, and by various modes of social and moral influence, for its extinction. In this work, they have not only been tolerated, but respected. They have wielded a steady, progressive, and effective influence. Pacific in their principles and practice, they have been admitted into the heart of slave-holding communities, to bear their testimony.

While such was the character of the general anti-slavery feeling and operations of the free States of this Union, their voice was heard, and their influence was salutary. Thousands in the slave States joined with them, and slave-holders themselves were open to argument and conviction, while moral means and pacific measures alone were employed. But the moment when *political* abolition rushed into the field, on the soil of the free States, with severe denunciation and the use of the ballot-box, all the good influence of the anti-slavery phalanx was not only at an end, but a retrograde movement in the cause of emancipation, in the slave States, commenced, and it is yet a moral problem in the aspects of society in that quarter, as to how many years, or how many ages, it may take to recover the ground that has been lost.

11. *Political abolition is force.*

We know that this is not commonly thought of, and would perhaps at first be questioned. But a vote at the polls is the original and fundamental power of American political society, and implies force in the end, if necessary. The first attitude, therefore, or first position of this political power, is that of *incipient* force. It *aims to compel* the accomplishment of its designs by the powers of the State, which are force in abeyance. There is no political power in existence, which is not fortified by force, in abeyance or in actual use, or that could stand one day without it. Such, precisely, is the position assumed by political abolition in the free States.

12. *And it is an aggressive movement.*

This results from the political structure of the Union, before considered. Slavery, in any of these States, occupies the same position, politically, in relation to the other States, which the institutions and laws of the European nations do to the United States. Suppose, then, that a party should start up in this country, and go to the polls, augmenting their forces every year, with the declared object of putting down any one or more of the institutions of a European power, because, in their view, that institution is a bad one, oppressive, and destructive of human liberty. There are many such institutions in Europe. Would it not be regarded as an *aggressive* movement?—And if there were any chance or apprehension of success, would it be a matter of surprise, if the menaced power should put itself on the defensive?—Would it be strange, if that power should take measures to anticipate the movement, and commence aggressive operations, in retaliation? The crusade of the first party might be a very benevolent one; but as a political movement, it would be *aggressive*.

13. *Political abolition, in the free States, is a breach of faith.*

This also results from the political structure of the Union already noticed. Do we hold ourselves at liberty to make a treaty with a foreign power, because we have since concluded that we can not tolerate some evil or evils in its bosom—evils which existed when the treaty was made, which were then considered by us, and which we *agreed* to tolerate, or at least, to leave entirely on their responsibility and in their discretion?—If we originate a new political movement, to disturb this arrangement, do we not violate the treaty?—But the compact of this Union is of a more solemn nature, than a ratified treaty between the United States and a foreign power; nor are the slave States less independent and sovereign, as to the matter in question, than a foreign power, with which we are supposed to be connected by such treaty stipulations.

14. *The impracticability of political abolition.*

We speak of course, in the case now under consideration, of such a movement in the free States towards the slave States. It is impracticable, 1. Because political power is force, and force is offensive. 2. Because the parties assailed, can shield themselves behind the Constitution of the United States. 3. Because, the farther political abolition, from such a quarter, goes, the worse and more hopeless is its cause, both as respects the temper of slave-holders, and the condition of the slaves. 4. Because the limit of such a movement, *unless open violence is meditated*, will be found just where its operations will have had no other effect than to plant obstacles in its own path. 5. And consequently, because, such being the Constitutional bar

rier to this movement, everything done in *this* way, by its moral effect, forces the object in view into a more remote position of possible attainment, if, indeed, it should not render it forever unattainable.

15. *The mischievous results of political abolition already developed.*

It is well known, that, previous to the start of political abolition in the free States, the spirit of emancipation prevailed extensively in the slave States, and among slave-holders; that the leading and most influential men in those States, were accustomed freely to acknowledge the evils of slavery, and were engaged in benevolent schemes to abate them; that many of them entertained with favor, the purpose of a gradual, and ultimately an entire abolition; that numerous conscientious persons were providing for the emancipation of their own slaves; that entire freedom of speech and of the press, on the subject, was tolerated; that free colored people in the slave States, were generally treated with indulgence, and encouraged; and that this state of feeling had made visible progress, from the organization of our government, down to the outbreak of political abolition in the free States. There was a fair prospect, that one slave State after another, beginning with the more northern, if left to their own free and undisturbed action, would follow the example of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, in the total extinction of slavery. Such was the state of things, while the subject was left to the *moral* influences operating quietly and pacifically, but effectively, on the public mind. It is but a few years since, that a strong movement was made in the State and legislature of Virginia, for the adoption of a system of emancipation, which was eloquently debated, and had a large minority vote.

But, behold the change! Maryland, which was expected first to move in the cause of emancipation, taking alarm from such interference, has inserted a clause in her Constitution for the *perpetuity* of slavery! The whole mind of the slave States, has been thrown off from its former basis of growing favor toward emancipation, and put in an attitude of defence against foreign interference. The ingress of free blacks into the slave States has generally been interdicted; free colored residents have been banished from some parts, and in all places subjected to great disadvantages, and deprived of important privileges; the work of emancipation has been put in check, and the disposition for it quenched; rigorous defensive laws have been enacted and enforced; the intellectual, moral, and religious improvement of the slaves, which before was encouraged, and growing in popularity, has been very much abridged, and in some places entirely stopped; the slaves are subjected to a stricter watch, and treated with greater rigor, where causes of apprehension exist; scarcely an advocate of emancipation can be found in the slave States, where there were thousands, and tens of thousands before; freedom of speech and of the press, except on one side of the question, is chiefly suppressed; and the entire slave-holding portion of the Union, instead of being engaged, as before, in meliorating the condition of the slaves, mitigating the rigors of the system, and marching forward toward the goal of final emancipation, has been forced into an attitude, and into measures of defence against the *political* abolition of the free States.

We ask, if these are not very impressive and very instructive facts?—The lessons of experience teach us, that it is safe to judge of the future from the past, of what is to come from what has happened. Such being our rule of judgment, it is manifest, that, as political abolition has yet done nothing but injury to the cause it has taken in hand, and injury on an immense scale, it will do nothing but injury in time to come.

16. *Civil war.*

We are not fond of alarming topics, nor disposed to excite unnecessary anxiety. But the evils of political abolition, rising up in the North, must be faced, and the consequences it tends to, must be considered. However averse the people of the free States may be to slavery—and we believe they are almost universally so—yet they can not but feel, that this remedy of political abolition is worse than the disease, first, because the rudeness and violence of the treatment only aggravate it; and next, because they fear, that the medicine, if administered as proposed, will kill both the patient and the doctor. A dissolution of the Union would be as certain as any effect of a moral cause that can be reckoned on. Nor is it likely, that this would be the end. The political asperities and exasperations that would grow out of such a conflict, would themselves naturally be breeders of other convulsions; and it would not be strange, if some military chieftain, or chieftains, should rise up in the struggle, to make slaves of all freemen, and bind in stronger chains, those whom, by such means, it is proposed to set free.

We are a family of States, bound together by a covenant solemnly ratified, which prescribes the rights of each. In this family, concord is beautiful; but family quarrels are the worst of all. Civil war is the most terrible and most desolating of all wars, and most difficult to be brought to an end. Look at Spain. Will any one say, that such a movement, as the political abolition of the North, does not put in jeopardy the peace of this Union, and the Union itself? And can any human foresight tell what scenes of strife it is likely to produce, if it

should be encouraged to pass on its way towards the supreme power of the nation, which is now its avowed aim?

17. *The effect of political abolition on the annexation of Texas.*

Under the present extent of our national jurisdiction, we can not see much occasion of jealousy between the North and South, in regard to slavery, if the Federal Constitution should be scrupulously observed by all parties. But, if political abolition in the North insists on making its demonstrations and advances towards the South, it is very natural that the South should endeavor to fortify itself by all means in its power; and it is not to be disguised, that the annexation of Texas, as a slave State, itself a field for the growth of several slave States hereafter to be erected, would strengthen their balance of power in the Union, and tend to give them a preponderance. Doubtless this question will be agitated, and the strongest motive of the South, and its strongest argument for the annexation, will be the growth and influence of Northern political abolition. In whatever aspect, therefore, we view this movement, it threatens to disturb the Union. Leave the slave States, just where the Federal Constitution has placed them, unmolested in their Constitutional securities, and we can not see any good reason why they should be anxious for the annexation of Texas—certainly not to urge it. But the continued agitation of political abolition in the North, will give them an apology, and be a strong incentive for efforts to attain that end. If the free States, by reason of the *fact* of political abolition moving on in the midst of them, can not say to the slave States,—Your Constitutional securities shall be respected—their ground of opposition to the annexation of Texas will be greatly weakened, and the slave States will have a power of motive and a force of argument, which would not otherwise be felt. There is no other public question likely soon to rise in the public mind of this country, in the disposal of which political abolition in the North would so embarrass the friends of the Union. If this consideration should operate as fuel to the hopes of the abolition party, we should be very sorry; but it is too important, as a warning to the country, to pass unnoticed. A feeling that will be gratified in the approach of difficulties that will engender greater difficulties, and which possibly may end in what would startle common minds to think of, is one that ought to give us concern, if it is to have influence in contributing to such a result.

18. *The suicidal character of political abolition.*

It is taken for granted, that, if political abolitionists were to vote for the one or the other of the two great parties of the country, they would not support the party that is opposed to emancipation in all forms, and which, in possession of power, would use it against abolitionists with a vengeance. There are numerous other reasons, political, moral, and religious, why the Abolitionists generally would not support that party. Their sympathies naturally run in another direction. But do they not see, that every *two* votes they give for political abolition, is *one* vote to raise that party to power, and defeat themselves, not only as to what they vote for, but in other great interests of society, to which they can not be indifferent, though they may shut their eyes to them?—This *diverted* action of political power—it is averred to be 40,000 votes in the free States—in a nice balance of the two great parties, may throw the government of the States and the nation into hands that will ruin us all, as they have heretofore tried to do, with no small success. By this means, the political Abolitionists have again and again defeated the candidates they would most of them otherwise vote for, both for State and national legislation and government, and raised to power men with whom they have little or no sympathy, political, social, moral, or religious.

19. *The responsibility of using the franchise, or ballot, for political abolition.*

Such a use of the ballot is political abolition itself. We hope it may be quite unnecessary to say, that we can not innocently violate our allegiance to the State, for a benevolent object; and we trust we have satisfactorily shown, that the slavery of the slave States is placed beyond the Constitutional power of the free States by the compact of the Union. Is there, then, no responsibility in attempting to break down a foreign power—foreign to us,—by such weapons? A mission of benevolence, which might otherwise be very commendable, becomes a crime, when moral obligations are trampled under foot in the enterprise. By what authority can we violate a covenant, to do a good act?—Shall we say, that the good to be attained is *paramount*, and erect our individual *feelings* into a court to set aside *public law*?

But to the responsibility arising from moral considerations, is to be added that of disregard to the general welfare of the republic. Is it not strange, unnatural, that American citizens, by casting their votes where they have no chance of success, should thus contribute to augment and perpetuate the common misfortunes of the country, by raising men to power, who, they know, are advocates of destructive measures? More than this:—are these Abolition voters *conscientious* men—*religious*? How, then, before God, can they be acquitted, if by *their means*, such men as Robert Dale Owen, a partner of Fanny Wright, and member of the 28th Congress, and Ely Moore, of the Fanny Wright school, and member of the 24th and 25th Congresses, elected by the infidel ticket, are to *make laws* for this nation—and if such men as

Thomas Herttell, also of the Fanny Wright school, who, in 1833, moved in the legislature of New York, to lay on the table the motion for daily prayers during the Session, and thus stifled the public recognition of Providence—are to make laws for the States? Like the dog in the manger, the political abolitionists will neither eat hay, nor allow a hungry ox to eat it.

Yet more than this:—*Suppose*—for there is no reasonable motive for such action without some hope of success—*Suppose*, that, by one step, and in one year, the political Abolitionists could attain supreme power in the nation. Knowing their designs, because they are declared, would not every reflecting man tremble at the consequences? Are there many men in their own ranks, that would dare to look such a posture of public affairs in the face? The same, precisely, is the character, object, and peril of the enterprise, in the position which it now occupies, and in the successive stages of its actual progress. Every man who votes that way at the polls, incurs this tremendous responsibility. He can not disengage himself from the obligations of an American citizen, and say, he will leave the Constitution to take care of itself, or vote to break it down. The American Government may be imperfect in some of its parts—what human edifice is not? But it is a great, a responsible, a momentous trust, confided to the ballot-box. It was a great compromise of feeling and interest between numerous parties, and was formed under circumstances of peculiar trial. Now, that some of the parties have waxed strong by the profit of the Union, will they dare to take the responsibility of upsetting it, because some one or more of its terms do not suit them? Are they at liberty, as conscientious men, to do it? The object they have in view, is neither within the sphere of their political, nor of their social duty, however their moral feelings may be so inclined. Surely they will not plead conscience to violate a contracted obligation, to go out on a mission of benevolence!

20. The spirit of bragging.

It gives us pain and anxiety, whenever we hear people of one part of the Union boasting, that they can do without the other. We entreat all such to consider, that the American Government, and American society, imperfect though it may be, cost *too much* to be made thus light of. It is too important in itself, and too important as a spectacle to the world. From the time of its setting up till this hour, the whole world have been gazing at it as a great experiment, and it still occupies that position in the public eye of mankind. And are we who are responsible for its operation, and for the results it may work out, so to trifle with the trust, as to commit it all to the winds of chance again, because it is not so perfect as we could wish?—Do we prefer the hazards of a civil commotion, for the possibility of a more speedy social improvement, to the slower progress of a pacific reform!

21. Misrepresentation—Exaggeration.

The way to excite sympathy, is to sketch a strong and glowing picture of suffering under injustice. It is in this way, that abolition preachers, lecturers, books, and papers, have labored to work on the feelings of those who know nothing of slavery by actual observation. They have misrepresented facts, and given exaggerated accounts. They have not only been careful to tell nothing but the worst things of slavery, but they have made the bad worse than it is.

Not to justify slavery—God forbid we should do that—it is nevertheless true, that nearly all the evils ascribed to it, may be found in other regions and in other relations of society, in forms equally aggravated, though not, perhaps, in cases equally numerous. Do we hear of owners of slaves treating them with great severity, or maiming, or killing them, in a fit of passion? The same is to be found in the relations of masters and apprentices, of parents and children, of husbands and wives, in the free States. Are slaves, in some cases, as on the cotton, sugar, and rice plantations, over-worked? If we take the evidence of British Parliamentary records, furnished by Government Commissioners, there is a greater amount of oppression of this kind inflicted on the half million of operatives in British manufactories, than on the whole two million and a half of slaves in the United States, as derived from any sources of evidence whatever. Does the extensive mingling of European and African blood evince the prevalence of the crime that produced it? We have not, indeed, the same species of evidence to establish this indictment against the white population of the free States; but there are other proofs of the fact to a wide extent. To the domestic slave-trade, and its consequent moral and social evils, there is confessedly no exact parallel in the free States; nevertheless, there are practices of the same moral character, leading to like results. As to acts of cruelty and inhumanity, of maiming and killing, they are not peculiar to a state of slavery; and the interest of masters in preserving unharmed the physical constitution of their slaves, is a better security against inhumanity, than any laws of society. In British manufactories, masters have not the same motives of interest to preserve the physical vigor of operatives by humane treatment, as the maimed and the helpless are cast on the parish. Hence we find, that the human constitution is more frequently destroyed, in British factories, by overwork and cruel treatment, than among the slaves of the United States. A case of the latter is rarely to be found, while those of the former are numerous.

This, we believe, is a fair statement. But it would doubtless subtract somewhat from the force of abolition preaching, among those who depend for information on the lecturers.

22. But it is slavery.

This can not be denied. But the Abolitionists are doing nothing to help that. Not a single step have they yet taken tending to relieve the doom, but every measure they have adopted, has only served to confirm it, and to make it worse. They *proclaim* liberty, and *establish* slavery. They have stepped into the path of emancipation, arrested its progress, and put it back, no one can tell how long.

This consideration, established as it is by *fact*, ought to have great weight on the conscience of those who, we think, must stand responsible before God and man, first, for having turned the favorable feeling toward emancipation in those who alone have power to effect it, into disfavor, and to a large extent, into opposition; and secondly, for having made the condition of slaves much worse, and more hopeless, than it was before.

We are aware, that some Abolitionists will fly from this charge, by saying, they are not responsible for consequences, after having done their duty. But the very question of duty depends, in part, on a consideration of consequences. If, before action, it should be said, we can not believe in such consequences, or we trust it will not be so, there might be some apology for ignorance. But, when the consequences have actually come to pass, and give a sure index of a continued result of the same character, from the same cause, we do not see how there can be any apology or excuse for such action.

The following are facts of history, as they bear on this question: 1. The Constitution of the United States has left slavery in the slave States, entirely under the control of those States. No persons, and no power, foreign to those States, can reach or touch slavery in their bounds, without their consent. 2. There was a growing favor, in the slave States, toward emancipation, before Northern Abolition commenced its movement toward and upon them. This feeling had existed, to a wide extent, among the greatest and most influential men of those States, and commendable efforts were in progress among slaveholders, to meliorate the condition of slaves, to instruct, moralize, and Christianize them, and to prepare the way for whatever of good might result from such efforts. The State of Virginia had made a powerful movement in a Convention called to amend the Constitution, and in her legislature, for an Act of emancipation. But, 3. It is no less true, as all know, that this feeling has been repressed, and this movement checked, since Northern Abolition broke out, the former being the effect of the latter as a cause. The intellectual and moral improvement of the slaves has been to a great extent suspended, and they have been treated with greater rigor. Their bondage has been made stronger, and its evils aggravated.

Is there no responsibility in this, when it was known, that there was a Constitutional barrier, over which Northern Abolition, as a political movement, could not pass, and when it *might*, and therefore *should* have been known, that, by moral necessity, such would be the effect of such a cause? Though it should be said, it is wrong that the slave States should have been so provoked, is there no wrong in the provocation? We can not but feel, that the *provokers* will be held responsible for this result, as well in the court of heaven, as in the moral sense of mankind. It can not be denied, that they have laid waste that garden of good feeling in the slave States, which Providence had planted and nourished so long, and which promised so much good fruit for the benefit of the slave, and converted it into something like a sterile wilderness. Nor can it be denied, that, by the same means, the chains of slavery have been riveted tighter than before, its evils enhanced, and its prospects darkened. We speak of *facts*, and all know, that these are facts, and that such is the CAUSE.

23. What the people of this country will not permit.

In our opinion, they will not permit the Constitution of the United States to be broken, to accomplish the ends of Abolition. The Constitutional boundaries of influence and control over slavery, are now pretty well recognised by all parties. They have been much better defined since the movement of Northern political Abolition commenced, than before. This debate, and this recognition of the Constitutional rule on the subject, have brought multitudes in the free States to a pause, who were otherwise disposed to favor this movement, and who are always ready to do everything *Constitutional* for the Abolition of slavery throughout the Union. This feeling of respect for the Constitution, and of opposition to slavery, is the prevailing feeling of the free States; and for our part, we desire it may ever be so. In this state of things, since the people of the free States can not Constitutionally, in the use of their political rights, step over the bounds into the slave States, to act upon the institution of slavery, they will very naturally, and for aught we can see, may very properly, desire and require to be rid of its responsibility, being, as they generally are, conscientiously opposed to it. This, we doubt not, the slave States will be disposed to grant. It can hardly be denied, that the people of the free States have had reason to feel, that heretofore they have been made in some degree responsible for slavery by the action of the Federal authorities, by requirements made of their

own State authorities, and in other ways. It is probable, however, that results of this kind will be very much, if not satisfactorily relieved, by the operation of the principles settled in 1842 by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of *Prigg vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*. That decision must necessarily be respected by all parties. We have assumed, in the former part of this Tract, that the free States are not responsible for slavery, which we believe to be sound doctrine resulting from the terms of the Union. Consequently, they can not fairly be made *practically* responsible. Let this be understood and acted upon by all parties, and we do not see any insuperable difficulty in maintaining harmoniously the original terms of the Union of these States. All minor controverted questions, arising out of slavery, can only be settled by time and the regular action of Constitutional authorities.

24. What follows.

By such an adjustment of the slave question, which has so long and so greatly agitated the public mind of this country, it will follow, if we mistake not, that slavery must be left where the Constitution has placed it, on the responsibility, and under the control of the States in which it exists. It will also follow, that any political action, originating in the free States, to act on the slavery of slave States, will not only be necessarily ineffectual, but improper and injurious. It will follow, moreover, that a return to the original mode of action on slavery for its abolition, *by moral means*, is the only course, which the opposers of slavery in the free States, can Constitutionally pursue. With this, will also follow the hope of an ultimate attainment of the end. Manifestly, there is no hope for it as a result of political Abolition in the free States. Every aspect of the question has only waxed worse and worse, and the end in view has been placed at a farther remove by this agitation, as we have before had occasion to notice, and the facts of which are undisputed. *Moral means* have heretofore operated well. They are the means of Christianity—means which God himself has ordained, benevolent in character, and beneficent in their effect.

25. The duty of anti-slave men in the free States as American citizens.

They can not of course disregard their obligations of fealty to the Constitution of the United States, for any *foreign* object, however good and meritorious it might be in itself considered. It would be equally proper for them to violate the Constitution to suppress slavery in any of the nations of Europe, or in any other foreign parts, as to violate it to suppress slavery in any of the States of this Union. As regards slavery, the States are as independent of each other, and of the General Government, as any two nations are in their relations.

All citizens of the free States, therefore, who desire to see an end of slavery in this Union, by Constitutional means, can hardly have failed to have their attention arrested by the deplorable spectacle exhibited in the slave States, as the result of Northern political Abolition, in the putting back of the work of emancipation so far and so greatly, in destroying the better feelings of masters toward their slaves, and in creating a strong current of feeling in those States against any purpose or plan of emancipation whatever. They must have seen, that political Abolition in the free States, has committed an error, not only of infinite magnitude, but of a corresponding responsibility. As friends of the slave, therefore, as the enemies of slavery in all forms, and as good citizens, owing allegiance to the Constitution, we think they can not fail to see a line of duty marked out to them, which will induce them, not only to abstain from countenancing, but to lend all their influence in opposing so destructive and hopeless an enterprise as political Abolition. If a "tree be known by its fruits," the evidence of its character in this case, one would think, ought to be deemed sufficient.

26. Indications of Providence.

It is the prerogative of Providence to bring good out of evil, and out of the evil actions of men. Observe the following facts: 1. African slavery, in the West, was begun by the nations of Europe. 2. Those very nations, including those which sprung from them in this Western world, are now, for the most part, acting in concert to suppress the slave trade. 3. Christian philanthropists, from among these nations, are making simultaneous efforts, to explore Africa, to develop its resources and capabilities, to Christianize and civilize its tribes, and to present inducements for lawful commerce. Witness the plans and progress of African Colonization from the United States, and corresponding labors in Great Britain, for the benefit of the African race. 4. The torrid regions of Africa appear to be the natural home of the colored races, and as such constitute a Providential indication of the course to be pursued by those who seek to elevate and establish them in a social and political standing among the nations of the earth. 5. Great, atrocious, and indisputable, as was the crime of the slave trade, which has justly received the reprobation of all mankind, it has nevertheless been so overruled by Providence, that those portions of the race which have survived the cruelties and inhumanities inflicted, have been improved and elevated in a state of slavery. They are the best portions of the race, and most capable of doing good to their brethren, whenever a general emancipation shall be effected. 6. The slaves of the United States are the best and most capable portions

of the race anywhere to be found. 7. And consequently, the crime of man, for which neither defence, nor palliation, can be made, may be overruled by Providence for the general good of the race, when a plan of universal emancipation shall be perfected and carried out. That the tendencies of human society are in that direction, is sufficiently evident. To retard this movement, by attempting to precipitate the event with violent means, is what we object to.

Believing in the progress of society, we may see, in this great circle of Providence, an apparent preparation for the social elevation and political independence of the African race. This grand result, however, can not be forced. A race so debased as the African tribes were, when they themselves, in barbarous warfare, made captives of each other, for purposes of trade, and thus originated this public mart of their own flesh and blood, were never known to be raised to the highest conditions of man's earthly existence in a brief period.

If the United States were one State, a political movement for the emancipation of slaves, might be hopeful of good. It is still so in any component parts of the slave States. But any movement of this kind, foreign to those States, designed to act upon them, will of course be regarded as an interference, in view of the terms of the Union, and thus, by moral causes, thrust in by force upon the surface of society, this great movement of Providence, gradually and constantly developing, in favor of the African race, is arrested and put backward.

27. *The best judges.*

It is very uncharitable, and not less injurious to the cause of emancipation, for those who know nothing of slavery by experience or observation, to undertake to dictate to slaveholders how they shall act. It is injurious, because they who give this advice, have no power of control, and it is only regarded as an interference. It is uncharitable to condemn slaveholders in the mass, because a large portion of them solemnly aver, apparently in all good conscience, that they look upon slavery as an evil, and desire to see an end of it, but are deterred from immediate emancipation by considerations of humanity to the slaves themselves. The sweeping and indiscriminate denunciations of Abolitionists on all slaveholders, have a pernicious effect on those who are favorable to emancipation. They know, at least they think, that slavery, as a question of moral casuistry between themselves and God, is one which can not be fairly adjudicated by those who know nothing about it.

28. *Where the power lies.*

It is manifest from what has been said, that the power of emancipation is vested exclusively in the slave States, as far as respects slavery in their own bounds.

29. *Northern Abolition inhuman.*

We do not mean that it is so by design, but in effect. Doubtless the design is quite the contrary. But the effect, as we have seen, and as all eyes must observe, is to put obstacles in the way of emancipation, and to defer the day to an unknown period. The way in which Northern political Abolition has been managed, is the unkindest thing that could be done for the slave, and most subversive of the cause of humanity, because they have no power in the case, by such weapons, except to do harm to the cause which they profess to espouse.

30. *The most effective way.*

The moral position of the free States, eschewing slavery, and denouncing it, side by side as they stand with the slave States, and members of the same great national family, is one of great force, and can not fail of its influence, on a large scale, and with great effect. Recognising the limit of their power for political action, as defined by the Constitution, they are then at liberty to employ all moral and social influences, by speech and the press, which private citizens may choose to put and keep in action. In that course, they would find numerous allies in the slave States, and among slaveholders, as formerly.

31. *The moral influence of the antislave feeling in the free States is suppressed, by the existence of political Abolition in the North.*

Not only so, but the tendency of the controversy raised by it, is to abate this feeling of antipathy and opposition to slavery. It is the natural feeling of the free States, and ought to be cherished by them. But while they are obliged to contend against political Abolitionists, they are in danger of imbibing a feeling of toleration toward slavery itself. In the meantime, their moral influence against slavery is almost necessarily suspended. It is hardly possible for them to act in this field, as formerly, lest they should be suspected or accused of alliance with political Abolitionists; so that the effect of political Abolition is not confined to the positive injury it is constantly doing, by putting obstacles in the way of emancipation, in the slave States; but it puts a stop to the cause of emancipation in all forms, and in all quarters, and suspends, for the time being, nearly all action and influence of the entire anti-slavery phalanx of the Union. They can do nothing, while these mischief-workers are in the field; but are forced to be employed in preventing the evil of their machinations.

32. Republican inconsistency—American Declaration of Independence.

The following clause of the Declaration of American Independence:—"We hold these truths to be self-evident—That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—is often quoted, in the ears of Americans, with the finger pointed to American slavery; nor can it be denied, that the principles here announced, are a condemnation of the fact. Nevertheless, the purpose for which that Declaration was framed, and the object to which it was then applied, was simply to deny the divine right of kings, and the claimed prerogatives of high birth, and to assert and establish the right of a people to govern themselves. That the *principles* here stated are more comprehensive than this, there is no doubt, and that they apply to slavery anywhere, must also be admitted. But there is no inconsistency in this Declaration, as it was *applied* by those who framed and adopted it, they having exclusive regard to the relations of the Colonies to the British Crown, and to the tyranny of the latter over the former.

Thomas Jefferson, the Author of the Declaration, professed to be an emancipationist. His views on slavery were frequently and freely expressed, and the following passage in his *original* draft of the Declaration of Independence, not adopted, will show where he put the blame:—"He" (the king) "has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty, in the persons of a distant people, who never offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur a miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of *infidel* powers, is the warfare of the CHRISTIAN king of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable commerce. And that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished dye, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms against us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also *obtruded* them—thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the *lives* of another."

Mr. Jefferson also took the first opportunity, after the separation, and during the war, to cause an act to be passed in the Virginia legislature, to *prohibit* the importation of slaves. And the other slave States followed the example.

33. Slavery a wrong.

Slavery is undoubtedly a wrong done to the natural rights of those enslaved, and the earliest possible emancipation, when unable to gain their own freedom, will be contrived and effected for them by those who appreciate the value of the right. But when it is to be effected by offices of *mediation*, it is a *moral* enterprise, and the master is to be consulted. If it is to be done by *force*, it is a *political* enterprise, and the cost must be counted.

34. But the wrong should be righted, and righted now.

That it should be *righted*, we agree; but that righting it *now*, will itself be right, is a question; and that may depend on many other questions. 1. It may depend on who did the wrong. If he can be found, it is doubtless incumbent on him to set about righting it instantly. 2. If he can not be found, the question is, who is to act as his substitute? 3. It may depend on the present condition of the subject of the wrong. 4. In any case, it depends on who is to undertake it. As a crusade, it might be a *wrong* interference. 5. As to the great, complicated, stupendous question of slavery, questions equally great, complicated, and stupendous, are involved in its abolition.

35. The Buffalo Abolition Convention—Their Manifesto.

In August, 1843, a national Convention of political Abolitionists assembled at Buffalo, N. Y., and nominated a President and Vice President of the United States, to be voted for in 1844, at which time they published the following Manifesto, as their latest creed, which, we suppose, is the best authority:

"Whereas, The Constitution of these United States is a series of agreements, covenants, or contracts between the people of the United States, each with all and all with each; and

"Whereas, it is a principle of universal morality, that the moral laws of the Creator are paramount to all human laws; or, in the language of the Apostle, that "we ought to obey God rather than men;" and

"Whereas, the third clause of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States,—when construed as providing for the surrender of a fugitive slave—does "rest upon such a basis," in that it is a contract to rob a man of a natural right—namely, his natural right to his own liberty; and, is therefore, absolutely void—

"Therefore, Resolved, That we hereby give it to be distinctly understood, by this nation and the world, that, as Abolitionists, considering that the strength of our cause lies in its righteousness, and our hope for it in our conformity to the Laws of God and our respect for the RIGHTS of MAN, we owe it to the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe as a proof of our allegiance to Him, in all our civil relations and offices, whether as private citizens, or as public functionaries sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, to

regard and to treat the third clause of the fourth article of that instrument, whenever applied to the case of a fugitive slave, as utterly null and void, and consequently, as forming no part of the Constitution of the United States, whenever we are called upon, or sworn, to support it."

As we are not in controversy with these gentlemen as to the *validity* of the claim of the slave to his emancipation, we fully acceding thereunto, but only as to their *mode* of accomplishing the end, and also as to the *ground* on which this document asserts the claim, we ask attention to a few remarks on the Manifesto itself.

It must be confessed, that this is an extraordinary, and a somewhat *startling* document. How the *conscientious* men of their party will be able to digest the *Resolution* that sets aside a part of the Constitution of the United States, pronouncing it "*utterly null and void*," which, indeed, *annihilates* it, "as forming *no part* of the Constitution," is more than we can say. It is manifest, that a right to strike out this part, is a right to strike away the whole; and so far as we can see, the blow at this part, is a blow at the whole. We can not feel it is too much to say, that that sacred and venerable Charter of our Government, the cost of which shook this Continent and shook the world, is here taken in hand, cast upon the ground, and stamped upon, as of no worth and no authority.

The reasoning by which this act is justified, is no less extraordinary. The whole transaction is based on the *authority of religion*, as interpreted by the actors, and invokes its highest sanction, "the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe." It is true, that another element of authority is picked up, by going back to a supposed state of man before he enters into society, commonly called "the state of nature," out of which grow "natural laws," and "natural rights;" but *religion* is the foundation, superstructure, and finish of the whole. We will first dispose of the *profane* part of the argument, or the *law of nature* part.

Let it be observed, that we do not undertake to *disprove*, that man has "natural rights," or that the claim of a slave to freedom is a valid one, both of which we fully accord to. We only wonder, that a conclusion of such tremendous consequence, as that arrived at in this document, should have no other *profane* authority (*profane* in distinction from *sacred*) brought to its support, than the undefined rule of "natural right."

"The law of nature," says Blackstone, "is the will of God." Justinian says, "it is to live honestly." Blackstone's comment on this, is, "not to injure society." "The *foundation*" of natural law, Blackstone says, is, "that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness," which, he adds, is "the *substance* of the law of God." He also says, that "to *know* the law of nature, it is necessary to have recourse to *reason*;" but he adds, as man's "reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error," "immediate and direct revelation, to be found only in the Holy Scriptures," is to be consulted.

NATHAN DANE, the great American jurist, speaks of "the laws of nature and reason, made by God himself." "The law of nature," he says, "is a perfect rule, but is understood only by a *right use of reason*." "A state of nature," he says, "wants a *common judge*," which society sets up. Again:—"Civil laws are those of nature *modified and perfected*." Again:—"A state of nature is a state of *despotism and wretchedness*," because, "if one may do as he pleases, another may, and each is his own judge, and judges the Judges." He says that justice in this way is obtained, "not probably more than once in twenty cases." Again:—"In a state of nature, heated and passionate men are the judges." "Hence," he says, "it is easy to see how much this poor free man's liberty, so much extolled by some, is worth to him, *on the whole*."

We have made these quotations, merely to show what an *indefinite and unsettled* rule the law of nature is. The more we cite legal authorities to this point, the more we shall be puzzled. They themselves don't pretend to understand it. Like sensible men, they set themselves to determine what law is as *fixed by society*, and they know no other. That there are "natural rights," which men may be compelled to resort to on emergencies, there is no doubt; but, instead of being the best, or even good authority, in the social state, they are the worst and most dangerous possible. They are for extremities, as a necessity, not for common use. The result of the whole is, as stated above, by Mr. Dane—that "*civil laws are those of nature modified and perfected*." The aims of the structure of civil jurisprudence have been, to ascertain, as well as could be, *the law of nature*, so called, by a general concurrence of opinion, and with Christian jurists, as Blackstone above intimates, by consulting "an immediate and direct revelation," the Bible. The best authority, therefore, is not to go back to a *state of nature*—for that is where man first began, and is, as Mr. Dane above says, "a state of *despotism and wretchedness*;"—but it is to consult that system of jurisprudence, which the wisdom and justice of many ages, and the most civilized and Christian nations, have established.

A man alone in the world, in a state of nature, would doubtless have a right—call it "natural," if you please—to anything he can lay his hand upon—a right to go where he pleases, and do what he pleases, except as his Creator might command otherwise. But the moment he enters into society, this liberty, or system of natural rights, is abridged, while other rights are multiplied; and if the state of society is good, his newly-acquired rights are more valua-

ble. His former liberty, or natural rights, *yield* to the regulations of society; and we can not think of any one of them which may not be affected, or even taken away, by such regulations. The right to breathe, for example, is the strongest of all natural rights; but society assumes the right to stop a man's breath by hanging, if his acts should expose him to such a sentence of the law. We can not conceive of a government of *law*, which recognises any other authority than that of the laws themselves, in determining social rights. They may be right, or they may be wrong. Nevertheless, while they exist, they are the rule. To oppose them, is rebellion; to live without law, is anarchy; or what Mr Dane calls the "despotism and wretchedness of a state of nature." To give "*natural rights*" as authority to resist law, is the most indefinite rule, and the most dangerous authority, that could be adduced.

And yet, *let it be observed*, that "*natural right*" is the *only* authority, on which this Buffalo Abolition Convention Manifesto is founded! It is first *assumed*, then merged in *religion*, and "the Supreme Ruler of the Universe" is made responsible for the *result*! He is appealed to, his sanction is invoked, and it is all done in his name! The whole of it, from beginning to end, is a *religious business, based on a religious sentiment*! Read it, and judge.

36. The proper rule.

We take the settled and *definite* opinions of mankind, as collected and recorded in the most approved systems of civil jurisprudence, and as established in the most free Governments and most liberal institutions of human society, to establish the claim of the slave to his freedom. These are *recognised* authorities, from which nobody can escape. The American Declaration of Independence *alone* is sufficient. And we take these established principles, to work with them by ways and means equally well established. *Here* is the essential, the vital, the momentous point, in which we differ from political Abolitionists.

37. Church and State.

There is not a more religious people in the world, than we of the United States; yet no people have been more scrupulous, by their State papers, by practical legislation, and by general feeling, in separating religion from a participation in the authorities of State. They give full scope to the *moral* influence of religion, but jealously deny to it *political power*. *If there be any one principle more firmly settled in the public mind of this country, or better established, by universal consent, and with fixed purpose, than another, or all others, we think it is, THAT RELIGION SHALL NOT USURP AUTHORITY IN THE AFFAIRS OF GOVERNMENT.*

38. Political Abolition a religious movement.

Look at this Buffalo Manifesto. Is it not a religious document? "The moral laws of the Creator are paramount to all human laws;" "we ought to obey God, rather than man;" "considering that, as Abolitionists, the strength of our cause lies in its righteousness, and our hope for it in our conformity to the laws of God;" "we owe it to the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe, as a proof of our allegiance to Him," &c., "to regard and to treat the third clause of the fourth Article of the Constitution of the United States," &c., "*as utterly null and void*," &c. Is not religion the rule, the sanction, *the everything* involving responsibility in this transaction? Nor is it a declaration of principles *to suffer*, but of principles *to act*; nor of *submission*, but of *aggression*; nor for the use of *moral* means alone, but to take hold on *political power*; they are a *political party*, and were at that moment assembled to nominate a President and Vice President of the United States!

Men, making the highest religious pretensions, have taken lead, and are at the head of the movement; numerous religious papers are employed to advocate it; a large corps of religious missionaries are in the field to preach it; numerous churches and pulpits are chiefly devoted to it, and are thence called Abolition Churches; its most religious Champion, Mr. Gerritt Smith, has publicly announced, that he will go forth, and preach the doctrine in Christian pulpits, on the Christian Sabbath; and religion everywhere is the high and holy sanction relied upon to enforce the doctrine. Nearly all the political Abolitionists, and with scarcely an exception, all the abolition preachers, lecturers, and missionaries, are religious men. It is, indeed, a *proper religious enterprise*. In this statement we have disclosed A GREAT, IMPORTANT, MOMENTOUS FACT.

39. Confession of a leading Abolitionist.

Since we published the first edition of this Tract, we have had a conversation with a leading Abolitionist, than whom no one has been more prominent or more influential as such. He expressed a wish, that we would make some alterations in this sheet, for greater good, as we have done. We were surprised at the interest he took in it, and are only sorry we could not follow his advice in all its extent. He said, "The Abolitionists, as a body, are honest people, BUT THEIR LEADERS ARE CORRUPT AND UNPRINCIPLED." We were startled at this, coming from such a source; but he repeated with emphasis:—"THE LEADERS ARE CORRUPT AND UNPRINCIPLED." We were forced to believe, that such was his conviction, and that no man knew better. It was said so seriously, so emphatically, and apparently with such honesty of

purpose, that we have taken the liberty to think, he would not object, that the public should be aware of it.

40. *"We must obey God rather than man."*

So says the Buffalo Manifesto, having *assumed* the thing to be proved, viz: that God commands it. It is obvious there is no answer to this reason, or no reasoning with such persons, if they think they have such authority. If they could prove their mission by miracles, it would be sufficient; but as this is only *their opinion*, a sentiment of their *own*, the conscience of those who think otherwise, is at least as good as theirs, and worthy of as much respect. Other Christians, and the great majority think, that God has not commanded this; that, in the days of the Apostles, when the state of political society was a great deal worse than it is now, and slavery far worse and more extensive, as history attests, not only was submission to "the powers that be," enjoined on all Christians, even to martyrdom, but "servants" (*slaves*) were commanded "to obey their masters in all things;" that St. Paul sent back Onesimus, a fugitive slave, to his master, Philemon, to be treated according to his will, thereby recognising Philemon's authority in the case; that the Apostles not only had a special authority by immediate revelation from God in regard to the matters referred to when they said, "We ought to obey God rather than man," but that they did not say this as a reason for disobeying existing regulations of society; that both Christ and his Apostles were most scrupulous observers of all such regulations, and could always defend themselves on that ground; that the duty of such submission to such authorities is paramount to man's individual right to arraign the law; that obedience to civil society results from Divine command; that political society, as it exists at any time, in any place, is "the ordinance of God," requiring our submission; that God's government, or Christ's kingdom is *moral*, in distinction from the political edifices of man; and that the design of Christianity is to avail itself of the *order* of political society, without being responsible for its defects, *to set all things right, by making all hearts good*. Hence, as they think, the scrupulous care and frequent injunctions of Christ and his Apostles *not to disturb society*, as its peace and order are necessary to accomplish the aims of Christianity.

41. *A Deduction.*

If the above thoughts are correct—we believe they are—it will follow, that no man can, with propriety or good reason, invoke Divine authority to justify a use of political power in upsetting political society, or reforming the State. If a Christian employs political power to attain what he thinks desirable in the State, he does it as a member of the political commonwealth, and not as being on a mission from God, armed with a Divine command, imperative on himself, and which he may proclaim as imperative on all others. No Christian, in our view, is authorized to invoke such a Divine sanction for such an act. It is, if we mistake not, identical with the principle, which we, as American citizens and American freemen, in our organization of political society, have very distinctly and very emphatically repudiated, viz: the authority of religion in the State and *over* it. And yet, as all will see, this is precisely the sanction of the Buffalo Manifesto, and precisely the principle on which that document is founded. The American people have solemnly resolved and declared, *against* the usurpation of authority in the State by religion. And yet, *here it is, sprung upon us by surprise*, by the public act of a public Convention, with the declared object of overrunning and revolutionizing the State, and the first step taken has been to plant its foot on the Supreme law of the land, proclaiming a part of it, "to this nation and to the world," "**AS UTTERLY NULL AND VOID**"—"ABSOLUTELY VOID!"

42. *The actual junction of religion and political power.*

They have organized as a party on the platform of this religious-political creed; they have nominated a President and Vice President of the United States; they have gone forth into the field, established presses, opened churches, and set up pulpits; they have an army of agents and missionaries; their candidate for the Presidency, himself acting as an *agent and missionary*, boasted in Faneuil Hall, Boston, that they had increased from 7,000 in 1839, to 35,000 in 1843; and that it is an actual junction of religion and political power, appears from the facts, that religion is the sentiment, and the machinery of State the means employed to accomplish the end. If we rightly understand the essential elements of Church and State *united*, apart from the accidents of *form*, this appears to be the thing. It comprises the most potent agencies of the kind recognised in history, as it takes hold of the fundamental power of the State, and would sweep all before it, when once it shall have gained the ascendancy.

43. *The Abolition Church.*

It is the party, and the party is a religious brotherhood. They have one creed, one faith, one baptism. To all others intolerant and denunciatory, they regard themselves as the only *pure* Church. They call, not only their political, but their religious opponents, "a brotherhood of thieves," "manstealers," "robbers," "murderers," "adulterers," "liars," "infidels," &c.

We take these epithets, thus bestowed, as they come from their presses, and are heard from their pulpits.

44. *This the only mode by which Church and State can be united in this country.*

If it is to come at all, it will not come in the forms heretofore known in history, but it will *steal* upon us. The old form would be instantly recognised, and reprobated. But, to succeed, it must take a form corresponding with the popular modes of action in American society. Can anything be nearer to it than this? It is the very model, the perfect type of our social system, in an original popular movement. It is nothing more, nothing less, but the *very thing*. We have only to ask, what is the *element* of this movement? Is it religion? Or is it not? If it is, then it is Church and State, and an attempt to unite the two.

45. *This would be a fearful power, if it should prevail.*

It is a power that mounts the hobby of *one* principle to ride over all others—a sword that cuts all ties, however sacred, for the sake of cutting one admitted to be bad. They do not consider, that the great principles of the moral and social system are numerous, all having their respective claims, and that, like men in society, they modify each other, in their practical application; but they take *one* out from all the rest, and propound it as an *abstraction* to govern the world—to break down every other that comes in its way.

It is no disparagement to state the well-known fact, that all religious sects have their favorite opinions, and often *one* favorite opinion. Holding them dear, they of course wish to see them reduced to practice, and if they had the power, they would not only urge them eloquently, but, preadventure, would enforce them rigorously. It is for this reason that religion is held to be a dangerous power in the State—certainly so, until we can be sure that the opinions adopted are sound. If a favorite opinion of a religious sect is unsound, and if it is to become a *hobby in power*, to be enforced any how, and by whatever means, it then becomes a *terrible* power. History exhibits too melancholy a record of devastations wrought in society by this cause, not to be a solemn warning.

46. *A difference between religion and true religion.*

There are a thousand, not to say ten thousand religions in the world, but only one that is *true*; and there are forms of Christianity by no means free from error. As a general rule, the more *intolerant*, fierce, and bloody a religion is, the farther is it from the pure religion of a pure Christianity. Is not political abolition intolerant? Is it not fierce? And who will say, that, in all its tendencies, it is not rushing onward to the opening of rivers and seas of blood?

47. *The duty of all true Christians in regard to this movement.*

The time is coming, *has come*, when religion, in the face and in violation of the American political creed and of American fundamental political law, is to be made responsible for an attempt to usurp the powers of State. It behooves all true Christians among us, to see, that *Christianity* is not held responsible for this. Christianity, rightly interpreted and properly understood, can not, in our view, be responsible for it. We do not deny, on the contrary we admit and believe, that many true Christians, with sincere and conscientious minds, have been and are being persuaded into the ranks of this religious-political sect, and that it is chiefly effected by an appeal to their religious feelings. They are persuaded to believe things which are not true, and they listen to interpretations of Divine command, which are unwarranted in the application that is made of them. The line of demarcation between "rendering unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," is effaced from their minds by the doctrines they read in abolition papers, and hear from abolition pulpits, and they lose sight of that great and fundamental principle of American institutions, equally important and equally precious to all freemen and to all religious sects, viz: that religion shall not have authority in the State, and may not usurp it. They are told, that "we ought to obey God rather than man;"—but they are not told that one part of such obedience is to "submit to the powers that be," that is, to the ordinances of civil society. The very precept that is invoked to lead them astray, is most directly in point to keep them right. They do not see, for the time being, though they may afterward see it with regret and sorrow, that religion, taking hold of the machinery of State, *as religion*, is entirely out of place, not only in regard to the design of our political institutions, but equally so in regard to the design of Christianity. The latter, in maintaining the character of a "kingdom not of this world," has a loftier mission, and more universal functions, than to raise a conflict with political powers, by using political weapons. Its errand is with the *heart*, and its power is *over* the heart. Its *moral* power is disarmed, the moment it resorts to *political* power, and God is no longer with it. The spirit has fled, and it is not Christianity, whatever may be its pretensions; nor can Christianity be made responsible for that which its precepts and spirit alike forbid. If these are just thoughts, every true Christian, as well as every true patriot, will be apprized of his duty in regard to political abolition. Most respectfully, most kindly, and with affectionate concern,

would we implore those Christians, who have honestly enlisted in this enterprise, to pause and consider. Their allegiance to God is doubtless first, highest, and most sacred. It is for that we invoke their allegiance to the State, because God has enjoined it. We implore them to consider both the scandal and prejudice that will attach to Christianity, by forcing religion into a political warfare, by buckling upon it a political harness, and putting into its hands political weapons, for an inevitable discomfiture. Can it for a moment be imagined, that the American people, having once opened their eyes to such an attempt, will tolerate it?

48. *Great Britain and American Abolition.*

In the political aspects of this question, it is scarcely possible for us to shut our eyes to the fact, that American citizens should stand up in the world's Convention at London, and panders to the lust of empire, and of the world's empire, nourished in that capital and by the Government of that country, by denouncing the Government of the United States, and conspiring with those who would embrace the first opportunity to overturn our institutions in a servile and civil war. That the policy of Great Britain is *morally* allied to the abolition movement of this country, is certain. The language that has been used by American Abolitionists, in Exeter Hall, London, and in other public places of that empire, can not but be regarded as utterly hostile to that fealty which every American citizen owes to the Government of his country. When words, and such words, are so strong, can the heart be right? If they have not already conspired, can there be any doubt, that they would at any moment conspire with the Government of that country to overthrow the Government of this, to accomplish their end?—Doubtless they are looked upon as *fellow-workers*, whenever the British Government shall have occasion to employ them.

49. *The denationalizing influence of political abolition.*

The conduct of American Abolitionists abroad, as above referred to, is an anomaly in the results of human society; at least, it is what no one could have anticipated, or would have predicted. If, indeed, there be anything in political abolition, which can so utterly *denationalize* Americans born, and set them against their own country, to denounce it publicly in foreign parts, and to show a disposition to enter into any conspiracy to overthrow the American Government, it is high time that so unpatriotic a movement be understood and appreciated.

50. *Perjury.*

We must farther solicit that honest and conscientious portion of the community, who, with the most upright designs, have, as we believe, been seduced by the leaders of political abolition into that faith, to consider the position in which they are placed as *religious men*, by adhering to and acting with the Abolitionists, in the way proposed. How can they, as American citizens, bound by all the solemnities of an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the United States—for that oath is always implied in a ballot, and in many States actually administered as a qualification—how can they subscribe to such a declaration as the Buffalo Manifesto, and then vote the abolition ticket, or how can they vote that ticket at all, having such a declared object, *without contracting the stain of PERJURY on their souls*? And is not the Manifesto itself a subordination of perjury?

51. *Another view of this perjury.*

It is certainly a most extraordinary case, as it is perjury proposed—and publicly proposed. In this view it is *shameless*. It is farther than crime has ever before presumed to go. But observe the spectacle it would present, if it were carried out. The proposal and enterprise is, to obtain a political ascendancy in the national councils, and to elect the Federal officers, to administer the Government of the country. They *invite* this whole nation to perjure themselves at the ballot-box! Is it not so?—What a scene would that be! And they set up the *pulpit of religion* to persuade them into it! They profess to do it all in the name and by the sanction of "the Supreme Ruler of the Universe!"

When they shall have accomplished this end, the President elect is to stand up before the nation and the world, and take the following oath:—"I do solemnly swear, that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, *preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.*" And he is to do this, with a proclamation in his right hand, before uttered and published, that he will do *neither*, and that he will violate *every part* of this oath! And the Vice President, and every member of Congress, and every Federal Officer, throughout the land, belonging to this party, is to do the same thing! Was such a scene ever before projected to be enacted in human society?—How it is possible to come to any other result, under the Buffalo Manifesto, we are utterly unable to see. A perjured people, a perjured Government, a perjured nation, punishing, in a common court of justice, with the heaviest penalties, that by which they attained their eminence!

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DEMOCRACY.

BY JUNIUS.

Author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and other Tracts of 1840.

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DEMOCRACY.

§ 1. A story.

A Member of the House of Representatives, in Congress, a friend of Mr. Van Buren, met a Whig Senator, in a steamboat, in the early part of the Presidential campaign of 1840, when the former said to the latter, "Your Log Cabin and Hard Cider is no go. We shall beat you." "How so?" asked the Senator. "Mr. Van Buren," answered the Member, "relies upon the words *Democracy*—*Democrat*—and *Democratic*. We all rely upon them, as a party. While we wear this name, you can not beat us, but we shall beat you." This is a story of fact, told us, with some other details, by the Senator himself. It happened, however, for that occasion, that there was more democracy in "Log Cabin and Hard Cider," than there was in "*Democracy*" itself. The Member of the House was right, and the very reason he gave, prevailed on the other side.—Mr. Van Buren was beaten.

§ 2. The Lesson.

As the above is a story of fact, and as it doubtless tells a truth, and confesses a secret, though perfectly obvious to all observing minds, the Whigs will be very simple, if they do not profit by the lesson. All know, that these self-styled "Democrats," place their chief reliance on this word, in its different forms of application. Not only so, but they rely equally on stigmatizing their opponents with the name of "Federalists." Look at the Globe and the other papers of that party throughout the Union. Is it not so? With an unwavering constancy they adhere to this rule, in print and in speech. They are aware of the importance of it. They "*rely*" upon it.

§ 3. Etymology.

The word *Democracy* is formed of the Greek words *Demos*, people, and *Krateō*, to rule. Compounded, it signifies a *people-government*, in distinction from *Monarchy*, or *One Man* government. The word *Monarchy* is compounded of the Greek words *Monos*, sole, and *Arkos*, ruler, and means as above defined. In grammatical construction, therefore, these words, *Monarchy* and *Democracy*, stand opposed to each other, thus: Monarchy means the government of *One Man*, and Democracy a government by the *people*. There is a perfect grammatical purity and propriety in both, and they announce and declare precisely what they are intended to do.

§ 4. Historical Origin.

The term *Democracy*, we believe, was first applied to the small republics of Greece, where the people ruled in primary assemblies. Hence the word is of pure Greek origin. That was the purest kind of democracy, where the people avoided the representative forms of a republic, as much as possible, and enacted their laws, and made their decrees, in primary assemblies of the people, though it is obvious, that the executive functions of the Government were necessarily, for the most part, performed by individual and selected agents. The word, Democracy, is therefore of very ancient historical use, and has never since been laid aside, because men, in different parts of the world, have been constantly struggling for liberty, for a *people-government*, in opposition to the claims of Monarchy, or One Man Power. Democracy and Monarchy, Democrat and Monarchist, Democratic and Monarchical, in their several substantive and adjective forms, have passed down through all languages, in all countries, from their pure Greek origin, with little variation in form or meaning, always and everywhere standing opposed to each other, as correlative terms. The fact of this uniform and general use of these terms, with a uniform meaning, among all nations, for so many ages, three thousand years, more or less, is conclusive evidence, not only of the uninterrupted and equally extensive agitation of the political questions which they involve, but of the general tendency of society, all the world over, and of the persevering aims of mankind, for the universal establishment of Democracy, or a *people-government*.

§ 5. The political position of these terms.

This, we should think, ought to be considered as settled by the etymological derivation and historical origin and use above given. Such facts have a character of high and emphatic teaching. They have a potent influence over the mind of the world, high and low, in political philosophy, as well as in the hearts of those, who have felt the iron hand of monarchical power, and are struggling for release, or who have obtained their freedom. It is for *democracy* as opposed to *monarchy*, which the whole world are striving for, and which they are resolved to have.

§ 6. De Tocqueville.

De Tocqueville's "*American Democracy*" is very instructive, not alone for the objects he had in view, but it is especially pertinent to our present purpose, which he never thought of, simply because he never thought it could be made a question. He took for granted, that

the word, Democracy, in all history and in all countries, with all political sects, in political philosophy, and in the common mind, occupies precisely the same position as it does in grammar, to wit, as opposed to Monarchy. Hence he everywhere treats of democracy as standing in this relation, and only in this general and comprehensive sense. He assumes, that there are different kinds of democracy, as of monarchy, and undertakes to treat of *American* democracy as one of the varieties. We hardly need say, that, by American Democracy, De Tocqueville means our *popular form* of government, such as it actually is.

§ 7. Other authorities.

In the same manner, all political writers of the old world, give the same meaning to these terms respectively, and uniformly use them in their relative grammatical sense. All attempts to put down monarchical power, and elevate the people, they call *Democracy*. It is the same in England. The antagonist of Monarchy there, is Democracy, and the growth of popular influence in the Government, and in general society, is used synonymously and interchangeably with the progress of Democratic power.

§ 8. The feelings of immigrants.

There is probably not a single exception—we have never known one—in the case of emigrants from European states to this country, so far as political reasons enter into their motives, where they have not come over for *democracy* as opposed to *monarchy*. They come because they are *democrats*. Democracy was the object of their affection and the theme of their praise before they came, it was their song on the voyage, it is their anthem here, and they all go for it. It is because they hate monarchy, having, no doubt, the best of all reasons, a sad experience of its evils.

§ 9. Republicanism.

It is a remarkable fact, that, while DEMOCRACY is a word of high and pure significance in the European world, representing simply what we have already indicated, to wit, a *people-government*, in distinction from Monarchy, the words, *Republicanism* and *Republicans*, have fallen under deep reproach. It results entirely from the atrocities of the French Revolution of 1790-'93, the authors and actors of which, as is well known, were called *Republicans*. We are known to the world as a Republic, and the phrase, "a republican form of government," is used in the Constitution of the United States, as guaranteed by that instrument to every new State; but the denomination of *republican* has never adhered long to any political party of the country. The cause is not apparent, unless it be supposed to result from the fact, that there is no obvious meaning in the term itself indicative of the precise character of our institutions. It is well understood, however, to denote a popular government, acting by representative agents.

§ 10. The effect of accidental causes.

It has happened, undoubtedly, that the terms, Democracy and Democrats, have to some extent, and more especially in particular sections of this country, been for a time rather odious, on account of what has very justly been regarded as the hypocrisy of pretenders to democracy, in the same manner as some dislike the name of Christian, because they observe the character of religious hypocrites. Let us not be accused of making a profane comparison. It is the only fit one to describe the case. But, as Christianity can never be ultimately and permanently prejudiced by the hypocrisy of false pretenders, so neither can Democracy, and the latter holds a like place in the political world, as the former does in the moral. Democracy, in our regard, is as sure to outlive this transient odium, as Christianity is to triumph over her foes. For as God will vindicate the former, so will truth the latter. The world is the theatre for both, and the little accidents of evil which may come in the way of either, here or there, to asperse their character, or retard their progress for a season, will not impede their steady onward course, nor bar a final triumph. The action and history of human society for three thousand years, have decided, that Democracy is the *opposite* of Monarchy, and no accident, no fleeting shadow of a day, can disturb or modify this relation.

§ 11. Our Government a Democracy.

We are aware, that some have denied this; but we think it is from want of an enlarged and philosophical view of the question. The grammatical and historical facts, already adduced, would certainly seem to decide, beyond controversy, in favor of our position. We think this question, if any choose to make controversy about it, is to be decided by the position which the term, Democracy, holds in the public mind of the world at large, and in the records of history, and not by the narrow views of our own political sectarians, nor by a nice scrutiny of the constitutional structure of our Government, as compared with an original and pure theoretical democracy, sitting and governing themselves in primary assemblies of the people. This latter picture is doubtless the purest theory of a democracy; but it is an impracticable mode of government. We choose rather to regard the more notable and fixed character, and to adopt the names, which history and immemorial usage have given to the different forms of

government, as they actually appear from time to time, in different countries, and these are generally classed under the heads of Monarchies and Republics, or Monarchies and Democracies, Republics and Democracies being used as synonymous and convertible terms. Each of these two classes, as before observed, has its varieties. But the representative forms of popular governments, however one may differ from another, if all the powers of government originate in the people and periodically return to them, or if those powers may be constitutionally resumed and modified by the people, cannot divest them of their democratic character. They are still Democracies in distinction from Monarchies. With the first of these classes, the government of these United States is properly, and for aught we can see, necessarily ranked. It is a *Democracy*. And ours is a *very* democratic government, in its practical operation, as compared with any that has ever existed permanently by its own inherent strength. Who does not know, how the slightest breezes of a political nature, moving over the popular mind, may affect and change the policy of the Government? Will any deny that this is *democracy*?

§ 12. *Aristocracy.*

As it is not found convenient for monarchies to stand alone, and being socially at a lofty remove from the level of the people, it has been thought necessary to surround a throne with orders and ranks of nobility, having chartered privileges, large endowments of wealth, hereditary rights, patented honorary distinctions, &c., &c., each occupying a mediate stage between the sovereign and the people, till the chasm is filled up; and the interests of these numerous parties are so connected and identified with each other, and with the throne, that all are interested in maintaining the rights of the Monarchy against the claims of the Democracy. With the sanction of time and usage for their position, with their wealth, and with the physical force at their command, they support their power, and the supremacy of the sovereign. An aristocracy, in form or substance, is considered a necessary appendage of monarchy.

§ 13. *An Oligarchy.*

An Oligarchy, or government of a *few*, associate and equal, is considered the most odious of all governments, and is doubtless capable of the most cruel despotism. Venice existed for centuries under this form of government, flourished as a commercial and warlike state, but was finally dissolved, and tumbled to ruins, by the atrocities of its Administration.

§ 14. *Democracy as a party in the Republic.*

A democratic party in a democratic state, would seem to be an anomaly. The curiosity of a stranger would naturally demand, What, then, can the other party be?—Are they monarchists? or what? An exclusive claim of one of two parties to democracy, in a democratic country like this, is, to say the least, not a very modest pretension, and a scrutiny as to the propriety and grounds of such a claim, must of course be expected.

§ 15. *A retrospective glance.*

It is a well-known fact, that, in the time of the elder Adams, a party, of high standing and great influence, existed in the republic, called Federalists, the leaders of which were accused—we do not decide whether justly or unjustly—of aristocratic aspirations and monarchical schemes. It is also known, that the passage of the Alien and Sedition laws, was the signal for the uprising and organization of a party, which assumed the name, and was called *democratic*, as being opposed to these imputed monarchical designs. With this color of propriety to start with, sounding their alarms, and urging their cause, they succeeded, under the lead of Thomas Jefferson, in 1801, in obtaining the government of the country, and the Federalists were thoroughly routed, so that they never appeared again, with any effect, as an organized party, were soon scattered, and after a few years, were merged in other parties, some going one way and some another. It is remarkable, however, that no small portion of the most prominent, most pretending, and apparently most influential leaders of the present self-styled “Democratic party,” came from the Federal ranks. It is a fact to be *observed*.

§ 16. *A young Champion of this original Democracy.*

Henry Clay, of Kentucky, roused by his eloquence, marshalled by his skill, and led on by his valor, the democratic army of that Commonwealth, as their chosen captain. He was recognised and honored, as such, by Mr. Jefferson, throughout his Administration. He was neither the least, nor second, among the leaders of the Democracy under the administration of Mr. Madison. (See the “*Life of Henry Clay*,” Tract No. IV.) From the beginning of his political career, down to this hour, he has been a true, consistent, *American Democrat*, “original, dyed in the wool,” as we shall by and by have occasion to see.

§ 17. *A Hint.*

Nothing is more obvious, than the truth, that, *since* the decline and dispersion of the Federal party, no other party in this country could, with propriety, modesty, or decency,

claim the exclusive title of *democratic*, even if it were proper *before*. It was first assumed for the occasion, and continued to be applied from habit; but even the Federalists, as is well known, denied the charges which were alleged against them; and if, indeed, there were traitors to the country then, not a few of the worst and most dangerous of them are now figuring largely and prominently in the self-styled "*Democratic*" ranks.

§ 18. *A Likeness.*

The history of political parties in this country has been very much like the movements of flocks of wild pigeons and shoals of fishes. A cloud of these birds comes sweeping through the air, in a dense mass and long train, apparently following one leader, and anon, they divide into two, or three, or four armies, separating and circling away to different quarters of the heavens, under as many captains. They may form a junction again, in whole, or in part, or they may not. The chances are, they will never *all* get together in the same order. The same is it with shoals of fishes. Now a solid body moves steadily on, when all at once, they break off, and dart away, no one knows where. It is supposed they have gone off under their leaders.

§ 19. *The state of parties under Mr. Monroe's Administration.*

There has been one period of comparative repose in our political history, when all parties were apparently blended in a common mass. It was under Mr. Monroe.

§ 20. *The new "Democracy" no Democracy.*

After a calm, comes a storm. The evoking of new political parties, of such character and force, out of such a state of things as existed under Mr. Monroe, can be accounted for only by special influences. The causes will be found in our Tract No. IV., pages 9 and 10. A violence was done to the repose of the public mind, and that violence was supported by a long protracted fraud. Principles were laid aside, and a MAN set up. The influence was PERSONAL, not political.

In this there could be no Democracy, but the very opposite. When Napoleon rose, it was all for *liberty*, for the *people*, for *France*. It is always so, when MEN rise, in the place of PRINCIPLES. They call things by names directly opposite to the FACTS; and it becomes necessary to insist upon it, with an emphasis and an energy, proportionate to the falseness of the pretensions, and the danger of detection. Popular deception can not be carried on and carried through, without heaps upon heaps of false asseveration. Democracy and a democratic party *had* been popular in the country. What more prudent, or more politic, than to call this new development by the same name? They had all power, could do as they pleased, and would be believed. They called it *Democracy*! An implicit giving up of the control and management of everything to ONE MAN, *democracy*! Such is not the decision of grammar, nor the utterance of history, nor is it very nearly allied to common apprehension.

What resemblance, or what connexion there was between the self-styled "*Democracy*," which ruled in the land from 1830 to 1840, and that which rose in 1801, and long presided over the destinies of the country, we are utterly unable to see. Jeffersonian democracy, for aught that appears, was the power of the PEOPLE. Jackson "*Democracy*" was the ascendant star of ONE MAN. The first grew out of an alarm for the safety of popular rights; the last sprung from an obsequious regard for a Military Chieftain.

§ 21. *The Democracy of Mr. Clay.*

The position of Mr. Clay in the democratic party which triumphed in 1801, and long swayed the sceptre of this republic, has already been recognised. He was first, most eloquent, and most influential in the ranks of the Kentucky democracy of that era; he had the entire confidence of Mr. Jefferson; he was the main pillar of Mr. Madison's administration, and to no man is the country more indebted than to him for the success of our arms in the last war with Great Britain, and for an honorable and advantageous peace. A true *American* democrat from the beginning, rising from the humblest origin, poor and friendless, and depending alone on his personal industry and energy, he was ready, and full armed, for the service of his country—such service as we have endeavored briefly to set forth in Tract No. IV.

§ 22. *Defining a position.*

While the Subtreasury Bill was under debate in the Senate, Mr. Calhoun cast some reflection on Mr. Clay, as having on his side members of the *Federal* party. "Sir," said Mr. Clay, addressing the President of that body, "I am ready to go into an examination with the honorable Senator at any time, and then we shall see if there be not more members of that same old Federal party among those whom the Senator has recently joined, than on our side of the house. *The plain truth is, that it is the old Federal party with whom he is now acting.* For, all the former grounds of difference which distinguished that party, and were the subjects of contention between them and the republicans, have ceased, from lapse of time and change of circumstances, with the exception of ONE, and that is the maintenance and increase

of executive power. This was a leading policy of the Federal party. *A strong, powerful, and energetic Executive, was its favorite tenet.* * * "I can tell the gentleman, that he will find the true old Democratic party, who were for resisting the encroachments of power, and limiting executive patronage, on our side of the Senate, and not with his new allies, the Jackson-Van-Buren democratic party, whose leading principle is to sustain the Executive, and deny all power to the legislature, and which does not hold a solitary principle in common with the republican party of 1798."

This accidental skirmish affords a true definition of the position of the two great parties at that time and now existing in the country, and which were formed by the accession of General Jackson to power. "The plain truth is," said Mr. Clay, "that it is the old Federal party, with whom he (Mr. Calhoun) is now acting." * * "I can tell the gentleman, that he will find the true old Democratic party on our side of the Senate." No man had a better right to understand this matter, than he who was born and raised in a democratic family, who was educated in a democratic school, who had worked all his life in the democratic harness, who had never once kicked in the traces, nor balked, and of whom, in regard to the true democracy of the country, it might be said, he was chief among the chief, and always foremost. Mr. Clay had never deserted his old family connexions, and passed from one side to the other; but he stood proudly on his patrimonial estate. He was never heard to say, like one of his rival opponents for the Presidency, lately withdrawn, "I thank Heaven, that I have not a drop of democratic blood in my veins." A democrat originally, and a democrat always, unchanged and unchangeable, he knew how to maintain the principles of democracy, and vindicate its honor. When he said, "I can tell the gentleman," &c., he said what every one knew to be a truth, and that truth was a hard one for his opponents.

§ 23. Mr. Clay's Democracy as a Senator of the United States.

The position we have given to Democracy in the grammar of language, in all history, in political philosophy, and in the universal sense of mankind, as a *people-government* in opposition to *One-Man Power*, we desire to be constantly borne in mind. It is only by this distinct perception, by this discrimination, that we can properly and fully appreciate the thing, when it comes up before us, in its various practical forms.

In this light, observe the career of Mr. Clay as a Senator of the United States, always jealous of all encroachments of Executive power on the legislative branch of the Government, and of all its abuses and usurpations in other applications. The national legislature is the representative power of the people, of the democracy acting through its own agents and organs. It is the people, standing up by proxy in that place, to enact laws for themselves. Inva~~de~~ the rights of that body—it can be done from no quarter but the Executive—and you invade the rights of democracy; destroy them—no power but the Executive can do it—and you destroy democracy. Congress is the *home* of American democracy, its theatre, its sacred ground. It is more:—IT IS ITS THRONE. The Executive is but the *servant* of democracy, to do its will. The bidding, the mandate goes out from the *Capitol*, not from the White House. It is the duty of the latter to *obey*, when the former has published its *orders*—to do the whole thing prescribed, and nothing more. *Excess* is as bad as short coming.

Of these prerogatives of American Democracy, in the Congress of the United States, where can be found so constant, so vigilant, so faithful a sentinel—so bold an advocate, or a defender so uncompromising, as Henry Clay has been?

It can not be said, that the rights of American Democracy have never been menaced, never assailed there. More than once, or twice, or thrice, have they been *violated* on that ground. But it was not without resistance—not without a warning voice, and a prophetic utterance. A minority sentinel can interpose no effectual democratic veto there. He can say, *Nay*; but it is on the weaker side, and doomed to be overpowered. When a despotic and lawless Executive has obtained for himself an obsequious majority in that body, he snaps asunder the cords of the Constitution, and tramples on the rights of democracy.

It was from a long protracted and painful experience of this kind, that Mr. Clay, on bidding adieu to the Senate of the United States, in 1842, never more to appear in that place, where he had served the people so long and so faithfully, left on the journal of that body, as his last will and testament in capacity of a Senator, a proposal for an amendment of the Constitution in three particulars, designed to restrict and limit Executive power, so as to prevent such violations of the rights of democracy. (See Tract, No. IV., page 14.)

§ 24. Mr. Clay's Democracy in private life.

We do not mean as to his manners, which in him require neither eulogy, nor defence; but those things which he can not but speak and do for the country, wherever he is. In all the emanations from his mind and heart, through private organs, which have found their way to the public, we find the same stamp of patriotism, the same regard for the rights of democracy, the same concern on account and in remembrance of abuses of Executive power, the

same desire to see these evils of the country rectified, which have illustrated his public life, from beginning to end, with indelible characters.

§ 25. *The pledge of Mr. Clay's democracy to the end.*

A public man's estate is his reputation—his fame. Is it morally possible, that a man, who has done so much for democracy, who has toiled nearly half a century for its extension and security, and in defence of its rights, should turn round, undo what he has done, blast the work of his own hands, tarnish his fame, or wantonly leave in the minds of men a *doubt* of his fidelity? If men can trust anywhere on instruments of Providence, duly appreciating the frailty of such supports, they will know how to trust in such a case.

§ 26. *Modern Democracy a new thing.*

We speak of that which is modern in our own history, as compared with its earlier dates. There is scarcely a feature of resemblance between the democracy, which preceded the amalgamation of parties under Mr. Monroe, and the self-styled "Democracy" that has sprung up since, and for twelve years held the reins of power. This is entirely a new thing. It is as remote from grammatical, historical, and philosophical democracy, and from any democracy ever recognised as such, as Monarchy itself. It involves the two principles of Monarchy and Oligarchy, with a strong smell of Aristocracy; but we have never found in it a single element of a *Constitutional* democracy. The people have had a part in it, without doubt; but it was only to do as they were told. They were mustered and organized under the *personal* popularity of *One Man*, and the *original*, afterward *transmitted* vitality of the party, consisted in *obsequiousness* to one man's will. Does any man need to be told, that General Jackson's will was the law of his party; or that the party was a body of which he was the *soul*? It was a party, formed around him *personally* as a nucleus, centre, and source of influence. Is it not apparent, at a single glance, and from moral necessity, that such a party could not be *democratic*? The head was *monarch* of the party, *sole and absolute*. And as all monarchs require privileged and rewarded agents, he put his finger upon, appointed, and endowed such as would answer his purposes, and captains of tens, of fifties, of hundreds, and of thousands, were made all over the land. It was a strictly *disciplined* party, under *one Chief*, who was also at the head of the nation. It had a *military* character in its organization, discipline, and effect.

Men do not usually give such confidence, without a consideration. In the first place, they were gifted with a flattering name—*Democrats*. This was understood to denote *equality of rights*. In the next place, they were told and believed, that their Chief would do for them some very nice things, in the way of making *equality realized*. In the third place, there was held out the bait of a sort of undefined license, a kind of political Millenium, not far ahead, of which some din of preparation was heard as an earnest of fulfilment. In this way was organized an *obsequious* party, every fragment of which was under the discipline and guidance of recognised leaders, all of whom, in grades, were connected with their Chief. This, we suppose, will be allowed to be a fair picture. And is this *Democracy*—a *people-government*!

§ 27. *The Oligarchic and Aristocratic features of this party.*

The *Monarch* is recognised. A government, under the will of *One*, is doubtless a *Monarchy*, whatever may be its Constitutional name. It was impossible to carry out such a party system, without *sub-chiefs*, and licensed authorities, in all its parts. The position of these agents lends them personal importance, and a sense of the obscurity of their origin and suddenness of their elevation, mounts into aristocratic pride of the worst kind. It is Aristocracy without grace, and without decency—loving power, but not knowing how to use it. Hence it has been remarked, that no party ever developed so distinctly the features of Aristocracy, or was ruled so entirely by Oligarchs. This fact has struck the party itself so forcibly, that some of them have waggishly dubbed it "the *Cod-fish* Aristocracy of Democracy."

§ 28. *An Anecdote.*

"How many legs will a calf have," asked a fellow of another, whose depth and shrewdness he wanted to prove, "if you call his tail a leg?" "Five," was the answer. "O no, that's impossible." "But certainly, he will have five." "Does your calling his tail a leg, make it a leg?" "Well, now, I never thought of that."

It is strange, indeed, that it should have taken the people of this country so long to find out, that a calf's tail could never be made into a calf's leg, by the act of calling it a leg; or that *One-Man Power* could not be converted into democracy, by calling it democracy. We have already partly suggested the reason why this misnomer was given, and the manner in which it was done. Democracy had been in good repute. And why should it not be, in a democratic country? But, as this new "Democracy" was known to be spurious, it was necessary to insist on its genuine character with special urgency—to affirm it over and over again. A falsehood is allowed to be made good, by telling it often and strong, and swearing to it, if necessary.

§ 29. *Discoveries.*

That certainly was a very strong stamp, which the Chief of this self-styled "Democratic" party gave to it, and the impulse of his hand kept the machinery a-going long time after he bequeathed the charge of it to his Successor. But it was not long before it began to be discovered, that there was not much democracy in this particular kind of democracy. It was true, that the captains of tens, fifties, hundreds, thousands, and so on, were generally rewarded; but the lower subalterns, who fought well, and worked hard, got nothing. As the principle proclaimed was, "to the victors belong the spoils," this partiality seemed very unreasonable. These dissatisfied members of the family could not with safety jump over the fence, because their faces would be recognised; they were therefore forced, for a long time, to work on, and fight on, in sulky mood. But in 1840, many of them broke loose, and quit, as the bondage had become intolerable. Captain Tyler's treachery gave hope to others, and he got a good many of the disaffected. Poor Mike Walsh, captain of the "Subterraneans," in the city of New York, after having done valiant and distinguished service for his masters, without reward, first tried Captain Tyler, till he saw his foundation giving way, and then rebelled openly, and was thrust into prison by his own party! Ungrateful "Democracy"!

But the most remarkable case of all the penitents, is that of Mr. Brownson, formerly Editor of the Boston Quarterly, since associate Editor of the Democratic Review, and now, in 1844, setting up again for himself in "Brownson's Quarterly," published in Boston, in the first number of which he gives Mr. Van Buren and the party a most terrible scathing. It appears by his statements, that he has long been dissatisfied (doubtless many others have), and that he is now his own man again, having swung clear of his old associates. Mr. Brownson is an original, vigorous thinker, an able writer, and utters some striking truths; but one hardly knows where he will land, if it be possible to tell where he is now. According to his own definition, he is a man of "*progress*."

One who has been admitted to the altars of this new "Democracy," and officiated there, ought to know something about it. The following are a few extracts on this subject, from his Review for January, 1844: "What passes for their voice (the voice of the 'Democracy') is only the voice of the corrupt and intriguing few, who contrive to manage them, and to cheat and wheedle them out of their votes." . . . "This talk about the voice of the people is all moonshine." . . . "The confidence which these politicians ('Democrats') have in the people, is in the facility with which they may be gulled." . . . "Would they willingly let the people into their secret caucuses, into their councils to contrive ways and means of plundering the simple and unsuspecting? Would the pure patriots, the democratic sages of *Lindenwold* and elsewhere, let the people know their various speculations and contrivances by which they cheat and swindle the laboring classes out of their hard earnings, to enrich themselves and their associates? No; there is nothing that these men more distrust than they do the people." . . . "The real enemies of freedom are your democratic politicians, who with their lips praise the people, and with their hands pick their pockets."

As for Mr. Van Buren, though Mr. Brownson voted for him in 1840, very reluctantly, he seems to think he was a sort of nightmare on the party at that time. In speaking of the re-appearance of Mr. Van Buren, as a candidate for the Presidency, he says: "He comes not alone, but as the chief of a band, which the country had devoutly hoped was dispersed, never to be collected again. He comes as the representative of the same old corrupt and corrupting system of party tactics, followed by the same swarm of greedy spoilsmen, with their appetite for plunder sharpened by the few years' abstinence they have been forced, through the remains of the original virtue and patriotism of the country, to practise. Gratify his wishes, restore him to the place he is personally soliciting, and we lose all that was good in the defeat of the Republican ('Democratic') party in 1840, and retain only the evil. We restore what, with an almost unheard-of effort, the country had thrown off, and place the Republican party in the condition in which it must be defeated again, or the country be inevitably ruined." . . . "Mr. Van Buren has, in politics, no standard of right and wrong but the will of his party, on the surface of which he floats, ready to take any direction the selfish views of its managers may give him. He is always pliable, manageable, with no obstinate views of his own, in his or anybody's way."

Well, this is a pretty stout confession for one who still belongs to the party, and only prefers Mr. Calhoun. It will be observed, that Mr. Brownson above substitutes *Republican* for *Democratic*. He has got tired of "Democracy" (not much wonder), and prefers a "*Constitutional Republic*." He calls himself a "Conservative," though he likes "*progress*"—progress on the past, not in upsetting the past—and we honor him for it.

§ 30. *The Radicalism and Revolutionary tendencies of this modern "Democracy."*

When the Dorr insurrection broke out in Rhode Island, Mr. Brownson bravely attacked the principle of that rebellion in the Democratic Review, with which he was then connected, and really did good service to the country, though he had the misfortune to offend his readers, the

patrons of that magazine. He showed very clearly, that all changes in the fundamental law of a State, must be made according to the *provisions* of that law. Else, it is a *revolution*. This doctrine was a manifest condemnation of the Dorr party and movement.

It has all along been but too apparent, that this new "Democracy" was not overcharged with respect, either for Constitutional or Statute law, or any law whatever, that might happen to come in its way. But the outbreak in Rhode Island *unmasked* the party, in regard to the reliance to be reposed in them on such occasions, and evinced how much more they are swayed by passion (some, it is to be feared, by hope of plunder), than by law. It will not soon be forgotten who favored, and who rebuked that disturbance. The peace and welfare of our country, and the stability of our Government and its institutions, demand, that we should know who will sustain them, or who will consent to overturn them in an unpropitious hour.

§ 31. *The design and importance of party names.*

We have already suggested, what we think can not be too well considered, that no party in this country is fairly entitled to the exclusive name of *democratic*. The government of the United States comes under the category of *Democracies*, in the general classification of the political forms of human society, and all the people of all parties are, or ought to be, *democrats*. They are not *monarchists*. Technically and specifically we are a Republic and Republicans; but for the general and more common purposes of language, both in political philosophy, and in the common speech of the world, we are a *Democracy* and *Democrats*. These are national designations, not party titles. The assumption of these titles by a political party, is a robbery of the other party of their national character. It is investing a sect—in such a case *self-invested*—for their exclusive use, with the honors which belong to the entire Democratic communion, in this country and elsewhere.

§ 32. *Whigs and Locofocos.*

Positively we know no such parties in this country as *Whigs* and *Democrats*. We deny that there are such. There are Whigs, and we maintain that the Whigs are *THE* Democrats, if there must be a party of that name. Certainly, they are the *true* Democrats, if there be any such in the land. We mean no disrespect to the *Locofocos* by this party designation. They came by it accidentally, as the name of Whig was first acquired. Under these names, or any others not national and generically comprehensive, the issue is fairly made, and always stands, as is proper and important, which of the two is *more truly*, or *more Democratic* than the other, according to the democratic standard of our Government and its institutions? Neither party, so far as we know, proposes any other standard. But if either of these divisions of the people is permitted to wear the name of *democrats*, as an exclusive party designation, and if they are fairly entitled to it, the question is conceded, and the argument at an end, as to which is democratic, or more truly so.

§ 33. *The cheat and stealth involved in this misnomer.*

The name of *democrats* was *stolen* by those who now claim to wear it exclusively. They had no title to it. It is an *American*, not a party name. In such an appropriation it is a *cheat*. The advocates of One-Man Power in the veto, as it has been used (abused) by our National Executive, are *Monarchists*, not Republicans. Much less are they Democrats. They have also been the advocates of other abuses and usurpations of Executive power. They were the first party in the country, since the formation of our Government, that set up and upheld *One-Man Power*, and the most remarkable fact is, that they did this at the very moment when they stole and put on the name of "*Democrats*"! They have justified and sustained the President of the United States in the use of monarchical powers, we might say *absolute* powers, which would have cost the Sovereign of Great Britain a throne and a crown, and which would have revolutionized almost any kingdom in Europe—all under the name of "*Democracy*"!

At the same time, and all along, the Whigs have resisted these encroachments of One-Man Power, and been the advocates of popular rights—of *true* Democracy. Such is their position before the country at this moment. It is for the rights of the *PEOPLE* that they maintain a perpetual strife. It is for this that Mr. Clay has contended uninterruptedly, untiringly. The rights of American Democracy, if sacrificed anywhere, will be sacrificed in the Capitol of the Republic, in the Congress of the United States, in the persons of the Representatives of the people. Repeatedly have blows against democracy been struck there—repeatedly have the rights of the people been trampled on in that place by the iron heel of Executive power, with the consent and by the aid of these self-styled "*Democrats*"! It is to shield and protect that citadel of Democratic power and of popular freedom, from these invasions and irruptions, that Mr. Clay, and those associated with him, have so long strived, and still strive.

§ 34. *The object of the political revolution of 1840.*

It was solely and alone to restore the democracy of the country—to *restore* it. For many years it had been giving way and was being swallowed up by Executive power. One en-

croachment after another had been made on the rights of the popular and legislative branch of the Government, abuses multiplied, usurpations thickened, till the powers of legislation, directly or indirectly, by influence or mandate, chiefly emanated from the Executive chair. Congress, instead of originating public policy and public measures, and giving form and substance to them, by its own independent action, became a mere registrar of Executive decrees, a mechanics' work-house for a master at the other end of the Avenue. The Democracy of the nation was prostrate—it was nearly annihilated. It was to *restore* the Democratic prerogatives of Congress, to reassert and reconfirm the independence of the national legislature, that the great struggle of 1840 was undertaken, and the aim triumphantly achieved. The people *saw* that their power was gone, and must be recovered, and they came to the rescue.

§ 35. *The genius of Locofoco "Democracy."*

The way in which it originated, and its history since, will show what it is. It began by the *personal* influence of *one man*. It had, therefore, an emanation from and concentration in *one point*. It whirled around *one centre*. There was no independence in the *body*, but a universal *obsequiousness to the soul*. Mr. Brownson, who has been a member and oracle in this party, and who is still a member, says, in describing this character: "One sees the *original* everywhere. The evil has become great and menacing. We have lost our *manliness*; we have sacrificed our *independence*; we have become *tame and servile*, afraid to say that our souls are our own." . . . "To keep the ranks of the party full, to prevent members from breaking away, and asserting their independence, appeals are made to the lowest and most corrupting passions of the human heart. The individual who shows himself a little uneasy, or disposed to kick at the party traces" (like Mike Walsh, or like Mr. Brownson himself), "must be denounced, thrown over, and declared to be an enemy, and no longer entitled to the confidence of the party. Thus men must be kept in the party, and faithful to its usages, decisions, and nominations, *not by attachment to its principles and measures, but through fear*, that, if they assert their independence, they will lose their share of the *spoils*."

This is a true picture of the party from its origin, by one, than whom nobody understands it better. There *never* was any democracy in it. From its character, its vital and all-pervading principle, *obsequiousness and obedience*, it was impossible there should be. It came from a man, *born to command*, and he infused his spirit into the whole machinery. The *genius of Locofoco "Democracy,"* therefore, is *obsequiousness and servility* in the masses, and *despotism* in the leaders. It is utterly *hostile* to true democracy, and a suitable foundation, on which to erect a *despotic throne*.

§ 36. *The genius of Whig Democracy.*

The Whig party of the Union is composed of men, who have been long out of power; who have been forced in the meantime to act on the conservative side, that is, as far as possible, to prevent mischief; who are of course, and necessarily, *lean men*, as regards the fattening effects of office; have none of the corruptions which are at least *supposed* to appertain to a protracted tenure of power; and if such men can anywhere be found, may fairly be regarded, as in a reasonable degree, disinterested patriots, from the fact of their choice to remain in the minority so long a period. *Principles* alone, not power, have bound them together. Their party organization has been sustained, not by the patronage of office, but by putting their hands in their own pockets. It was a glorious sight, in 1840, to see what sacrifices and efforts they could make, to rescue the country from bad hands. The obvious truth of their facts, and the force of their arguments, brought a great majority of the people over to their side, and they triumphed; but treachery has left them precisely in the situation they were in then. Still without power, still relying on *principles*, and the practical *results* of principles, "though betrayed, not dismayed," they still adhere, and press onward.

Every man in the Whig ranks, is a MAN—a man that thinks for himself, and acts for himself—an uncompromising *American Democrat*. It is perhaps an evil in the Whig party, that they are *all* leaders; but it is *not* an evil, that they are *SERVILE* to leaders. Nobody has ever dared to name in their ranks that wicked, corrupt, and corrupting maxim, that "to the victors belong the spoils." The great mass of them would never care who governs the country, if it were well governed. But when it is badly governed, they resolve, in the spirit of true patriots, to put the reins in better hands, that they may return to and prosper in their own private affairs, as independent American citizens—as *Democrats*.

Such, for the most part, is the genius of Whig Democracy. They recognise no authority of leaders, that binds them to obsequiousness; it is not party, but the *country* they go for; it is not MEN, but PRINCIPLES; and they adopt party organization, and sustain it, not as an *end*, but as *means* to an end.

§ 37. *Democracy will prevail.*

And it will prevail under that name. It is too late in the age of the world, in history, and in the progress of human society, to give another name to this thing. That is the common

symbol destined to be employed, throughout the world, to denote popular forms of government. It is stereotyped in the public mind of all nations, and everybody, everywhere, understands it.

It is true this name has been somewhat confounded in the practices of the political sects of our own country, and we are perhaps a little disqualified to judge of its general and permanent influence. A portion of our citizens also have prejudices in relation to it, which it is hard to get over. In the first place, those who were opposed to the first party in this country which assumed and wore this name, (it was a party of no affinity whatever with the present self-called "Democrats,") have not even yet forgotten their feelings of dislike to it, although they may be at this moment, and to a great extent are amalgamated with that party. But the distaste which they have for this name as having been put on by the *Locofocos*, is fresh and strong. They despise the hypocrisy which they have found lurking under this garb, and can hardly help associating the thing with the name. Not unlikely they may often have been heard to pronounce the name of "*Dem-o-crat*" with unmitigated contempt and emphatic scorn, simply because they think of the character that claims the exclusive use of it.

We entreat all such to look at this subject with more enlarged and more philosophic views. We are, personally, fully convinced, that we do not mistake in the political importance we attach to this word. We have shown it is a *pure* word, apart from our own political atmosphere, where, we confess, it has been somewhat contaminated. But even here, it is to a great extent purified already, and is becoming more so every day. It was assumed by a large portion of the Whig party in 1840, under the style of *Democratic Whigs*, because they knew it belonged to them, and to them alone. This feeling and determination have been gaining strength ever since, and before the campaign of 1844 is closed, we doubt not it will generally be felt and acknowledged by the people, that the Whigs are the *only true Democrats*. It is vain to rely on common power of discrimination between *principles and names*. Every practical man ought to know, that names embody principles, and are the symbols of principles to the mind. The word, *Democracy*, is a *universal* symbol, of *uniform* import, and no power can arrest or limit its influence. It will prevail over everything, and carry all before it.

§ 38. *The duty of the press, and of common speech.*

It is perhaps true, that *half* of the Whig press, and *half* the Whigs in the land, are at this time in the habit of calling the *Locofocos Democrats*, of speaking of them as the *Democracy*, of honoring their party with the title of *Democratic*, and of using the word in all its forms in this application. Are they aware of the consequence, and that they are probably doing more to help the *Locofocos* by this recognition of their claims, than all the counter influence they can throw into the other scale, by any means whatever? We are sure, if they thought as we do, believed as we do, they would from principle, from a sense of duty, abstain at once and for ever from such an application of these terms. It is unjust to all parties—to the *Locofocos* themselves; for they, of all men, are least entitled to it. It is a *cheat* they have palmed on the community, by which they acquired and retained their power for twelve years, and by which, sooner or later, if permitted to continue the fraud, they will rise again, and rule in spite of opposition. In 1840 they were beaten, because, through the democratic symbols of "*Log Cabin and Hard Cider*," in connexion with the *facts* brought home to the people, the people saw on which side the true democracy was. And we shall doubtless triumph in this campaign of 1844, because the democracy of Henry Clay is unquestioned and unassailable. But still, as revealed by the story in the first section of this Tract, Mr. Van Buren and his party "*rely*" on the word "*Democracy*," and on stigmatizing their opponents as "*Federalists*." They understand the potency of these words. Believe it, dear friends, they have done more, and will do more, *by this fraud*, than by all other means whatever. Strip them of that name, and we put the question—Who believes that they could live a day? Without that name, they never would have succeeded. How, then, can a true Whig be so *suicidal* as to award it to them, in the press, or in common speech? They have a name, *Locofoco*, accidentally acquired, as the name of Whig was originally, and there is no discourtesy in using that designation. They then stand upon their naked principles and practices, and the issue is fairly made before the people, Which are the true and best Democrats?

§ 39. *The importance of this question in its relation to immigrants.*

It appears by official records, that the number of immigrants who arrived at the port of New York, from August, 1832, to August, 1842, ten years, was 507,131. We have not the means of knowing what proportion this bears to the *entire* immigration of foreigners into the country; but we have noticed immigrations, by way of Canada, for some years, which, at the same rate, would make an aggregate in ten years, but little short of this statement for New York. But suppose the average immigration into the country is *fifty thousand a year*, which was the average for ten years, at New York alone, as above; and suppose that one half of these become voters by naturalization; we then have an aggregate acquisition of voters, from foreign parts, every four years, not much short of the majority which elected General Harrison! We have before shown, that all these, or nearly all, come here for

Democracy as opposed to *Monarchy*, and that they will be *Democrats*. Most of them ignorant of our language, all are ignorant of our state of society, they know nothing of the principles which distinguish political parties here, but they are governed chiefly by the names which parties bear. The party that is called democratic, if there be such a party, they are sure to join. What other rule can they go by? And such, we generally find, is the result. Is not this fact alone sufficient for all the purposes of our argument?

§ 40. *The effect of this name on native Americans.*

It is impossible to tell how great it is, but it can not be small. We know, that the head and leaders of the Locofoco party "*rely*" upon it, and our conviction is, that they rely upon it chiefly. We do not believe they would make another effort, if this name, by any means, could be taken away. They are shrewd men, and understand this matter well. Observe how they manage in their press and speech: We are the "*Democrats*;" they (the Whigs) are "*Federalists*;" and for twelve years, they made the people believe it, notwithstanding that, all this while, they were acting on the very principle, which made the old Federal party obnoxious, to wit, a *strong and overpowering Executive*, while Mr. Clay and the Whigs, with all their might, were opposing it, and laboring for democracy. The moral influence of this name, in favor of the Locofocos, so long as it is *awarded* to them, must be immense, and we do not think it would be overstating it, if we were to put it down at *fifty per cent.*, half of their entire strength.

Is there not good reason, then, why Mr. Van Buren should "*rely*" on this name? Mr. Brownson asks: "Who ever caught the weasel asleep?" If they are entitled to the name, let them have it. But we have shown it is a *fraud*.

§ 41. "*Democrats*" the friends of the laboring and poorer classes.

This has not only been a standing text, but there has been much effective preaching from it, by the Locofoco "*Democracy*." But the laboring and poorer classes have made an important discovery in three particulars. 1. That they have been made *tools of*, as described in our quotations from Mr. Brownson, who, from his long standing and public labors in the Locofoco party, will no doubt be accepted as a very credible witness. 2. That Whig policy and Whig measures are best for them. 3. They like that democracy which does them most good; which gives them food, clothing, and a comfortable home, instead of *promises*. They have at least *begun* to make this discovery, and are advancing in it rapidly. The tariff, a great Whig measure, is diffusing its blessings everywhere, and gladdening the hearts of the laboring and poorer classes. We have just noticed the remarkable fact, that a little girl, in a Cotton Bag Factory at Cincinnati, earns *six dollars* for five and a half days' labor every week, and that there are fifty-five females and forty-five males working in the same factory, with similar results. (See also our tract on the Tariff.)

Take away the name, by which the Locofocos have deceived the people, and their power is gone.

§ 42. *The great Indexes of Democracy.*

That party which seeks to maintain and defend the prerogatives of the popular branch of the Government against the encroachments and usurpations of the Executive, and to guard the Constitutional rights of the people in the persons of their immediate representatives, is the *democratic party*. All know, that this has been the position of Mr. Clay, and of the Whigs, and that their opponents have been constantly seeking to strengthen the Executive in its invasions of the rights of Congress. The former have constantly and steadily braced up against the Executive, in their defence of the democratic powers of the Government; while the latter have as constantly and as steadily prompted and aided the Executive in all its attempts to curtail and abridge those powers. To secure the exercise of the powers of Government by the people, in all that the Constitution prescribes and warrants, has been the undeviating aim of Mr. Clay, in all his public life and labors; and in doing this, for many years past, he has been found in uninterrupted conflict with the Executive and the Locofocos. These facts are signs, indexes, and infallible proofs of *democracy* in those who thus take the side of the people; and no less are they conclusive evidence of the *luck* of democracy in those who take the side of the Executive *against* the people.

§ 43. *The Veto Power.*

This is but one of the many forms, in which the Chief Executive of this country has invaded the prerogatives of democracy, in violation of the design of the Constitution. It is a pure *monarchical* power, and is liable to be very momentous in its results. It has actually been so in our case. The framers of the Constitution thought the occasions for its proper exercise would be very rare, and it was even supposed at the time, that it would scarcely be used at all, on account of the great responsibility. It has not been used by the Sovereign of Great Britain for more than a century, and probably never will be used there again. But with us it has been used as wantonly as if there were no democracy in the Constitution, or in the country, or ever could be, to call this absolute power to account; and what is most remarkable is, that the

Locofoco "Democracy" should be its chief advocate and defender! Its most during use commenced under the *Locofoco* Dynasty, and it has been cherished by that party ever since. But nothing could be more inconsistent with the spirit, or more hostile to the rights of democracy. An examination into the history of the formation of the Constitution will show, that the chief design of the Veto power was to protect the Executive from the encroachments of the Legislative branch of the Government; whereas, it has been chiefly employed, in the later periods of our history, in an aggressive movement from the Executive, on the rights of Legislative authority, to nullify its functions; in other words, to nullify the democratic powers of the Constitution.

It has been stated by English authorities, that the only practical benefit of the Veto Power in the British Crown, is the *knowledge*, that it can be used in defence of the prerogatives of the throne. This, probably, will be thought quite as far as it ought to go; and such, as above recognised, appears to have been the main design of this power in our Constitution, to wit, to protect the Executive. But, as there has been no occasion for that in our history, and some of our Presidents having taken it for granted, that this power was not given to lie idle, have used it freely and wantonly in encroachments on democratic prerogatives. Mr. Tyler gave notice, in his first message to Congress, that there was such a power in the Constitution! Therefore, my dear democratic friends, guardians of the people's rights, take care what you do! We marked it at the time as an ominous foreboding, and so it turned out. He had at that moment, and even earlier than that, as we may hereafter have occasion to show, made up his mind to use it.

§ 44. The confusion of political parties.

As was sagaciously and shrewdly calculated upon by those most interested, a majority of the people of this country, honest and unsophisticated, took for granted, that the leaders of a party, coming into the field, would not call themselves *democrats*, if they were not so; and it was generally supposed, that this new party was only a continuation of the old democratic party, and that it occupied the same position; whereas, it was the reverse, or opposite position. What Mr. Clay said, in reply to Mr. Calhoun, that "it does not hold a solitary principle in common with the Republican (democratic) party of 1798," was perfectly true. It was in the antipodes, at the opposite pole, in relation to that party. It was moreover true, that this new party had adopted—it is equally true, that it has uniformly carried out—the most obnoxious principle of the old Federal party, viz.: "A strong, powerful, and energetic Executive," and that with this party still resides all the Federalism there is in the land, which in their case is a reality, whatever may have been the fact in the first case.

It was also supposed by the people, that the party, since called Whig, was anti-democratic, and that they succeeded to the Federalists, and inherited their principles; whereas, they were the only legitimate successors of the Jeffersonian, afterward Madisonian school, and were opposed to this new self-styled "democracy," because they were opposed to Federalism, and the worst kind of Federalism, as it was developed under the *Locofoco* Dynasty.

Such has been the entire and absolute confusion of political parties in this country, growing out of the fraud practised in the assumption of the name of "*Democrats*" by the *Locofocos*, who were able, by the irresistible sway of a popular Chieftain, to maintain it for a protracted period. On this account, the two great parties have all this while been in false positions before the people, and it was not till 1840, that this fact began to be understood; nor is it perfectly understood even now.

§ 45. The unscrupulousness of Locofocoism.

The fraud of calling itself, and claiming the title of *democratic*, was bad enough. They who fixed upon this name for themselves and the party, knew perfectly well, that it was a false flag, and they intended to deceive by it. But this was innocent compared with the second part of their offence, in calling their opponents *Federalists*—a name which, in truth, belonged to themselves. The unscrupulousness with which it was first done, with which it has been maintained, and is practised to this day, is a most remarkable fact. The manner of doing it, all along, betrays a consciousness of the fraud. Else, why crowd every column of their newspapers, fill every speech and all their common talk, with these names and epithets, thus applied? That is not the way of honest people. When a case is evident, and when a question is settled, it is quite unnecessary to be always affirming it. But they "rely" upon the cheat, knowing it to be such. They know that they are always exposed to detection, and must therefore anticipate all by the repetition of false asseveration. The people generally are honest, and can only be held in their state of deception, by a constant echo of that which first led them into error, and gained their misgiven confidence.

The *Locofoco* press and leaders are also equally unscrupulous in their statements of fact, to maintain their cause. We are aware, it may be replied, that this is always the way with politicians, and that it is equally true of both sides. But there is an answer to this, which few people have thought of. It is this:—The facts which the Whigs have to state of the *Loco-*

focos, are so perfectly astounding, that they have no occasion, and no temptation, to go *beyond* the truth, but are forced, in prudence, to stop short of it, or very seldom to give the whole, lest they should be *disbelieved*. This we know to be true from our own experience; and we have never known a statement insisted upon by the Whig press, or often repeated, after it was proved incorrect. This is strong proof of the purity of a political party, and we think it is true. The Whigs have no need of weapons against their opponents, which *facts* do not furnish; whereas they are constantly assailed by naked assertions *destitute of truth*.

§ 46. The morals of Locofocoism.

It results from a moral necessity, growing out of the history of the thing, that it should be corrupt. Founded in untruth, erected and sustained by it, it is impossible it should be pure. The system of party tactics introduced by General Jackson, and carried out by Mr. Van Buren, is one of utter and revolting corruption. Take the testimony of Mr. Brownson, before given, who has been and is yet one of the party, and who has made politics a study all this time, who has been looked up to by the party as an oracle, and whom, we presume, no man, of any party, will accuse of dishonesty, and was there ever a fouler picture of moral loathsomeness presented as a subject of consideration?

§ 47. Repudiation.

Out of this infected, foul atmosphere, has grown this MONSTER of American public morals. Who will deny, that it is the sole offspring of Locofocoism? Fortunately for the Whig party, in this case, they have nothing to prove or disprove. The Locofocos not only father the child, but they glory in his moral qualities, and think him a prodigiously smart fellow. While the flesh of this nation is smarting and writhing under the lashes which the public opinion of the world is inflicting upon us for this great offence, its authors are dancing and singing around the fires of their barbarous faith.

§ 48. Nullification.

See our Tract, No. I., page 14, for a statement of the *Districting* law of Congress, and its Constitutional authority. Can anything be imagined more utterly subversive of all law and order, or more radically revolutionary, *de facto*, and in its tendencies, than the action of the House of Representatives of the 28th (present) Congress, in trampling that law under foot? Admitting that the law is unconstitutional, as the nullifiers say it is, still it is *law*, till the proper Constitutional authorities shall have reversed it. The Constitutional action of a Constitutional body, (that is, acting according to its established rules,) is *Constitutional*, in its binding force and effect, till a Constitutional Court, whose province it is to determine that question, shall have decided otherwise. It sometimes happens, that the judiciary does so decide. But their decision has no *retrospective*, but only a *prospective* effect. The operation of the law, *previous* to such decision, is allowed to be Constitutional and valid, because it was the Constitutional action of a Constitutional body, notwithstanding they *erred*, according to the judgment of the judiciary, which is a final umpire. Such is the necessity of society. If any person or persons, or State, may act on the assumption, that a law of Congress is *null and void*, because in their opinion, it is unconstitutional, where are we, but in a state of anarchy? And yet we are often astonished to hear members of Congress, in their places on the floor of legislation, say this, and act upon it, as they did in admitting members of the present House of Representatives, *contrary to law*! Is not this *nullification* by the law-makers *themselves*? It is *Locofocoism*—not of the people, but of *leaders*. The people *know* it is wrong.

§ 49. Locofocoism and Tylerism.

Some one has suggested, that John Tyler's Administration should not be embodied with our history, but put in a *parenthesis*. But it will yet be recognised as a legitimate sprout of an old trunk. One of the "GUARD" said to us, while we were remonstrating with him against the course about to be pursued, before it was begun, "THE PEOPLE LIKE BOLD STROKES OF POLICY"—by which we understood him to intimate, that they liked such things as General Jackson did, and that Mr. Tyler was going "to tread in his footsteps," make himself a *third* party, and be *re-elected*. We are perfectly sure we did not misunderstand this conversation, and that such was its point and drift; and we moreover believe, that it was a true echo of the sentiments of the White House at that moment. General Jackson had led off the nation; why could not John Tyler? Doubtless this conclusion was a *non sequitur*—a thing that did not follow of course.

But the facts show how much *example* had to do with it. The nation had been once and a long time deceived; why could they not be deceived again? Faith with the people *had* been broken with impunity, and with great success; and the reason *seemed* to be plausible, that one might and *could* do it as well as another. Indeed, if the history referred to, proved anything, it would seem to prove, that *deceiving the people*, is the best way to prosper. "*Bold strokes of policy*," was certainly the language employed with us, in justification of the course.

We have never for a moment doubted, that *Tylerism* is *Locofocoism gone to seed*, though the latter, as a stalk, has shaken off the former as its fruit. Dishonesty begets dishonesty, and

treachery to the interests of the country in one case, for selfish ends, if prosperous, will tempt to treachery in another, for like ends.

§ 50. *The great error of the Whigs, Whig party, and Whig press.*

Look at the Whig press, and listen to the common talk of Whigs. In large portions of the East, in some portions of the West, not a little in the South, and more or less all over the country, the Whig press, and Whigs in conversation, speak of *Whigs and Democrats, the Whig party and Democratic party, Whig ticket and Democratic ticket, Whig votes and Democratic votes, &c., &c.* We hope we have said enough to show, that this is not only a great mistake, but absolutely *suicidal*. The Whigs may toil and sweat in this way, to row their boat against the current; but, if they will look at the trees on the shore, they will see they are all the while going down stream, except as now and then a breeze of "Log Cabin and Hard Cider," or such a name as Henry Clay may come to fill their sails and help them. With a favorable breeze, or without one, they are all the while toiling against a strong and irresistible tide of nature. The world has pronounced in favor of *Democracy*, and is resolved to have it. The great majority of the people of this country are *Democrats, honest Democrats*, and always will be, *unless* the stealth and frauds of Locofocoism shall succeed in bringing them under a *despotism*. It is of no use to say, that the people will distinguish *principles from names*, so long as the Locofocos are called *democrats*. The word, *Democracy*, is the *symbol* of Democracy all the world over, and no power can make it otherwise. If it be said, that we underrate the intelligence of the people by these remarks, it is not true. We only give them credit for honesty. They have a right to take things as they are *called*, and there is no other honest rule. It is the Locofoco leaders alone who underrate the intelligence of the people, by the frauds they practise upon them. They *assume* this want of intelligence, and act accordingly, and the people are betrayed, not for want of discernment, but by their easy confidence. The people, as a body, are not politicians; much less are they abstractionists; but they take things by their *names*, and go straight ahead.

In 1840, the people began to see, what is the fact, that Locofocoism is *servility in the masses and despotism in the leaders*. But the sheepskin was only lifted from the head of the wolf. It requires to be snatched *entirely off*.

§ 51. *How to set it right.*

1. Let the Whig press be reformed in this particular. It would do much less hurt by advocating Locofoco *principles*, than by calling Locofocos *Democrats*. The principles, in their *naked form*, will not bear scrutiny, and are generally a sufficient answer to themselves. But wrap them up in the name of *Democracy*, and they will mislead the majority of the people, simply because the people are honest, and take things by their *names*. 2. Let the Whig press endeavor to set this whole matter in its true light, debate the question, and dispute the point. 3. Let all Whigs, everywhere, scrupulously abstain from applying these terms to Locofocos, show why it ought not to be done, and if necessary to counterbalance the fraud of their opponents, let them take and wear the name themselves, as their right. It has already been done extensively. Let it be done universally, and it will be an approximation to justice. In the end, it will cure the evil. 4. Show Mr. Clay's position, historically, in the ranks of true democracy; where he was under the Administration of Mr. Jefferson; where under Mr. Madison; and how faithfully he has fought the battles of Democracy, under the Locofoco Dynasty, against One-Man Power, against Executive encroachments on the democratic prerogatives of the Constitution, as vested in the Representatives of the people, in the legislative branch of the Government. 5. Show, that the Whigs have occupied this position, all along, and still occupy it; and that Whig measures are for the *whole* people, against the claims of officeholders and public agents. 6. Show, that the genius, doctrines, and practice of Locofocoism, are alike hostile to liberty and democracy. All these things are manifest, and the facts need only be cited, to be felt.

§ 52. *Apology.*

It is with some diffidence, that we have ventured on the suggestions of these pages. We trust, however, we shall not be deemed presumptuous in hoping that they will have some influence; that the Whigs will see and *feel* the false position they have occupied before the people, so far as they have awarded the name of *Democrats* to their opponents; that, from a sense of justice to the public, to all parties, from principle, from conscience, they will pause and check themselves, before they allow this name, in such an application, to flow from their pens, or fall from their lips; that they will see what is due to themselves, and to their cause; that they will challenge the name of *democrats* as properly belonging to the Whigs *alone*, and show the reasons; and then may we hope, that things will not only *get righted*, but *stay put*.

§ 53. *Importance of symbols.*

Whig democracy prevailed in 1840, in our opinion, *only* because it was *believed* to be *true* democracy. We are also persuaded, it can only prevail now and ultimately for the *same*

reason. We would not lay aside the "*Log Cabin*," nor "*Hard Cider*," for they are the appropriate symbols of democracy; nor even the "*Coon*," for people like to laugh; nor *songs*, for a great statesman once said truly: "Give me the making of the *ballads* of a nation, and I don't care who makes its laws." Let it not, however, be supposed we recommend *drinking*. We only speak of "*Hard Cider*" as a *symbol*. Doubtless, there will be many new and appropriate devices. The Poetry of symbols is the natural language of the heart—the first and everlasting altar of enthusiasm.

§ 54. *Mr. Clay as the Candidate for the Presidency.*

It is fortunate for the Whig democracy of the country, that the democracy of their candidate for the Presidency, is so legible and apparent in the chapter of his public life. It may surprise some of the Whigs, but it will be a *poser* to the Locofocos, to find, that nowhere in the republic can be found, among our public men, an *American democrat* from the stump, so consistent, so firm, so unchangeable, so uniform, amid all the fluctuations of parties, that have characterized our history. THERE HE IS, the SAME under Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, J. Q. Adams, Jackson, Van Buren, Tyler—always and invariably the uncompromising Advocate of democracy—of the people's rights, against the encroachments of Executive power; always defending American interests against foreign interests; always advocating protection for American labor and industry; always toiling for the welfare and glory of his own country; always sympathizing, not only with American democracy, but with democracy in every part of the globe, where the people were oppressed, or struggling for freedom; always the defender of the democracy of the Constitution, as the organ and instrument of the democracy of the country; always taking in charge the interests of the masses, not only for the equity of the principle, but as the surest way of promoting the general welfare; the same in defeat as in success, in adversity as in prosperity, under the dark clouds of calumny as in the bright sun of popular favor; never disheartened, never weary, never flagging; but ever prompting and cheering the nation onward to honorable fame and great achievement.

The Locofocos know full well, that they can not impeach the democracy of Henry Clay, nor blast the reputation he has won in the service of his country, and there is nothing they fear so much as the word, democracy, in such an application. Their trade in detraction, vilification, and slander, will avail them little on such a mark. Their only task is now to hold on tight the garment which they stole. We shall see, ere long, whether they do not stand shivering in the cold, or burning in the sun, for lack of a covering.

§ 55. *Sam of the matter.*

The result of the whole is—1. That Locofocoism is a *new system* of party tactics, never before known to the country, having no politics in particular, except such as lead to power and the spoils of office. 2. That the leaders only are benefited, while the people are made tools of, and necessarily injured. 3. That it is chiefly indebted for its success, to the assumption of a false name for itself, and to bestowing a false one on its opponents. 4. That it still "*relies*" on the continuance of this fraud for future success.

That it is a *new system*, will be apparent to the slightest reflection on its origin, rise, and singular developments. That it has no principle, but the profit of the Oligarchs, is demonstrated by the facts of our history since its advent. That the people are injured, behold the devastations and overthrow of our national prosperity under its rule. That its success is attributable to the cause we have assigned, observe the facts we have recited. And that they still rely on this, take their own word for it.

§ 56. *The way to do it.*

ONE thing, *all*, doubtless, will agree in, *to wit*, that to have a good crop in the autumn of 1844, the seed can not be put in the ground *too soon*. It is surprising, that the importance of *early* efforts to inform the people, is not more deeply, more *practically* felt by those whose *appropriate* business it is to put the means in their hands. The Locofocos have nothing to gain, but everything to lose, by debate before the people. In every important position they occupy, they are forced to *defend*, and they are exceedingly vulnerable, while the Whigs occupy precisely the position they did in 1840, *viz*, *carrying the war into Africa*. All the *facts* and *principles* which gave the Whigs triumph then, are now more clearly brought out, more impressively stated, and are in all respects more available for effect. It only requires, that they should be thrown into the *lap*, and put under the *nose* of the people. Let the Locos *fire back*. It is only the fire of a retreating, discomfited foe. Their last rally is a *forlorn hope*. Give the people *ammunition*, and let the word go round,—"*Pick your flints, and try it again.*" REMEMBER—all they want is *AMMUNITION*, IN GOOD TIME. "*WHIGS!*"—cried he, whose voice for forty years had been heard from the high places of the land, now speaking to his neighbors, near his own hearth, the 9th of June, 1842—"WHIGS!—AROUSE!—AWAKE!—SHAKE OFF THE DEW-DROPS THAT GLITTER ON YOUR GARMENTS, AND ONCE MORE MARCH TO BATTLE AND TO VICTORY."

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LABOR AND CAPITAL.

§ 1. *What is labor?*

It is any man's or woman's efforts to live and prosper, whether of body or of mind, or of both; whether in agriculture, or commerce, or manufactures, or mechanics, or in either of the numerous branches of these great and comprehensive pursuits; whether in the useful or fine arts, in digging ditches or digging out the sciences; whether in a professional career, or in making books; in teaching, or in study; in legislation, or in government; in making pins, or casting cannon; in the use of hands or of feet, of fingers or of toes, of muscles or of brains; in search of knowledge, or in its application; in inventions, or their uses; in making canals, or building ships; erecting railroads, or constructing locomotives; in burning lime or brick, in quarrying or in masonry; in wielding a sledge-hammer, or making watches; in grinding knives, or selling brick-dust; in fishing for oysters, or harpooning whales; in any one of the thousand occupations, of the city or the country, on the land or on the sea; and so on, and so on, to the end of that infinite diversity of human pursuits, by which men and women toil for a livelihood, and to get on in the world. In a free country each one chooses his own vocation, and it is not easy to say, whether mind work or muscular effort is hardest.

§ 2. *What is capital?*

Money is usually called capital. But it is not exclusively so, unless it is intended to comprehend everything that will fetch money; or everything that is *worth* money. In this sense labor is capital. Labor, certainly, is the foundation and cause of wealth. All the world would be poor, and come to nothing without it. Whatever any man has, which others want, and which, being wanted, will fetch money, whether it be a capacity for labor, or any species of property, it is capital. For any man, therefore, to know how rich he is, or how much capital he has, he has only to inquire *what he can do and what he has* that will fetch money.

§ 3. *The capital of labor.*

He who is able to work, and who can find employment with fair pay, is rich to begin with, and may become rich in the usual sense of the term. A power to labor, where labor is in demand, is the best, most independent, and most productive of all capital. Money at interest, or in stocks, usually produces, in this country, an income averaging perhaps six per cent. Some get more, some less, and some none at all. They are liable to go backward, and lose principal itself. But labor, with economy, can hardly ever be worth less than fifty per cent. That is, a laborer can live satisfactorily, and lay up, as vested capital, half of his wages. In some kinds of employment, he can lay up three-fourths, it may be more than that. Economy and skill in the management of his earnings, may also be made productive of wealth, in addition to the profits of his labor. Some laborers, by a careful use of past earnings, soon get to realize a hundred per cent. on their capital, including labor; and then they are growing rich, wealthy. Industrious labor of any kind, in a country like ours, with economy, and being applied where labor is in demand for wages, is a sure foundation of wealth. Man does not have to labor to acquire the power. It is a capital with which he is endowed by creation, an independent faculty, and more productive than any other.

§ 4. *Skill in labor, and in the management of its avails, is capital.*

Man has not only bones, sinews, muscles, and other powers of bodily labor, but he has mind to direct it, to improve in it, to make it more available, to put all its proceeds to a profitable use, and to improve even its uses. Labor turns bodily power to account, and skill multiplies the profits of labor, so that when a man gets a-going in the world, he goes fast. Riches flow in, and wealth accumulates. A man's power of labor is limited; but his skill is unlimited. Skill is often a thousand times more productive than what is commonly called labor. But, it is to be remembered, that skill itself is the fruit of the labor of mind, or is the employment of mind, as muscular effort is labor of the body. But skill is capital. It is equally applicable to agriculture, as to manufactures; to the mechanic, or the useful, or fine arts. It is applicable to trade and commerce, to every pursuit and occupation of life.

§ 5. *Enterprise is capital.*

It might seem quite unnecessary to say, in view of what enterprise has accomplished in and for this country, from the beginning of our history, that enterprise is capital. With slender means, it has evoked unbounded wealth from the long repose of a continent, and erected thereupon a vast national estate. No other species of capital has contributed so largely to this stupendous result. As the collective power of national enterprise is composed of individual enterprise, we find accordingly the same character in isolated conditions, chequering the whole surface of society with great achievements effected by single persons. There was capital enough in the soul of Washington, to humble the greatest nation, and to make another, with

means that would have been laughed to scorn as a subject of prophecy. In all our history, and in the various walks of life, are to be found like miracles of enterprise, originating in the profound and inexhaustible wealth, and carried forward to consummation, by the invisible power of man's moral attributes.

§ 6. *Moneyed capital.*

Money is most coveted, because it is most convenient; and its convenience arises from the fact, that it will procure, in exchange, everything which a man wants, or desires. But, in itself, it is dead capital, and the least worthy of respect or affection, as compared with labor, and skill in the application of labor and its avails. When money is put to use, it is said to be active; but it has no natural, inherent productive power. Hoarded money, while in that state, is no better than rusty old iron in a farmer's garret. And when put to use, the income is not the natural product of a natural agent, or natural effect of a natural cause, but a mere commercial result, which is limited and small as compared with the products and avails of labor, and that little is contingent on good management and good security. The principal itself is subject to the same contingency.

Nevertheless, moneyed capital may be an important instrument in the hands of the owner, and is usually an effective power, within certain limits. It will always supply wants, and gratify desires, so long as it lasts. But as productive capital, put to use in the hands of second and third persons, for the increase of itself, it bears no proportion to the productive power of human labor and skill. The fact, that they who employ money, can afford to pay interest for it, and often double, sometimes quadruple the principal sum annually, by the use of it, is proof of this point.

§ 7. *Vested capital.*

By vested capital is commonly understood money put to use for what is called interest or income. The most common forms of vested capital, are bonds, mortgages, negotiable notes, silent partnerships in business firms, stocks in banks, insurances offices, turnpike and railroads, canals, fishing companies, great commercial enterprises, steamboats and steamships, navigation companies, manufactories, state and government securities, and any undertaking that is beyond the ordinary means of individuals, and which requires the combined and aggregate capital of numerous persons having money to put to use. The capital of corporate companies or bodies, formed for these objects, is usually divided into small shares, which, being made negotiable, that anybody can buy or sell, are thence called *stocks*.

§ 8. *Corporations.*

The object of corporations is to combine the surplus or spare capital of numerous individuals, for enterprises which are usually beyond the reach of single persons. Properly organized by the statute of incorporation, by a division of the capital into small shares, and securing to men of small means equal chances, they are well adapted to a democratic state of society, by bringing down the powers of government, distributing them among the people, and vesting them in the hands of all persons who can raise twenty, or fifty, or a hundred dollars, according to the price of shares. Few and large corporations, monopolizing power in their own specific spheres, are objects of popular jealousy, and justly so. But the multiplication of them, with moderate capital and powers, divided into small shares, spreads them out over the surface of society, and whatever powers they have, be it more or less, is so much resigned by the government, and vested immediately in the hands of the people, who are able and disposed to be owners of stock. It is a wider and more democratic distribution of power. The responsibility of the managers, is to the stockholders for the use of the capital, and to the government, and through the government, to the great body of the people, for the use of their powers. That is the best, most democratic, and most beneficent system of corporations, which enables and encourages laborers and men of small means, widows and orphans, and the more dependent and helpless portions of the community, to become interested in them, by the investment and application of their funds, which they themselves could not employ to advantage. For example:—Two men, in partnership, were joint-owners of mills of great value in the state of Maine, and one of them died, leaving a widow and several children. The widow and children, of course, could not manage such a business; but by an act of incorporation from the state, the widow and the guardians of her children became corporators and managers, and the joint-interest went on as before. It will be seen, that cases are constantly occurring in society, which require the aid of such privileges. All helpless persons, who have capital enough to support them, but who are unable to manage it, naturally resort to such helps provided by the state, in parental care, and by considerations of humanity, as well as for the general welfare.

§ 9. *Laborers may be stockholders and corporators in corporate companies.*

The town of Lowell, in Massachusetts, which has risen from nothing in twenty years, to a population of more than twenty thousand, has between eleven and twelve millions of dollars

vested in her manufactories, employs upwards of *nine thousand laborers, male and female*, pays for their work annually \$1,800,000, about fifty per cent. of which, on the average, or \$900,000, they can save, or lay by, after paying their board and necessary expenses. Their savings support a Savings bank in the place, where deposits are constantly being made. Some of them, after having laid up a satisfactory sum, go home with means to settle down for life, while others vest their savings in the manufactories, and become stockholders and corporators—managers of their own stock, and presiding over themselves as laborers, gradually accumulating their interest in these companies. In one manufactory alone, \$100,000 of stock is owned by those who work in the factories for wages; in another \$60,000; and so on. Factory girls, and women who live by their needles, are often stockholders in these and other institutions. It will be observed, that in all these cases, the capital of labor creates the moneyed capital thus or otherwise vested, and that in the case of a laborer at Lowell, who receives in wages \$200 a year—that is the average—and lays up one hundred dollars, the profits of labor are *ten to one* of the income of moneyed capital at *five per cent.* In other words, the profits of labor in these cases, are *fifty per cent.* on the cost or principal, that being \$200.

§. 10. *The effect of corporations on the general welfare.*

1. *Manufactories.* In our tract on the Tariff, No. III., we took occasion to adduce the case of the Glenham woollen factory of Fishkill, N. Y., with a capital of \$140,000, which, as proved, actually employs other capital of the country, chiefly agricultural, but yet embracing a variety of other kinds, in all to the amount of \$1,432,000. From this aggregate of other capital, thus employed, it will easily be seen, what a great variety of other occupations find a profitable employment by this investment of \$140,000. Among the items specified, we notice 66,000 sheep, 22,000 acres of pasture land to feed them, 2,600 acres of farm land to supply the wants of the families belonging to the factory, and \$8,000 annually used up in the small articles of teazles, firewood, coal, provender, &c. All the laborers and their families belonging to this factory, are, of course, supported by it. All the farmers connected with this establishment, and the owners of the 66,000 sheep, are also supported by it, to the extent of their investments thus employed. It will be seen that the individuals and families connected with the capital of \$1,432,000 employed by this factory, are neither few in numbers, nor small in the aggregate of their various interests. All of them derive their support from this source, and it is satisfactory, else they would look to another quarter.

Let us carry out the rule furnished by these facts, to another and more comprehensive stage. The entire capital vested in all the manufactories of the United States at this time, is estimated at \$300,000,000, (*three hundred millions of dollars*). If we suppose that this aggregate, thus vested, employs an amount of other capital of the country, corresponding with the case of the factory at Fishkill, as above stated, then the whole amount of the other capital employed, and profitably employed, by the manufactories of the Union, would be \$3,068,571,428, or a little *over three thousand millions of dollars*! This is doubtless an unexpected, it is even an astonishing result. It may be, that other manufactories, different in kind, do not employ an equal proportion of other capital; there are doubtless some which do not; but some, for aught we know, may employ a greater proportion, enough even to swell the aggregate. The vastness of the amount, at the lowest possible estimate, is sufficient to show the importance of these corporations to the various occupations and interests of the country. There is no occupation, however humble, no man, however poor, that is not materially affected and essentially benefited by them. The wool growing interests of the country, which are chiefly connected with our manufactories, and sustained by them, are estimated at *two hundred millions of dollars*, and the farmers of the country receive annually from the manufactories, for all their various supplies, an aggregate of *sixty six millions of dollars*, which is nearly *nine times* as much as the avails of all our exports of flour, beef, and pork, to all parts of the world. Massachusetts, a great manufacturing state, alone consumes annually more than *forty millions of dollars* of the products of other states, which is nearly a moiety of all our exports to foreign countries.

2. *Collateral evidence.* The assessed value of property of all kinds in the state of Massachusetts, as reported by her legislature in 1841, is *three hundred millions of dollars*. As it is known that official assessments of this kind are very much less than common estimates, often *fifty per cent.*, on an average, in Massachusetts probably *twenty five per cent.*, it may, perhaps, be fairly assumed that the aggregate value of the property of that commonwealth, is not less than *four hundred millions of dollars*, about one fourth of which, or *one hundred millions*, lies in Boston and its immediate vicinity. The capital vested in the manufactories of that state, is about *fifty millions of dollars*. We have endeavored from the best sources of information to ascertain, as near as possible, the amount of value imparted to the wealth of Massachusetts by the manufactories, and the result is, that it can hardly be less than *one hundred millions of dollars*. It has been stated as high as *one hundred and fifty millions*. That the first of these statements is not too high, may be presumed from the fact, that the assessed value of all the

property of the state of Maine, with a little less than two thirds of the population of Massachusetts, but three times as much territory, is only *seventy millions of dollars*, resulting apparently from the fact that she has few manufactories.

Sir Robert Peel, in his speech at the agricultural meeting at Tamworth, England, in 1843, said:—

"Therefore, gentlemen, in this favored locality, we have no excuse for being behind-hand in the race of agricultural prosperity. Another advantage we possess is, that we live in the neighborhood of a great manufacturing district, and you all know of what importance Birmingham and the great iron district in its neighborhood is—you know also what influence it has in the demand for your agricultural produce, and you have had ample experience that with the decay or increase of the prosperity of that district there are corresponding sympathies on the part of the agriculturists. Thus you have not only a country formed by nature, but possessing the advantage of a great manufacturing district in its immediate neighborhood, and creating a market for its produce."

Every one will see, that this species of evidence is to the same effect, and of the same value, in all parts of the world.

3. *Canals, railroads, &c.* The construction of works of these kinds, disburses over the country the entire amount of their cost, be it more or less, giving employment to laborers, manufacturers, mechanics, artisans, and various classes, who do the work, supply materials, and aid in accomplishing the end. We have not the means for an exact statement of the cost of these works, already completed or begun in the country; but the aggregate must be very large, not less, probably, than some hundred millions. Most of this has been realized by laborers of various classes employed to do the work and supply materials. And it is to be understood, that if all these works were good for nothing when done, the money which they cost has all passed into the hands of those who made them. But in most cases they answer their design, and contribute permanently to the employment and profits of labor, and to the activity, facility, and profits of the business of the country, on an immense scale. They also enhance the value of the property of the country to a great extent. A gentleman owning a very large estate in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, though not bordering on her public works, told us he would be glad to be taxed at any moment for his fair proportion of the whole amount of the state debt, and that such a tax would be but a fraction of the increase of the value of his property on account of these works. If this be true, as doubtless it is, the state, though encumbered with a public debt, by the erection of these works, is yet richer on account of them. The only embarrassment is, how to liquidate the debt most satisfactorily to the people of the commonwealth. All the erections of this kind, whether made by states or by corporate companies, are greatly beneficial to the wide community, in the disbursement and realization of their costs, in the permanent use to which they are applied, in the increase of the general value of property, in the additional and profitable employment which they give to labor, and in promoting the facilities and activity of business. All classes, more especially the poorer classes, feel and reap the benefit. Individual capital could not accomplish these great works. It is only by states, or by the combined capital of numerous individuals, in the form of corporations, that such enterprises can be achieved.

These remarks are equally applicable to all other enterprises on a large scale, which can only be accomplished by associated capital. They are beneficial to the whole country, and to all classes, in the same way, and by the operation of the same causes.

4. *Banks.* For want of space, we are forced to refer to our Tract on the Currency, No. II., or to presuppose an acquaintance with it, for a proper appreciation of the few remarks made here. It is a settled fact, that the business of this country can not be carried on without a paper medium, and the only question is, whether it shall be supplied by private and irresponsible persons, shop-keepers, and the like; or by corporations created and regulated by the government, and responsible to it? Experience has decided, that the evils of the former plan can not be endured, and bank corporations are the result of the necessity of the public. Their powers are specified, their modes of business regulated by law, and they are held accountable to the authorities which gave them being. They have a reasonable amount of the confidence of the public, and the reasons why that has been in some degree shaken, are exhibited in our Tract on the Currency, which are, briefly, the effects of the mal-treatment of government, in a war against its own offspring. Can a child do well, with a father striking heavy blows on its head?

A good system of banking supplies a sound, convenient, and indispensable circulating medium for the demands of business. It is physically impossible, that the vast trade of this vast country, should be carried on with an exclusive metallic currency. The people will use the paper of private and irresponsible persons, with all its evils, if they can not have that of responsible and law-governed institutions. Besides the general soundness of a bank-paper medium, they are usually able, by the conditions on which they are chartered, to supply an adequate currency. But not the least of the benefits of a good banking system, is its effect in suppressing exorbitant usury. By far the greater portion of the sacrifices of property in this country, as the consequence of the revulsion of general credit through which we have recently passed, has been occasioned by exorbitant interest exacted by private money-holders, when the

banks could not loan, and all commercial agents were in trouble. Much of the farming interest and other property of the country, has changed owners in this way, by the foreclosing of mortgages, and the original proprietors, who were well off before, have been ruined by merciless usurers. But in the operation of a sound banking system, exorbitant usury is always kept down, because it is forced to moderation, to a specified limit, by law. (*See Tract on the Currency.*)

5. *Insurance companies, etc.* The benefits of these and similar institutions, are too well known to require defence. They absorb a large amount of capital, which is thus put to profitable use, at the same time that it secures the private property of individuals on an immense scale, at a premium which all can afford, if they can not afford to lose it. A ship insured, is lost, but the owners and shippers do not suffer; a house insured, is burnt, but the owner receives cash for the value; a valuable life insured, is lost, but the surviving relatives get an equivalent for the services of which they are deprived; and in this way the most afflicting strokes of Providence are greatly relieved of their severity. Men bear one another's burdens from motives of interest, where charity would be cold and unproductive. It is a beneficent result of civilization.

6. *Corporations secure activity to moneyed capital.* It is best for all, that money should be in constant use. While lying still, it is dead to all the world, and good for nothing. But they who have money, will not trust it to second and third persons, without security. The rights and powers of corporate bodies, are indispensable to evoke hoarded wealth from its hiding-places, and bring it into use for the benefit of society.

7. *Money vested in corporate institutions, is put under the control of general society, through the government.* This is a prime consideration, especially for those who are jealous of moneyed power. The government is virtually trustee of all funds vested in corporate institutions, prescribes the objects to which they shall be applied, and the manner of using them, employs the corporations as its agents, and holds them accountable. The government is supposed to be partial to the public, and will always endeavor to serve and promote the interests of the public. To have the moneyed power of the country under such control, can not but be regarded as better than to have it in the hands of private and exorbitant usurers, or shavers.

8. *There are many important objects indispensable to the interests of the country, which can not be accomplished, except by the power of associated capital.* The objects of the various institutions we have had under review, will sufficiently show this. If they must be done, they can only be done in this way. And what and where would the country have been without them? Half-way back to barbarism.

§ 11. *The controlling power of labor, industry, and enterprise, over moneyed capital.*

We have before recognised the substantial capital and productive power of these capacities of man. We have seen that they are many times more productive than moneyed capital. It remains to show, that, in this country, they command and control the latter. Money and property, we know, among us, are constantly changing hands. A man has only to work on, and wait patiently, and with industry and enterprise, he is sure to get both. The wheel of American fortune is perpetually and steadily turning, and those at bottom to-day, will be moving up to-morrow, and will ere long be at the top. The rich man of this year, may be poor the next, and the wealthy family of this generation, is likely to dissipate its fortune in the next. Scarcely ever does it remain in the same line to the third generation. And where is it, when no longer found with the same owners? It is in a thousand or ten thousand hands. Where the laws of primogeniture and entail are abolished, as in this country, and where everything is put under the control of labor, industry, and enterprise, there is a substantial equality. All property, among us, tends to the hands of those who work and wait for it. They are as sure to get it, as the sun is to rise and set.

Where now is the vast estate of Stephen Girard, of Philadelphia? The two millions left in charge of that city, is chiefly in the hands of the lime-burners, brick-makers, quarry-men, stone-cutters, masons, carpenters, carters, architects, artisans, manufacturers, mechanics, lumber merchants, trades of many kinds, and agents of great variety, whose labors, services, and materials were put in requisition for the erection of Girard College without the city, and Girard Square within it. And the immense estate of John Jacob Astor, of New York, where will that be in the next generation? A considerable fraction of it has already gone into the Astor House and other edifices in that city; that is, into the hands of those who built them, and furnished the materials. Every expensive house and establishment that a rich man sets up, scatters the entire cost over the wide community, putting that amount of money and property into other and many hands. Money never stays, except with the miser, and all the wealth of the wealthiest, for the time being, is for the most part in use by somebody, benefitting the poor, and helping those who are not so well off, to rise in the world. It is impossible to keep money and property out of the hands of those who work for it, who are industrious and enterprising. They earn it, and they get it. And the productive and absorbing power of frugal and industrious labor is so much greater than that of moneyed capital, that the latter stands no

chance in the competition. It must yield, and give up, and it always does. The relative position of the capital of labor and moneyed capital, is, not that the latter commands the former, but that the former commands the latter. Moneyed capital employs labor, because its owner has need of the service; and the second step of the relation is, that the parties have changed places. Labor, industry, and enterprise, in this country, are all absorbing. They lay their hands upon everything. Their compensation is a fair one, as between the parties. The industrious and frugal toil of the last generation, possesses most of the wealth of this. So will it be with this generation, and so with the next. It is the natural order, and necessary result of American society. Labor is the master here; it is the great capitalist; the embryo millionaire; and he who can stand up, in the bloom and vigor of ripening manhood, pure in heart, and determined to prosper, though he has not a penny in the world, may look ahead, and behold a large estate within his reach. Within his own skin, and deep down in his own soul, lies the capital, the productive power, with which he is to trade. All wealth lies in abeyance to these physical and moral energies, and comes into hand at their summons.

§ 12. *The lazy character of moneyed capital.*

We speak of the general character of its owners, and with them, it is not only lazy, but often improvident. Its proposal and its terms are, *use me and give me my dividend*. When men get beyond the necessity of labor, they never live to return to it. They seek repose, enjoyment, and exemption from the rude occupations of life. It is seldom, if ever, that they realize the satisfaction they hoped for. But they have become lazy, and by their lazy position they fall into the power of the active mind of the country. They who work are going ahead, while these fall back on their resources, can command nothing but their dividends, and are fit only to make their wills in favor of heirs, who anticipating the future, are waiting only for the good luck that death may bring them, to dissipate, it may be, the estate that falls into their possession. At best, the investments of moneyed capitalists, are only valuable as they are in demand for use by the active, laborious, and industrious portion of the community, who, of the two parties, always derive the greatest benefit from them, and in the end are likely to have the whole. Labor is all powerful, and destined to supplant opulent indolence, by gaining possession of the means of its luxurious ease. Guard their wealth however they may, "riches take to themselves wings and fly away." There is no law of inheritance in American society, that can secure wealth in the same family line, while it is always open to the acquisition of industrious labor. The gifts of fortune are always tendered to those who toil for them, and snatched from those who riot in affluence. Already we behold no inconsiderable fraction of the large investments of the Lowell manufactories in the hands of those who began there by spinning and weaving, and who still spin and weave. And who that has observed the mutations of society for half a generation, or even a less time than that, does not see the same operation going on everywhere?

§ 13. *The mutual dependence between laborers and moneyed capitalists.*

The rich man can not eat his money; nor clothe himself with bank notes, or gold leaf, or silver plate; nor shelter himself from the inclemencies of the seasons by these materials; nor make of them any of the comforts of life. If he chooses to live at ease, for all necessities, and for all means of enjoyment, he is entirely dependent on those who produce them. For all these he must give his money in exchange, which enables those who minister to his convenience and comfort, to better their condition, and rise in the world. In these very acts of exchange, they are gradually exchanging positions in society. Nor can the wealthy get a return for their investments, or an income from their estates, if there be nobody to use the former, or work the latter. Both parties are served by their relative position for the time being, though it is possible, and not unlikely, that their children will stand in directly the opposite position of their parents, in relation to each other.

The laborer wants the reward of his toil, first for necessities not in his line; next, to add to his comforts; and thirdly, to increase his stock in trade, or augment his estate. But how could he get this reward, if nobody had it to give in exchange for his services? On the other hand, the consideration paid would be of no value or use to its owners, except as it is in demand by those who carry on the active business of society, and minister to its wants.

§ 14. *Which of these parties is more benefited by the other?*

It is true, that the moneyed capitalist wants his dividend; but the profits of labor, united with moneyed capital, well applied, are many times greater than the proceeds of money as an investment in the usual forms. Labor is the source of all wealth, and with money, as tools in hand, multiplies the principal in manifold quantities. The laborer, working on his own estate, gathers the rich harvest into his own barns, and gives the moneyed capitalist a small fraction for the use of his sickle—for moneyed capital, in the hands of labor, is only an instrument. Or if he works on the estate of the moneyed capitalist for wages, as at Lowell, he soon gets enough to retire in a condition to satisfy his ambition, or becomes part owner of the

estate, gradually gaining on the original proprietor, with the prospect of supplanting him. Such is the advantage of labor, united with skill and enterprise, over the mere instrument which it employs.

§ 15. *Labor the original and fundamental power of society.*

The recognition of the true position of labor, in relation to moneyed capital, is of no inconsiderable political importance. We mean its position in the actual state and practical operation of American society, where labor is free and sovereign, and not as it stands under a despotism, or in the monarchical and aristocratic countries of Europe. It is our own politics, and our own political powers, with which we have to do. In this country, labor, since our independence was acquired, always has been and still is, not only an original and fundamental, but a controlling power in society, and in the state. We are characteristically and distinctively a nation of *workers*. There are some who do not work; but most people do. Work is the fashion, and the proudest distinction in American society. Nobody looks with respect on those who live in idleness, or who riot in luxurious ease. To have no business, is a kind of living death. A man is lost, who does not work.

Moneyed capital, with us, is a mere *tool* in the hand of labor, and is good for nothing, except as labor will bid for it. The millionaire would be scarcely better off than the owner of a single penny—not even so well off, in regard to his physical wants—if he could not call the laborer into his service; whereas the laborer is much more independent, and can better do without the rich man, than the rich man can do without him. This independence, this high ground of labor, is perfectly well understood in this country, by all parties. As the great majority are workers, and all workers sympathize with each other, the ground they occupy is not only an elevated social position, but a controlling political power. Just show the working power of the country what laws, and what policy of government, will be best for it, and the ballot box will soon demand those measures. Who will say that this demand can be successfully resisted? Who, regarding the well being of the country, would desire it?

§ 16. *The true and best interest of moneyed capital.*

It is to give labor a fair reward, and to make it profitable. But as this can not be forced, as between the parties, trade being always a voluntary transaction, the ability to do it can not be separated from the action of government. All workers, therefore, as well as moneyed capitalists—all laborers are deeply concerned in supporting a public policy, which will put labor in good demand, and thus enable it to command a good price. This depends entirely upon the proceeds of moneyed investments. While these are good, labor will be in demand, and the price of it, or its wages, will be proportionately high. Moneyed investments are sure to pay well, if it can be afforded; and the more they can afford, the better for them. But generally, this ability to give good wages, depends very much, sometimes entirely, on the policy of government, in the privileges it confers on such investments, and the chances it gives to them. If the government wars against them, instead of extending to them its fostering care, if it endeavors to cripple and break them down, instead of protecting and sustaining them, this hostility may and does injure the moneyed capitalist, by rendering his investments insecure and unproductive; but it injures the working classes of the community much more. The rich can hide themselves in a storm of government hostility, though they may be losers; but the poor perish, or are in great distress, for want of employment. Our remark above on the comparative independence of labor, applies to an ordinary state of things, and not to a crisis of this description.

§ 17. *A false notion.*

It has been a prevalent and fatal doctrine in this country, with a certain class of statesmen, that it is always a safe policy and a duty in the government, to fight against moneyed capitalists, in whatever place or shape they lift up their heads, whether in banks, or in manufactories, or in any and all other forms and enterprises requiring associated capital. In this, it is not considered, that the employment and thriving of the people depend on the profitable investment of the moneyed capital of the country; nor that the wages and profits of labor, and the price of its products, depend on the profits accruing from the use of the moneyed capital which labor employs. Moneyed capital is regarded by this policy as a master, not as a servant and instrument; as a hostile power, not as a friendly auxiliary; as having in itself a faculty of independence, not as deriving all its value from labor; and as aiming to acquire a supremacy over society. But a little reflection, in view of what has been said, one would think, ought to show, that the condition of moneyed capital, in this country, is *passive* in the hand of labor, and not *active* to rule over it, and that it is not possible to change this relation of dependence in the former on the latter. Moneyed capital, in itself, is an *inert* power, and derives all its vitality from the touch of labor. For government, therefore, to open the way, by its policy, for the profitable use of money, is the same as to provide for the success and fair reward of industry and work; and that policy which

destroys the profit of money, destroys the profit of labor. Let government strike at the rich, and the blow falls on the heads of the poor.

§ 18. *The effect of allowing foreign labor to compete with home labor, on the same level.*

Estimating the value of moneyed capital in any country by the average price, or interest, paid for its use, American moneyed capital would fall at once to about two thirds of its present value; and the price of home labor would sink to about one third—or jointly the depression would be fifty per cent.—and the value of all other property would sink in like proportion. For it is manifest, that, with no tariff to protect us, the price of American labor must fall to the average price of European labor. They who work for the same market, must work for the same wages. Besides this, we should, to a very great extent, be driven from our own market as producers, and forced, commercially, into the condition of a dependant and tributary colony. [See our Tract on the Tariff, No. III., for a farther elucidation of this point.]

§ 19. *A comparative view of the position of labor in America and Europe.*

We have told in the outset what we mean by labor. IT IS THEY WHO WORK—REAL WORKERS, no matter in what, or with what, or for what end, if it be lawful and honorable work, to supply the wants of civilized man, or the increasing wants of advancing civilization. The more wants, the more work, and so much the better for all, where each chooses his own calling, and finds employment.

But the position of labor in this country is, in a variety of important particulars, a new one in human society. 1. It is *free*—with the exception of African slave labor. This species of freedom, which is a most important attainment in the progress of society, implies a practicable alternative to working on wages at the price fixed by the employer. In Europe, for the most part, there is no such alternative, and the laborer is *compelled* to work at a price in which he has no voice, or he must starve; and for the reason that he has no voice in fixing his wages, they are too scanty for comfort, much more for bettering his condition, and often too scanty for subsistence. European wages are next to a state of starvation. At best, it is a state of slavery, without hope. But in this country, labor occupies a high social and political position. It is never compelled to work for wages fixed by employers, because there is always open to it the alternative of working on its own hook. American labor, therefore, does not accept a price imposed, but commands its own price. At least, it is always an independent party in the compact. It is made freely, and can be as freely dissolved, without incurring the doom of starvation or distressing want. 2. The social position of American labor is such, that none but workers are held in respect—and work is held in the highest respect. No power, in this country, can enforce respect for the man who has nothing to do, and who does nothing. Just in proportion as a rich man retires from society, to wrap himself up in selfishness, does he lose his influence, and the idle, lazy poor man gets little pity in his poverty. Our fathers brought with them both the necessity and spirit of work, and made it respectable. It has been transmitted as the highest recommendation, and the most honorable character. 3. The political position of labor here is all-powerful, and so long as it is so, it can not but be respectable. As a nation of workers, we demand from Government a security for the interests and rights of labor, and one of those rights is, that free American labor shall not be put on the same level with the forced labor of other countries, or any country. It is only necessary for the people of this country to understand correctly what the true interests and rights of labor are, and they are sure to have them secured at the ballot-box. No earthly power can hinder it. What more elevated or more commanding position, can labor possibly occupy? The free American laborer is the most powerful, and may well be the proudest of men.

§ 20. *The dignity of labor.*

“The mandate of God to his creature man is, WORK!” “The GENIUS of work is the Conqueror, the supreme Lawgiver, the born King over affluent idleness.” “The Leaders of Industry are the Captains of the world. If there be no nobleness in them, there will never be an aristocracy more.”

This is higher-toned phrase than we are addicted to employ, as they who read us well know. Nevertheless, as there is such a vast body of comprehensive truth in it, we have borrowed it for the sake of brevity. It plants labor where God intended it should stand, in the loftiest, most influential position. The plan of Creation is visible in her works. Behold the constitution of man, contemplate the character of his mind, and judge, if he was not made for work, if idleness is not a disease, a fatal malady. Creation itself is called the work of God. “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread,” which, though announced as part of the doom of the first transgression, is, by the remedial scheme of man’s redemption, converted into a blessing and a dignity. Earth is a work-field, and heaven a rest. It is as bad, as vicious, not to work here, since God has so appointed, as to violate any other

precept of Divine authority. The example of God in the work of Creation, and the example of Christ in the work of Redemption, aside from the force of command, impart the highest possible sanction and the highest possible DIGNITY to these labors of man which have become necessary in this life. Human labor will never have attained its true position, till it shall stand at the head of human affairs. "The Leaders of Industry are the Captains of the world." Such was the design—such is the *tendency*. They who work, *will govern*. We know it has not always been so, and that was a vicious state of society when and wherever it was not so. We know that labor has not, in all history, received due homage. But this fact does not affect, nor impair the validity of its claims.

§ 21. *The physical and moral healthfulness of labor.*

Doubtless, in the best possible state of human society, labor should be neither a toil, nor a task, but the healthful action of all the faculties, bodily and mental. Labor, in most parts of the world, has been so unequally divided, that parts of the race have been excessively burdened, while others have suffered equally for want of a proper share. The pauper or forced labor of Europe is an example of the first, and the pampered ease of its masters an example of the second. The whole Eastern world is full of scenes of this kind. But wherever labor is rising, or has risen to its true position in political society, we observe both the physical and moral healthfulness which it diffuses all around. It is good for man and woman to work, and neither can find the greatest comfort and happiness attainable in the human state, without employment. Nor is it possible, without diligence in some industrial pursuit, to have the best state of health in body and mind. The results of Providence, reveal and announce his designs, viz., that idleness is the curse of the human state, and diligent occupation, in a lawful and useful calling, the consummation of its blessedness.

§ 22. *The content of labor.*

When society shall have made labor what God designed it should be, it will present a happy scene of contentment. Specimens are frequently found, in actual life, to illustrate this desirable state of things. Who has not seen them? And who, seeing, has not envied them? Behold the farmer, happy in his own domain; and listen to the housewife, joyously exulting in song, in the midst of her children, or soothing her infant to repose with a hymn of early love. The wagon boy's whistle, the woodman's laugh, the boatman's glee, the sailor's jolly face, and all the forms of labor's rest on the past, satisfaction in the present, and hope in the future, are so many various symptoms of labor's content. What industrial calling has not its quiet aspects by day, and its refreshing sleep at night?

§ 23. *A new Era of labor.*

It is impossible not to observe, that labor has taken up a new position on this continent, in our state of society, and that a new Era in its social and political importance, is opened on the world. If no interruption should take place in its progress, it will be the true Millennium of labor. During the long nightmare of despotic rule over the European and Eastern world, the breast of humanity felt its heavy tread, and the toiling millions were unable to rise. But here labor has sprung to its feet, lifted up its hands on high, clapped them with joyous exultation, and learnt a new song of freedom—THE REWARD OF LABOR. It has risen, at one bound, to influence and authority. There has never before been such a scene in the history of civilization. And the most remarkable and most auspicious feature of it is, that it occupies a wide theatre—a vast domain of political power. Erect, in the image of God, imitating and obeying God, as a diligent worker, man here has taken possession of his primitive estate, so long alienated, and cultivates it as his own, himself the heir of his own created wealth; and not only the heir, but the sovereign disposer thereof. We know not what may grow out of this new form, this apparently auspicious development of human society; but it has much contingent promise of perpetuity, enlargement, confirmation, and final consummation in all that could be hoped for.

§ 24. *The contingency.*

A *protective Tariff* is the sole palladium of American labor. Without that defence, it is as sure to fall back *prostrate* on the level of European, Egyptian, and Asiatic labor, from which it has been lifted up, as the sun will rise in the East and set in the West. If American labor, having the power in its hand, will not protect itself, the fault of parting with its rights, will lie at its own door. The struggle has been a great one, and it will yet be long protracted. Either the rights of American labor must give way, or the despotic rule of the old world must yield to the claims of freedom. It is impossible that both should stand. And so long as both are in conflict, we shall not fail to realise a sturdy hostility from tottering and crumbling thrones, gathering fresh vigor from despair, assisted by their agents in our own bosom, who are paid by their gold.

§ 25. *Our domestic and foreign trade.*

From Senate Document, No. 340, 2d Session, 27th Congress, we learn, that the internal commerce, or domestic trade of the United States, is *two thousand millions of dollars annually*. Having made this quotation, as it stands in a public document, we would add, that in our opinion, this estimate is *one fifth or five hundred millions* less than the facts would warrant. The Honorable Senator, the author of the above cited document, once stated to us a few facts, from which he deduced the conclusion, that the annual amount of exchanges required to carry on this domestic trade, could not be less than *four hundred millions of dollars*. Add to this all the money required to be used in paying for the labor employed in producing these fruits of the earth, and these materials, goods, and merchandise; add all required to pay for their transit from one point to another and in the retail distribution of them, and it will be seen, that it not only requires a large circulating medium, which nothing but banks could furnish, but great activity of the same. It will also be seen, as our annual exports do not usually exceed *one hundred millions*, that our domestic trade is about *twenty to one* of our foreign trade, and that on the former, therefore, is our chief reliance for the reward of American labor and industry. The work of production, and the carrying on of this trade, must of course form innumerable commercial relations between the producers and the consumers, between the employers and the employed, between the laborers and the moneyed capitalists. Nearly the entire subsistence, and nearly all the growing wealth of the people of this country, spring from the employment of this capital, and from the action of the labor and industry sustained by it.

§ 26. *Deductions from the foregoing facts and reasonings.*

1. Though money is usually understood to be designated by the term *capital*, in the commercial world, it appears, that labor, together with those moral qualities which enter into it, constitutes the original and fundamental capital of human society, and is more important and more productive.
2. That the capital of labor is more influential and more commanding, socially and politically.
3. That the relation of labor to moneyed capital, is that of the agent to the instrument, of the hand to the tool.
4. And therefore, that the position of the capital of labor is more dignified, and worthy of more respect.
5. That the interests of labor are best promoted by the activity of moneyed capital.
6. That the interests of labor require the existence of corporate bodies, so far as may be necessary to set on foot and accomplish commercial and other useful works and enterprises, which are beyond the capacity of individual capital and unassociated effort.
7. That since banks and other corporations give security to and invite the investment of moneyed capital, it is the only mode by which that species of capital can be brought into effective use for the benefit of the public.
8. That the multiplication of corporations, on right principles, augments democratic influence, by the distribution of the powers of government among the people.
9. That the tendency of labor is to wealth, and that of wealth to want.
10. That the political power of labor in American society, is dominant, and only requires correct information, as to its best interests, to secure them, in the administration of public affairs.
11. That the vitality of moneyed power lies in the arm of labor.
12. That, in the relation of moneyed capital to labor, labor has the best chances.
13. That a correct view of this relation, in its practical effects, is of great political importance.
14. That a great and disastrous political heresy, in regard to this relation, has for a long time pervaded and controlled the counsels of our government.
15. That the rich can hide from a storm raised by government against them, while all its merciless peltings fall upon the poor.
16. That the true policy is always to encourage the investment of moneyed capital, so that labor can reap the benefit.
17. That a home market is the most productive source of national wealth.
18. That labor in this country occupies an eminently high social and political position, as compared with labor in all other parts of the world.
19. That labor is honored of God, and therefore worthy of universal respect.
20. That it is most healthful to body and soul.
21. That it is most fruitful of contentment.
22. That with American society, commenced a new era of labor in the history of the world.
23. That the advancement and consummation of this era, is contingent on a *protective tariff*.
24. That our home trade is twenty times as great as our foreign trade.
25. That every American laborer can stand up proudly, and say, **I AM THE AMERICAN CAPITALIST**, which is not a metaphor, but literal truth.

§ 27. *A picture.*

We will suppose, that the government, in making war on the moneyed capital of the country, and on the various institutions, corporations, and enterprises, in which it was invested, has succeeded in suppressing them; that it has broken down all the banks, dissolved all moneyed corporations, stopped all public works and public improvements, and will neither do these things itself, nor allow others to do them. There is no less money in the country, than there was before, other things being equal; but it is chiefly out of sight, and little of it in use. The thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of laborers,

whose families depend on their daily wages for daily bread, solicit employment, but there is nobody to hire them; at least, not more than one in many of them can get anything to do. The soil of the country yields bountifully to the labors of the husbandman, but there is no market for its products; the buzz and din of our manufactories have ceased, and they who worked in them have disappeared; the mechanic finds little encouragement for the use of his art; commerce drops her wings, and her ships are eaten up by worms; the banks of our canals are falling in like a neglected ditch; our railways rust, and there is no motive to repair the damages of time; our cities are noiseless, and the grass grows in the streets; and the whole country has fallen into a deep sleep, a perpetual sabbath of repose. But there is poverty, hunger, nakedness, and universal misery. The wheels of government go heavily along, for lack of wherewithal to grease them.

We admit that such a state of things is not very likely to come to pass; for the people, in 1840, proved, that they are capable of foreseeing the evil, and of preventing it. But we respectfully submit, that some such consequences must necessarily come to pass, from a full and complete operation of such a destructive system. Nay, we have had some foretaste of it already, as all the people of this country are witnesses, in the partial operation of such measures. The effect has been, to stop the use of money, by breaking down those institutions, through whose instrumentality alone it can be had, to answer the demands of this great and enterprising country. For an eighth of a century, we had been rapidly marching toward the consummation of such a destiny, and it is yet to be decided, probably in 1844, whether we shall get in that path again.

§ 28. *A great Fact.*

Till within a few years, the prosperity of this country and its increasing wealth, have been unexampled in the history of nations. Small as our population was, comparatively, and comparatively poor, the debt incurred by the war of Independence, was shouldered by the nation, and between that period and the second war with Great Britain, it was nearly liquidated. This second struggle brought upon us another burden, but this too, was all paid off in about twenty years, and in 1836 we had a surplus revenue of *thirty six millions* to distribute among the states. This is a great and comprehensive fact, to which we desire to call very special attention. During this half century of prosperity, we labored under some disadvantages, from various causes, probably from none more, than from the want of a proper adjustment and uniform action of our tariff system. Nevertheless, we struggled through them all, and they proved insufficient materially to mar our prosperity, or put in check our increasing wealth.

§ 29. *Another great Fact.*

It is certainly very remarkable, in view of the previous history of our national finances, which had improved so steadily, and at last swelled to such a scale of income, that, on a sudden, this current of our public affairs should be reversed; that, in a time of peace, the Government could not get money enough to defray its own expenses, without borrowing; that it was compelled to withhold the fourth instalment of the public funds voted to the States in 1836; and that the expenditures and appropriations of the Government, from the 4th of March, 1837, to the 4th of March, 1841 (*only four years*), should have been some *fifty millions of dollars* in excess of the revenues of the same time! (See our Tract, No. 1, *THE TEST*, pp. 10 and 13.) And it would seem, that the nation has been plunged in a slough of this kind, from which it is very difficult to get out. The causes, which have produced such an amazing reverse in our national fortunes, must have been prodigiously potent. The momentum of a half century of a nation's rapidly increasing prosperity, rising like the sun, and swelling like a mighty river, as it descends into the sea, required no common cause to check, derange, prostrate, destroy it. There is no accounting for this GREAT FACT, except by misgovernment, and that, too, on a stupendous scale. It takes a long time to build up a nation; but destruction is a *quick work*.

In our state of society, a good Government makes a prosperous people. It is impossible, that this country should not be growing great and rich, and that without interruption or check, so long as the various occupations of life are suitably encouraged and protected, each in its fair proportion. But the Government had so legislated away the prosperity of the people, and reduced them to such straits and such distress, that the sources of revenue were cut off and dried up. The public expenditures were also unnecessarily great and prodigal, and altogether unprecedented. (See our Tract, No. 1, pp. 9 and 10.) The people can not supply the wants of the Government, unless the Government gives them a chance. On the other hand, they are sure to make an overflowing treasury, while in a state of prosperity, and under a suitable system of revenue laws. But the success of the Government, in its war on our moneyed institutions and other great enterprises, in which moneyed capital was invested, broke down the currency, which was the means of public wealth, by being the means of private prosperity. The entire credit system of the country, under which we had

grown up, prospered, become wealthy, and powerful, was also assailed by the Government, and bent and broke under the weight of its powerful hand, and by its repeated blows. Was it strange, under such a destructive policy, that the people, the Government, the whole nation were impoverished? The Government had struck the people such heavy blows, so long continued, that the misfortunes of the people fell back on the Government with a weight, under which it reeled, as the people had reeled before, and unfortunately fallen. The Government had ruined a nation's prosperity, and as a consequence bankrupted an overflowing treasury. (See our Tract on the Currency, No. II. p. 16, for the aggregate of losses to the country by that Destructive Dynasty.)

§ 30. *The Chief Cause.*

It is undoubtedly true, that the causes, more properly, perhaps, the *instruments*, have been several, and the system of injury complicated, by which the country has been so fearfully run down. But the *great cause of that destruction* was to set labor to war against moneyed capital, by legislation and Government; and the mode of this warfare was an endeavor to cripple and break down those institutions and enterprises, in which the moneyed capital of the country was chiefly vested.

§ 31. *The destructive and fatal effects of this warfare.*

Unless it were proposed to rob moneyed capitalists, and divide the spoils *directly*, any attempt to cripple them by legislation and Government, with the design of better securing the rights of the laboring classes, must necessarily cripple and destroy the latter. Whatever war the Government may wage against capitalists, short of robbing, it is always in their power to withdraw their funds from those uses which have heretofore, in our experience, so well served the convenience of the public and the wants of labor, and turn them into investments, which will only serve themselves. In some respects, and to no small extent, they would be able to serve themselves much better than before, as by exorbitant usury, and in other ways taking advantage of the necessities and distresses of the people, which must necessarily result from such an administration of public affairs. The rich can protect themselves, but the poor can not, when the Government forces all classes to change their modes of business and of living. If the great law of mutual dependence in society be overlooked or violated, in the policy and measures of Government, and an attempt be made to injure and cripple moneyed capitalists, for the benefit of laborers, the most fatal consequences must unavoidably ensue. Facts of this kind have already been alluded to, in cases of exorbitant usury. If the rich can do without the poor, by turning their capital into other investments, than those which give to the latter employment, food, raiment, and a comfortable home, with chances of rising in the world, and of becoming rich in their turn, the poor can not do without the rich, who, in these ways, minister to their necessities, and secure to them the means of bettering their condition. A war upon the rich, in legislation and government, is a war upon the poor, of the worst kind, and of the most disastrous effects. It is a war upon the most vital interests of society, and upon the relations of mankind in the social state, which, if carried out, the entire social fabric must bend and break.

§ 32. *A plain statement.*

Nothing but an extraordinary infatuation could have shut the eyes of the people to the fact, that moneyed capital employed in the country, is for the interests of labor; that its uses afford chances of improvement to those who have little, and give bread, clothing, and a home to the poor; that rich men seek to invest their funds where they can be employed by labor; that the modes of investment are naturally determined by the habits and wants of the commercial, agricultural, manufacturing, mechanical, and other laboring classes of the community; that what these want will be most productive to capitalists, because most beneficial to labor; that capital in large amounts, intrusted to the keeping and management of secondary agents, must necessarily be vested with corporate rights, to be secure for all concerned, and most effective for general good; that moneyed capitalists would never put their funds in other hands without such protection; that banks are necessary to furnish a circulating medium, convenient in form, and adequate for the trade and business of the country; that all these institutions had their origin in the wants and necessities of the people; that in putting down and destroying them, by legislation and Government, the people only put down and destroy themselves; and that the greater the income of capital vested in these various forms, as a permanent state of things, so much greater the evidence of general prosperity.

But the revolution introduced in the financial policy of the Government, and forced on the commercial habits of the people, from 1830 to 1840, broke up all these established relations of the different parts of the community toward each other, and left all in a mass of confusion and ruin, to be reorganized and set in order again, as best they could.

§ 33. *The way it worked.*

It is true, that this work of destruction was not thoroughly carried out, for there was not time for it, before the people, with ruin staring them full in the face, began to feel their danger, by the pressure of present calamity, and showed symptoms of a desire to avoid it. Nevertheless, these old institutions of the country were shaken by the onset; some of them fell down and were entirely broken up; confidence in them was impaired; capitalists knew not where they could safely vest their funds for the uses of the community, and consequently withheld, or withdrew them, or vested them in forms not liable to such attack; the natural connexion between moneyed capitalists and the laboring classes, was dissolved; while the rich were trying to protect themselves from the effects of the war waged upon them, in the uses of the functions of Government, the poor were plunged in want and distress; the financial habits of the Government and the commercial habits of the people were entirely avoided, to painful and calamitous results, public and private; the credit and enterprises of the States, were prostrated with the credit and enterprises of the people; the sources of public revenue were exhausted; and Repudiation followed, with its indelible stain on our national character. We need not recite more particularly the ordeal of financial embarrassment and commercial distress, through which this country has so recently passed, by means of this vindictive, insane, and fatal policy.

§ 34. *This war unnatural.*

It is certainly unnatural for labor to do that, which deprives it of tools to work with, cuts off its chances, and involves it in distress. For by breaking down moneyed capital, it breaks down itself. It is moneyed capital which makes business grow and thrive, gives employment to labor, and opens to it avenues to success in life. In the state of American society, and in a prosperous condition of the country, a comfortable degree of wealth is within the reach of every honest, industrious, and enterprising man. The moneyed capitalist has no political superiority or advantage over the laborer, and no right in the republic, which is not secured to both. It is, therefore, the laborer's interest, that the wealth of the rich should be so invested as to impart the greatest activity to trade, and the greatest effectiveness to useful enterprise; and in nothing is this end so surely accomplished, as by those moneyed and other corporations, which are organized for this sole purpose. If this capital were to lie dead, the loss to the country would be immense, and that loss would of course be divided among all classes of people, and participated in by the Government. It is as much the duty of the Government, to endow moneyed capital with the faculties of the greatest activity and effectiveness, as it is the interest of its possessors to consent that it should be so used, and of labor to employ it. What supreme folly, then, for labor to go to war with moneyed capital! It thereby wars against its own life and means of success. The blow aimed at the moneyed capitalist, strikes over on the head of the laborer, and is sure to hurt the latter more than the former.

§ 35. *The capacities of our Country.*

Well and rightly governed, it is capable, not only of astonishing the world, but of astonishing itself. If things do not go on well, it must be owing solely to the perversion of our institutions from their design. There is no sufficient apology, that our general prosperity should ever be interrupted. It is impossible that it should be, except by a violation or misapplication of the trusts reposed in our public functionaries. By a suitable protection of the interests of American labor and industry, from a self-sacrificing rivalry with a foreign, oppressed, and degraded pauperism, which is in no wise mitigated, but only aggravated and rendered more hopeless by the favor done to their oppressors; by a proper encouragement of the voluntary enterprises of our own citizens, the people of this country, with the rich and inexhaustible treasures of creation comprehended in our jurisdiction, are capable of producing amazing results. That almost astonishing height of prosperity, to which we had attained, under all the disadvantages of a defective tariff system, before the advent of the late Destructive Dynasty, is conclusive and impressive evidence of what this nation is capable of, under a wise and faithful administration of our public affairs. We had been put in a train, by which we were enabled to discharge with ease the entire and heavy debt incurred by the last war with Great Britain, and to overwhelm the public treasury with surplus funds; the public domain in the west was in such demand, that the sales of one year amounted to *twenty-four millions of dollars*, and although there were special reasons for this fact, which could not be expected to operate in perpetuity, to an equal extent, nevertheless, in a prosperous state of things, there would be a steady increase in those sales, which, under an equitable system of distributing the proceeds among the States, whose property they are, would relieve the burdens of the indebted States, and give the others a chance for such enterprises as might best promote their interests.

Providence has assigned us a rich, productive, and glorious heritage, and established among us and over us a new, regenerate, and admirable system of Government. It has been abused, indeed; but it is good. All we want is good and faithful men at the head of it. The wealth of the country is inexhaustible, and the enterprise of the people is unsubdued, notwithstanding all our late misfortunes. Give them a good Government, and they can not help going ahead, and outstripping every nation on the globe.

§ 36. *The chances of life in this Country.*

Ours is a country, where men start from an humble origin, and from small beginnings rise gradually in the world, as the reward of merit and industry, and where they can attain to the most elevated positions, or acquire a large amount of wealth, according to the pursuits they elect for themselves. No exclusive privileges of birth, no entailment of estates, no civil or political disqualifications, stand in their path; but one has as good a chance as another, according to his talents, prudence, and personal exertions. This is a country of *self-made men*, than which nothing better could be said of any state of society.

§ 37. *The mutual dependence between the Government and the People.*

Nothing is more instructive to this point, than the chapter of our own history. Except as the Government, by its policy, shall enable the people to prosper, in a free country like ours, where tyrannical exactions can not be enforced, the Government itself can not prosper, but its finances will be embarrassed as soon as its own measures shall have brought embarrassment and distress on the people. A crippled and disheartened population, who have no money, either to pay taxes or buy luxuries, can not send money into the public treasury. While they are poor, the Government will be poor.

§ 38. *A Retrospect.*

Understanding, as we now do, if what we have said is correct, the relation between the labor of the country and its moneyed capital, we must look back with astonishment at the policy of the Federal Administration, from 1829 to 1841, when the cry rung through the land, and never ceased—**DOWN WITH THE BANKS! DOWN WITH MANUFACTORIES! DOWN WITH CORPORATIONS! DOWN WITH CAPITALISTS!** It is a history that one can hardly believe in!

While memory lasts, and fathers are capable of telling the story to their children; while true Americans are endowed with concern for the welfare of the country, and have virtue enough to stand up for its interests; and while history may be relied upon to discharge its impartial functions, it will not fail to stand stereotyped in the minds of the American people, to be rehearsed to the listening and succeeding generation, and recorded in the annals of this nation, that, for the period above named, we had a *re-lapse* and *col-lapse* in our national welfare, never to be forgotten; that an unlucky star rose in our hemisphere, ascended to its meridian, and marched to the western hills, leaving an OMINOUS TAIL BEHIND; that the people were persuaded for a time, that it was the TRUE SUN, and were hard to be convinced of its eccentric and ill boding character; that it brought famine, pestilence, and death; that demagoguism was the rage of its season, inoculating the poor with a mania against the rich, and the laborer with jealousy against the moneyed capitalist; that the love of ONE MAN POWER, was the chief malady that afflicted the nation, and its ascendancy the most remarkable occurrence of the time; that the long-established, simple, and democratic habits of the people, social and political, were superseded by the dictation of a Chief, and by the aristocratic assumptions of his menials; that new, unheard-of, and destructive doctrines were promulgated for the government of the country; that a well-ordered system of currency was broken up and destroyed; that the useful relations between capitalists and the laboring classes, were violently assailed, and so far dissolved, as to bring great distress on the industrious and working population; that States and large corporations were first enticed to enlist in great enterprises, and then forced to suspend them, and to stop payment, by sudden changes in the policy and measures of the Government; that our credit at home was prostrated, and abroad became the by-word and scorn of nations; that the shameless doctrine of the Repudiation of debts, was for the first time avowed and sanctioned by legislative authority; that the superstructure and very foundations of society were shaken in the general convulsion; in short, that times, modes, customs, morals, and manners underwent a complete revolution, so that the republic that *was*, could hardly be recognised in the new state of things.

It was because the relation of labor to moneyed capital, was entirely mistaken and misrepresented, and a war of Government made upon the latter, as if it was the natural enemy of the former.

§ 39. *The Future.*

The dawn of a brighter day has gleamed, or begins to gleam on this long-suffering and much-abused nation. The last (27th) Congress, notwithstanding the TREASON and all its attendant difficulties, gave us a Tariff, which has put us in a position to start for the recovery of a long lost national prosperity. This great boon of Whig policy has operated like a charm on every branch of the business and trade of the country, has brought back the specie, the absence of which had undermined our currency, and the people are beginning to open their eyes to the true character of that Destructive Dynasty through which we have passed. They see what ruin it brought upon us, and begin to understand the causes—especially do they see, that the war of Government on the long-established monetary system of the country and its great commercial and financial agencies, was a war on its labor and industry. This great discovery will lead to important results. The prophecies of the faithful, uttered in dark days, being now interpreted by their fulfilment, the prophets themselves will be honored. What have we suffered as a nation, that was not foretold as the necessary consequence of that destructive policy? What of good was predicted, in the beneficent operation of a Tariff like that of 1842, which the brief experiment does not begin to shower upon us? Who are they that foretold these things? Who is CHIEF among them? The sad and gloomy days of our political misfortunes, it is to be hoped, are drawing to a close. The steady counsels of HENRY CLAY, once and for a long time spurned, are now beginning to be appreciated. The eyes and hopes of the nation are turned and turning to that bright STAR OF THE WEST, and the suffrages of a great people are waiting to honor him. It is yet indeed a *contingent* future, into whose vista we gaze with an interest so profound and intense, and with hopes not unmingled with concern, because it is contingent. Nevertheless, there are certain and numerous facts, rising thick and fast, out of the past and the present, the grateful import of which can hardly be mistaken. The people are waking; they are coming; and in 1844, as in 1840, their power is likely to be felt. Now, as then, they understand what is to be done, to make miscreants tremble, and drive traitors for ever from power and influence. Enough of mischief, surely, has been achieved; LET US TRY FOR THE GOOD.

§ 40. *Revolutions never go backward.*

Under our form of Government, other revolution than that of opinion, is impossible. Can anybody doubt there was a great revolution of this kind in 1840? And where is that feeling? Have the people changed their minds? They would not *act*, till the time of *rescue* should come, and the silly crew at the head of affairs, took the people's *disgust* as a compliment to their *treason*! The *banished* horde also took courage. But the sleeping-fires have only been made hotter, by that respect for order which sealed them up, and for a time repressed them. The internal pressure tends upward, to open a place of utterance ere long, and cast its broad light on the dark upper sky, and thence to astonish those below. A free nation, once convinced of its wrongs, must be avenged, and wo to them who have done the wrong! BACKWARD? OR FORWARD? is the question for this nation to answer, and it will be answered. They have chosen a LEADER, and the cry is—ONWARD!

§ 41. *The means.*

Much of precious time, and of useful appliances, has been lost, irrecoverably. There is a partial remedy, however, in a more diligent application of time and means yet on hand. Will not they who can speak, make themselves heard; they who can write, take the pen; they who can work, begin to stir; and they who have money, give it freely, at the call of the country? Where is the virtue of '76? The Destructive Dynasty has done us infinitely worse things, than the British Crown ever did. Shall a confidence in our Captain—he is a good one, truly—put us asleep on our arms? After the battle, let us hope for the repose, which, in many conflict, shall have been purchased.

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THE PUBLIC LANDS.

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THE PUBLIC LANDS.

§ 1. *The Question.*

THE question we have to consider is—What were the *conditions* of the Deeds of cession of the public domain from the States to the United States, what were the *purposes* of those acts as understood by the parties, and what *practical rule or rules* will result from them, for the administration of this great estate, and for the disposition of its proceeds?

§ 2. *The original Controversy which led to these Cessions.*

It should be understood, that while the Colonies were parts of the British empire, the public lands were chiefly owned, under charter rights from the Crown, by Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, while the other of the thirteen original States had no interest in them. It will be apparent, however, that the perils, toils, cost of blood and treasure, and other sacrifices of the Revolutionary struggle, fell equally upon all the States, while the debts were rapidly accumulating, and in the end rose to a great and oppressive magnitude. It was impossible, in these circumstances, to repress the question, Whether it was fair, that the States which had no interest in the titles of the public lands, should be obliged to fight, shed their blood, and pour out their treasures *equally* in defence of this vast territorial domain, and finally be excluded from all participation in the benefits? More than this, whether they should be left in the end, with a debt upon their shoulders, without means or power to meet it, while the other States, which would have done no more, would have an estate large enough for an empire, and valuable beyond estimation? No one can deny the pertinence of such a question. It was unanswerable.

§ 3. *The political Character of the Confederation.*

It was a mere association of separate sovereignties, for common good, and for a common end. We were not a nation, in the common sense of the term, till the adoption of the Constitution, unless the States be regarded in the light of so many nations, having all the attributes of sovereign powers, as was actually the case. Of course, in this view, we were not *one* nation, but *several*, which leaves the matter as we feel obliged to represent it. The Confederation was capable of dissolution; the Union is not, except by violence. The question about the public lands, as it existed among the States, was started, agitated, and settled by them, in their capacity and character, as *independent sovereignties*, not as integral portions of a republican empire. For a right understanding of the case, in determining the question before us, it is necessary, that this state of things should be kept in view.

§ 4. *The Action of the old Congress on this Subject.*

Contemporaneously with the agitation of this question among the States, Congress, for several years, sympathized, and formally expressed their views and purposes. To check the progress of discontent, and suppress controversy between the parties to this question, they had recommended a cession of these territories to the United States for common use and benefit, and in October, 1780, "*Resolved*, that the unappropriated land that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States, by any particular State, pursuant to the recommendation of Congress of the 6th of September last, shall be disposed of for the *common benefit* of the United States," that is, of the *confederated* States, such being their position at the time, before the Union, under the Constitution, was conceived. The recommendation alluded to and this resolution were held out as a *lure* to the States, and as a *security* of their rights in the public domain. Considering the character of the Government at that time, under the Confederation, it was precisely the same as saying to the States, in order to remove all grounds of jealousy and concern—*You shall in no wise lose your rights in this property, as STATES. It was to rescue the lands from controversy between the States, that this arrangement was recommended and consummated, and not to invalidate their title as parties. It is obvious, if the States, which owned the lands, were unwilling to give a part interest in them to the other States, that they would never entertain the idea of making over the whole to a third party, and all for the benefit of that party. It would be absurd to suppose, that such was the case. But the term "United States," at that time, was synonymous with confederated States, and that settles the point.*

§ 5. *The Deeds of Cession.*

It is to be observed, that the States, which owned the public lands by charter rights, were slow and reluctant to part with them, and it was only a sense of justice to the other States, and of the necessities of the country, that finally prevailed. New York came first into the arrangement, in 1780. Virginia, whose domain was vast, held the question in suspense, till 1783, and although the resolution of Congress, in the foregoing section, was couched in terms expressly to guaranty the ultimate destination of the avails or proceeds of the lands

to the States, in their *State capacity*, yet, to make the security doubly secure against any possible future interpretation of the cession into a *quitclaim*, the Legislature of Virginia selected the most explicit terms to guard and defend this point, in their act of cession, as follows:—"That all the lands within the territory so ceded, and not reserved," &c., "shall be considered a COMMON FUND, for the use and benefit of such of the United" (confederated), "States as have become, or shall become, members of the Confederation, or Federal alliance of the said States, Virginia inclusive, ACCORDING TO THEIR USUAL RESPECTIVE PROPORTIONS in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be FAITHFULLY AND BONA FIDE disposed of for that purpose, AND FOR NO OTHER USE OR PURPOSE WHATSOEVER."

Massachusetts followed in 1784, and having the law of Virginia before them, must have intended the same thing. In 1786, Connecticut passed her act of cession "to the United" (confederated) "States, in Congress assembled, for the common use and benefit of the said States, Connecticut inclusive." In 1787, South Carolina ceded her vacant territory "to the United States, in Congress assembled, for the benefit of said States." In 1789, North Carolina ceded in terms as follows:—"All the lands intended to be ceded by virtue of this act, shall be considered as a COMMON FUND for the use and benefit of the United" (confederated) "States of America, North Carolina inclusive, ACCORDING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AND USUAL PROPORTION in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be FAITHFULLY disposed of for that purpose, AND FOR NO OTHER USE OR PURPOSE WHATSOEVER." The cession from the State of Georgia was made in 1802, the conditions of which are as follows:—"That all the lands ceded by this agreement to the United States, shall be considered as a COMMON FUND, for the use and benefit of the United States, Georgia included, and shall be faithfully disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatever."

§ 6. Exposition of the Deeds.

First, it is to be considered, that they originated and were matured under the *Confederation*, when the States existed as independent sovereignties, with their separate systems of political economy. The agitation of the question commenced early in the history of the Revolutionary war, and the principles of cession were settled before 1780, in which year the old Congress, as we have seen, acted formally on the subject, first, by recommending this course to the States, and next, by adopting a resolution to secure the rights of the States. The acts of cession by six of the seven ceding States, bear the following dates:—that of New York, 1780; of Virginia, 1783; of Massachusetts, 1784; of Connecticut, 1786; of S. Carolina, 1787; of N. Carolina, 1789; and the Constitution was adopted in 1789. Thus it appears, that the whole plan was fixed in that state of things, which existed under the Confederation. This is an important fact in the question of interpretation, as it goes to show in what sense the terms and phraseologies of the Deeds of cession were used. The States at that time had no ideas of the UNION, as embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and as entertained since its adoption; but they all looked to their separate interests as paramount with them to all other considerations. In this view, let us examine the terms and phraseologies of the Deeds. 1. "Shall be considered a *common fund* for the use and benefit of *such of the United*" (confederated) "States, as have become, or shall become, members of the *Confederation*, or *Federal alliance* of the said States." The words "*common fund*," and "*such of the United States*," in connexion with what follows, most clearly constituted the *States*, in distinction from the *Confederation*, as the parties to be benefited by this arrangement. Every one will see, that such language was not required in a cession to the *nation*, for the use and benefit of the nation, and that it is incredible it should have been employed for that object. 2. "Virginia inclusive," "Connecticut inclusive," "North Carolina inclusive," "Georgia included." This, it will be observed, is a legal technicality, arising from the principle of law, that when one party of two or more parties, makes a conveyance to the others, as in this case, the party executing the deed retains no right, but conveys *all* title, except by the introduction of this saving clause, as "Virginia inclusive," which leaves Virginia her title, according to the terms specified. If the cession had been made for the use and benefit of the United States as *one nation*, Virginia of course would have been *included*, and there would have been no need of this phrase; but as it was manifestly made for the use and benefit of the *States*, in their separate capacities, it was necessary in law to introduce this phrase, to save the right of Virginia, else she would have retained none. If there were no other evidence of the *intent* of this instrument, as being for the *States*, and not for the *nation*, this alone would be conclusive. 3. "According to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure." Here is the *rule* of distribution. It would be strange, indeed, that it should be possible to suppose that no distribution was intended, when the *rule* is given! Can anything be more clear? 4. "Shall be faithfully and *bona fide* disposed of for that purpose." "Bona fide," in good faith. But what faith is required for a party to manage its *own for itself*? If the public domain is the property of the United States as a *nation*, there is no faith with the *States* concerned in its administration. 5. "And for no other use or purpose whatsoever." If these lands were not given in trust for the use and

benefit of the States *as such*, then the contracting parties are chargeable with the absurdity of agreeing, that they shall not be disposed of for the use and benefit of foreign powers! Was there any apprehension of that?

With these *express and explained* conditions (it is remarkable that they were *explained by expiutive phraseology*), the General Government *accepted* the trust, and became a party to the covenant. It was to settle a most serious difference, an alarming controversy among the States—a controversy which had well nigh lost us our independence, and which, if continued, would have rendered independence of little avail. It was a great compromise, such as has frequently characterized our history in our more critical emergencies. But the States took care not to surrender their rights.

§ 7. *The Deeds of Cession, Deeds of Trust.*

In all cases of trust, the trustee is not proprietor of that which is put into his hands, but an agent bound by the instructions of the instrument that invests him with his functions. This is a principle which is perfectly understood, because it is one constantly practised in society, in the administration of common law and statute regulations. In the case of *Jackson vs. Clark*, Supreme Court, U. S., 1 Peters, 635, Chief Justice Marshall, after having cited the terms and conditions of the Virginia cession, as we have done above, says—"The Government of the United States, then, received this territory *in trust*, not only for the Virginia troops on the Continental establishment, but also for the use and benefit of the members of the *Confederation*: and this *trust* is to be executed, by a faithful and *bona fide* disposition of the land for that purpose. We can not," says the Chief Justice, "take a retrospective view of the *then* situation of the United States, without perceiving the importance which must have been attached to this part of the *trust*," &c. Throughout his argument, in this decision, the Chief Justice uniformly calls these Deeds of Cession "*a trust*;" and there is probably no man who would presume to call this authority in question.

In 1825, the Hon. Rufus King, of New York, introduced a resolution into the Senate of the United States, having in view the appropriation of the proceeds of the public lands, *by the States*, to the emancipation and colonization of slaves, with the consent of parties, which began thus:—"Resolved, that as soon as the portion of the existing funded debt of the United States, for the payment of which the public land is *pledged*, shall have been paid off," &c. Of this resolution, Chief Justice Marshall, in a letter of Dec. 14, 1831, to the Rev. R. R. Gurley, Sec. of the Am. Colonization Society, says:—"I have always thought, and still think, that the proposition made by Mr. King, in the Senate, is the most *unexceptionable*," &c. This term, "*unexceptionable*," we suppose, refers to the *right* of the States to the proceeds of the public lands, as the recognised ground of Mr. King's resolution.

Mr. Madison, in a letter to the same gentleman, on the same subject, Dec. 29, 1831, says: "My thoughts and hopes," (for the aid of Colonization,) "have long been turned to the rich fund presented in the Western lands of the nation, *which will soon entirely cease to be under a pledge for another object*." General Jackson, in his message of Dec., 1832, says: "As the lands may now be considered as *relieved from the pledge*, the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished," &c.

These several authorities, in view of the language of the Deeds of cession, will doubtless be regarded as sufficient to establish the "*Trust*."

§ 8. *The Principle of Distribution recognised in the Trust.*

"According to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure." Here, as will be seen, is at the same time the *principle* and the *rule*. That such was the understanding of the compact between the States on one side and the United States on the other, is evident, first from the fact that the Deeds of Cession were familiar to all the parties before they were finally ratified, and next from the fact, that the United States *accepted* the trust on this condition and with these instructions. If there had been nothing *else*, either in the history of the time, or in the Deeds of conveyance, to settle and determine the *principle* of Distribution, this alone would fix it. But we know very well, that these Cessions were made under the *Confederation*, as the date and terms of them show, when each State looked after its own interests with a jealous eye. Hence we see the reason, why these Deeds are so carefully guarded against acts of usurpation and fraud on the part of the General Government, which, it was justly apprehended, might be committed on this immense estate. No one can read the history of that time and these documents, and not be convinced, that such was their *aim*; and if it *was*, and if it was so *understood* by all the parties, *that is enough*.

§ 9. *The Assumption of State Debts in 1790.*

As all the States, *united*, had fought the battles of the Revolution, and as one of the great advantages of independence *acquired*, would be the possession of the wealth of the public lands, it was only fair, that the States should be interested in these lands, "according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure." After long delays, and with great difficulty, this question was finally and equitably adjusted, and the General Gov-

ernment was made the TRUSTEE of the public domain, *for and in behalf* of the parties, proprietors, that is the *States*, as we have shown. But both the nation and the States were left under the burden of heavy debts at the close of the war. In 1790, with a population of about 3,000,000, and a gross national revenue of only \$2,382,617, the debts of the States were over \$20,000,000, and those of the United States, \$56,000,000. (See House Document No. 296, 3d session, 27th Congress, page 470.) As the General Government had in charge the public lands, the property of the States, *as security*, it was required by the States, that the United States should assume the State debts, chiefly incurred by the war, which was done in 1790, as follows:—For New Hampshire, \$300,000; for Massachusetts, \$4,000,000; for Rhode Island, \$200,000; for Connecticut, \$1,600,000; for New York, \$1,200,000; for New Jersey, \$800,000; for Pennsylvania, \$2,200,000; for Delaware, \$200,000; for Maryland, \$800,000; for Virginia, \$3,500,000; for North Carolina, \$2,400,000; for South Carolina, \$4,000,000; for Georgia, \$300,000. (See Document as above.)

To show the grounds of this assumption, and the consideration held in charge thereof, we need only cite the 22d section of the Act of assumption, as follows:—“*And be it further enacted, That the proceeds of the sales, which shall be made of lands in the Western Territory, now belonging, or that may hereafter belong, to the United States, shall be, and are hereby, appropriated towards sinking or discharging the debts, for the payment whereof the United States now are, or by virtue of this act, may be, holden, and shall be applied solely to that use, until the said debts shall be fully satisfied.*”

Here is a distinct recognition of the “Trust,” and a willing discharge of its obligations, *out of its avails*, or holding its avails in *mortgage*. As this debt could not be immediately paid, but must be necessarily funded, the transaction was in effect and simply a *loan* of the credit of the United States to the States, for their relief, the former holding the property of the latter *as security*, and being at the same time the Trustee and Agent of that property. It is called *assumption*. But so far from being a *gratuitous* assumption, it was a fair commercial transaction—a bargain to *pay*, for a valuable consideration—in this case, a *full and safe* consideration. The gratuity was rather from the States to the United States, in consenting to mortgage their property, to pay debts which had been contracted for the party that was made the Agent and Trustee of the public domain, if, indeed, it is proper to *erect* two such parties in the case. But we admit and maintain, that, in many important respects, regarding public policy, the States are *merged* in the United States, as parts of a whole, and that the interests of the former can not be easily separated from those of the latter, nor those of the latter from those of the former. The States were magnanimous, and consulted the general welfare, in putting the public domain in charge of the United States, when the country was in such straits; and for these reasons of a generous and noble character, they were and *are* entitled to equally generous, certainly to *fair* treatment from the other side.

§ 10. A great Sacrifice made by the States for the general Good.

The Articles of Confederation proved totally inadequate for the necessities of the country, especially in regard to the power of raising revenue, which is the life of any government. With a public debt of nearly *eighty millions*, and a revenue of less than *two millions and a half*, what was to be done? It was in these straits that the reorganization of the General Government was conceived, and the Constitution of the United States was adopted, to get out of these difficulties. In the consummation of this great work, the States were called upon to sacrifice all their power of raising revenue by imposts, and to fall back on their internal resources and direct taxation, for all the necessities of their respective commonwealths. It was a great demand, certainly; but they generously, magnanimously made the sacrifice, for the general good, and deprived themselves forever of this important, it might be called indispensable power of political sovereignties. Had they not known, that the public lands were theirs, subject only to the debts of the United States then existing, would they, *could* they, in safety and common prudence, have done this?—Never. But it was done—done in good faith—done for the public weal, from the most patriotic motives, and the States were left to get along as they could, till the lien of the public debt on the public lands should be worked off through the agency of the General Government. Give back to the States this power of raising revenue by imposts, which was so nobly resigned by them to the United States, and Pennsylvania, with the customs of Philadelphia, and of her other entrepôts in her hand, might laugh at her debt of *forty millions*. Every indebted State of the Union could relieve itself at once, and the non-indebted States might enter on magnificent schemes of internal improvement. But what would become of the United States?—The Union would be dissolved, because it could not subsist without this power. The States might justly claim a *consideration* for the resignation of it; but they modestly ask only that which *was* their own, and *is* their own.

§ 11. Another Sacrifice.

Patiently the States waited for the liquidation of the public debt, when, in 1812, while the debt was yet considerable, we were overtaken with the second war with Great Britain, and

came out of it with a debt of \$168,000,000. Though the public lands were not liable for this new debt, still the States generously allowed the proceeds of their own property to be applied to its extinguishment, and it was not till 1836, that the first dividend was awarded in the shape of a *deposit* of surplus revenue from the National Treasury, the States being held liable to Treasury warrants at any time for its repayment!

§ 12. *Early Views of the Government as to the legitimate Source of Federal Revenue.*

It will be found by an examination of the Journals of the old Congress, while the Deeds of Cession of the public lands from the States were going on, that the lands were not looked to as a source of revenue for the *ordinary* purposes of the Government, but that the most strenuous efforts were made to mature and establish a revenue system by imposts, adequate, not only for current expenses, but to pay the interest and principal of the public debt. (See Ho. Doc. 296, 3d sess., 27th Cong., p. 177, and onward.) These efforts were continued, till the consummation of the plan in the adoption of the Constitution, the powers of which were supposed and intended to answer this purpose. They are doubtless ample. Not a word is said, not a symptom is manifested, in this early history of the Government—burdened as it was with debt, slender as was its revenue—not a word of reliance on the public lands to answer the permanent necessities of the Federal authorities. Nothing can be stronger than this negative evidence, to show the true position which the public lands occupied in the public mind of that period—that they were not regarded as the property of the nation, and could never be legitimately relied upon for the ordinary purposes of Federal revenue.

§ 13. *General Jackson's Opinion on Distribution.*

In his first Message, 1829, after alluding to the different opinions on internal improvement by the General Government, but acknowledging its importance, he says: "To avoid these evils, it appears to me, that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue, would be its apportionment among the several States, according to their ratio of representation."

In the annual message of 1830, speaking of internal improvement, and of distributing surplus funds among the States for that object, he says:—

"That the plan under consideration would derive important advantages from its certainty, and that the moneys set apart for these purposes would be more judiciously applied, and economically expended, under the direction of the State Legislatures, in which every part of each State is immediately represented, can not, I think, be doubted." Again: "Each State would receive its quota of the national revenue from a fixed principle, as a matter of right, and from a fund to which it had itself contributed its fair proportion."

In the message of December, 1832, he says:—

"Among the interests which merit the consideration of Congress, after the payment of the public debt, one of the most important, in my view, is that of the *public lands*. Previous to the formation of our present Constitution, it was recommended by Congress, that a portion of the waste lands owned by the States, should be ceded to the United States, for the purposes of general harmony, and as a fund to meet the expenses of the war. The recommendation was adopted, and at different periods of time, the States of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, granted their vacant soil for the uses for which they had been asked. As the lands may now be considered as relieved from this pledge, the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished, it is in the discretion of Congress to dispose of them in such way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general interest of the American people." . . . "It seems to me to be our true policy, that the public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source of revenue."

We have not been accustomed to regard General Jackson as *openly* recognising the right of the States to the proceeds of the public lands; but we think he has hit the main and most important *historical* points in the above cited passages, although he may have avoided the conclusions to which they tend. Inadvertently, or otherwise, he has, with equal simplicity and truth, recognised the facts, that these lands were "*owned by the States*," when the cession was proposed by the United States; that the *object* of the recommendation was "for general harmony, and as a fund to meet the expenses of the war;" that the cessions were made "for the uses for which they had been asked;" that a time had arrived, when these lands were "*relieved from the pledge*" of cession, "*the object for which they were ceded having been accomplished*;" that the States would receive their respective "*quotas of national revenue, as a matter of right*," &c. It was difficult to go into this subject historically, and not bring out the truth—difficult not to have some sound reflections upon it, if it were touched at all. We are perfectly satisfied with what General Jackson has proved, and with his opinion, that "*the public lands, as soon as practicable, should cease to be a source of revenue*" to the General Government.

§ 14. *Mr. Van Buren's Opinion.*

When we can find this gentleman in the right place, we like to hold him there, *if possible*. In 1826, Mr. Van Buren said:—

"No man could render the country a greater service, than he who should devise some plan, by which the United States might be relieved from the ownership of this property" (the public lands)

"by some equitable manner. He believed that if these lands were disposed of at once to the several States, it would be satisfactory to all."

In his letter to Sherrod Williams, 1836, in which he declares his opposition to the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the States, is the following remarkable passage:—

"In respect to the public lands, I need only observe, that I regard the public domain as a *trust fund, belonging to all the States, to be disposed of for their common benefit*. Ample authority for that purpose is conferred on Congress, by an express provision of the Constitution."

To account for this passage in a document, which, in other particulars, makes a decided set-*against* Distribution, it is proper to observe, that it is quoted by Mr. Van Buren himself, from a former letter to his constituents in the State of New York, *apparently* for the purpose of satisfying those who agree with him, so far as this quotation from an old letter of his is concerned. Mr. Van Buren, as is partly suspected, has an eminent faculty of throwing out crumbs flavored for the tastes of all sorts of appetites.

§ 15. Mr. Calhoun's Proposal.

It is to cede all the public lands to the States in which they lie, and hold those States debtors to the national treasury for a price, a little more than nominal, to be fixed by law, and suited to the generosity of a parent towards a child. It assumes, that this property belongs to the nation, and not to the States, and that the new States have a natural right to their own soil. Of course, all the thirteen original States, and some others, would be cut off at once from *their* rights, and from all benefit, except so far as the national treasury might get something, an event not very certain, if the new and favored States should take it in their heads to repudiate, or ask to be discharged. Not to speak of the injustice, the *fraud* of such a measure towards the States which fought the battles of the Revolution, and which have ever been accustomed to think, that the public domain was one of the things bought with their blood and treasure, suppose the States so munificently endowed, at such vast expense of the old States, should at any time refuse to pay the *nominal* purchase-money—Who and what power is to collect it? And what would be the consequence of enforcing collection? The Nullifier might indeed be a *breeder* of nullification, and the feeling left behind by such a measure would be ill calculated to secure domestic harmony.

§ 16. Mr. Jefferson on Internal Improvement.

Mr. Jefferson, in his annual Message of 1806, after noticing the rapid liquidation of the public debt, and the prospect of surplus revenue not far ahead, says:—

"The question now comes forward—To what other object shall these surplusses" (anticipated) "be appropriated, and the whole surplus of imposts, after the entire discharge of the public debt, and during those intervals when the purposes of war would not call for them? *Shall we suppress imposts, and give that advantage to foreign over domestic manufactures?* On a few articles of more general and more necessary use, the suppression will doubtless be right; but the great mass of the articles on which impost is paid, are foreign luxuries, purchased by those only who are rich enough to afford themselves the use of them. Their patriotism would certainly prefer its continuance and application to the *great purposes of public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvement*, as it may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumeration of Federal powers. By these operations, new channels of communication will be opened between the States, the lines of separation will disappear, their interests will be identified, and their Union cemented by new and indissoluble ties."

It will be seen, that this plan of Mr. Jefferson, for the application of surplus funds, is more enlarged and more comprehensive, than has ever been proposed from the Executive Chair. As, in his opinion, it surpassed the powers of the Constitution, he earnestly proposed such alterations as might be required to embrace these objects. It will further be observed, that Mr. Jefferson appears here, not only as a staunch advocate of the doctrine of *protection* by a tariff of duties, but makes an appeal to the *patriotism* of those who pay duties on luxuries for that object, to make them satisfied with their continuance.. [See Tract No. III., page 5, for further views of Mr. Jefferson on protection.]

§ 17. General Jackson on Internal Improvements.

In his annual Message of 1830, is the following passage, being part of a labored argument on the subject:—

"It may sometimes happen that the interests of particular States would not be deemed to coincide with the general interest, in relation to improvements within such States. But if the danger to be apprehended from this source is sufficient to require it, a discretion might be reserved to Congress to direct such improvements of a general character as the States concerned might not be disposed to unite in, and the application of the quotas of those States, under the restriction of confining to each State the expenditure of its appropriate quota. It may, however, be assumed as a safe general rule, that such improvements as serve to increase the prosperity of the respective States in which they are made, by giving new facilities to trade, and thereby augmenting the wealth and comfort of the inhabitants, constitute the surest mode of conferring permanent and substantial advantages upon the whole. The strength as well as the true glory of the Confederacy is founded on the prosperity and power of the several independent sovereignties of which it is composed, and the

certainly with which they can be brought into successful active co-operation through the agency of the Federal Government."

Nothing can be more manifest, from this and what we have before quoted, than, that General Jackson was a Land-Distribution and Internal Improvement man "*at heart*;" but Mr. Clay had taken the lead, and General Jackson was not a man to follow. He wanted to come at the same ends, by different routes; or he would follow up an endless labyrinth, instead of the open and public highway. That he favored Internal improvement and Distribution, no one can doubt. The above-cited passage, and other things of the kind in his messages, together with his *almost* recognition of the rights of the States in the public domain, as before shown, in our opinion, had more influence in securing his second election, than has usually been supposed. These two great objects have ever been popular, when put to a fair and unembarrassed issue. Internal Improvement was arrested only by the *regal* power of the Constitution, *THE VETO*, when the voice of the nation, of the people, of the democracy, was in its favor; and the Distribution policy has never been put to the test in the *democratic* branch of the Government, that is, in Congress, but that a large majority has uniformly sustained it. If we are rightly informed, the Legislatures of *twenty-two*, out of twenty-six States, have formally addressed Congress, or otherwise instituted action, in favor of it. Kingly power alone, in defiance of the popular will, has obstructed these great measures, for the largest part of one entire generation.

§ 18. *The Extent and Value of the Public Domain.*

The public lands unsold on the 31st of October, 1843, as certified by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, were 1,042,731,765 acres, which, at the minimum price fixed by law, would amount to 1,303,414,706 (*one billion, three hundred and three millions, four hundred and fourteen thousand, seven hundred and six dollars.*) [See Ho. Doc. 296, 3d sess., 27th Cong., page 238.]

§ 19. *Apportionment of the Value of the Public Lands to the States and Territories, estimated according to the present Federal Representation.*

If we apportion the above sum of \$1,303,414,706, the estimated value of the public lands, to the States and Territories, according to their right of representation in Congress, allowing one representative to the District of Columbia, the respective amounts which each State and Territory would be entitled to, will be as follows:—

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Maine will be entitled to..... | \$42,045,635 | Kentucky..... | \$56,060,847 |
| New Hampshire..... | 28,030,423 | Tennessee..... | 60,732,584 |
| Massachusetts..... | 56,060,847 | Ohio..... | 107,449,957 |
| Rhode Island..... | 18,686,949 | Louisiana..... | 28,030,423 |
| Connecticut..... | 28,030,423 | Indiana..... | 56,060,847 |
| Vermont..... | 28,030,423 | Mississippi..... | 28,030,423 |
| New York..... | 168,182,542 | Illinois..... | 42,045,635 |
| New Jersey..... | 32,702,161 | Alabama..... | 42,045,635 |
| Pennsylvania..... | 121,465,169 | Missouri..... | 32,702,161 |
| Delaware..... | 14,015,211 | Arkansas..... | 14,015,211 |
| Maryland..... | 37,373,898 | Michigan..... | 23,358,686 |
| Virginia..... | 79,419,534 | Florida Territory..... | 4,671,737 |
| North Carolina..... | 51,389,110 | Wisconsin "..... | 4,671,737 |
| South Carolina..... | 42,045,635 | Iowa "..... | 4,671,737 |
| Georgia..... | 46,717,372 | District of Columbia..... | 4,671,734 |

The cents and smaller fractions are dropped in this copy, which would make the footing a trifle less than the aggregate from which the apportionment is made.

§ 20. *Average Annual Proceeds of the Land Sales.*

The average annual and net proceeds of the sales of the public lands, from 1830 to 1840, inclusive, eleven years, were \$6,964,459, those of the whole period being \$76,609,059; as appears from the Treasury accounts. In the former part of this period, the increase of the sales was gradual, and may be considered healthful. About the middle of it, they rose to an unprecedented and unnatural amount, the proceeds of 1835 being \$14,757,600, and those of 1836, \$24,641,979, from which time they gradually fell off, till, in 1840, they had sunk to \$3,292,220, having started, in 1830, at \$2,329,356. The disastrous history of the twelve years Destructive Dynasty, which first inflated and then destroyed general credit, will account for this. As the land sales from 1828 to 1831 were considered moderate, showing an average annual increase of 23 per cent., as appears by Mr. Clay's report to the Senate in 1836, that is, more than doubling every five years, it may perhaps be assumed that the average annual proceeds, from 1830 to 1840, as above stated, are not very much, if at all, in excess of a natural and prosperous state of things, at the present period of our history, under a good

administration of the Government. Doubling the income every five years on \$2,322,356, which were the net proceeds of 1830, those of 1840 would have been \$9,317,424. As the annual sales are now gradually increasing again, it can hardly be many years, if the country should recover its fair condition of prosperity, before the proceeds from sales of the public lands will rise to *ten millions* a year. Be it more or less, *five*, or *seven*, or *ten* millions, it can not fail to be a very handsome and convenient sum, annually increasing, to be distributed among the States, according to their Federal representation. Assuming either of these, or any other given amount of annual proceeds, with a table showing the representation in Congress, to which each state is entitled, Senators included, it will be easy for any person to work out the respective annual distributions among the States, if the General Government shall finally award to them their just claims. When the proceeds shall be *eight millions* a year, the distribution for such year will be as follows:—

| | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|
| Maine..... | \$257,706 | Kentucky..... | \$344,086 |
| New Hampshire..... | 172,040 | Tennessee..... | 372,769 |
| Massachusetts..... | 344,086 | Ohio..... | 659,498 |
| Rhode Island..... | 118,279 | Louisiana..... | 172,040 |
| Connecticut..... | 172,040 | Indiana..... | 344,086 |
| Vermont..... | 172,040 | Mississippi..... | 172,040 |
| New York..... | 1,032,258 | Illinois..... | 257,706 |
| New Jersey..... | 200,716 | Alabama..... | 257,706 |
| Pennsylvania..... | 741,936 | Missouri..... | 200,716 |
| Delaware..... | 86,021 | Arkansas..... | 85,021 |
| Maryland..... | 229,356 | Michigan..... | 143,369 |
| Virginia..... | 487,455 | Florida..... | 28,673 |
| North Carolina..... | 315,412 | Wisconsin..... | 23,673 |
| South Carolina..... | 257,706 | Iowa..... | 28,673 |
| Georgia..... | 286,738 | District of Columbia..... | 28,673 |

When the annual proceeds shall rise to *sixteen millions*—they have been over *twenty-four millions*—double the above apportionments respectively, and they will be the quotas of distribution.

§ 21. Debts of the States.

In a report of the Secretary of the Treasury to Congress, 1842, compiled from official returns he had been instructed to invite, we have the following statement:—

| | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| Maine (indebted)..... | \$1,734,861 | Florida..... | \$4,000,000 |
| Massachusetts..... | 5,424,137 | Tennessee..... | 3,189,166 |
| Pennsylvania..... | 36,336,044 | Kentucky..... | 3,085,500 |
| New York..... | 21,797,267 | Michigan..... | 5,611,000 |
| Maryland..... | 15,214,761 | Ohio..... | 10,924,123 |
| Virginia..... | 6,994,307 | Indiana..... | 12,751,000 |
| South Carolina..... | 5,691,234 | Illinois..... | 13,527,292 |
| Georgia..... | 1,309,750 | Missouri..... | 842,261 |
| Alabama..... | 15,400,060 | District of Columbia..... | 1,316,030 |
| Louisiana..... | 23,985,000 | To these may be added, | |
| Mississippi..... | 7,000,000 | North Carolina..... | 1,050,000 |
| Arkansas..... | 2,676,000 | | |

The sum of these debts is a small fraction less than *two hundred millions*. In the lapse of two years some of them have been increased, some diminished, and others more correctly ascertained; but the sum total is supposed not to vary much from \$200,000,000. Most of them having been contracted for internal improvements, there is of course, to some extent, a *quid pro quo* in the hands of these States. The public works of the State of New York, for example, are much more than a balance for her indebtedness, and abundantly capable of liquidating the debt. Those of Pennsylvania will pay a part of the interest, and several of the States are able, not only to provide for the interest, but to manage the principal, though in most cases burdensome, while others do not, and a few can not pay even the interest. The spectacle, as a whole, presents a great and difficult political problem, in the question, How are these debts to be got rid of? The country can never be restored to a prosperous condition till this problem is solved.

§ 22. Who plunged the indebted States into these Difficulties?

We aver that it was done, and *all* done, by the action of the General Government. 1. By withholding from them the proceeds of the public lands since they became due, on the conditions of the trust. In House Document 296, 3d session, 27th Congress, pages 475 and 476, it is shown, from the books of the General Land Office, that the amount of proceeds

due to the States, Sept. 30, 1840, on account of the public lands, in the faithful execution of the trust, was \$142,018,766. This alone, distributed according to Federal representation, would have rescued the indebted States from all their embarrassments. 2. By instability of national policy, legislation, and government. It can not be denied that General Jackson was in favor of internal improvements, and that he proposed and recommended to supply the States with funds out of the national Treasury for that object. See the passage we have already cited from his Message of 1830, and other like things in his official documents. Observe his order to loan the Deposites. The announced policy of the Government at that time, as well as its acts, stimulated credit and enterprise in the States and everywhere. The projects of the States for internal improvement, were first suggested and prompted, and were fully authorized, by the General Government, and that Government proposed to supply the funds. Contemporaneously, Senator Wright said in his place, that "he was not afraid to recommend such an investment of the national funds, as the States would issue as many bonds as the Government might choose to buy." Verily, was not all this prompting, and a sufficient warrant? The States, instead of acting rashly, only conformed to the leadings of the General Government. But, as we all know, by sad experience, the General Government did not persevere in this policy, but, after having seduced the States into these projects and great expenditures, and tempted the whole country to extravagant enterprise, it turned short about, upset the States, upset the nation, upset everything! Who, then, we ask, is responsible for this wide-spread ruin, these frightful and long-protracted calamities of a great nation?

In coincidence with these suggestions, observe the history of the State debts. In 1830, when President Jackson so fully propounded his scheme of internal improvement by setting the States to work, and supplying them with funds out of the national Treasury, the whole amount of the State debts was only \$6,974,889; while the increase from 1830 to 1840, under the stimulus of these encouragements, amounted to \$178,409,084 of which \$87,366,010 took place in the defaulting States. [House Doc. 296, 3d sess., 27th Cong., page 47.]

§ 23. *What, therefore, is due to the States.*

We will not pretend to say what *else* ought to be done in such a case, but we think the States, and the people of the States, will expect and require that the original covenant between the States and the United States, respecting the public lands, should now be "faithfully and *bona fide*" executed. So zealous, so intent, so emphatic, were the parties of one part, in respect to the importance and sacredness of this compact; that they were not content with the qualifying word "*faithfully*," to express its obligations, but they put in the still stronger words, "*bona fide*," in good faith. If it were possible for any one to doubt the character of this instrument as a TRUST, by the terms in which it is constructed, we have the opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States, John Marshall, before cited, acting in his high judicial capacity, himself bearing testimony to its very special importance *as such*. Since, then, the case is so; since the States, in the adoption of the Constitution, resigned forever their power over revenue by imposts; since they acquired their title to the public domain by their own blood and treasure, while acting as independent sovereignties, under the Articles of Confederation; since, for purposes of harmony and general good, and in all good faith, they put this great estate in the hands of a common TRUSTEE, composed of representatives from themselves, acting under their authority; since the conditions of that trust, in giving its avails another direction than to the hands of the original parties, have long since been fulfilled, imposing the duty of rendering the proceeds of the property to its rightful owners; since the Government of the United States, by its own action, invited the States into expensive projects of internal improvement, more beneficial to the Union than to the States themselves, promising the States, or giving them good reason to expect, the aid of the public funds, it can not be deemed unreasonable, that the States should require and demand what is their own, to help themselves out of the difficulties in which the General Government has involved them by a violation of its faith. No favor is asked. It is simple JUSTICE.

§ 24. *The Prospect of a Surplus National Revenue.*

The Tariff of 1842 is doing wonders for us, and under the present rate of its operation in the increased production of revenue, we shall soon have another surplus in the national Treasury. The annual revenue is more than doubled by this measure. The protection given to our labor, industry, and productions, has relieved the country suddenly, and restored it to a condition of comparative prosperity, though it will take years, under this same beneficent Act, to get back to the place from which we were cast down by the Destructive Dynasty.

Suppose, then, that we go on under the present Tariff, it would not be strange, with a realization of present prospects, if, in five years, we should be able to spare from the national Treasury to the States, from imposts alone, *twice* as much as was voted in 1836. The amount of that, as determined by the Act, though it was not all realized, was \$37,468,859.

Double of this would be \$74,937,718. We take this sum, merely because it is more convenient to make out an apportionment, by doubling one already made to our hand for the half of it. To avail ourselves of this, however, we are forced to assume, as a rule of distribution, the Electoral Colleges of the period from 1830 to 1840. The distribution, by this rule, would be as follows :—

| | | | |
|----------------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Maine | \$2,548,902 | South Carolina | \$2,803,792 |
| New Hampshire | 1,784,230 | Georgia | 2,803,792 |
| Massachusetts | 3,568,462 | Alabama | 1,784,230 |
| Rhode Island | 1,019,560 | Mississippi | 1,019,560 |
| Vermont | 1,784,230 | Louisiana | 1,274,450 |
| Connecticut | 2,039,120 | Missouri | 1,019,560 |
| New York | 10,705,388 | Kentucky | 3,823,352 |
| New Jersey | 2,039,120 | Tennessee | 3,823,352 |
| Pennsylvania | 7,646,706 | Ohio | 5,352,694 |
| Delaware | 764,670 | Indiana | 2,294,010 |
| Maryland | 2,548,902 | Illinois | 1,274,450 |
| Virginia | 5,862,474 | Arkansas | 764,670 |
| North Carolina | 3,823,352 | Michigan | 764,670 |

Adopting the present Federal representation as the rule of distribution, this apportionment would vary somewhat. The quotas of Pennsylvania, and of some other States, would be increased, some would be diminished, and the relative proportions in a slight degree changed. It will be obvious, that the Territories should come in for a share. The object of this exhibit is merely to give a notion of something like what may be reasonably expected, from time to time, as occasion may require, provided we can once obtain a good government, maintain a suitable Tariff, and fully restore the prosperity of the country. This is no dream, but founded on the history of the past. Under a Tariff adequate to a fair protection of the interests of the country—fair as doing *relative* as well as *positive* justice—we could not fail soon to have a large annual surplus from the impost revenue and land fund, sufficient to answer all the purposes of the present public debt, if it be proper to call the State debts public. The reasons why these debts are proper to be considered in our national policy, are, *first*, because they affect our national interests, and can not be separated from them; *next*, because the General Government is bound by compact, as Trustee, to administer the estate of the public lands for the “sole use and benefit of the States, faithfully and bona fide,” since the lands are “relieved,” as General Jackson says, “from the original pledge;” *thirdly*, because many of the States require the relief which such an administration of the lands would give them; *fourthly*, because all the States would be benefited; and, *fifthly*, because the *United States* would be equally benefited. The States, even the most indebted, have no occasion to ask what is not due to them.

It is quite immaterial, however, whether the distribution be made on Mr. Jefferson’s and General Jackson’s principle of *expediency*, for national objects, or as a debt due the States on account of public lands. We have seen there is a balance yet behind of *one hundred and forty-two millions*, which, together with those annually accruing, will abundantly answer all the necessities of the States.

§ 25. *The great National Objects to be promoted by Distribution.*

Jefferson and Jackson, in the documents already referred to, have reasoned this matter out so well, that little is left for others to do. It is true they did not base their argument so much on the *right* of the States to the proceeds of the public domain, as on the *expediency* of the measure they proposed for great national objects; and professing to have scruples, and to respect the scruples of others, on the Constitutional question of Internal improvements, on such a large scale, by the General Government, they proposed to travel *round* this difficulty, and accomplish the same great and important end—Jefferson, by amending the Constitution, and Jackson by setting the States to work, and endowing them with the surplus funds of the national Treasury for that object. Now, it happens, that much of this work is already done by the indebted States, which has been the occasion of their debts. Acknowledge their claim to the proceeds of the public lands, in the past and in the future, and let them be distributed, and these debts will be provided for, while the non-indebted States will doubtless use their respective quotas, for the most part, in promoting the same great national objects. They have only to follow out the hints given in General Jackson’s Message of 1830. The work is there projected. And they would most naturally do it; for as General Jackson says: It may be safely assumed, that the public works which are best for the States, will be best for the Union.

§ 26. *The probable Effect of Distribution on Public Credit.*

The whole world is watching to see, whether the General Government will *relieve* the States, and nothing is required but to give the States their own. As things now are, as they

were fixed by the twelve years' Destructive Dynasty, and finally sealed by the present Chief Magistrate, in his Veto on the first Tariff bill of 1841, notwithstanding that he strongly recommended Distribution in his message, the indebted States are prostrate, and some of them can never rise again, without help from some quarter. It is *known*, that such is their helpless condition. Nobody expects they will ever be able to pay, without the proceeds of the public lands. But secure to them this RIGHT, of which they have so long been wrongfully deprived, and the VERY NEXT HOUR their credit would spring up from the grave, in which it has been rotting, and the world, which has assumed to rebuke and reproach them, as is always the fate of insolvent debtors, would take them again to the arms of its confidence and affection.

We know that the present proceeds of the public lands will not be a full relief, "*per se*," to the States which are most indebted; but it will be *some* help, and that will be augmenting every year. Their greatest need, in the present juncture, is a *foundation and warrant of credit*. Settle the land question, as justice requires, ordain a distribution of the annual proceeds among the States, according to their Federal representation, fix it so that the public, the world, may *rely* upon it, as an arrangement not to be disturbed, and it is a sufficient foundation for all the credit that is required, and many times more. Not only so, but it would probably enable the indebted States to fund their obligations, so far as occasion should require, for one half the interest they are now charged. The indebted States, the other States, the whole Union, would spring to their feet again, go to work with the joy of hope, and the world would smile on our prosperity, and confide in it.

§ 27. *There is now no Apology for not doing it.*

The Tariff of 1842 is pouring into the national Treasury more money than is wanted, and if it is permitted to continue, it will not be long, so far as the ordinary expenditures of the Government are concerned, before we shall have a *surplus* in the Treasury. That will not be a bad time to begin to pay the *one hundred and forty-two millions* due to the States, before noticed, as a balance *accrued* on account of the public lands. Then the indebted States might *pay up*, sustain and perfect their public works, and the non-indebted States might cross their territories with canals and railroads, as might be judged expedient. The remarks of General Jackson, as cited by us, page 7, section 17, are pertinent to this point. General Jackson was there proposing to appropriate funds out of the national Treasury for this object, and to constitute the States as *agents* to carry the plan into effect. It was very well said. We are glad to embrace such reasoning, coming from such a quarter, believing, that it is as well entitled to have weight with us, as with the somewhat warmer and more unqualified friends of General Jackson. On this platform, we would most heartily co-operate with those, who claim to be "*State-Rights Men*," and who have wasted as much declamation upon this topic, as they have on "*Democracy*," as if born to the name, at the same time that they have been doing *all they could to destroy* the States, as to their power and independence, and to build up and fortify a *regal* power in the White House, at the expense and with the sacrifice of true republicanism. We go for "*State-Rights*," in the *rights* of the States, and that is what we understand by it. We go for the *practical*, not for the *abstract*—for the *real*, not for the *visionary*. He who denies to the States the *right* to the proceeds of the public domain, we will *never* allow to be a "*State-Rights*" man. It is a contradiction *in terms*. The whole and inevitable tendency of the Anti-Distribution policy, is, to *concentrate power*, to *cripple* the States, and to fortify the Federal arm in acts of oppression and violence. This is one form of *Federalism*, and such are *FEDERALISTS*. [See Tract No. VI., on Democracy.]

§ 28. *The Effect of Distribution on the Sales.*

We assume, after what has been said, that Distribution is indispensable to the complete restoration of State and national prosperity. The indebted States can never rise without it; the others will feel the effect of the embarrassment or bankruptcy of their neighbors; and the States, in this position, will hang like a mill-stone on the neck of the United States. Consequently, this state of things, so long as it lasts, will be a great check to that spirit of enterprise, which is required for the purchase and occupancy of the vacant lands. In addition to this, and a greater obstacle still, the more desirable unoccupied lands lie in States most oppressed with debt, and few people will go where they will be liable to such a heavy burden of taxation. But take away these obstacles by Distribution, and the sales will increase with great rapidity, with the revival of general credit, and the credit of the States where the unoccupied lands are situated. Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, must inevitably remain very nearly *in statu quo*, while unrelieved by Distribution; but give them this, and they would spring forward in a new and rapid career at once. The same may be said of other western States, and of the Territories. The consequence of this would be a rapid increase of the *proceeds* of the sales, and of the benefits to the States to be derived therefrom.

§ 29. *The effect of Non-Distribution on Legislation.*

So long as reliance is placed on the proceeds of the public lands as a part of the national revenue, so long will the Tariff regulations be *fluctuating*, than which, a greater commercial evil could scarcely be entailed on the country. The annual net proceeds from the sale of public lands, between 1830 and 1840, ranged from *three millions to twenty-four millions*. The operation of the Tariff of 1842, shows, that the proceeds of the lands will not be wanted by the General Government, so long as this Tariff lasts, and that there will soon be a surplus in the Treasury from the Tariff alone. Distribution, therefore, is now demanded, as well for the *STABILITY* of our Tariff regulations, as for reasons before given.

§ 30. *The Attempt to Repeal the Distribution Act of 1841.*

It is true, that Mr. Tyler's Veto of the first Tariff bill of 1841, rendered that Act inoperative for the present. Nevertheless, it remained a law, and only required the repeal of the restrictive clause, to give it immediate, permanent, and full effect, for *five years*, except in case of war; and the effect of this exception would tend very much to prevent war. But the wanton attack, made by the House of Representatives of the present (28th) Congress, on the Distribution law of 1841, and the fury with which they carried the repeal bill through that body the very day it was reported, by a strong party vote, under the previous question, evinces the deadly hostility of that party to such a measure, and their determination, that it shall never stand or be a law. Though no observing man doubted their sentiments before, yet this decided action shows the country what may be expected from that party on Distribution, as well as on the Tariff, both of which they are resolved to crush.

§ 31. *The Purchased Lands.*

It is true, that all the territories falling under the purchases of Louisiana and the Floridas, have been acquired as the property of the United States in their federal capacity. The principles of Mr. Jefferson and General Jackson, however, as recognised in these pages, are sufficiently broad and comprehensive, if they should be approved, to answer all the purposes of the States, in the existence of surplus funds in the national Treasury, which is sure to result from a good Government, except as it may be interrupted by the expenses of war. It will only be necessary to apply that power of the Constitution, Article IV., Sec. 3, which Mr. Van Buren, in his letter to Sherrod Williams, calls "*an express provision*,"—"ample authority," and which reads as follows:—"Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the *territory*, or other property, belonging to the United States," &c.

§ 32. *Alleged or Supposed Conflicting Interests of New States with Old States.*

It is fortunate that the time is nearly, if not quite gone by, when some effect could be produced by telling the new States, "*Claim the public lands in your own limits, and you can get them.*" This, certainly, could not easily be shown to be a very *honest* recommendation. Since, however, this seductive bait was thrown out in the "counter report" to the Senate, on the public lands, in 1832, and industriously propagated in other forms, it has been discovered by the new States, that a joint interest with all the other States, in a public domain of more than a *BILLION* of acres, is a richer inheritance than all they can find of public lands in their own bounds. Possibly, there may be two or three States that would like to have all those parts of the public domain which lie in their respective jurisdictions; but we doubt, whether any would be very fierce for it, when, by seizing upon or accepting it, they sacrifice all right and claim in the public lands *exterior* to themselves. They know, that the General Government has been generous to them, in its grants and bonuses for a variety of objects and considerations, and they have ceased to be influenced by another suggestion thrown out in the "counter report" of 1832, viz: that all the money paid for public lands is *drawn* from the States in which the purchased territory lies. It is seen, that the money, so applied, comes from *other* quarters, does not belong to the new States, and was never *there*, till carried by immigrants, and a part of it is disbursed on the spot by the expenses of the land offices. There is an *acquisition* in all such cases to the wealth of the new States, by the introduction of additional power to produce it; but nothing belonging there is taken away. Immigrants also, for the most part, have money left, after paying for their lands. The older States may be injured by the loss of their inhabitants and *labor* power, and to some extent are so. The money, of course, is drawn from those States which the immigrants came from, and is scattered over the Union. In 1832, it was stated, in a report to the Senate, that the greatest emigration was from the States of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The fear of collision, therefore, between the new States and the old, on this account, has chiefly subsided, as every new State almost instantly becomes an *old* one, as to its interest in the public domain.

Mr. Clay, in his speech on the public lands, 1832, after having alluded to the *concessions* of the new States as to the rights of all the States over the public domain, by the action of the former in various modes, says:—"The existence of the new States is a falsehood, or the right

of all the States to the public domain is an undeniable truth. They" (the new States) "have no more right to the public lands within their particular jurisdiction, than other States have to the mint, the forts and arsenals, or public ships within theirs, or than the people of the District of Columbia have to this magnificent Capitol, in whose splendid halls we now deliberate."

Mr. Clay concludes this speech as follows:—"Among the ties which bind us together, the public domain merits high consideration. And if we appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of that great resource, among the several States, for the important objects which have been enumerated, a new and powerful bond of affection and of interest will be added. The States will feel and recognise the operation of the General Government, not merely in power and burdens, but in benefactions and blessings. And the General Government in its turn, will feel, from the expenditure of the money which it dispenses to the States, the benefits of moral and intellectual improvement of the people, of greater facility in social and commercial intercourse, and of the purification of the population of our country, themselves the best parental sources of national character, national union, and national greatness. Whatever may be the fate of the particular proposition now under consideration, I sincerely hope that the attention of the nation may be attracted to this most interesting subject; that it may justly appreciate the value of this immense national property; and that, preserving the regulation of it by the will of the whole, for the advantage of the whole, it may be transmitted, as a sacred and inestimable succession, to posterity, for its benefit and blessing for ages to come."

§ 33. *Federal Power as opposed to State Rights.*

It will be seen, that, never, in the history of this country, has so flagrant a violation of the rights of the States been planned and systematically carried on, as in the attempt of the Federal Government, for a long course of years, to rob the States of their interest in the public lands. Every possible artifice to conceal the truth, or to obscure, mystify, and cloud what could not be concealed, and every muscle of the Federal arm, has been employed to defraud the original parties that created this republic, of the rich inheritance which they purchased with their blood and treasure: as if it were not enough for the States to give up the right of raising revenue by imposts, but advantage is taken of a *sacred trust*, to deprive them of their last and only heritage for sustaining their political powers. Prompted by the Federal authorities, they have done the work of those authorities, and then, when they have need of the wherewithal to pay for it, they only ask the proceeds of their own estate, and it is refused! As if it were not enough to rob, the insatiate appetite calls for the blood of its victims! The unnatural parent strangles her own children! Does not every one know, that the States can not subsist, unless they are relieved? And what power stands in the way of their relief, but the Federal Government? And by what means is it done, but by wrong? Have we not reason to fear a power, that is so fraudulently, so oppressively, so tyrannically exercised—whose tender mercies are cruelty? Crying "*State Rights*," they rob the States of their *dearest* rights! Preaching "*Democracy*," they wield the most hateful power of kings! It was by the munificence of the States, that the Federal Government was enabled to stand, and the prodigal gifts, bestowed in the form of a *trust*, are employed to crush the givers!

§ 34. *The Unity of the Union.*

One would think, that they who deal in *abstractions*, had discovered at last, how every State of this Union can be utterly ruined, and the *United States* be in a prosperous condition—that just in proportion as the States are in debt, in trouble, and perishing, the *United States* are enriched, happy, and farther removed from danger! How is it possible otherwise to account for their persistence in an apparent determination to *crush* the States, by an obstinate refusal to consider their helpless condition, and do an act of simple justice? But the fact is, and must necessarily be so, that the non-indebted States sympathize, politically and commercially, with the distressed condition of the indebted States, and this effect is unavoidable, by the nature of their alliance and companionship. If one suffers, all suffer. They are all at sea in the same boat, and if half go down, they must all go, unless, peradventure, the stronger shall throw the weaker overboard, and even then it would be difficult to cut the ties which bind them together. And what is this thing called the *United States*, that it should lift up its head on high, take on itself such airs of independence, mock at the misery with which it is surrounded, and think itself not at all concerned in it?—Has it never considered, that it is only a head, resting on the shoulders of a body?—that it partakes of the same vitality, is nourished by the same aliments, breathes the same air, in the use of common organs, and is nothing, and can do nothing, without the body?—that its pride, glory, and power, are sustained, and its purse supplied, by the hands and arms, the muscles and sinews, on which it looks down?—that in the pains of the body, itself must suffer, and if the body dies, itself will die? That abstraction of mind, which revels in dreams and visions, may do very well for a philosopher in his closet, who chooses to have nothing to do with the world, and who could blame nobody else, and possibly might hurt nobody else, if, in some fatal ex-

periment, he should blow himself up there. But, to sever a head from a trunk, without harm, is a nicer operation than surgical skill has yet attained to. But, this thing, called the *United States*, seems to think it possible for the head to live *independent* of the body!

§ 35. *A blind and heartless National Policy.*

Nothing could be more stolid, than that Federal policy, which sets up the theory, and acts on it, that the Federal Government has nothing to do, but to take care of itself. It is alike unpatriotic and treasonable to a high, most responsible, and vastly comprehensive trust. They who separate the interests of the Union from those of the States, undertake to perform a miracle; and those in power, who say, let the people take care of themselves, and the Government will take care of itself, are Sub-treasury men, and fit only for a despotism. They have no heart, and no sympathy for the common lot of mankind. Most of all are they unfit for a democratic state of society, and most-unfriendly to it.

§ 36. *The Principle of Sub-Treasury.*

That is what holds on so tightly to the public lands as Federal property. It seeks, in all manner of forms, to strengthen Federal power, at the expense of the States, and to the injury of all minor interests. The earliest and most remarkable instance of *Sub-treasury* in history, and the most graphic picture of the system, is found in the 47th chapter of Genesis, from the 15th to the 26th verses, under which the treasury of Pharaoh first swallowed up all the money of the people; next, their cattle were taken; then, their lands; and last of all, they sold themselves into perpetual bondage, to render to Pharaoh, in perpetuity, *one fifth* of the products of their labor; and they remained in slavery for ever afterward. When Spain exhausted the mines of South America, and in the end drew forth more than a *thousand millions* of bullion into the royal coffers, it was all done by *sub-treasurers*, while the people were taxed, worn out, and kept under. *Sub-treasurers* are always in favor of *direct* taxation, and that is the only way to maintain the system. Rome was free till the system of *sub-treasury* was introduced. So was it in Greece. So has it been in every country that has lost its freedom. The peculiarity of a *sub-treasury* system is, to separate the Government from the people, to raise it above them, to make it *independent*, and to make the people *dependent*—*slaves*. There is no sympathy between the parties, but a necessary and perpetual hostility of interests. The doctrine of true democracy is, that what is good enough for the people, is good enough for their governors; that the currency which will do for one party, must answer for the other; that *direct* taxation should be a last, and only a necessary resort; and that government has no rights except such as are derived from the people, and is set up to *serve* the people, not to be served by them.

§ 37. *The Obligations of Patriotism.*

We dislike to give a reason for doing an act of justice that is foreign to its claims. But here is the remarkable spectacle of a number of the States of this Union, with a mill-stone about their necks, tied on in the way and by an agency as we have described, hanging over an abyss, and if they fall in, are sure to carry with them all the other States and the United States. They can not be ruined alone, but will have companionship in their fall. When the States which were possessed of the public lands by charter rights, saw it was necessary to divide the interest with the other States, who were fighting side by side with them for freedom and for this great estate, and when they saw it was necessary to bind the sacrifice on the altar of the patriotism of that day, *they did so*, and left it in charge of the Agents of the Confederation, *pledged* to redeem the debts of the war, and then to be used for the common good of the parties, who carried the nation through the struggle by their joint efforts and sacrifices, and of such other members of the family as might come in afterward. It was a great, generous, noble, patriotic sacrifice—worthy of the men and of the time. After the war, as soon as the debts of the States and the nation could be conveniently ascertained, they were found to be about *eighty millions of dollars*, on about *three millions* of people, with an annual revenue from all quarters of less than *two millions and a half*! In this position of the Confederacy, the public lands, which had been so generously given up for this object, and only for this, were the pledge and anchor of public credit. But for this, there is reason to believe that the Republic, so loosely bound together, though victorious, would have been dissolved into worthless fragments. At the close of the second war with Great Britain, we shouldered a public debt of *one hundred and sixty-eight millions*, and paid it all off in *seventeen years*. But now, with no national debt worthy to speak of, with *eighteen millions* of people, with capabilities and resources unlimited, with from *thirty to forty millions* of revenue by imposts, with a land revenue, soon to rise perhaps to *ten millions*, and with an annual expense of Government not exceeding *twenty millions*, we dare not look in the face a debt of some *two hundred millions*, which happens to be saddled chiefly on about half of the States! Approach it we must, or it will come to us. There is no escape, nor should patriotism desire it. For the most part, we have had the *quid pro quo*, and are every day reaping the benefit

of it. This *quid pro quo*, take it as a whole, and properly used, is itself well nigh, if not quite, sufficient to pay the debt. So far as it consists in public improvements, the national benefit is incalculable, and the chief one. [See General Jackson's Message of 1830.] In a time of war, it might, and very probably would happen, that their worth for national uses, in the movements of armies, artillery, ammunition, and baggage, and in maintaining an easy and rapid communication between our public marine on the Atlantic and on the lakes and rivers, would exceed the entire cost of them all. But no matter for that. Their national value in a time of peace is immense. Nor is even this worthy of consideration, if we look at the justice of the claim. The public lands saved the nation once, and carried a far heavier, many times heavier debt, in proportion to our population and means, than that which they are now invoked to be pledged for; and it happens that they are the property of the present *debtors*; whereas, in the former case, the *owners*—now the *debtors* requiring relief, but still *owners*—freely gave them up, for a season, to pay the debts of *others*, and pledged them to the last farthing. The object was finally accomplished; but the Trustee, having taken a liking to the charge, chooses to hold on to it, and to use the avails by fraud, while the lawful proprietors are sinking under bankruptcy! Oh, patriotism! whither art thou fled?

§ 38. *The Discouraging and Ruinous Effect of Commercial Dishonor in a State or Nation.*

"Private credit is wealth; public honor is security. The feather that adorns the royal bird, secures him in his flight. Pluck him of his plumage, and you fix him to the earth."

The plumes which the world had allowed to stand in our cap, and which the world had admired, have been plucked and trampled under foot. While other nations can borrow money at 3 per cent., a public agent of our Government returned from Europe a year ago, having been everywhere refused a loan at 6 per cent. No nation that has claimed and been permitted to stand up on a footing of equality with the family of nations, in honor, credit, influence, and power, can stand a repulse of this description. It is a blow that strikes all and everything that belongs to us. "It fixes us to the earth." Abroad, our citizens are forced to blush at what they see and hear. Once courted and cherished in foreign parts, they are now shunned, and the finger of scorn is pointed at them. At home we are ashamed, and filled with self-reproach. And what is the cause? It is BECAUSE OF THESE STATE DEBTS. State bonds have been *protested*, and some have been *REPUDIATED*, by State authorities!

Besides the mortification, the dishonor operates more to our commercial disadvantage as a nation, in a single year, than the whole amount of the debt. As it is with an individual who has lost his credit, so is it with a nation. Neither can trade, but with great sacrifice, directly and indirectly. In Senate Document, No. 340, 2d session, 27th Congress, it is shown, that our domestic trade amounts to \$2,000,000,000 (*two billions*) a year, and our foreign trade, including exports and imports, rarely falls below \$200,000,000. It is stated, in House Document No. 296, 3d session, 27th Congress, that at that time, we were losing, in prices and by a bad currency, an average of 20 per cent. on the whole of our trade. Abate this loss *fifty per cent.*, or one half, and can it be doubted that, in our peculiar position of bad credit, and in the embarrassments arising therefrom at home and abroad, the loss on the whole of our trade (\$2,200,000,000) would average 10 per cent.? If such be the fact, the entire loss amounts to *two hundred and twenty millions annually*, being *twenty millions* in excess of the whole amount of the State debts! In addition to this, we are paying 50 per cent. more interest on our debt, than would be demanded of us, if our credit were good, which is equal to a funded debt of a *hundred millions* at a fair per cent. There is yet another consideration in the decline of the value of all kinds of property, through which the country has passed, and which can hardly be estimated for the vastness of the amount. [See Tract No. II, page 16.] Such are the *commercial disadvantages* resulting from the dishonored credit of a nation.

§ 39. *Mr. Clay's and Mr. Van Buren's position in regard to Distribution.*

As certain as Mr. Clay is in favor of Distribution, so certain is it, that Mr. Van Buren would veto any measure of the kind, however strong and decided might be the wishes of the people, or the vote of Congress in its favor. The people of this country, therefore, who feel the importance of this great national measure, will be aware of the importance of their vote at the approaching Presidential Election. Nor is it less certain that the Tariff would be sacrificed by Mr. Van Buren and his party, if they should ever have it in their power. These two great and vital measures, on which hangs the weal or wo of this country, according as they shall be maintained or destroyed, are the great stake of the coming contest. Others of vast, and many of less importance, are also at stake; but none so momentous as these. The question before the nation is—*SHALL THE LONG-PROTRACTED DESTRUCTIVE DYNASTY BE RESTORED, OR SHALL THE REPUBLIC BE SAVED?*

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ANNEXATION OF TEXAS.

BY JUNIUS.

Author of "THE CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY," and other Tracts of 1840.

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ANNEXATION OF TEXAS.

§ 1. Mr. Clay's Position on this Question.

It is defined in his Raleigh Letter, of April 17th, 1844, addressed to the Editors of the National Intelligencer.

1. He was opposed to the cession of Texas to Spain, in the treaty of 1819.

"When the treaty was laid before the House of Representatives," says Mr. Clay, "being a member of that body, I expressed the opinion which I then entertained, and still hold, that Texas was sacrificed to the acquisition of Florida."

2. Mr. Clay acknowledges the validity and bona fide obligations of the treaty of 1819.

"If," he says in this Raleigh letter, "we made too great a sacrifice in the surrender of Texas, we ought to take care not to make too great a sacrifice in the attempt to re-acquire it. . . . We have fairly alienated our title to Texas by solemn national compacts, to the fulfilment of which we stand bound by good faith and national honor. It is, therefore, perfectly idle and ridiculous, if not dishonorable, to talk of resuming our title to Texas, as if we had never parted with it. We can no more do it, than Spain can resume Florida, France Louisiana, or Great Britain the American Colonies, now composing a part of the United States."

The "national compacts" above alluded to, are, first, the treaty of 1819, and next, all our official recognitions of that transaction in our intercourse and arrangements with Mexico and Texas, based upon it, in regard to boundary, &c. Granting that the cession of Texas to Spain, in 1819, was unconstitutional, as some think, as we did it, we cannot plead our own laws to the prejudice of a foreign power, to whom we have made engagements. How could they know? Besides, if we choose to break the treaty by breaking our faith, on this ground, we lose the Floridas, our sole title to which is based on that instrument. It would be singular if a man should plead as an apology for violating a contract, that when he made it, he overlooked certain rules of action, which he had prescribed to himself! Is not this the principle involved in this case? If a man has sworn to his own hurt, as a just man he must abide by it. Such special pleading would be stamped by every fair mind as dishonest in a private individual—in a nation, infamous. Mr. Clay has always maintained, and still maintains, that, in parting with Texas, we committed an error to our own hurt. But to seize upon it now, on the ground of this error, would be shameful violence.

3. Mr. Clay thinks, that our recognition of the independence of Texas, on our own established, published, and well known principle of acknowledging the Government *de facto* (actual) of any country, without regard to other *de jure* claims (claims of right), does not at all affect the relations of Mexico and Texas, as belligerent parties.

"That negotiation," says Mr. Clay, "did not affect or impair the rights of Mexico, or change the relations which existed between her and Texas. She, on the contrary, has preserved all her rights, and has continued to assert them; and so far as I know, yet asserts her right to reduce Texas to obedience."

This position of Mr. Clay rests on matter-of-fact ground, and is incontestible. Our Government has proclaimed to all the world, that such is our doctrine, all the world know it, and such, invariably, has been our practice, till Mr. Tyler got up his treaty of annexation. There is no principle of our government longer established, better known, or more uniformly maintained. Every administration, till the present, has acted upon it. We have never before sought, but always declined to meddle with the controversies of foreign states and nations. It is a most delicate affair, when, for our own commercial advantage, we have acknowledged the independence of a state that is in controversy with a parent state for national rights, we go yet farther; while the dispute is pending, and undertake to decide it by our own arbitrary act, for our own benefit! Mr. Tyler says, in his message to the House of Representatives, of June 10th, "The Executive has dealt with Texas as a power independent of all others, both *de facto* and *de jure*." So it would seem. But it is the first time in our history that our Government has ever done a thing of the kind, and not less a violation of our principles, than a departure from our practice. It is an outrage on the customs and laws of nations.

4. "Under these circumstances," says Mr. Clay, "if the government of the United States were to acquire Texas, it would acquire along with it all the incumbrances which Texas is under, and among them the actual or suspended war between Mexico and Texas. Of that consequence there cannot be a doubt. Annexation and war with Mexico are identical."

The "suspended war" is the case of a supposed armistice, which was proclaimed by President Houston, June 15th, 1843. "All the incumbrances which Texas is under," are, first, her debts, asserted by her Commissioner in treaty with Mr. Tyler, to be five millions of dollars, but very prudently provided for in said treaty to the amount of ten millions, since swelled to twenty-two millions by credible evidence, and very likely in the end could not be satisfied with fifty millions. All this liability, more or less, is of course incurred by annexation. Next, we should incur all her treaty obligations with Great Britain, France, Holland, and other powers, which might be disagreeable, and very inconvenient. There would be no escape from this, as is distinctly intimated in Mr. Everett's official letter of the 18th of May to Mr. Calhoun, and is farther determined in the advocacy of the treaty of annexation, on the authority

of Vattel, that one treaty cannot vitiate the obligations of a former treaty. This sword of Tyler, Calhoun, Walker & Co., by which they cut their way to a hitherto undiscovered platform (we shall by and by see what it is), happens to have two edges, and the edge which they did not see, may prove the sharpest. Mr. Everett reports Lord Aberdeen to have said in the House of Lords, the 17th of May, in answer to a question from Lord Brougham, "that the annexation of Texas raised a question, as he believed, new and unexampled in the history of public law, which demanded and would receive the earliest attention of her Majesty's Government." Mr. Everett inferred, that the point of this question was "the effect of a union between two separate and independent States on their previously existing relations with other powers." Lord Aberdeen spoke with reserve. The third incumbrance is that more particularly specified in Mr. Clay's letter. "Annexation and war with Mexico, are identical." A fourth and contingent incumbrance is, what may accrue from "the previously existing relations of Texas with other powers," which may also be war with very formidable opponents.

5. Mr. Clay thinks, that a war with Mexico is not to be regarded with levity. He says,

"I know there are those who regard such a war with indifference, and as a trifling affair, on account of the weakness of Mexico, and her inability to inflict serious injury upon this country. But I do not look upon it thus lightly. I regard all wars as great calamities, to be avoided if possible, and honorable peace as the truest policy of this country. What the United States most need are union, peace and patience."

As to the weakness of Mexico, as relied upon in the project of annexation by force of arms, Mr. Clay thinks "it would be more compatible with the dignity of this nation, and less dishonorable, to attempt a like enterprise against a strong than against a weak power. In view of "all the incumbrances which Texas is under," as above noted, certainly a war with Mexico is not to be lightly regarded. Will Mexico venture on such a contest, relying upon her own strength? She must be very stupid in doing so. Will she not see the tendencies of the opinion of mankind in such a case, and estimate, *not unadvisedly*, her chances of preying on our rich commerce by commissioning privateers, and for forming powerful alliances, offensive and defensive? Hence Mr. Clay asks:—

"Are we perfectly sure that we should be free from injury in a state of war with Mexico? Have we any security, that countless numbers of foreign vessels, under the authority and flag of Mexico, would not prey upon our defenceless commerce in the Mexican Gulf, on the Pacific ocean, and on every other sea and ocean? What commerce on the other hand, does Mexico offer as an indemnity for our losses, to the gallantry and enterprise of our countrymen? This view of the subject supposes, that the war would be confined to the United States and Mexico, as the only belligerents. But have we any guaranty, that Mexico would obtain no allies among the great European powers? Suppose any such powers, jealous of our increasing greatness and disposed to check our growth and cripple us, were to take part in behalf of Mexico in the war, how would the different belligerents present themselves to the world? We have been seriously charged with an inordinate spirit of territorial aggrandizement, and without admitting this portion of the charge, it must be owned, that we have made vast acquisitions of territory within the last forty years. Suppose that Great Britain and France, or one of them, were to take part with Mexico, and by a manifesto, were to proclaim, that their objects were to assist a weak and helpless ally, to check the spirit of encroachment and ambition of an already overgrown republic, seeking still farther acquisitions of territory; to maintain the independence of Texas, disconnected with the United States, and to prevent the farther propagation of slavery from the United States; what would be the effect of such allegations upon the judgment of an impartial and enlightened world?"

This, as cannot be denied, is a tremendous hypothesis, and a tremendous question, not less instructive in view of the jealous disposition of European powers towards the United States. It is *prophecy*, which needs no other inspiration than the sagacity of the great statesman who uttered it. We are at this moment on the verge of the most momentous war of all history, the responsibility of which will be charged at our door.

6. The domestic aspects of the question, independent of foreign. Admitting that Mexico would give her consent,

"I do not think," says Mr. Clay, "that Texas ought to be received into the Union, as an integral portion of it, in decided opposition to the wishes of a considerable and respectable portion of the confederacy. . . . Mr. Jefferson expressed the opinion, and others believed, that it never was in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution, to add foreign territory to the confederacy, out of which new states were to be formed."

Mr. Jefferson felt the importance of acquiring Louisiana, and fore-shadowed in a letter to Levi Lincoln, Aug. 30, 1803, an *ex post facto* amendment of the Constitution, to sanction the deed, at the end of which he says:—

"I quote this for your consideration, observing, that the less that is said about any Constitutional difficulty, the better, and that it will be desirable for Congress to do what is necessary, in silence."

In a letter to Mr. Brackenridge, Aug. 12, 1803, he says:—

"The Constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. It is the case of a guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important adjacent territory, and saying to him when of age, I did this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you; you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as I can. I thought it my duty," &c.

In a letter to Wm. C. Nichols, Sept. 7, 1803, he says:—

"I am aware of the force of the observations you make on the power given by the Constitution to Congress, to admit new States into the Union, without restraining the subject to the territory then constituting the United States. But when I consider that the limits of the United States are precisely fixed by the treaty of 1783, that the Constitution expressly declares itself to be made for the United States, I cannot help believing the intention was, only to permit Congress to admit into the Union new States, which should be formed out of the

territory, for while, and under whose authority alone, they were then acting. I do not believe it was meant, that they might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &c., as would be the case on your construction. Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. I say the same as to the opinion of those who consider the treaty-making power boundless. If it is, then we have no Constitution."

We do not quote these passages from Mr. Jefferson, to show, that, if he was right in this opinion, Texas could not be annexed. It appears that Mr. Jefferson himself got over this difficulty; in the case of Louisiana, by proposing an *ex post facto* amendment of the Constitution; and rendering an account to the nation for the irregularity. Nor do we cite this, to put Mr. Clay on that ground. We have no right to put him there, or elsewhere, where he has not distinctly taken up his own position. Personally, we have another mode of getting over this difficulty, viz., by an act of national sovereignty, which the Constitution does not expressly forbid, and which no party, or no "considerable portion of the confederacy," objects to. Such, precisely, were the transactions which added Louisiana and Florida to the Union, and nobody has ever objected to them since. Such are many acts, on a smaller scale, some of them important, which are constantly being done by this Government. Where, for example, is the authority in the Constitution for laying out the Congressional burying-ground, for taking and using the Smithsonian legacy, for building an observatory, for erecting the magnificent public edifices at Washington, for setting up the Patent Office, which is fast growing into a Home Department of the Government, for fitting and sending out the Exploring Expedition, &c. &c.? These and many others, are all acts of national sovereignty, not expressly forbidden in the Constitution, to which no party, scarcely any body, objects. It is virtually legislation on the *no-objection* principle—the harmonious exercise of national sovereignty. We do not know that Mr. Clay has taken ground on this principle, in the respect he feels obliged to render to "the wishes of any respectable and considerable portion of the confederacy," on the question of Annexation; but we think he is right in his position, certainly prudent. There are grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the measure; no *express* authority can be cited; and who would be warranted, in such a case, to trample on "the wishes of a considerable and respectable portion of the Confederacy?" The majority cannot rightfully put down the minority, which rises up and invokes the Constitution as a shield, demanding authority for an act of alleged injustice. This is a mete, a boundary, over which a fair man will not, dare not, leap. The annexation of Texas, as now proposed, is a great, a momentous question, sprung upon the country at an unexpected moment, with a view to force it, before it can be considered, because it is known that "a considerable and respectable portion of the confederacy" is not prepared for it, would perhaps oppose it. Mr. Clay, a republican from the beginning, is manifestly, though he does not say it, shocked at such a violation of democratic principles—at an attempt to force upon the Union a *foreign sovereignty*, without asking leave of the people! He proposes, that the people should have time to consider it; and as it is a measure of doubtful Constitutionality with many, he would feel bound to respect the objections of "a considerable and respectable" minority. He says:—

"I think it far more wise and important to compose and harmonise the present Confederacy, as it now exists, than to introduce a new element of discord and distraction into it. In my humble opinion, it should be the constant and earnest endeavor of American statesmen, to eradicate prejudices, to cultivate and foster concord and to produce general contentment among all parts of our Confederacy. And true wisdom, it seems to me, points to the duty of rendering its present members happy, prosperous, and satisfied with each other, rather than to introduce alien members, against the common consent, and with the certainty of deep dissatisfaction."

Mr. Jefferson proposed to take Louisiana, "*in silence*,"—"the less said the better," because he *knew* the people would be satisfied. He said, "we shall not be disavowed." It has recently been proposed to take Texas, "*in silence*," and *by stealth*, because it was known, that the people would be *dissatisfied*, and that it could not be done openly without strenuous opposition from the most respectable quarters.

7. In the apparent motive which actuates this precipitate movement, is developed an alarming element of future strife and disunion between opposing sections of the confederacy. Mr. Clay says, "It is useless to disguise, that there are those who espouse, and those who oppose the annexation of Texas on the ground of the influence it would exert in the balance of political power, between two great sections of the Union." He thinks, that nothing could be "more unfortunate, or more pregnant with fatal consequences," than a struggle of this kind. "If to-day Texas be required to add strength to one part of the confederacy, to-morrow Canada may be required to add strength to the other," and where and in what is such a strife to end? It needs no prophet's ken to answer. All see the end of it.

8. "If," says Mr. Clay, "any European nation entertains any ambitious designs upon Texas, such as that of colonizing her, or in any way subjugating her, I should regard it as the imperative duty of the Government of the United States, to oppose to such designs the most firm and determined resistance, to the extent, if necessary, of appealing to arms, to prevent the accomplishment of any such designs."

Well, we do not see what more the hottest annexationist can ask than this. The sole pretext assigned for the movement, so far as appears, is this *very thing*, which, Mr. Clay says, would impose "an imperative duty on the Government of the United States to oppose it, if necessary, even by an appeal to arms." We should then have the public law of nations on

our side. Any foreign European interference in the affairs of Texas, would be a just occasion of offence to us, and we could never consent to it, as it might endanger our interests, and impair our political and national rights. They who are for immediate annexation, cannot go farther than this. Mr. Clay declares, that he would defend this right against all the world, and fight for it if necessary. To all European nations, his language is—HANDS OFF OF TEXAS—and they, who know Mr. Clay, will believe, that it will not be his fault, if they are not kept off. But these immediate annexationists want to fight *before* it is necessary—before it can be done with honor—when it is sure to incur the reprobation of mankind—and when it may bring down upon us the combined hostility of the most powerful nations. No man would grasp the sword quicker, or with a more resolute will, than Mr. Clay, when a European power should make tangible demonstrations of a meddling interference in the affairs of Texas. But, like Captain Tyler, who cuts off heads for the suspicion that the wearers are "Clay men at heart," the immediate annexationist would fight all the world on the presumption, that there is somebody in it, who has an evil thought, though he cannot tell who it is. We demand the evidence.

"From what I have seen and heard," says Mr. Clay, "I believe, that Great Britain has recently, formally, and solemnly disavowed any such aim or purposes—has declared that she is desirous only of the independence of Texas, and that she has no intention to interfere in her domestic institutions."

It appears, that *four* separate and distinct official disavowals of this kind, from Lord Aberdeen himself, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, two through our Minister Mr. Everett, and two through Mr. Packenham, British Minister at Washington, were in the hands of our Government, when Mr. Clay wrote this letter—all communicated in the space of three months. They were *volunteered—gratuitous—altogether unusual*. They were disavowals, not only of "any desire on the part of the Government of Great Britain to establish a *dominant influence* in Texas, whether partially dependant on Mexico, or entirely independent," or to interfere in her domestic affairs; but also of any desire or design, "openly or secretly, to disturb the internal tranquillity of the slave-holding states, or to injure the prosperity of the American Union." Even Thomas Hart Benton, a right good hater of the British, and always sufficiently jealous of them, was constrained to say in the Senate—"This is enough for me. That Government is too proud to lie." It is remarkable, that the British Government should have taken such special pains to contradict the statements and correct the misrepresentations of a secret agent of President Tyler (supposed to be Mr. Duff Green), on which the treaty of annexation was founded; and still more remarkable, after those disavowals were made, that a treaty, based on such a false foundation, should be persisted in, and defended by the very documents which contained the disavowals! Not less remarkable is the fact, that the letter of our Secretary of State to Mr. Packenham, finding reasons for the treaty in the papers of disavowal, was dated *six* days after the treaty was signed, thus evincing that this letter was an *after* thought—an *ex post facto* production! Most unfortunate was this British Minister, in having his words, which were designed for peace, thus perverted to kindle strife. What Mr. Benton believes in this affair, we may safely have some respect for.

9. Mr. Clay's position on the annexation question, leaves it precisely where it was. He opens and shuts no door on this question, nor does he put his little finger to one. He frankly ventures on some suggestions, which, perchance, may prove prophetic. But Mr. Clay, so far as we can see, is not committed or pledged to any course of policy on this question, other than—1. To maintain the faith of treaties. 2. Not to violate our rule of non-intervention, where our position is neutral. 3. To do what he can, fairly and honorably, to secure the independence of Texas. 4. To see that our own republic receives no damage by European interference in the affairs of Texas. 5. To oppose, if necessary, by force of arms, all such machinations. 6. To leave the question of Annexation open and unembarrassed, for the future decision of the parties concerned, *after* they shall have had a fair and sufficient opportunity to consider it. And 7. To help the country through the critical posture, into which ambitious men, reckless of consequences, have brought it. This is the position of Mr. Clay on the annexation question, as we understand it. He would not pick a quarrel, where we could only reap dishonor, and where we would chance to have the world against us. And we have reason to believe, there is no part of the Union and no interest, no feeling or prejudice on this subject, which Mr. Clay does not regard with impartial and patriotic concern.

§ 2. Mr. Van Buren's Position on Annexation.

To understand this is alike important and pertinent, as it goes to determine the position of Messrs. Polk and Dallas—names but little known till lately, but whose whereabouts we are required to notice, since the misfortunes of our political opponents have suddenly made these gentlemen prominent. The question of the annexation of Texas had been twice in Mr. Van Buren's hands for official action, first as Secretary of State under General Jackson, and next as President of the United States; and we must do him the honor to say, that he treated the subject in both cases with ability and fidelity. His official action, and the grounds of it, were

n record. It will be seen, therefore, that, in his letter from Lindenwold, of the 20th of April last, he stood between two fires; or between a sleeping tornado on one side, and an unmasked battery on the other. If he should disregard his action on this question as President of the United States, it would blow upon him like a tempest: and in provoking a minor section of his party by disappointing their hot haste for annexation, he would chance to be scorched by their flagrant indignation. But, *as was supposed*, he had contrived to pack a Convention for himself, and was reasonably secure of a nomination. Neither he nor his friends doubted as to the result. Sooner or later he must meet the question of annexation direct. He could neither dodge, nor equivocate; nor could he decently, certainly not safely, decline to answer the letter of Mr. Hammett, who, as "an unplugged delegate to the Baltimore Convention," had asked his "opinion as to the constitutionality and expediency of immediately annexing Texas to the United States, as soon as the consent of Texas may be had." He was therefore forced to meet the question, and wisely or unwisely, he made up his mind to plant himself on the platform of his former official action. In that position he had no enemy behind, and he little dreamed of being overwhelmed by a charge from mutineers in his own camp. Though not directly pertinent, as regards Mr. Van Buren personally, we will first cite a passage from Gen. Jackson's Message to the Senate, in 1836, communicating a proposition from Texas to be recognized as an independent State, with a view to annexation to the United States. "There are circumstances," he says, "which require us to act in this case with *even more* than our *wanted* caution." After alluding to the character of the population of Texas as emigrants from the United States, many of them citizens, and to the succors they had obtained from among us, to achieve the revolution, he says:—

"It is a circumstance of peculiar delicacy, and forces upon us considerations of the gravest character. It becomes us to beware of too early a movement, as it might subject us to the imputation, however unjustly, of seeking to establish the claims of our neighbors to territory, with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves."

We will now cite a passage from Mr. Forsyth's answer to General Hunt, the Texan Plenipotentiary, who applied to our Government for annexation in 1837. Mr. Forsyth speaks under instructions from the President, Mr. Van Buren, as follows:—

"So long as Texas shall remain at war, while the United States are at peace with her adversary, the proposition of the Texan Minister Plenipotentiary necessarily involves the question of war with that adversary. The United States are bound to Mexico by a treaty of amity and commerce, which will be scrupulously observed on their part, so long as it can be reasonably hoped that Mexico will perform her duties and respect our rights under it. The United States might justly be suspected of a disregard of the friendly purposes of the compact, if the overture of General Hunt were to be even reserved for future consideration, as this would imply a disposition on our part to espouse the quarrel of Texas with Mexico—a disposition wholly at variance with the spirit of the treaty, and with the uniform policy and the obvious welfare of the United States."

Mr. Van Buren, in his letter to Mr. Hammett, of the 20th of April, cites this and other like parts of the same document, as the platform on which he now stands, and says:—

"That the admission of Texas as a member of the confederacy, while the contest for the maintenance of the independence she had acquired, was still pending, and a consequent assumption of the responsibility of protecting her against invasion, would have been a plain departure from the laws and usages of nations, and a violation of the principles to which we had avowed our adhesion in the face of the world, was too clear to be doubted. We must look at this matter as it really stands. We shall act under the eye of an intelligent and observing world. We have a character among the nations of the earth to maintain; and the affair cannot be made to wear a different aspect from what it deserves, even if we had the disposition to throw over it disguises of any kind. . . . Should not every one, then, who sincerely loves his country—who venerates its time-honored and glorious institutions—who dwells with pride and delight on associations connected with our rise, progress and present condition—on the steady steps with which we have advanced to our present eminence, in despite of the hostility, and in contempt of the bitter revilings of the enemies of Freedom in all parts of the globe—consider, and that deeply, whether we would not, by the immediate Annexation of Texas, place a weapon in the hands of those who now look upon us and our institutions with distrustful and envious eyes, that would do us more real lasting injury as a Nation, than the acquisition of such a territory, valuable as it undoubtedly is, could possibly repair?"

However, and for whatever reasons, we may have felt disrespect for Mr. Van Buren, this firm and decisive stand, and the homily he has adventured on the occasion, deserve and will receive commendation. That he was compelled to fall back on the past, or apostatize for the chances of the future, is clear enough. For his reputation in history, he undoubtedly did the safe thing. It is true, he scratched hard in his letter, to obtain favor. He admitted the Constitutionality of the measure, put Mr. Jefferson in a false position, and did many atoning things. But his offence was rank, and could not be forgiven. He laid down the law, preached a sermon on it, and became a martyr. It cannot be denied, that a proposal, which shocked Mr. Van Buren, must be very shocking.

§ 3. The position of Messrs Polk and Dallas, on the Annexation Question.

Everybody knows, that Mr. Van Buren was sacrificed on the altar of "immediate annexation." It was not enough that he believed in the Constitutionality of the measure; that he believed Texas ought to be annexed, and would be soon; and that he would do everything in his power to get it speedily; but it was a *sine quâ non* with the *Immediatists*, that the candi-

date for the Presidency, to be entitled to their support, should be pledged for annexation without any condition whatever, except the consent of Texas. Our treaty stipulations with Mexico were nothing with them; our published principle of non-intervention, nothing; our past history, nothing; the public law of nations, nothing; the opinion of the world, nothing; the responsibilities of such a course, nothing; but if Texas would consent, we must have it *on the instant*. The instantaneous commotion produced by Mr. Van Buren's letter; the violent outburst of indignation in a certain quarter; the sudden revolt of a portion of the Virginia phalanx, led off by "Father" Ritchie; the whirlwind of machinations, to maintain the Van Buren ascendancy on the one hand, and to upset him on the other; the inappeasable temper of the two sections of the party in Convention, on its being assembled; the violence of their measures and debates, in a long protracted struggle, to thwart each other; and the desperate plunge which they at last made together, to light on a plank thrown out by an unseen hand, to rescue them from the stormy sea of their own creation—all show, that no compromise was to be made, or could be made, with the doctrine of Mr. Van Buren. It was a *revolution*. The Van Buren flag was down, and from the chaos of party dissolution, the elements of a new combination, as yet unbaptized, took the vacant seat, and in one hour a new party was recognized and installed—a party pledged to a single leading principle, "*immediate annexation*," as above defined. The question was—*shall we acquire Texas FAIRLY, or have it any how, by fair means or foul?* On the last horn of this dilemma, James K. Polk, of Tennessee, was put, and *there he is*. THAT IS HIS POSITION. This was the sole issue in the Convention, and that is the cue of the party summoned to support the ticket. As between them and the Whigs, there are *other* issues; but in this, the Van Burenites, equally with the Whigs, must be at variance with the Polkites, though mute for a season, struck dumb by the unexpected overthrow which they experienced. Between these two sections of the old party, there is a great gulf, across which they cannot shake hands, and over which neither can pass. The line, sooner or later, must be visibly drawn, as there is another element of strife, another issue, of a more startling character, and of more momentous concern, lurking behind the curtain, which cannot long be hid. It is a plan which lies at the bottom of the movement for "*immediate annexation*," and is its mainspring—to wit, the *setting up of an independent Southern and South Western Republic!* That a candidate for the Presidency of this Union should be identified with a plot for its dissolution, is indeed a startling fact! We do not know that such a thought was whispered to him, or entertained by him, before his nomination; but he is not the man for those who put him forward, if he is incapable of entertaining it, in any possible emergency. Look at the demonstrations of disloyalty to the Union already made by the supporters of this ticket!

But it is enough, that Messrs. Polk and Dallas are pledged to "*immediate annexation*," in the sense understood by the phrase, and as already defined by us. That they are so pledged, is evident, *first*, from the fact that the Van Buren ticket was superseded, as already seen, because Mr. Van Buren would not pledge himself to this; and *next*, from their own words.

Enough has transpired since the nomination of Mr. Polk, to show, that he had been thought of at the *Hermitage*, near Nashville, Tennessee, to supersede the too timid lord of Lindenwood, and that his consent had been obtained. It is absurd to suppose, that the Convention, at so great distance, would risk a nomination, without an understanding of this kind, however his acceptance might be *presumed*; and his consent necessarily supposes, that he was *pledged* to do what Mr. Van Buren could *not* do, viz., to go the whole figure of "*immediate annexation*." But we have a letter from him, of the 23d of last April, to gentlemen of his own party in Cincinnati, who were disposed to support him for the Vice Presidency, with Mr. Van Buren as President, if he should not prove *too hot* for annexation. To their inquiries as to his sentiments on this subject, he replies:

"I have no hesitation in declaring, that I am in favor of the immediate annexation of Texas to the territory and government of the United States."

What "*immediate annexation*" means, is now well understood. The rest of this letter amounts to nothing as to the *point* of inquiry. With the wariness and concern of a candidate, answering questions, he flourishes *about* the subject very manfully, and says boldly what nobody disputes, that "the proof is clear and satisfactory to my mind, that Texas once constituted a part of the United States, the title to which I regard to have been as indisputable as that to any portion of our territory." He admits that it was ceded by us to Spain, in 1819; but he valiantly says, "it was most *unwisely* ceded!" Who denies this? He also states, that "the Government and people of Texas, as is *understood*" (everybody knows it), "not only give their consent, but are anxiously desirous to be annexed to the United States." What does this amount to, except, that he says *not a word* about the *CONSENT* of Mexico? Again, he says:—"If the application of Texas shall be rejected by the United States, there is imminent danger that she will become a dependency, if not a colony of Great Britain—an event which no American patriot, anxious for the safety and prosperity of his country, could permit to occur, without the most strenuous resistance." Well, on this point, Mr. Polk and

Mr. Clay are well enough agreed, except that Mr. Clay goes a little farther, and boldly says, he would "appeal to arms" in such a case. Mr. Polk's reasoning is of this wise:—1. Our title to Texas was good. (Granted.) 2. We parted with it most unwisely." (So says Mr. Clay.) 3. Therefore, we have a perfect right to it! We would add, 4. Why consult Texas, since our title was "indisputable," and since we gave it up "most unwisely?" According to this reasoning, we can take Texas whenever we please, though she might get in bad humor, and try to annex herself elsewhere. We should *only* have to fight for her at last, and are sure to be obliged to fight by taking her now. But Mr. Polk says, "I have no hesitation in declaring, that I am in favor of immediate annexation." Enough.

As for Mr. George M. Dallas, when he had never dreamed of so high a destiny as to be a candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the United States, he wrote the following letter:—

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 5, 1844.
 MY DEAR SIR—I cannot resist the impulse to tell you how much delight I have taken in reading your pamphlet on Texas, &c. It is comprehensive, clear, argumentative, and eloquent. Nothing can remove or resist your facts, and I defy ingenuity to assail the justice and integrity of your deductions. In the midst of all my distraction at the bar, my head has been running on this topic for some months, and your admirable brochure comes to me like manna in the way of starved people.—I cannot tell you without using words you might consider extravagant, how highly I appreciate your labors, and how sincerely, as an American Democrat, I thank you.

Truly, and ever yours,

GEORGE M. DALLAS.

HON. R. J. WALKER.

Mr. Dallas is evidently in an ecstasy here. What was it that set him up thus lofty on these stilts of political satisfaction? The answer is, that Mr. Senator Walker, of Mississippi, the High Priest of the Tyler Treaty of Annexation, the caterer for the altar, and the expounder of all law on the subject, *for that side*, commenced his work early in January last by a public letter, to which this note of Mr. Dallas refers. That letter proves *anything, for anybody*. For example:—It proves that the annexation of Texas is the sure and only way to get rid of slavery in the United States; that it is the only way to support our Tariff system; that it is the only way to break down the Tariff system; that it is the only sure mode of fortifying and perpetuating "the institution of slavery;" that Texas never owed allegiance to Mexico; &c. &c. It meets all tastes, all passions, all interests, on this question, North or South, or anywhere. Therefore, all should go for annexation. (See the Letter.) This is the Document which put Mr. George M. Dallas into such ecstasies, as his note, above, indicates. It was "a brochure" that came to him "like manna in the way of starved people." He could not tell all the satisfaction he felt, without being "considered extravagant." If Mr. Polk could have written a letter, without thinking that he was a candidate for the Vice Presidency, we might have had another "brochure." Both of them, however, stand pretty fairly and thoroughly committed for "immediate annexation." SUCH IS THEIR POSITION.

§ 4. It is a poor rule that wont work both ways.

We have seen how skilfully the argument for "immediate annexation" is adapted to all tastes and interests. Mr. Senator Walker, whose reasoning is so commended by Mr. Dallas, and who has made himself so prominent in support and defence of the Tyler treaty, maintains, that we can acquire and can cede territory *constitutionally*; but is obliged to rely upon the principle, that we *could not* constitutionally cede away Texas. Therefore, the treaty of 1819 is null and void. Texas is ours—"all our own." This, so far as we can see, is the *technical ground*, or the *special pleading*, on which "immediate annexation" is based. It is said, that in our treaty of 1803, with France, by which we purchased Louisiana, we guaranteed the right to all the inhabitants of that territory, to come into the Union as a state, or states, whenever their population should be sufficient, according to the terms of the Federal compact. This is true. And in pursuance of that engagement, we have already made three States, Louisiana, Missouri, and Arkansas. The authority of Vattel is then cited, to show, that a State or nation cannot make a new treaty with a new party, to vitiate a former treaty with another party. Consequently, the treaty of 1819, with Spain, which ceded away Texas, is null and void. The citizens of Texas have a constitutional right, on this foundation, to claim admission into our Union, as a separate and independent State. This is the argument of Mr. Walker, and the ground on which the Tyler treaty of annexation was based. It is, we believe, the *sole ground* on which the "Immediatists," when hardly pressed, can fall back. —Let us consider it:—

In the first place, we have made three States out of the territory acquired by the treaty of 1803. In the second place, the Spaniards, in the valley and on the bank of the Rio del Norte, and any other Spaniards occupants of Texas, when it was ceded by us to Spain, in 1819, did not object, and do not to this day object, but prefer to remain under Mexico. In the third place, they who now apply for annexation, were not inhabitants of Texas in 1819, and therefore cannot plead the right claimed for them. In the fourth place, when they went there, voluntarily, they voluntarily took the oath of allegiance to a province of Mexico, and by that act *alienated* themselves from our Union. In the fifth place, and consequently, they cannot

claim the rights of American citizens. In the sixth place, as a matter of fact, they never have claimed those rights, but they present themselves to us as *aliens*, soliciting annexation as an *alien* sovereignty. In the seventh place, Texas, as a piece of territory, is evidently in a mute condition, and cannot assert the rights of a party in this question. Where, then, is the party entitled to claim admission to our Union on such a ground? No such party has ever yet presented itself. It will, therefore, be time enough to consider its claims, when it does. The argument amounts to this:—We confess ourselves to have been rogues in the treaty of 1819, for a supposed benefit then, that we may profit by our roguery in a benefit now. The Texans are too modest to take any advantage of our confession, and come to us with a manly front, soliciting annexation as an *alien* State. We, desiring the Union, but finding obstacles in our relations with Mexico, suddenly discover a flaw in an old contract, of which nobody complains, by which no party was injured, but which can be mended by breaking later contracts, and by defrauding a party, which lives to complain, does complain, and peradventure may sue for redress. What is the name of such a case in law? We do not deny that the cession of 1819 was unconstitutional, if any choose to have it so. We have done many unconstitutional things in our history, which cannot be undone. It is said, that Mr. Clay was of opinion that this treaty was unconstitutional, and that he offered a resolution in Congress, in 1820, to that effect. The Constitution was our own rule, not a rule for Spain, nor a part of the law of nations. The rights and interests of a vast variety of parties, and of whole nations, have been established on our error. Can we rightfully assert that error to dispossess them? If we claim Texas on this ground, we must give up Florida, which was acquired by the same treaty, and which has already cost us *fifty millions*. Is not this the case, and the consequence?

§ 5. *A state of War.*

The "*Immediate Annexationists*," aware of the critical position into which they were about to plunge the country, in its relations with Mexico, have denied that there is a *state of war* between Mexico and Texas. Mr. Senator Walker says, that ever since the battle of San Jacinto, in 1836, the relations between Mexico and Texas have "been a state of peace—of profound peace." He moreover says that the Government of Mexico "is not now, and never was the Government of Texas," and that "the people of Texas never owed or rendered it any allegiance."

The Publicists, or writers on international law, say, that "war is a controversy by force. Nations are said to be at war, not only when their armies are engaged, but also when they have any matter in dispute which they are determined to decide by the use of force, and have declared by words, or shown by certain actions, that they are determined so to decide it. War, therefore, signifies not only an act, but a state or condition." —*Rutherford*. "Custom has so far prevailed, that not the act, but the state or disposition now goes by that name" (war).—*Grotius*.

In Kennedy's "Texas," the Anglo-American population of Texas, the party now in controversy with Mexico, is stated to be 200,000, and the Mexican population, within the borders of the Republic of Texas, he puts at 100,000; a later authority makes it 150,000. This Mexican population lies chiefly on the left bank of the Rio del Norte, is entirely subject to Mexico, and so far as we know, they prefer Mexican jurisdiction. Mexico not only maintains an undisturbed civil jurisdiction over these parts of the Republic of Texas, but has military occupation thereof, with hostile intent and hostile demonstrations—is in short *encamped* in the Republic of Texas, without having experienced any disturbance of its position. The Republic of Texas is not only in actual military dispute between these belligerent parties, but it is at least doubtful, which party is most strongly entrenched on the premises. If we take Mr. Tyler's Message to the Senate, accompanying the Treaty, who says, "I repeat, the Executive saw Texas in a state of almost *hopeless exhaustion*," we may fairly conclude, that Mexico is much the strongest party on the ground. She is there, confessedly, in military array, and in undisturbed possession of no inconsiderable portion of the territory and population of Texas. The people she governs without dispute, and by their own choice. Mr. Tyler, in his last Annual Message, and all his official documents, referring to the subject, calls this "war." So do our Secretaries of State, Messrs. Webster, Upshur, and Calhoun, in all that they say about it. So do the public functionaries of other nations in their correspondence with the belligerent parties and other powers on the subject. So do the authorities of Mexico and Texas. President Houston officially proclaimed an armistice, the 15th of June, 1843, but prematurely, as it was not consummated. Mexico and Texas have been continually fighting, by sea and land, since 1836, whenever they could, and Mexico has officially notified our Government more than once, that the Annexation of Texas to this Union will be regarded by Mexico as an adoption of the war, and in this she still persists, even down to the return of dispatches to Washington, June 17th, 1844. Will anybody say, this is not a *state of war* between Mexico and Texas?—Mr. Senator Walker calls it "*a profound peace*!"

§ 6. American Doctrine of Neutrality and Non-intervention towards Belligerents.

"Peace with all nations, and entangling alliances with none," was the advice of Washington, and this principle has been sanctioned by our practice from that time to this, except as, in regard to the first part of this advice, just provocations have summoned us to arms—for which also we are advised by the same authority, "in peace prepare for war." Not to "entangle" ourselves in the quarrels of belligerents, has ever been the policy of our Government, till Mr. Tyler got up the Treaty of Annexation. In the recognition of the independence of the South American States, of Mexico and Texas, the successive administrations of Monroe, Adams, Jackson, and Van Buren, were careful to advise all whom it might concern—they published it to the world—that this act, "in no sense or degree," went or could be construed to determine the *merits* of the controversy pending, or which party was in the *right*. Our principle and aim always have been to acknowledge the government *de facto* (*actual*), but never to judge the question of *right* between belligerents, knowing, that by this last decision, as to *right*, we should render ourselves liable by the law of nations, to be held responsible as a party in the contest. The Committee of the House of Representatives, on Foreign Affairs, 1822, reporting in favor of recognizing the independence of certain of the South American States, said, "Whatever might be the policy of Spain in respect to her former American Colonies, our recognition of their independence can neither affect her *rights*, nor impair her means in the accomplishment of that policy. Should Spain, contrary to her avowed aim and acknowledged interests, renew the war for the conquest of South America, we shall observe, as we have done, between the parties, an *honest and impartial neutrality*."

President Monroe, in recommending this recognition, said, "It is not contemplated, thereby, to change, in the *slightest degree*, our friendly relations with *either* party. Of this friendly disposition, an assurance will be given to the Government of Spain." The Secretary of State said to the Spanish Minister, in his correspondence on the same subject, "This recognition is not intended to invalidate any right of Spain." Mr. Forsyth, acting under the instructions of President Van Buren, in 1837, says to General Hunt, the Texan Ambassador, applying for Annexation,—

"In determining with respect to the independence of other countries, the United States have never taken the question of *right* between the contending parties into consideration. . . . This was the course pursued with respect to Mexico herself. It was adhered to when analogous events rendered it proper to investigate the question of Texan independence. . . . The question of the annexation of foreign independent States to the United States, has never before been presented to this Government." With regard to the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, Mr. Forsyth says:—"The circumstance of their being Colonial possessions of France and Spain, and therefore dependent on the Metropolitan Governments, renders those transactions materially different from that which would be presented by the question of the annexation of Texas. . . . The President thinks it inexpedient, under existing circumstances, to agitate the Constitutional question. . . . So long as Texas shall remain at war, while the United States are at peace, with her adversary, the proposition of the Texan Minister Plenipotentiary necessarily involves the question of war with that adversary," &c. (See further on this point, § 2.)

Such has been the *uniform* practice of our Government, till Mr. Tyler, in his Message to the House of Representatives, June 10th, of the current year, appealing from the Senate to that body, said—"The Executive has dealt with Texas as a power independent of all others, *both de facto and de jure*"—and here the Rubicon was passed. That act, sanctioned, would have involved us in war. *As it is*, but for the favorable consideration, on the part of Mexico and other powers, arising out of the rejection of the treaty by the Senate, it might even yet involve us in war. The act itself, and its accompaniments, were acts of *hostility*, by the law of nations.

§ 7. Recrimination.

It is said, that President Adams, in 1827, and General Jackson, in 1829, made suit to Mexico for Texas, before the independence of Mexico was acknowledged by Spain, which is the same thing as to negotiate with Texas alone for Texas. It is not the same thing. 1. Because negotiations were at the same periods opened with Spain, and there is no evidence, that either Mr. Adams or General Jackson contemplated getting Texas without the sanction of Spain. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that they considered such consent indispensable. 2. It is maintained, by the Immediatists, that Mexico has suffered a lapse of her rights, by lapse of time—*eight years*—and by default of asserting them. We have seen how she asserts them; and if they have expired in *eight years*, much more had the rights of Spain expired in 1827 and 1829, the first period being *seventeen* and the second *nineteen* years after the commencement of the Revolution, in 1810. By the Treaty of Cordova, in 1821, the independence of Mexico, and her ability to maintain it, were acknowledged, and the extinction of the power of Spain in Mexico, was declared. It is true the king refused to ratify the treaty, and afterwards, in 1829 occupied Tampico with a small force *forty-four days*, when it was reduced and surrendered. In 1836, Spain, contrary to custom, acknowledged the independence of Mexico, because Cuba needed it for purposes of commerce. But she did not

acknowledge the independence of Holland till seventy years after her revolt, and she still claims her rights over Colonies which have been independent for a quarter of a century, more or less. Unable to take care of herself, she lets them alone, and other nations, by common consent, have virtually settled the question for her, as in the case of Holland. Nevertheless, neither Mr. Adams nor General Jackson, so far as appears, would have taken Texas without the consent of Spain. 3. Our relations with Mexico are widely different from our relations with Spain. Spain was beyond sea, and the Treaty of Cordova had acknowledged her power in Mexico to be extinct, as in fact it was. She could not take care of herself, but was under the protection and in the hands of European powers. Whereas, Mexico is a border Republic; we have treaty engagements with her for amity and intercourse, corresponding with our relative position and mutual necessities; in 1831, we made a special treaty of *boundary* with her, based on our treaty with Spain, in 1819, thereby recognizing the rights of Mexico over Texas, which is a treaty still, with all its obligations unimpaired, so that, as between us and Mexico, Texas is a province of Mexico, notwithstanding that we acknowledge Texas as the Government *de facto*, so long as she maintains her ground. This is our doctrine and our practice. 4. Mexico has kept uninterrupted possession of 2000 miles of the Republic of Texas, in one direction, extending so far into the heart of it, as to embrace the whole of some and parts of other of her departments, some large and important towns, and a population but little short of that which acknowledges the jurisdiction of Texas. As a neutral power on terms of amity with both, we are not entitled to decide their relative rights and claims, nor can we lawfully interfere in their disputes. We have as good a right to negotiate with Mexico alone for Texas, as with Texas alone, and are equally bound to respect the claims of both.

§ 3. *The Weakness of Mexico.*

Mr. Senator Walker says—"If Mexico should make war on us, it would excite nothing but pity and derision, as well among women and children, as among men." We say—"Let not him that putteth his harness on, boast himself as he that putteth it off."

"He's doubly arm'd who hath his quarrel just."

Let us consider this imputed weakness of Mexico. The Florida Indians were *weak*, but it took us some half dozen years, and it is said to have cost us *forty millions*, to subdue them. These Indians were comparatively accessible, and begirt by impassable seas. Between us and Mexico, in case of war, lies a waste of a thousand miles, to be marched over, the almost undisputed domain of wild and fierce aboriginal tribes, if they choose to make it so, and for which they might have strong inducements. Ten to one they would be in the *mêlée*. With the numerous tribes of those vast regions against us, a civilized army would chance to perish before them, as did the legions of Napoleon on the plains of Russia. Aid they would not be without, while we have enemies. But, it may be said, we would move quick, and strike a sudden blow. And would Mexico be asleep? "Forewarned, forearmed." In such a cause, she would be united to a man and ready for the fight. Such, we understand, are her feelings now: She would await us on her own ground, can at any moment bring ten, probably twenty times more force into her own fields than we can move towards them; and they would fight by their fire sides, for their fire sides—for their altars and their sacred home. Do we count on raising a large force? Armies require money, and money must be *voted*. In a republic, war, to be vigorous, must have the *heart* of the people enlisted in it. They must know and *feel*, that they are in the *right*. Will it be so in this case? If not, you are beaten, before you begin. In such a case you cannot march an army *one inch* towards Mexico. You will have no army. Your half dozen regiments—what are they? Do you talk of *volunteers*? How will you *coax* them at the end of a seven days' march and sore feet? Where is your commissariat, without an appropriation adequate to the enterprise? If you could raise troops, you are without clothing and food. You have to ask the people for supplies, and the people, peradventure, *don't like the war*. You did not consult them. By this time, Mexico has filled her chests with millions of gold, for commissions sold to countless privateers, which, in six months, will have destroyed fifty millions, more or less, of your commerce; and with that gold, armies will come quick, move briskly, and fight well. By this time, too, Mexico may have formed her alliances, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain, or France, or both. M. Guizot, prime minister of Louis Philippe, it is said by a Paris Journal, the *Constitutionnel*, has already recorded his protest, in behalf of France, against the annexation of Texas to us; and Mr. Everett tells us, that, on the 17th of May, Lord Aberdeen said in the House of Lords, that this affair "raised a question unexampled in the history of public law, which would demand and receive the early attention of Her Majesty's government." It appears to be morally certain that in our breach of faith with Mexico, for purposes of conquest, or for such objects as will be attributed to us in this case, Mexico will have much sympathy, and not unlikely will be able to form any alliances required to make

her formidable to us by sea and land. It will be a war of sentiment—of opinion, as well as of interest—and the opinion of the world will be against us, right or wrong. If we provoke the world to oppose our war for the annexation of Texas, it will chance to cost us *hundreds of millions*, without getting Texas. Strong and invincible as we may be, *when united in a good cause*, it would be a rash enterprise to brave the opinion, and set at defiance the powers of the civilized world. We have presented this picture as a *probable future*, on the contingencies supposed; and honestly, we can conceive nothing *more probable*. The annexation treaty brought us to the verge of a war, such as history has rarely, if ever, recorded. Mexico weak? That depends entirely upon circumstances. There is no power on earth so strong as she would be against us, if the world should pronounce us *in the wrong*.

§ 9. *For whose advantage is Immediate Annexation.*

It seems to be generally understood that the project of annexation has some connection with slavery. If Mr. Senator Walker's theory (*one of his theories*), to wit, that annexation will open a natural outlet of slavery and of African blood, to merge itself with the already partially colored races of the tropical regions of this continent, till it disappear from its present latitudes, and vanish into freedom—if this theory should prove a sound one, there will of course be no objection to annexation among those who dislike slavery. But if the motive is to establish slavery more securely, they who go for it on that account, will doubtless think it prudent to consider whether the annexation of a foreign state will not be regarded by many as surpassing the powers of the Constitution; and whether this opinion may not be entertained to such an extent as to put in peril the security now afforded to slavery by the Constitution itself, so long as the present bounds of the republic are not extended? As things now are, no power can Constitutionally disturb the slave States in the matter of slavery. But if they insist on having Texas, while a general impression prevails that such a union is unconstitutional, the present rights of the slave States, as determined by the Constitution, may be held as forfeited. This, as will be seen, would put slavery in a new position, and possibly might defeat the object of annexation as alleged. If, indeed, this has been foreseen, and the plan of a southern and independent slaveholding Confederacy be relied upon to meet the case, that, too, is at best a contingency, and one that might properly claim much grave reflection before it is attempted. *Now* the slave States are secure, and can have slavery as long as they choose to maintain it. But break away the dam, and it is not easy to tell where the waters will run. It should be well considered, that, while the people of the free States, naturally and generally averse to slavery, will feel bound to defend the Constitution for the whole republic within its present limits, they would as naturally be reluctant to aid in employing the powers of the Federal Government, which were professedly set up to give and secure freedom to mankind, to extend yet farther, and farther to fortify the domain of slavery.

It ought doubtless to be fairly stated and well settled, whether Texas is to be annexed for the common and equal good of all parts of the Union, or only for the supposed good of one section? There is a heavy debt to fall upon the country by this transaction, according to the developments of the Tyler treaty. If Pennsylvania is not to be benefited, will it be fair to add one or two millions to her present burden of forty millions, to pay the debts of a foreign state, when she cannot pay the interest on her own debt except by direct taxation? The hard-working and hard-fisted people of the free States, who live by the sweat of their brows, and who look upon labor as an honor, and not as a servile brand, will want to know, if this El Dorado of the south west will be a field for them to find gold in; or whether, if they go there, they will have to work, side by side, with slaves? If they are to buy it, and pay for it, they will wish to know, whether they are to get their money's worth?

§ 10. *Immediate Annexation in the light of Political Economy.*

That Texas would add much to the geographical perfection of this Republican Empire, is certain; that it is a great and valuable country, is no less true; that it is likely to constitute a part of this Union, at a future day, may easily be believed; but a little reflection will show, that its *immediate* annexation as a slave State, will of necessity and rapidly revolutionize the commercial condition of the present slave States, and tend to impoverish them. The market for the staples of the South, in which the wealth of the slave States consists, is a limited one, and must remain so, with slow and slight variations; and it is well known, that those States are capable of enhancing the supply of these staples to an indefinite amount, which a growing demand would instantly call forth. Let Texas be annexed, and the field for the production of these staples, more especially of Cotton and Sugar, would be almost instantly transferred to the more inviting soil of this new member of the family, and the laborers (the slaves) must go too. Texas alone, under our fostering government and adequate culture, would, after a short season, furnish all these most important staples to the full demand of the market at much less cost, and the chief business of the present slave States would be to raise negroes!

The South would be removed into the South West, and a vast desert would be created between the two great sections of the Union (if Union there would be after such a revolution)—a mere stable for the breeding of slaves! And slave-breeding itself would soon flag, and give place to other inventions, which necessity and poverty might suggest. There is no power that could prevent a result of this kind, in the case supposed, though we may be unable exactly to estimate the extent of it. It may perhaps be said, that this transfer of the field of Cotton, &c., is inevitable, annexation or no annexation, and that it will be better to have it under our own control. If it is inevitable, why precipitate the ruin of the Southern States?—But we do not think it is inevitable. As a province of Mexico, Texas would never be a competitor of any section of this Union, and as an independent State, Mr. Tyler solemnly declares he “found her in a state of almost hopeless exhaustion.” No doubt he did find her so. So far from threatening to rival any of the States of this Union, in a separate and independent existence, it is much more probable, that a half century to come would not find Texas relieved from the ruinous effects of her social profligacy and her financial prodigality, if it could ever be done. If the people of the South are so filled with concern on account of Abolition at home and Abolition abroad, as to be willing to throw away the shield of the Constitution, and plunge headlong into such a suicidal abyss, it will at least amaze all sober thinking men.

But it is said, Texas will throw herself into the arms of a European power, if we do not take her. There is not a nation on earth that would accept the boon, without our consent. Witness the repeated and gratuitous disavowals of the British Government of any such intent, within a twelvemonth past. So long as we maintain the plighted faith of our neutral position, and adhere to our principle of non-intervention with belligerent States, we can at least respect ourselves, and we shall certainly have the strongest possible ground to defend our rights of contiguity to Texas, founded on the public law of nations, against aggressors. As a fragment of a border and friendly power, to which we are bound by a treaty of amity and good faith, Texas, itself on our border, cannot claim the right, first to rebel, thereby opening a field of war and disturbance between us and our ally, and then to put or admit an enemy there. Nor can Texas fairly accuse us of unkindness. It is not a case in which kindness can overlook principle. She cannot demand of us to set her up on our own ruin, or to our own dishonor. Charity is out of the question, so long as our national faith, our own public professions and engagements, forbid its exercise.

§ 11. *It is said we want Texas for defence against Free-Trade and War.*

As to war, whatever be our limits, we are exposed to that, and the wider they are, the greater the exposure. It is not difficult to see, that we already have a sea-board long enough to defend against a powerful maritime foe, without adding five hundred miles to the line, with all the costs of fortifying it. Texas, as a neutral State, in a time of war with Great Britain, or any European nation, would be a wall of defence, instead of a battle-field; and it will be our business to see, that she stands neutral, if she chooses to be independent. We have had two wars with Great Britain, with her jurisdiction bordering upon us from the Atlantic to the Rocky Mountains, and with far greater facilities of descent upon us, than Texas would afford, even if she were a British province. As for Free Trade, smuggling, and all that, if a Tariff is necessary to us, it will be necessary for Texas, and for the same reasons. She is not so rich as to be able to do without a revenue. In 1838 she adopted the revenue laws of the United States—not as they stood then, for they were not high enough—but as they stood a year before. Even if she could afford, or should be foolish enough, to sacrifice herself on the altar of free trade, smuggling through her would be much more difficult than over the boundary between us and the British dominions on the North, of which we have so little, as to hear nothing.

§ 12. *The True Reasons for Immediate Annexation.*

Mr. Benton, in the Senate of the United States, has, we believe, stated them truly. 1. Speculation in Texas funds and land scrip. 2. To make political capital for the Presidential Election. And 3. To dissolve the Union, and erect a Southern slave-holding Confederacy. The first panders to the second, and the third is a conspiracy by itself. It is a singular fact, in the current of events, that the great, and for a long time dominant political party of this country, which has always laid claim to clean hands and pure hearts in their aversion to and exemption from the influence of stock-jobbers, moneyed capitalists, and a moneyed aristocracy, have at last formed an alliance with a stock-jobbing interest in amount far greater than the entire capital of a National Bank, and as much more dangerous than a bank, as the former is perfectly irresponsible, intangible, and beyond the reach of any law, while the latter is amenable to the Government and the people. Such precisely is the position of this great party at this moment. They have at least a hundred millions of dollars as political capital to speculate upon, and all which can be bought with this amount of money in prospect, prop-

erly distributed, will inure to their benefit. This capital is worth little or nothing *without* their success; *with* it, it mounts instantly to par, and to a premium. The interests and people of this Union, may be—*must inevitably* be injured to an inestimable amount; they may be ruined; but the fortunes of the leaders of this party, and of those who buy them up, *are at stake*. It is a great stake, and will be fought for desperately.

As for the conspiracy of treason, to dissolve the Union, and erect a Southern slave-holding Confederacy, it is not for us to bring the proof, when Mr. Benton and the great "Globe" itself have confessed it—have themselves brought the charge. The Beaufort, Edgfield, Barnwell, Sumter, St. Helena, and other resolutions reported to us from South Carolina, and paraded in the Globe, item by item, smelling so rankly, so foully of treason, and so interpreted by the Globe itself, are enough to settle the question of *fact*. Mr. Benton and the Globe knew, that the people of this country were not ready to be precipitated over such a precipice, into the abyss below. They knew, that the Polk and Dallas Ticket had been made up by these conspirators; that the South Carolina Delegation did not come into the Convention at Baltimore, till this nomination was made; and that when they did come, they were received with most tumultuous and deafening shouts of applause, in sympathy of a common triumph. Mr. Benton and the Globe knew, that the conspiracy was hatched, when they saw it strutting abroad, and proclaiming its designs. Feeling for the safety of a common cause, and not being able to conceal the facts, they confessed them, put their finger upon them, and sprung to the rescue of Polk and Dallas, from such imminent peril—but *too late*. A Southern Convention of the Conspirators was already proposed at Nashville, Tennessee! It may be stopped—quite probable—but it was *proposed*—and proposed at NASHVILLE! We honor Mr. Benton and the Globe for the honest warning they have given to the country.

§ 14. *The Debts of Texas*

If they do not themselves know what they are, how can anybody else know? They have sold land scrip, and borrowed money wherever they could at ten per cent, but can render no reliable account. We can easily see by the evidence of their own history, debiting the State for the lands acknowledged to be sold, and adding to that some of their earliest loans, how they have used up *seventy-seven millions of dollars*. Whether the unascertained actual debts are *seventy-seven, or fifty, or twenty millions* more, it is impossible to say. The Texan Commissioner, who treated with Mr. Tyler, said, he believed the debts were not more than *five millions*; but Mr. Tyler was generous enough to *assume ten millions*. Whether this gratuity of *five millions* was to be distributed among those who helped Mr. Tyler, in the matter of this treaty, we are not informed. Any how, the Texan functionaries could easily run up the debt from *five to ten millions*, before the settlement. Mr. Clay, in his Raleigh letter, supposes the debts may be *thirteen millions*. Since that time, in about two months, they have mounted up to *twenty-two millions*, by the transpiring of new evidence. Growing at this rate of four and a half millions a month, they would be *seventy-eight millions* at the end of twelve months more. No doubt, if we were to take Texas, as a man does his wife, "for better for worse," we should have a prodigious draft on our treasury, especially when we consider what a fine opportunity there would be to *forge* evidences of debt. We should hope, in such a case, that there are no *rogues* in Texas, and that they have been grievously slandered in the naughty words that have been said about them. At best we must conclude, that the amount of the debts of Texas is very uncertain. It is pretty generally understood, that all their valuable lands are well shingled over with titles. No wonder that the holders of Texas bonds should desire to find a pay-master in the United States, or that the owners of Texas land scrip should exert themselves to give a value to it by "immediate annexation." One thing is certain, that in buying Texas, we buy *all* her debts.

§ 15. *The Menaces of Texas.*

When General Hunt, the Texan Minister, applied to our Government for annexation, in 1837, he said to Mr. Forsyth, "The undersigned will not conceal from the Honorable, the Secretary of State, the *apprehension* that any delay in the conclusion of the treaty of annexation, may be fatal to its ultimate accomplishment." And then he goes on to speak of the probability, in case of being refused, that Texas will form connexions with European powers, *prejudicial* to the interests of the United States. To which Mr. Forsyth, with exemplary dignity, replies, "In that case, this Government would be consoled by a consciousness of the rectitude of its intentions, and the certainty that, although the hazard of transient losses may be incurred by a rigid adherence to just principles, no lasting prosperity can be secured when they are disregarded." This was indeed princely conduct. It was more than that: It mounts to the dignity of Christian principle, and was a just rebuke. From that time to this, we have been menaced in the same way, directly or indirectly; and Mr. Tyler tells us "*now or never*." All these menaces are answered by Mr. Forsyth. Texas, and all concerned,

should know, that we are not to be brow-beaten into a breach of faith and a violation of the law of nations for fear of such consequences. Great Britain has given us her word of honor—which Mr. Benton says, “is enough for me”—that she will neither offend nor injure us by forming connexions of this kind. Respect for the political, social, and commercial rights of parties in such juxta-position, is a recognized principle of the law of nations; and, if Texas is disposed to be singular, we may be consoled, as Mr. Forsyth says, for having done right. The truth is, Texas cannot do wrong in such a matter, if she would, because she can find no European power that would be party to it. In the last resort, “if necessary,” as Mr. Clay says, “we could appeal to arms,” rather than tarnish our honor, or have our rights trampled on.

§ 16. Assumption of State Debts.

It is pretty manifest, that the “LONE STAR” would be slow in moving towards our constellation, to have her glory merged in our beams, if she were not in peril of being blotted from the firmament. She modestly asks us to adopt her war, and pay her debts, as the condition of being snugly packed in our society. Texas being, as Mr. Upshur said to Mr. Murphy, “persecuted by an unrelenting enemy” (that is, being in Mr. Walker’s state of “profound peace”), and, as Mr. Tyler says, “in almost hopeless exhaustion,” it is not so much a wonder she should be willing to have us take her war off her hands; nor could she naturally object, that we should take her debts too. Not to speak of the expenses of the war, is it right that the States of this Union, about half of which are already in debt on their own account about *two hundred millions* in the aggregate, should be obliged to add to their burdens *fifty* or even *twenty millions*, to pay the debts of Texas, as a compliment to her condescension in taking rank with them, that she may come in scot free, and not be hereafter vexed or trammelled with debt? The indebted States have never asked such a favor; they do not expect it; no man or party has asked it for them; they would not take it because they believe it is unconstitutional. All parties agree that it is unconstitutional. It is singular that this hitherto insuperable difficulty of *assumption*, should be so suddenly and so easily got over to the tune of *tens* or *scores* of millions, when a *foreign* state wants the benefit of it! The trick of saying she is not a State of the Union, but only in the process of becoming one, will hardly do. It will be the most natural thing in the world, for the indebted States to say, “Well, gentlemen, pay our debts too, and we will think of it.” And the unindebted States must have their share of the bonus. How is it possible to avoid this *universal assumption—this great charity*? Admitting that Texas is a prodigal son, who has spent all “with harlots and in riotous living,” and that it is fit to rejoice over his return, ragged and miserable though he be, there is no good reason why he should be exalted over the heads of the rest of the family, who have served from the beginning in contributing to the common weal, and in creating this ability to *assume* the debts of others.

§ 17. The Union—Nullification.

When Mr. Senator McDuffie said in his message as Governor of Georgia, in 1836, “If we admit Texas into our Union, while Mexico is still waging war with that province, with a view to” (re-) “establish her supremacy over it, *we shall by the very act itself, make ourselves a party to the war*,” it cannot be denied, that he acted in good fealty to this great Confederacy. It was a genuine spark of the virtue of “OLD ’76,” and in harmony with his oath of allegiance to the Federal Constitution. But when, in the early part of the first session of the 28th (present) Congress, he presented to the Senate of the United States his project of *three* Confederacies, and attempted to show the advantages that would result from the consummation of such a plan, there was something startling to the feelings of that body. As an ingenious hypothesis, it might be innocent; but the time and the place did not seem to be most suitable. The Hon. George Evans, of Maine, in noticing this, was constrained, in common charity, occasionally to throw in some such remarks as this:—“I presume the honorable Senator was not *serious*.” But subsequent events have cast light on the inception of that *project*. It would seem that Mr. McDuffie, and many others with him, *are serious*, and that Mr. Van Buren was set aside at the Baltimore convention, and Mr. Polk put forward, as a part of a plan to dissolve the Union, and erect a Southern Confederacy! We have already noticed that Mr. Benton and the Globe have considered the developments sufficient to warrant a recognition of the *fact* of such a conspiracy, and to bring the charge. They did it so promptly, to save Messrs. Polk and Dallas from being involved in the responsibility. How far these candidates are cognizant of such designs, it is impossible to say; but that they were nominated to carry them out, or to *permit* them to be carried out, if occasion should require, there cannot be a doubt. They are the *men* of those conspirators, put forward as *tools*.

The Spectator, Mr. Calhoun’s organ at the city of Washington, pluming the conspiracy on this great achievement, says:—“Never was there a more remarkable proof of her power,

when unite!" (the power of the South), "than in controlling the nomination of that Convention. She made one brave sally, and swept all opposition before her. *Texas defeated Mr. Van Buren.*" The Charleston Mercury, another Calhoun organ, says, "Mr. Polk's views on the Tariff, the Bank, and the all-absorbing question of Texas, are SOUTHERN TO THE BACK BONE."

It may be supposed we have said enough to show—indeed it should be deemed quite unnecessary to say—that this Union, *as it now is*, under the shadow of the Constitution, is a glorious republican fabric. We do not say, that it cannot, or ought not to be, at a proper time, enlarged by the annexation of Texas. Personally, we have been, and still are disposed to think favorably of such an acquisition, if it can be made harmoniously, and without prejudice to the social, commercial, or political interests of the Union as it now is. But if "TEXAS OR DISUNION" is now to be forced upon the country, *per fas aut nefas, vi et armis*, without regard to consequences, we pray God, that the projectors of this rash scheme may be disappointed. Of this glorious Union, we say, let it not be assailed by rude hands. *Esto perpetua*!—LET IT NEVER PERISH! WO TO THEM WHO WOULD DESTROY IT!

§ 18. A "Swell Mob."

Anybody who has been at St. Bartholomew's Fair, London, or to any other similar great assemblage of that metropolis of the British Empire, will have chanced, in all probability, to know what a "swell mob" is. For example:—the pick-pockets prowl about in squads among the throngs, and all of a sudden a "swell" is felt, and a *rush* made. You can't tell what it is, nor what it is for, but you are borne onward because you can't help moving with the "swell." By the stretching of necks all around you, it would seem there is something *ahead* which all are anxious to see, and you also stretch your neck, and with all the rest ask,—*What is it?* The rogues have diverted your attention from yourself and your pockets, and you do not perhaps know, till you have got to your lodgings, that you are robbed! The "swell mob" had so effectually blinded your eyes, that they had the best possible chance, without your suspecting, at the moment, what they were at; and so you have lost all there was in your pockets, and they have got the booty.

Now, this "immediate annexation" movement is a political "swell mob," got up by rogues to make or mend their fortunes by it. The old issues of Tariff, Currency, Land Distribution, Retrenchment, and such like, on which the people have made up their minds, and are prepared to act, and act right—these must all be thrust aside, because there is no profit in them for rogues, and an *ignis fatuus* is held up and kept dancing before the public eye, till the people can see and think of nothing else. *Look! behold!* it is Texas, away off in a bog yonder! Who hears of or who sees anything but Texas?

We had never heard much about Texas before; but Texas is *all—everything now*. All other questions—all other issues most important to the country, and for which the nation has been struggling for a quarter of a century, are forced into the back ground, just at the moment when all was about to be decided right—(no doubt it will yet be so decided), and a "swell mob" rushes upon the stage, to pick the people's pockets! You don't exactly know what the matter is—but there is something away ahead yonder—what is it? It is Texas. The people stretch their necks to see what this Texas is, and while they are intent on the unseen object, the hands of a gang of rogues are in their pockets!

It will be seen by every one, that this Texas Annexation movement is nothing but a "swell mob;" and if so, it is no less certain, that it is got up by rogues. One laughs—he may as well laugh as cry—when he finds, how slick he has been robbed by a "swell mob." He laughs at their dexterity, and at his own simplicity. He was as innocent as could be, when they were rushing on him, and rushing past him, and seeming to be after something ahead, and begging his pardon for running against him, or pushing him down, while he himself was as anxious as they appeared to be, to see what in the world all this fuss could be about! Lo! and behold! when it was all over, it was all nothing! But when he gets home, he finds he has lost his pocket book! Who wouldn't laugh at such an ingenious cheat, himself the dupe? It is to be hoped, that the people of this country will understand this Texas "swell mob," before it is too late; and that, instead of being pushed down and robbed, they will rush upon the horde of thieves, and throw them into the ditch. The rogues are of three classes. 1. The owners of Texas scrip and land claims. 2. The political stock-jobbers. And 3. The Nullifiers. Captain Tyler stole the thunder from the first class; the Locos stole it from the Captain; and everybody sees the feather in the cap of the Nullifiers.

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THE TARIFF TRIUMPHANT.

§ 1. *Protection, so long as it does not amount to Prohibition, reduces the prices of the products of manufacture.*

1. As to the *facts*. The prices on cotton fabrics, since our system of protection commenced in 1816, though it has been imperfect and fluctuating, have fallen, for Shirts, from 25 cents a yard to 5 cents; for Sheets, from 32 cents to 7 cents a yard; Checks, from 32 to 8 cents a yard; striped and plain Ginghams, from 26 to 8 cents a yard; printed Calicoes, from 20 cents a yard in 1826 to 9 cents in 1844; and so on. Doubtless improvements in machinery, and reduced prices of the raw material, have had something to do with it; but these facts would only account for a fraction of the difference.

From House Document, No. 420, 1st Session, 28th Congress, Mr. Hudson's Report from the Committee on Manufactures, we select the following facts: The depression in the prices of 23 different kinds of manufactured iron, from 1840 to 1844, ranges from 10 to 46 per cent.—average 23 per cent.—a result effected under the increase of Protective Duties. In a list of 22 different and chief materials for ship-building, such as are imported, the fall of prices from 1842 to 1844, ranges from 2 to 35 per cent.—average $17\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.—all under the Tariff of 1842. In a list of *nine* articles of American Hardware protected by increased duties of the present Tariff, the fall of prices from 1841 to 1844, ranges from 13 to 30 per cent.—average 15 per cent. The tables appended to Mr. Hudson's Report go on with quotations of prices current, before and after the present Tariff, in regard to numerous articles of domestic manufacture enjoying increased protection against foreign producers, and showing an almost universal depression of prices as a consequence of protection, in a measure corresponding with the above-cited instances—so that the question is put beyond doubt or cavil. But the experience of the people in supplying their wants, will have been to them the most conclusive argument. The Free Trade Demagogue will in vain cry out, that the poor man has to pay six cents more a yard for his shirt, in consequence of the Tariff, when the poor man himself is able to look him in the face, and say, "Why, Mister, how can that be?—I gave only five cents a yard for the shirt I have on. Do you mean to say, that, without the Tariff, I could have got it for one cent a yard less than nothing?"

2. As to the *theory*. The theory of the advocates of Free Trade is, that the consumer pays the duty. This is the beginning, middle, and end of their argument. But this doctrine can not be sustained. We will show who pays the duty—who suffers and who gains by the reduction of prices. It can not be denied, that a theory founded on *facts*, is better than a theory which has no foundation at all. The LAW of the reduction of prices of manufactured articles by protection, will be made evident by a consideration of the following facts: Foreign Governments make great exactions, in the shape of excise, direct taxation, and imposts, on the producers of their exports, all which necessarily enters into the cost to us, so far as we import and consume them. It is commonly estimated that, when any of us have occasion to visit England, about 75 per cent. of the expenses of our living there, is a tax to the British Government. Be it more or less, it is precisely the same with all that we import from that country and consume. The following are extracts in point from House Document, No. 296, 3d Session, 27th Congress, pp. 500, 501:—

"England levies no direct taxes upon her Colonies, or rarely is it done. But by *indirect taxes* they give *four fifths* of their productive wealth to the support of the mother country. It was that support which she derived from the Thirteen" (North American) "Colonies, and it was for that alone she resisted their independence. She desired to produce, and that they should be forced to consume; and of all that they consumed, at least *four fifths* went into the national treasury at home, after supporting her farmers and mechanics... It is generally alleged, that a man pays 15 shillings for the use of Government, out of every 20 shillings he spends in England. Some have stated the public tax at 17 shillings in the pound. Let us take one instance in the article of beer. The land pays a tax; the barley, when malted, pays an excise of 6 pence a bushel; hops pay one penny a pound; the beer, when brewed, pays an excise, greater in some cases than the original value: all the persons who labor in the premises contribute to the national revenue, by their sundry consumptions, to the amount of *three fourths* of the whole price of their labor. It follows, then, that the people of this country contribute in like proportion to the support of foreign Governments, upon all that they purchase. In 1836, we imported more than \$70,000,000 worth of foreign articles *free of duty*. The effect was, that they who purchased these articles, paid not one cent to the support of our own Government, while at least *four fifths* of that amount went into the treasuries of foreign governments, to support Kings on their thrones, Parliaments that make laws prohibiting our productions, and foreign armies and navies."

Allowing that the above estimates are too large, and suppose that an average of 50 per cent. of the costs to us of British products goes to the British Government, Great Britain will be glad to have our market, so long as she can get 10 or 5 per cent., or any per cent. whatever, as a revenue to her coffers. Of course, there remains, for the reduction of prices on all articles produced and protected by us, this entire range from an average of 50 down to 5 per cent., before Great Britain will be driven from our market. The moment our labor is protected so as to enter into competition with British or foreign labor, prices fall, and the burden rests on the foreign producers, not on the consumers. It is impossible, as will be

seen, that it should rest on the latter, since the fact of reduction of prices, shows that the latter are benefited. And prices will continue to fall, as a general rule, though there may be occasional exceptions in regard to some articles. Facts prove it, and the range left for reduction of prices on the side of the foreign producers, as illustrated above, shows *how* it is brought about. If the foreign producers *per se* can not bear the reduction, the foreign producing nation is compelled to abate her system of excise and other taxation, rather than crush the instruments of her wealth, and lose a market. Just in proportion as we raise our Tariff of duties, will they be compelled to reduce their prices. Consequently, in the same proportion, are prices reduced to us as consumers. More than this: Our own labor, brought by protection into the field of competition, is another cause of reduction of prices. There may be accidental and transient exceptions to the general rule, by occasional deficiencies of supply in the raw material of a specific product of manufacture, the cause of which is always recognised.

§ 2. *Inferences from the foregoing Facts.*

1. It will be seen, that while our people would rebel against our own Government for excise duties, and murmur at heavy taxation in any form, they do yet constantly and habitually submit to these exactions, to an enormous amount, for the support of foreign and despotic Governments, by the consumption of their products. 2. The Free Trade theory, that duties augment prices, is annihilated by these facts, and the opposite theory established. 3. Every item of protective duties is so much diminution of these foreign exactions thus levied on us. 4. It is so much benefit to our own people, by giving them the work and the reward. 5. It is so much saving and increase of our national wealth. 6. So long as protective duties are not prohibitory, they are generally in favor of consumers. 7. By this means, we subtract from an indirect support of foreign Governments, and contribute to the support of our own. 8. We have heretofore done many times more for the support of foreign Governments, than for our own. 9. We see in these facts how our own national treasury has been impoverished, our specie drawn out of the country, the banks compelled to suspend, and the nation bankrupted. It was because free trade on our side alone, opened our market to foreign nations, while their markets were closed to us. 10. Protection rescues us alike from the power of foreign governments and foreign factors, extends the basis and fortifies the structure of our national independence.

§ 3. *Comparison of British and American Tariffs, and the Results.*

The average of the British Tariff on our products is 289 per cent.; whereas the average of our Tariff on British products is only 32 per cent. Great Britain admits nothing from us free; whereas we have been accustomed to admit, free of duty, many millions annually of her products. In 1840, this favor amounted to \$9,875,496, the largest part of which, as before shown, went, as a contribution from us, into the British national Exchequer, in the form of indirect taxation. In addition to this, the British Government gets more annual revenue by imposts on our products, than we get from *all the world*. For example, the entire amount of our revenue from customs for the years 1838, '39, and '40, was \$52,796,227; while, in the same years, the British Government collected duties on the two articles of Cotton and Tobacco from the United States, to the amount of \$73,638,828! Yet further: the British Tariff is so contrived as always to bring a balance of trade in favor of the country of about 1 in 3 of the aggregate of exports and imports. In the three years 1839, '40, and '41, the balance of trade in favor of Great Britain was \$237,227,414. But the balance of trade, for the lack of an adequate Tariff, has generally been *against* us, through the whole progress of our history—often to a fearful amount. From 1831 to 1839, inclusive, the balance against us was \$235,278,605. (See Tract No. III., pp. 3 and 4, for further particulars on this point.) It is no wonder that London should always be the bank of the world, with "money to let." It is the Tariff policy of the British Government that brings it there.

§ 4. *Protection of Domestic Manufactures enhances the prices of our Agricultural Products.*

The prices of agricultural products are subject to more fluctuation than the products of manufacture, on account of excess or deficiency of supply by more or less favorable seasons. But the tables of Mr. Hudson's Report, before cited, show that they have generally and considerably improved under the operation of the Tariff of 1842. The average fall in the prices of some products, from 1842 to 1844, has been $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., while the average rise in the majority has been 25 per cent. But the saving to agriculturists in the prices of the products of manufacture, by reason of a protective Tariff, should be added to this account, for the true economical result, which, as will be seen, would very much enhance the benefit. The practical operation of a protective Tariff, for the increase of prices of agricultural products, is very simple, and may be thus explained: All agricultural products are comparatively gross and heavy, and consequently more expensive in being carried to a remote market.

Suppose the cost of transportation from the remote West to our Eastern market be 100 per cent. In other words, that the products are only worth *half* as much in the place where they are grown, as in the place where they are consumed. Add as much more for the expense of delivery in a foreign market, and the price to the producer is reduced to *one third* of the price at the place of destination. But bring the market half way toward the producer, and you will have raised his price *one third*. Bring it to his door, and his price is *trebled*. This is precisely the principle of the theory, and the practical effect on our agricultural interests. By encouraging and protecting domestic manufactures, the market is brought home, and the expense of transportation is saved. Further: All who work at manufactures and trades established by a protective policy, are withdrawn from agricultural pursuits, and give to the residue employed in agriculture better chances for a ready market and high prices. The multiplication of useful crafts and avocations contributes to the profit of each, as well as to national wealth. A home market is also more steady and more secure. The money paid for products of domestic manufacture, instead of going abroad, and thus impoverishing the nation, stays at home, and enriches it. All know how the country has prospered under the Tariff of 1842. The wool-grower who sold his wool in 1843 for \$125, sells the same quantity in 1844 for \$175. The protection extended by the Tariff to the products of agriculture, also contributes to the general result. The average amount of protection to Cotton, Wool, Beef, Pork, Bacon, Lard, Cheese, Butter, Potatoes, Flour, Wheat, Oats, and Hemp, comprehending thirteen of the great staples, is 50 per cent. The manufactures and mechanic occupations of Massachusetts alone, furnish a market for *forty millions of dollars'* worth of the products of other, chiefly Western and Southern States, besides the benefit to the agricultural interests of that State. This is about half the amount of ALL our exports to ALL PARTS of the world. Of course, the manufactures and mechanical arts of Massachusetts are worth HALF as much to the whole country, as the market of the whole world.

But a more important view of the effect of Protection, as it relates to agricultural interests, is its practical operation in *sustaining* the prices of agricultural products. But for protection to manufactures and the mechanic arts, the numerous classes employed in them and by them, would naturally, at least a large portion of them, be devoted to agriculture, and thus produce a surplus to glut the market, and reduce the prices to almost nothing. Does not every one see this?

§ 5. *Protection amounting to Prohibition, also reduces prices of the products of manufacture, if there is domestic competition.*

We do not say, that it does so as certainly and as comprehensively as is the effect in regard to protection which is not prohibitory, but that such is the *tendency*, and that generally such is the *ultimate effect*. Even the exceptions to the rule may be profitable to those who pay higher prices. For example, it is manifestly better for a farmer to pay a slight advance of price on an article of domestic manufacture, which is protected to the prohibition of imports, if by that means he gets a much greater advance on his own products, by supplying these workshops with the fruits of his own labor. Let us look into the HOW—THE WAY IT WORKS.

In the first place, we have nothing to pay to Government. Our Government gets its revenue from imposts. We have seen, that there is an average range of about 50 per cent. for the reduction of prices by the exclusion of foreign products. Out of this 50 per cent., we can afford to pay our operatives and laborers a fair price, and still have room for the reduction of prices in the products of their labor, when we get well along in the exclusive supply of our own markets, in the case of any product of manufacture. It is found that the duties on Pins have greatly reduced prices. This probably is an article, the prices of which, by domestic competition, under a prohibitory duty, would still be reduced. We have inexhaustible supplies of iron ore in this country. The uses of iron are so multifarious, and the extent of the demand for the purposes of life is so great, that a prohibition of all manufactures from iron, to be permanently relied upon, would no doubt start into being domestic rival factories, and in such numbers as greatly to reduce the prices of all the products of iron manufacture. Railroad iron could doubtless be afforded cheaper here by a permanent and reliable prohibition, than it can be imported from England. We should then have the work, the profits, and all within ourselves—and withal a cheaper article. But this can not probably be done without prohibitory duties, as large investments of capital would be required. There is probably not a single product of iron manufacture, which prohibitory duties would not ultimately cheapen to the people of this country, and most of them in a short time. There are also many other products of manufacture, to which the same doctrine applies, and in regard to which the effect of prohibitory duties would be the same. The range of reduction of prices lies in the exorbitant exactions of foreign Governments on the producers of the articles which we import and consume—the exactions of course, as before seen, falling on us in all that we buy. The annual revenues of Great Britain, paid by the people, including parochial and municipal exactions, are not less than *three hundred millions*

of dollars, a very large part of which is raised by excise and direct taxation on the producers of what we import from them, and which of course is to that extent levied on us. Such a revenue is an enormous exaction on the industry and labor of a nation. Such is substantially the condition of all European and foreign nations, from which we derive large imports for consumption, all of which are landed in this way. It is our interest, a duty which we owe to ourselves, to be relieved of this burden, as far and as fast as we can, by the encouragement and protection of domestic manufactures—most of which we can produce cheaper and better, and retain the profit of the work. It is an humiliating fact, that we permit foreign and despotic Governments thus to tax us, *indirectly*, more than what is necessary for the support of our own Government! By which also we rob our own people of their rights and property, and impoverish the nation! It is but another name for a system of colonial bondage! What is the use in having the *name* of freemen, while we are *slaves*?

§ 6. Inferences.

So long as we have an abundant revenue from imposts, as under the Tariff of 1842, which will soon pay our debts and yield a surplus, it is a proper occasion to inquire, what imported articles of manufacture we consume, which we derive solely from foreign factors, for which we are paying exorbitant prices by reason of this monopoly, and which our own people would be glad to furnish at a cheaper rate, and soon with equal or greater perfection, if they could be adequately protected. The ingenuity, capacity, and enterprise of our citizens, are unrivalled, and new manufacturing inventions are constantly springing up in all parts of the country, requiring nothing but the fostering care of Government to bring them to perfection. Under the present Tariff we can well afford to protect and encourage them, and the result would be, not only to make the fortunes of these industrious and enterprising individuals, but greatly to augment national wealth, and more firmly to establish our national independence. Whenever a new invention promises to promote general good, public economy, and wealth, it should be encouraged, even by prohibitory duties, if necessary. We do not subscribe to the doctrine, that the people must take care of themselves; but rather, that the Government should protect and take care of the people. This is the design, the great end of Government. It is manifest, that cases may be constantly rising, in regard to which public policy, as well as more circumscribed interests, may require the protection of prohibition, the ultimate result of which will be a cheaper and better article, and the money saved to ourselves, instead of going abroad, to support foreign Governments, and enrich foreign factors.

§ 7. *Our country is capable of rivalling any and all other countries in manufactures and the mechanic arts.*

In whatever branch of manufacture or mechanic art our countrymen have embarked, under adequate protection, they have proved their capacity, not only to *rival*, but to *excel*. They not only rival and excel in the perfection of their work, but they soon insinuate their rivalry into the great market of the world. Our Cotton fabrics go to China, to England herself, everywhere. News has just arrived from England, that a petition has been sent in to Parliament by Cotton Manufacturers, asking a reduction of duty on the raw material; and the reason assigned is, that American Manufacturers are competitors in all parts of the world! Who would not be astonished at this? Next thing, peradventure, we shall be carrying coal to New Castle. Certainly, we ought not to bring coal from Liverpool, when our own mountains are made of it, and our own people want the work and the profit. It can not be doubted, that, in the skill of every useful art, our countrymen are capable of a proficiency not inferior to that of the people of any other nation. Nothing is required but the encouragement and protection of our Government.

§ 8. *Protection of home industry, labor, and enterprise, is equally beneficial to all interests of all sections of the Union.*

The reciprocal dependence of all industrial occupations in the community, and the mutual benefit they derive from each other, have been set forth at large in our Tract No. III. The same principle of political economy is practically applicable to the proposition above stated. But some of the Cotton planters of the South have conceived, that the protection extended to Northern manufactures, is injurious to them. Hence the "forty bale theory," which avers, that the effect of a Protective Tariff in raising the prices of manufactured goods, imposes on the Cotton-grower a sacrifice equal to *forty bales in every hundred*. It will be seen, from what we have already shown, that since the effect of protection is to *reduce* the prices of manufactured goods and articles, this theory falls to the ground. It is built on the false assumption, that protection *enhances* prices. It is manifest, however, that a more enlarged, more comprehensive, and more correct view of the policy of protection, is gradually modifying that erroneous opinion, even among those who have entertained and advocated it, and that it is forming a different one. The "forty bale theory" has now but little credit.

it is at last seen, and generally acknowledged, 1. That a home market for Cotton, is at least as good as a foreign market, under any circumstances. 2. That the demand for raw Cotton is necessarily limited. 3. And consequently, that it makes little difference, whether Cotton-growers sell their product here or elsewhere. 4. That British policy is looking to other quarters for a supply of the raw material, and will come here no longer than is absolutely necessary. 5. That we can extend our manufactures of Cotton to an indefinite extent, and rival British fabrics in the market of the world. The petition lately preferred to the British Parliament, by British manufacturers, for defence against American manufacturers, shows, that this event has already come to pass. 6. That the manufacturing system may be introduced into the Southern States, to use up the Cotton before it leaves the country, leaving behind the profits both of growing and manufacturing. 7. That, at least, it may be necessary to the Cotton-growing States, for this country to act on the defensive against British policy, and be prepared to rival Great Britain on the largest scale, in the production of Cotton fabrics for the world. 8. That, occupying this position, which we can doubtless attain to, which, as would seem, we have already in some measure acquired, we need not be anxious about the policy of Great Britain. It will be easier for us to cripple her, than for her to cripple us. If she does not choose to buy our raw Cotton, we can manufacture it ourselves, and in spite of her sell it to all the world. We know, that we have that range of 50 per cent., before noticed, as a battle ground, on which to contend against such an adversary, and victory must inevitably be ours. It is these more enlarged views, which are reconciling the Cotton-planters of the South to the policy of protection. They begin to see, that protection is even now equally beneficial, and that it may soon be far more necessary to them, than to any other section or people of the Union. If the planters of the South can be convinced of the reciprocal benefit of the protective policy, as applicable to them selves, it is unnecessary to continue the argument for other sections and people of the Union which are already convinced. (See our Tract, No. III, on the general subject.)

§ 9. *The Protective Policy has triumphed.*

In support of this position we would briefly allude to the following facts:—

1. The *Anti-Tariff* House of Representatives of the 28th (present) Congress, having an overwhelming majority of about 70, came together, in December, 1843, with a full determination to break down the Tariff of 1842; they spent some months in preparing a Bill for that object; and some three months more it was under consideration. In the meantime, they had heard from the people, and when the child came to the birth, they were so frightened, that it could not be born. The Bill was lost by 103 to 99, in the very House which began this brave work of destruction six months before, with the strong majority of 70!

2. The twisting and squirming now practised by the same party throughout the Union, to prove James K. Polk, their candidate for the Presidency, an *Anti-Tariff* man at the South, and a *Tariff* man at the North! Everybody knows, that he was twice defeated as an *Anti-Tariff* Candidate for Governor of Tennessee, and that he publicly recorded and proclaimed his opposition to Protection and the Tariff of 1842.

3. The little *bit* of a letter from Mr. Polk, of June 19, 1844, to John K. Kane, of Philadelphia, most reluctantly conceding the smallest imaginable bit of "*moderate and incidental*" protection to the people of Pennsylvania, as coming from a man so hostile to Protection, is a most remarkable proof of the triumph of Protective policy. He did not dare to speak to the people of the North as Candidate for the Presidency in 1844, as he spoke to the people of Tennessee in 1843, while Candidate for Governor of that State. Why this change? The reason is obvious. He occupies a new position. In 1843, in Tennessee, with all the power of his master of the Hermitage to back him, he hoped to succeed as an *Anti-Protection* man, and therefore came out boldly *against* Protection and *against* the Tariff of 1842. But now, as Candidate for the Presidency, he dare not repeat his words of 1843, nor look them in the face. Is not this a triumph of the Tariff? Nevertheless, his Anti-Protection supporters at the South say, he is sound "*TO THE BACKBONE*," and trust him as such. That must be a good assortment of principles, which can satisfy such antagonistic opinions. They are not unlike the accommodating principles of Mr. Polk's grandfather, *Ezekiel Polk*, who fearing for his safety among the Whigs of the Revolution, went over to Cornwallis for *protection*; or like James K. Polk himself, who was charged to his face by Gov. Jones, in the Canvass of 1843, of having gone out of the County in our last war with Great Britain, to avoid being *drafted to fight*—*He did not deny it*. Mr. Paine, a Loco-foco M. C. from Alabama, contended in an article of the *Globe*, while Mr. Polk was a candidate for the *Vice Presidency*, that he was not fit for it, because he *cowered* under an insult from Henry A. Wise. His courage seems equal to this, at least, in braving the Tariff feeling of the country. It is curious, however, that this same M. C. from Alabama is a strong supporter of Mr. Polk for the *Presidency*!

4. The action of the Legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania, by instructing their Representatives in Congress not to disturb the Tariff of 1842. The well-known political character of the majority of these two bodies is enough to satisfy any one, that these acts were a reluctant concession to the wishes of the people, the same as the votes of Messrs. Wright, Buchanan, and Sturgeon, Senators of those States, for the Tariff of 1842, as acknowledged by themselves. None of these men would vote for a Pro

tective Tariff, if they could help it; and all of them would repeal it, if they could. They wait only for an opportunity. Who gave the country the Tariff of 1842? It was a Whig Congress, and by Whig votes. Only 20 Loco-focos in the House voted for it, and that only because their constituents required them to do so, as in the case of the three Senators above named, who, with Mr. Williams of Maine, were the only Senators of that party voting for the measure—all by compulsion. And who voted for taking up Mr. McKay's Bill last Session, which was designed to destroy the Tariff of '42? Not one solitary Whig, except a nominal one, Mr. Chappell, of Georgia, who had disappointed his constituents. Yet the Bill was taken up by a majority, and lost only for the reason above stated. *Ninety-nine Anti-Protectionists stuck to it to the last. But the Tariff of '42 was saved.*

§ 10. James K. Polk on the Tariff.

He said in Congress:—"The wool-growers consider the duty on foreign wool as important to their prosperity. This opinion, I apprehend, is founded in error. My own opinion is, that *wool should be duty free.*" In a speech at Madison, Tennessee, April 3, 1813, he said:—"The difference between the course of the political party with which he" (the Hon. Milton Brown) "acts and myself, is, while they" (the Whigs) "are the advocates of Distribution and a *Protective Tariff*—measures which I consider *injurious* to the country, and especially to the interests of the planting States—I have steadily and at all times *opposed* them." In a pamphlet from his own hand, 1813, he says, "All who have observed my course know that I have at all times *opposed* a Protective Policy. . . . I am in favor of a Tariff for revenue, and *opposed* to a Tariff for protection. . . . I had steadily, during the period I was a Representative in Congress, been *opposed* to a Protective Policy, as my recorded votes and published speeches prove. Since I retired from Congress, I have held the same opinions. In the present canvass for Governor, I have avowed my opposition to the Tariff Act of the late Whig Congress, as being *Protective* in its character, and not designed by its authors as a revenue measure. I have avowed my opinion in my public speeches that the interests of the country and especially of the producing and exporting States, require its REPEAL."

"As my recorded votes and public speeches prove." Yes, true enough. In 1827 Mr. Polk voted and speechified *throughout* against Mr. Mallory's Bill "for the better protection of Wool," &c. See Congressional Debates, vol. 3, pp. 986, 996, 1027, 1023, 1057, 1059, 1060, and the House Journal. In 1823 he also voted and acted against the Tariff Bill brought in by Mr. Mallory, of Vt. See same authority, vol. 4, part 2, pp. 2318, 2182. In 1830 Mr. Polk opposed Mr. Mallory's Bill "to prevent frauds on the Tariff." *Ib.* Vol. 6, part 3, pp. 979, 987. The next session, Mr. Polk voted for Mr. Barringer's Bill to reduce the duties on Wool, Woollens, Sugar, &c. Mr. Polk appeals to his action in Congress, to prove what he says in 1843, and the above are specimens. It can not be denied, that he was faithful in this service against the Tariff.

"In repeated instances," says Mr. Polk, "he," General Jackson, "recommended modifications and reductions of the Tariff, with a view to the final abandonment of the odious and unjust system. So effectual were these recommendations, that even Mr. Clay, the reputed father of the Tariff, seized on a favorable moment to save the whole from destruction by a timely compromise" (the Act of 1833.)

It is then admitted by Mr. Polk, that Mr. Clay saved the Tariff from being destroyed by Gen. Jackson—an undoubted truth. But Mr. Polk, as late as 1843, seems to have regretted this narrow escape. In 1843 he calls the Tariff "AN ODDIOUS AND UNJUST SYSTEM."

§ 11. Difference between a Revenue and Protective Tariff.

A proper Revenue Tariff, or "Tariff for revenue," as Mr. Polk calls it, and of which he seems to have been the advocate, such a Tariff, as distinguished from a Protective Tariff, discriminates for purposes of revenue, while the latter discriminates for purposes of protection in obtaining revenue. The former would impose duties—high duties, if necessary—on articles which we do not and can not produce, such as Tea, Coffee, Spices, Drugs, Dyes, Furs, Ivory, Mahogany, &c., which must necessarily be paid by the consumers, because there is no domestic competition to throw the burden back on the producers. And a Tariff for revenue would impose low duties, or no duties at all, on articles which we can produce, such as Cloths, Wool, Boots, Shoes, Hardware, ready-made Clothing, &c., thus leaving our own producers of these articles to struggle against foreign monopolists, and the low prices of foreign labor, by which they are sure to be impoverished, and may be ruined. Whereas, a Protective Tariff, a Tariff for revenue discriminating for purposes of Protection, admits the first class of articles, which we can not produce, duty free, or imposes upon them light duties, and seeks to obtain the necessary revenue chiefly from duties on the latter class, which we can produce, by which discrimination sundry most important political and commercial advantages are secured. 1. The burden of such duties, as we have shown, is thrown back on the foreign producers of such imports. 2. The prices of the articles thus protected, are reduced. 3. We thereby subtract from an indirect tax to foreign Governments, and convert the amount to the uses and support of our own Government. 4. We secure chances of wealth to the parties protected, and add to our national wealth. 5. We check the power of those foreign influences, private and public, which operate to our injury, private and public. 6. We kill more than two birds with one stone. A Tariff for revenue, discriminating for purposes of revenue, will impoverish the country; whereas, a Tariff discriminating for purposes of Protection, will enrich the country. Mr. Polk and the Loco Focos are in favor of the former; Mr. CLAY and the Whigs are in favor of the latter. In Mr. Polk's new position, as candidate for the Presidency, he will not object to what he calls, in his recent letter to Mr. Kane, "moderate discriminating duties, affording reasonable INCIDENTAL protection to our home industry."—"INCIDENTAL"—not protection direct, intentional, but such as may happen, or such as you can not prevent. The Baltimore Convention, which nominated Mr. Polk, and his Southern supporters, have resolved him right as an anti-Protectionist. His friend Mr. Fisher, of Cincinnati, says, "He is out and out for Free Trade—openly and unconditionally opposed to Protection." The Nashville Union, Mr. Polk's organ, says, "The provisions of the oppressive Tariff of 1842 are viewed with abhorrence by Mr. Polk." Mr. Henley, Member of Congress, of Indiana, when Mr. McKay's bill failed in the House of Representatives, said on that floor, "I can tell gentlemen, that the present Tariff will be reduced, as soon as we are in full power. We will do it. FOR SUCH IS OUR PURPOSE. AND SUCH IS OUR RESOLUTE DETERMINATION." Forewarned, forearmed.

§ 12. Mr. Polk in a Dilemma.

In his speech at Madison, 1843, he said, "The late Tariff act" (of 1842) "was not a revenue measure. It has raised the duties so high, as to shut out imports, and consequently to cut off and diminish revenue. It will not produce annually HALF the amount of revenue which would have been produced by the lower rates of the Compromise Act," a maximum 20 per cent. Let us see how this vaticination has been fulfilled. The average net annual revenue, from 1830 to 1839, inclusive—most of it under the Compromise Act, with its semi-annual decrease of duties—was \$19,700,000, as stated in House Document, No. 420, 1st Session, 28th Congress; and the annual revenue in the state of things which Mr. Polk wishes to return to, to wit, the maximum 20 per cent. rates of duties, where the Whigs found mat-

ters, June 30, 1842, did not exceed \$12,800,000, as stated in the same Document as above. Mr. Polk's position, therefore, in 1843, was, that the Tariff of 1842 would not produce annually HALF of \$12,800,000—not even \$6,400,000. The fact is, that, in the first six months of 1844, it has actually produced more than \$20,000,000; and it is expected to yield full \$40,000,000 this year. If Mr. Polk believed what he said in 1843, who would be willing to trust him as a statesman? If he did not believe it, who can confide in his honesty?

§ 13. *The Theory of Protection as it affects Prices.*

We are not aware that this THEORY has ever been framed and distinctly set forth. Facts have been abundantly exhibited to establish it; but the LAW which effects and secures the result, seems not to have been defined. One of the main objects of this Appendix to our Tract No. III., has been to bring out this theory in palpable form, by connecting it with the facts on which it rests. We trust those who may have attentively perused these pages, and those of Tract No. III., are prepared to recognise it. We think it must have been seen, that the uniform tendency and inevitable result of Protection, as a general LAW, *in the position which this country occupies in relation to other nations*, are, 1. To reduce prices of manufactured articles, so long as protection does not amount to prohibition. 2. That the general tendency of protection, even when it amounts to prohibition, is also to reduce the prices of articles protected, if there is domestic competition. 3. That the protective policy enhances the value of our mineral wealth, and the prices of our agricultural products. 4. That it is equally necessary and beneficial to ALL interests of ALL sections of the Union. And 5. That it is indispensable to national prosperity. We do not deny that there may be apparent exceptions to this GENERAL LAW, as for example, the prices of Woollen and Cotton fabrics may rise for a season, when the raw materials rise; but the fabrics do not rise in equal proportion, nor do they rise so high as not to have been on the whole cheapened by protection. When the raw materials, the prices of which are raised, are the products of the country, it will be seen that the country and all parties are still benefited by Protection, inasmuch as the rise in the manufactured articles is generally less than the reduction occasioned by protection. These remarks are applicable to all the accidental fluctuations of the market, while the GREAT LAW which we have endeavored to explain and elucidate, still abides, still has its influence, and still secures the GRAND RESULT. The result is INEVITABLE, and the cause is PROTECTION. Hence it is a LAW in political economy, which scatters to the winds—utterly annihilates the Free Trade theory.

It will be observed, that we have used above the qualifying phrase—in the position which this country occupies in relation to other nations. It is indispensable in this debate, not to lose sight of the peculiarities of our political and commercial position. There may be general principles of political economy, which are equally applicable to all nations. There are others applicable only to particular states and nations. A British political economist can not lay down laws for the United States. They would ruin us. Hence the errors into which some of our statesmen have fallen by adopting British authorities, and hence the disasters of the country, brought upon it by applying borrowed and ill-considered principles to our legislation. We want and must have “AN AMERICAN SYSTEM”—a system which Mr. CLAY has been fighting for all his life, and of which he is the reputed father.

§ 14. *What we have lost as a Nation for want of Protection.*

The only rule we have to determine this with any tolerable accuracy, is the BALANCE OF TRADE between us and other parts of the world. In pages 3 and 4 of Tract No. III., we have given the result of a careful examination of public documents, as they relate to this part of our commercial history, and find that the aggregate of balances of trade against us, from 1790 to 1840, just half a century, was \$907,341,999! What must not be the resources and capabilities of a nation, that could bear such a draft from her wealth in fifty years? And the most mortifying part of it is, that it has all been drawn from us on the principle of colonial vassalage, when we thought we were free and independent! It is probably more than double the present value of our entire public domain to the shores of the Pacific! But this nine hundred and seven millions of dollars, sunk and drawn off by balances of trade against us in fifty years, should at least be doubled to reach the balances in our favor, to which we were justly entitled, and which would have been a small profit of the business of a nation for half a century. Great Britain gets that amount of profit every four years. No nation can prosper, as it is relatively entitled, that habitually allows a balance of trade to come in against it, and there is no way to prevent it, but by a Tariff of duties adequate to counter-vail the Tariffs of those nations with which it has commercial intercourse. We have seen, that the policy of Great Britain is always to secure a balance of trade in her favor by her Tariff regulations, and that the average annual balance for the years 1839, '40, and '41, was \$237,227,414, as appears by a Report of the American Institute, 1844. By the same authority, we learn that the balance of trade against us for the period from 1831 to 1839, inclusive, was \$235,278,605. Under the Tariff of 1842, we shall have a constant balance of trade in our favor, and in one year we have grown perceptibly rich by it.